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ABSTRACT 
The nationalist revolution of 1924 -28 has been traditionally treated in terms 
of a political revolution staged by Sun Yatsen and his radical party members with the 
help of Russian Comintern agents to reunify China. Most studies of the nationalist 
revolution have ignored that the unification was achieved largely through military 
means led by Chinese officer corps who were trained in military academies in China 
and abroad. This thesis argues that the introduction of modern military academies in 
China since the late Qing dynasty has created a system of military schools which 
spread across the country and a generation of Chinese officer corps who were the 
power- brokers in early Republican years. The history of the Huangpu Military 
Academy exemplified the role of modern military academy and the officer corps. The 
National Revolutionary Army was created from a military academy and subsequently 
expanded to become a force to be reckon with. It is further argued that the nationalist 
revolution coincided with the officer corps long term objective of re- establishing a 
national army which had been absence since the demise of Yuan Shikai in 1916. This 
was made possible when the Guomindang legitimised the southern armies as its party 
army. Hence, the party army assumed the role of the central and national army. The 
history of the Huangpu Military Academy was an effort of the Guomindang, the 
Chinese officer corps, with the help of the Russian military assistance and the Chinese 
Communist Party cadres to transform provincial armies into a party army. With this 
army, it hoped to defeat major warlords in the North and reunify China. Although the 
Northern Expedition did bring about a partially united China centred on Nanjing, the 
country was still divided. Reasons for this outcome are complex. One of the basic 
reasons was that neither the Guomindang nor the officer corps was strong and united 
to forge a united China. Meanwhile, the Nanjing government continued to build its 
central army in a manner similar to its early effort: modern military technology, 
foreign advisers, and modern military academy. The main difference in this attempt, 
as compared to the previous efforts, lays in its leadership. This time, the efforts came 
from the academy- trained officer corps rather than the traditional Confucian scholars 
or politicians. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation is about the history of the Huangpu Military Academy and roles 
of the Chinese officer corps in the Nationalist Revolution. In May 1924, Sun Yatsen with 
the Russian assistance established a military academy on Huangpu, a small island in the 
muddy delta of the Pearl River south of Guangzhou. This later became the well -known 
Huangpu Military Academy, dubbed as the "cradle" of the Chinese revolution. During its 
most active years, 1924 to 1928, the Huangpu Military Academy and its two principal 
branches -- Chaozhou (Guangdong) and Wuhan (Hubei) -- graduated six classes of students 
and contributed to the Guomindang's unification effort up through 1928 and during its 
subsequent rule in China.' The "cradle" altered the course of the Chinese revolution in 
ways unforeseen even by the Republican's founding father. The Huangpu alumni, whose 
members were drawn from its faculty and graduates, furnished the leadership of both the 
Nationalist and Communist armed forces as they struggled for control of China from 1927- 
1949. 
In 1926 the Guomindang armies, together with its United Front partners the 
Chinese Communist Party and the Russian advisers, launched a military expedition from 
Guangzhou against the warlords in central and northern China. This was the famous 
Northern Expedition of 1926 -28 where both the civil and military organisations were 
mobilised under the Guangzhou government. The army of the Guomindang- -the National 
Revolutionary Army, comprised of eight army corps from southern China with a total 
strength between 100,000 and 150,000 men, some forty vessels and a small squadron of 
aircraft. At the end of the Northern Expedition in 1928, however, the size of the army 
grew to more than forty corps. The National Revolutionary Army thus far was the largest 
group of participants in the Northern Expedition. 
The basic aim of this dissertation is twofold. Firstly, it aims to examine the nature 
and character of the Huangpu Military Academy and why it became the centre of the 
Nationalist Revolution in the 1920s. Secondly, it examines the roles of Chinese officer 
corps, who were the products and later leaders of modern army and military academy, in 
the making of the National Revolutionary Army and shaping the course of the Northern 
Expedition. 
' The Central Military Academy replaced the role of the Huangpu Military Academy when the 
Guomindang established its capital at Nanjing in 1927. Huangpu closed down in 1929 after a series of 
internal struggle and financial difficulties. Lujun junguan xuexiao xiaoshi (A history of the army officers' 
academy), compiled Lujun junguan xuexiao bianzuan weiyuanhui (The army officers' academy editorial 
committee). Taibei: Fangshang Military Academy, 4th bian, 4- 125 -6, 1969. 
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Previous Studies 
Despite the crucial roles of the military in the Nationalist Revolution, no serious 
attempts have been made to look at Huangpu Military Academy and the National 
Revolutionary Army from a military perspective. The historiography of the Nationalist 
Revolution has been predominantly political. A major approach has been to study Sun 
Yatsen and the Guomindang's attempt to resurrect the "abortive" revolution of the 1910s, 
and their collaboration with the Chinese Communist Party and Russian Comintern agents 
to stage a movement from the South which would sweep across warlords' controlled 
central and northern China.' In this approach, the Huangpu Military Academy was 
presented as one of the key institutions recommended by the Russians to build a Party 
Army modelled on the Soviet Red Army. A system of political commissars was 
introduced and would play a crucial role in reforming the regional armies.' This Russian- 
guided new form of army- -the National Revolutionary Army, would eventually, as in the 
case of the Bolshevik in the Russian Civil War, defeat the warlords and reunite China. In 
this context, the Huangpu Military Academy was a key instrument in converting regional 
armies into the National Revolutionary Army. To these authors, the Russians' doctrine, 
money, expertise in guiding the revolution were the decisive factors contributing to its 
success.' The Huangpu Military Academy was a revolutionary institution as it changed 
the Chinese army from the bottom up. 
According to this Marxist -populist or Trotskyist interpretation,' the villains of the 
Nationalist Revolution were Chiang Kaishek and Stalin, betrayers of a revolutionary 
movement that proper leadership might have led to victory. The Guomindang left-wing 
and the Chinese Communist Party leaders were portrayed as tragic -comic figures. It 
2 The most authoritative work in this approach is C. Martin Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in 
China, 1923 -1928. This work is a detailed inquiry into the source of the Guomindang's political inspiration 
and course of its march to Nanjing. 
' For an analysis of the institutional change, see Richard B. Landis, "Institutional Trends at the 
Whampoa Military School: 1924- 1926." Ph.D. diss., the Washington University, 1969; Thomson Marvin 
Williamsen, "Political Training and Work at the Whampoa Military Academy prior to the Northern 
Expedition." Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1975. 
° See for example C. Martin Wilbur and Lien -ying How. Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers 
and Nationalist China, 1920 -1927. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989. 
See for example works such as Harold R. Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1961; Hua Gang, Zhongguo da geming shi, 1924 -1925 (A history of the great 
revolution, 1924-1925), first published in the 1930s, reprint Beijing: Wenshi zíliao chubanshe, 1982; and 
Zhonghua minguo shigang (An outline history of the republican China), editors Zhang Xianwen et al. 
Henan: Renmin chubanshi, 1985. 
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showed the nameless masses, propelled onto the political scene with a little Communist 
coaxing, were the true but betrayed heroes.' Even the work of Donald Jordan, the only 
Western scholar who treats the Northern Expedition as its subject of inquiry, has been 
influenced by this interpretation though his main focus is the Northern Expedition.' 
Many scholars in Taiwan and mainland China also treat the 1920s as a "great 
revolution" but they differed on the roles of the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist 
Party in this movement and the outcome of the revolution. The Guomindang's histories 
place great emphasis on the leadership roles of Sun Yatsen and Chiang Kaishek.8 
Although Sun laid down the direction and stages of revolution for the party and the state 
in his jianguo dakang (outline of national reconstruction) he did not live to see the success 
in the Northern Expedition he had. Sun invited the Russians to assist in the revolution. 
The founding of the Party academy, the Huangpu Military Academy, was one important 
policy which paved the way for the subsequent build -up of the National Revolutionary 
Army. The vision of the "Father of the Nation" (guofu) was fulfilled by Chiang Kaishek 
who was the commandant of the Huangpu Military Academy and commander -in -chief of 
the National Revolutionary Army.' 
Historians from mainland China see the first United Front under Sun Yatsen as a 
"great revolution" because large number of labours, farmers, students, intellectuals and 
For a critical review of villain -hero and tragedy- romance approach, see John Fitzgerald, The Irony 
of the Chinese Revolution: The Nationalists and Chinese Society ", in The Nationalists and Chinese Society 
1923- 37: A Symposium, 13 -43, Melbourne: University of Melbourne, 1989. 
Donald A. Jordan, The Northern Expedition: The Chinese National Revolution, 1926-1928." Although 
Jordan stresses the importance of battles in this study, this work was a political- military history of the 
Northern Expedition. In Part III of this work, for example, Jordan devotes one third of the work to 
examining the roles of the masses in the expedition. 
s See Huangpu jianxiao liushi zhounian lunwenji (Papers on the 60th anniversary of the founding of the 
Huangpu military academy), 2 vols., Taibei: Guofangbu shizheng bianyiju (National military history and 
translation bureau), 1984; Huangpu junguan xuexiao xiaoshi jianbian (A brief history of the Huangpu 
military academy), Taibei: Guofang bu shizheng ju (The historical and Political Bureau of the ministry of 
national defence), 1986; Gong Lequn. Huangpu jíanshi (A short history of Huangpu). Taibei: 
Zhengzhong shuju, 1971. 
Beifa jian shi (A brief war history of the northern expedition), ed. Guofangbu shizhengju. Taibei: 
Zhengzhong shuju, 1970; Beifa tongyi (The northern expedition and unification of China), Chief editor 
Wego W.K. Chiang {Wei -Kuo }. The History of the Chinese National Revolutionary War, Part II, 4 vols, 
Taibei: Liming wenhua shiye gongsi (Liming cultural publication company), 1980; Beifa tongyi wushi 
zhounian tekan (A special publication in honour of the 50th anniversary of the northern expedition), Taibei: 
Guofangbu shizhengju, 1978; Beifa zhanzhi (A war history of the northern expedition), 4 vols, Taibei: 
Guofangbu shizheng bianyí ju (National military history and translation bureau), 1959. 
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military were mobilised in the movement against the regimes of northern warlords.'" The 
revolution, however, was a failure because Chiang Kaishek and right -wing Guomindang 
members betrayed Sun Yatsen's "three cardinal policies " -- collaboration with Russians, the 
Chinese Communist Party, and farmers and labours -- and surrendered to forces of 
imperialism, warlords, feudalism and capitalism." 
Another interpretation for Huangpu and the National Revolutionary Army history 
is the political -military factionalism approach. F. F. Liu's A History of Modern Military 
History begins his study on conflicts between Soviet advisers' and the Chinese Communist 
Party and the rise of Chiang Kaishek in the first United Front12. Looking primarily at the 
Guomindang's military affairs, he argues that it was through the Huangpu Military 
Academy that Chiang rose to become a leader in the party. In a more recent book, entitled 
Jiang Jieshi yu Huangpu xi (Chiang Kaishek and the Huangpu's faction), the authors 
attempt to account for the rise and fall of Chiang Kaishek and the Huangpu faction. It 
traces Chiang's early military life and events leading to the founding of the Huangpu 
Military Academy and the Huangpu clique. The clique includes instructors and graduates 
of the Huangpu Military Academy who embraced the "Huangpu Spirit" (defined as loyalty 
to Chiang, party and the state; anti -Communism; and self- sacrifice).`3 In this work, the 
formation of Huangpu clique in Guangzhou was treated in detail. Since the book focuses 
on Chiang Kaishek and his clique, the work suffers from common weaknesses of adhering 
too closely to partisan history. The so- called "collapse" of Chiang and the Huangpu clique 
refers to events in mainland China and ignores the continued existence in Taiwan after 
1949. 
'° Huangpu junxiao shiliao, 1924 -1927, (Historical materials on the Huangpu military academy, 
1924 -1927, a continuation), compiler Zhao Liping, editor Chen Yipei et al. Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin 
chubanshe 1994; Huangpu junxiao jianxiao liushi zhounian jinian ce, 1924 -1984 (The 60th anniversary 
commemorating magazine of the founding of the Huangpu Military Academy, 1924 -1984), Edited Huangpu 
junxiao tongxuehui (The Huangpu alumni). Beijing: Changcheng chubanshe, 1984, and Zhonghua minguo 
shigang. 
" This kind of statement is very common in Chinese mainland publications. See for example, Deng 
Yingchao's Preface to Huangpu junxiao jianxiao liushi zhounian jinian ce (Magazine for the 60th 
anniversary of the founding of the Huangpu military academy), Beijing: Huangpu Alumni, 1984. 
12 F. F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China, 1924 -1949. New York: Kennikat Press, 1956. This 
work was originted from his dissertation "The Nationalist Army of China: An Administrative Studies of the 
Period 1924 -1926" from Princeton University. 
" Chen Yusheng and Zhang Guangyu. Jiang Jieshi he Huangpu xi (Chiang Kaishek and the Huangpu 
clique). Kaifeng: Henan chubanshe, 1994; Xie Benshu and Hongping Nie. Jiang Jieshi he xinan difang shili 
pai (Chiang Kaishek and the south -western military factions) . Zhonghua minguoshi congshu, Henan: Henan 
chubanshe, 1990; Zhang Guangyu, Di yi ce guogong hezuo shiqi de guomin gaming jun (The national 
revolutionary army during the first co- operation between the GMD and CCP). Wuhan: Wuhan University 
Publication, 1989. 
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Another approach is to treat the Huangpu Military Academy in the context of 
student nationalism." Lincoln Li's work is primarily a comparative study of the political 
life of the Huangpu Military Academy at Guangzhou, the Resistance University at Yanan, 
and the Associated University of the Southwest (Lianda). The study draws some of the 
disparate threads together to appreciate how such elite groups competed in the process of 
rebuilding a system during the Republican China, 1924 -49. Li examines the critical role 
of the students as a political force during China's reunification in 1927 and again in 1949 
in the context of cultural and ideological debates- -the New Culture and May 4th 
Movement --and student politics. Li argues that Chinese student nationalism, despite its 
radical image, represents a prominent feature of continuity in Chinese socio- political 
culture. 
In sum, scholars have examined the roles of the Russians, the political commissar 
system, Guomindang's leaders, Chiang Kaishek and the Huangpu clique, the Chinese 
Communist Party and the mass movement, and the Huangpu's students. However, how 
could one explain why such a national movement took place at a military academy? Why 
did such a large group of officer corps take part in the Nationalist Revolution? The roles 
of Chinese officer corps, and the military academy have not been subjects of any serious 
inquiry. It may be that the military men were seen as passive, opportunists and 
reactionaries and not as the main driving force of the nationalist revolution. However, in 
reality the picture is different. Modem military academy was introduced to China as early 
as 1885. After about 38 years of development it had produced a great number of officer 
corps that had spread all over the country and constituted a most well organised and 
modernised force in the early Republican years (see Table 1). 
Approach of the Study 
The basic approach of this study is to Iook at modern military academies and its 
impact on the development of the modern Chinese national army. It wil1 examine broader 
issues such as the circumstances which led to the rise of military men like Chiang Kaishek 
and other military officers; the relationship between the officer corps and the state, party 
and the society at large and conflicts between the regional and the central armies. The 
modern military academy was introduced in a big way by the Qing's government to build 
a modern central army. To meet the manpower requirements, national military education 
'^ Lincoln Li, Student Nationalism in China, 1924 -1949. New York: State University of New York, 
1994. 
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was introduced in the early 1900s with basic military education at provincial military 
schools and higher level schools for the brightest and ablest young men in the major cities 
and the capital. After graduation, these officers were posted by the central government to 
provincial and capital military organisation. Many of them served as staff officers to 
various governmental offices and military instructors in military academies that spread 
around the country. During the warlord period, they were the principal staff of regional 
warlords. They helped to run the administration and fought war in time of conflicts with 
other warlords. 
This study separates the Chinese officer corps from the Guomindang -CCP United 
Front and the warlords of the 1920s, and treats the officer corps as a single interest group 
in the Nationalist Revolution. They derived their common identity from their education 
in modern military academies. They grew up during the change of regimes from Imperial 
to Republican China. They immersed with Chinese nationalism and believed "strong army 
the basis of a strong China" ideology. 
Contribution to Historiography 
By looking through the prism of the Huangpu Military Academy and the roles of 
Chinese officer corps in the National Revolutionary Army, this dissertation presents the 
military dimension of the Nationalist Revolution. The main thesis is that the Nationalist 
Revolution represents not only a political movement of the 1920s but also the continued 
attempts by the Chinese officer corps to recreate a national army in the context of a new 
political environment. Although the ideas and structure of the Party Army came from the 
Guomindang and the Russian Red Army respectively, with the Russian advisers playing 
an important role in the build -up of the National Revolutionary Army, the development of 
the Huangpu Military Academy and the Party Army was the result of efforts by the 
Chinese officer corps. The period 1924 -28 was a turning point for Chinese national army 
and military academy where the relationship between the military and political party was 
institutionalised. In the Guomindang, the political leadership had since in the hands of 
military strongmen. In the Chinese Communist Party, the role of the military was 
formalised but it came under the firm control of the party leadership. Mao's famous 
dictum: "Power came from the barrels of the guns" but it was the party that controlled the 
guns and never the other way. 
Definitions and Terms 
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The modern military academy originated from the West. It had three basic 
characteristics: the use of Western arms, Western battle drills, and a command and staff 
organisational structure with various supporting arms under its control. In general. there 
were two basic types of officers' training in the armed forces. Military training schools for 
officers -- military academy for officer cadets to war college for senior officers, junior ranks 
(non- commissioned officers), and various supporting arm specialists (such as artillery, 
combat engineers, medical etc. for the army). These training schools usually came under 
the provincial or central governments control. The other type was unit military training 
for officers and soldiers. The Model Battalions and Training Regiments, for examples, 
were used in Chinese armies during the turn of the century. These training units would 
train sub -units for operations. Unit training would emphasis combat skills from individual 
field training to section, platoon, company, battalion, and regiment military exercises. In 
time of exigency, units might also conduct short training courses for officers and other 
ranks to fulfil the manpower shortage. These kinds of short training courses were most 
common in the Chinese armies during late Qing and early Republican years. 
In this thesis, military academies refer mainly to military training schools under the 
control of the provincial and capital governments. In early Republican years regional 
warlords controlled most of the provincial military schools and military schools lost its the 
importance and appeal as national institutions. 
The most common definition of the National Revolutionary Army is the Party 
Army of the Guomindang. When Guomindang established the National Government in 
Guangzhou on 1 July 1925, it decided to reorganise its armies and place them under the 
party control. On 26 August 1925, units loyal to the Guomindang were organised into five 
corps. These were the original National Reconstruction Army (Jianguo fun) which took 
part in the early Sun Yatsen's Northern Expedition, and units of the Huangpu Military 
Academy which was part of the First Eastern Expedition forces. It was through the party 
military academy at Huangpu that the Guomindang gradually established control over the 
military. However, party control of the army had its limitations. This was clearly 
manifested in the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident of 1926 and the breakdown of the United 
Front during the Northern Expedition in 1927. 
This thesis defines the National Revolutionary Army as the Guomindang's army 
but under the leadership of the Chinese officer corps. These officers were the products of 
modern military academies from both China and abroad. The rally base for this group of 
officers was the Huangpu Military Academy. Although the Nationalist Revolution of the 
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1920s was a political movement, the military played a crucial role in this reunification of 
China. The army played an essential role in Guangdong's unification in 1925 and in the 
Northern Expedition of 1926 -28. The completion of the Northern Expedition ushered in 
the Nanjing regime until the Japanese invasion in 1937. 
New Sourcesi5 
Apart from the Guomindang archives at Yangmingshan in Taibei, there are 
substantial new Chinese sources on Republican China released from the Nanjing Second 
Historical Archives in mainland China. These include the 10- volume Zhongyang lujun 
junxiao shigao (Draft history of the central military academy) the official records of 
Huangpu; the multi- volume Zhonghua minguo shi dangan ziliao huibian (Historical 
materials of the republican China); Beifa zhenzhong riji (The war diary of the northern 
expedition, July 1926 to May 1928), Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao (A draft chronological 
biographical of Chiang Kaishek); Guangdong Revolutionary History Museum compiled, 
two- volume Huangpu junxiao shiliao; Zhang Bofeng and Li Zongyi edited, Beiyangjunfa, 
1912 -1928 (The beiyang warlords, 1912- 1928), six volumes. There are also many 
memoirs of Huangpu alumni published recently. In addition, personal interviews were 
conducted during the research field trip to China in 1992 -3. 
As for Russian sources, C. Martin Wilbur and Lien -ying How, Missionaries of 
Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920 -1927; and Tony Saich, The 
Origins of the First United Front in China: The Role of Sneevliet (Alias Maring), 2 vols, 
contain details of Comintern agents' and Russian military advisers' activities during the 
1920s. 
Scope 
The thesis examines the Huangpu Military Academy and its impact on the making 
of the National Revolutionary Army, It will study the process of military reforms during 
Late -Qing and the early Republican years, in particular, the roles of modern military 
academy and the officer corps. Military training, organisation, leadership, and warfare 
during the 1920s will also be main subjects of this study. 
15 For a detailed list, see "Notes on Sources of the Huangpu Military Academy and National 
Revolutionary Army" attached behind the thesis. 
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study of the development of modern military academies in China and their impact on the 
Chinese officer corps. It will look at the circumstances under which modem military 
academy was introduced into China, through the study of the Tianjin Preparation School 
to the national military educational system. It will highlight two processes: the military 
modernisation process in China which includes the introduction of modem technology, 
modem operational doctrine of combined arms tactics and operations in Chinese army; and 
the process of Chinese Military Nationalism in modem military academies. Military 
defeats by foreign armed forces in China during the turn of the century and the exposure 
to foreign military education, especially the concept of the Japanese Meiji Restoration's 
slogan of'fukoku kyoheì" (a rich country, a strong soldier) were the key motivations for 
Chinese military nationalism. M,e 
Chapter Two will discuss Sun Yatsen's contribution to the Huangpu Military 
Academy. Sun's military thought, the influence of the Russian Revolution and the Civil 
War on the Guomindang, and the military exchanges between the Russians and the 
Guomindang will be traced. 
Chapter Three will look at the roles of Chiang Kaishek and the Chinese officer 
corps in establishing the Party military academy and Party army at Huangpu. It will 
examine sources of finance and arms, training, organisation and key personalities of the 
Huangpu Military Academy in its first two years. It will also look at the Huangpu army 
and the circumstances in which the academy turned an army. 
Chapter Four, entitled The Emergence of the Party Army, looks at the formation 
of the Academy Army, the Party Army and the National revolutionary Army in 1924 -5. 
This development coincided with the Guomindang's effort in unifying Guangdong. 
Chapter Five will study the military reform of the Guomindang Party Army 
through the re- organisation of Huangpu into the Central Military Political Academy. This 
chapter will examine Guomindang efforts to control the National Revolutionary Army in 
1926 and its impact on the National Revolutionary Army. The result of party control of 
the army was a mixed one. Structurally, there was a centralised command and the 
Guomindang was in control of Guangdong's finance. But actual command of individual 
corps of the National Revolutionary Army was in the hands of individual commanders. 
Chapter Six examines the National Revolutionary Army prior to the Northern 
Expedition. This chapter looks at the strengths and weaknesses of the original eight corps 
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of the National Revolutionary Army. Among the eight corps, I and IV were responsive to 
the central high command, IV and VII Corps had higher fighting capabilities. The National 
Revolutionary Army prior to the Northern Expedition was a very weak force. 
Chapter Seven is about the National Revolutionary Army and the Northern 
Expedition. It traces the involvement of the National Revolutionary Army in the Northern 
Expedition during 1926 -28. It will examine factors contributing to the success of the 
expedition and problems faced by the National Revolutionary Army during the Northern 
Expedition. 
The final chapter highlights the institutionalisation of the Huangpu's legacy during 
the post- Northern Expedition period. It will look at the context of the post- Northern 
Expedition China and discuss the reorganisation of the National Revolutionary Army into 
the Central Army. The setting up of the Central Military Academy, and other military 
short courses, and the roles of the German advisers in Nanjing will be discussed. It ends 
the chapter with a discussion of the Huangpu spirit and the Third Party Movement. 
Chapter 1: Modern Military Academies and the Emergence of the Officer Corps 
in China, 1885 -1923 
The origins of modern military academy could be traced from the late 17th 
century when European countries began developing permanent national armies 
although the founding of academies themselves did not begin until the mid -18th 
century. Until the 20th century, training emphasised the handling of weapons, the 
drilling and management of men, tactics and strategy, and ceremonial. To 
accommodate the increasing part played by science, technology, and organisation in 
modern warfare, the content of the instruction has broadened to include more scientific, 
technical, and general subjects. At the same time, cadets began to be drawn from much 
wider social strata than hitherto. 16 
One of the first countries to develop a comprehensive and efficient scheme of 
military education was Prussia. The country had such early brilliant reformers as 
Gerhard von Scharnhorst, August von Gneisenau, and Carl von Clausewitz and whose 
complex of military institutions in the 19th century would elicit the respect and often 
the imitation of other military powers. At the base of the officer- training system were 
eventually eight cadet schools, more or less for the upper class or elite, and ten war 
schools for the less select --both training men for commissions. At the apex of the 
system was the venerable War Academy, or Kriegs Akademie, at Berlin, founded in 
1810 and offering the highest advanced education for commissioned officers. A great 
complex of technical and auxiliary schools, such as for cavalry and engineering, filled 
in the system. After World War I the entire complex was disrupted, though the military 
tradition persisted.'? 
Among the countries that closely imitated the Prussian system were Austria - 
Hungary, Tsarist Russia, and Japan. The first real military academies in Prussia were 
established in the mid -19th century. In Japan, the principal schools for the training of 
officers were the Army Academy founded 1868 and the Naval Academy founded 1869. 
Immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917, a new centralised Soviet 
military academy was founded in Moscow, followed by the founding of naval, air, 
16 See Showalter, Dennis E., "Caste, Skill, and Training: The Evolution of Cohesion in European 
Armies from the Middle Ages to the Sixteenth Century ", in The Training and Socializing of Military 
Personnel, edited by Peter Karsten, New York and London: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1998, 1 -25; and 
Barnard, Henry, "Introduction ", in Military Schools and Courses of Instruction in Science and Art of 
War, rev. ed., Henry Barnard editor, reprint of 1872, ed., New York and London: Greenwood Press, 
1969. 
17 Barnard, Military Schools and Courses of Instruction in Science and Art of War, Part II: Prussia, 
27 -297. 
engineering, and military political academies. In China, the first modern Western- 
styled military training institution was established in 1885 although the national 
military academy and a staff college were officially opened only in 1912. 
Scholars on modem Chinese history have discussed extensively the 
unprecedented military expansion of the Chinese army during the turn of the 19'h and 
20`a century and its impact on the politics of the early Republican years.'. What has 
been less well acknowledged is that apart from this quantitative growth of military 
strength, the Chinese officer corps had also undergone a qualitative transformation. 
The transformation of the officer corps was brought about directly by in the 
introduction of modern Western- styled military academy. In a short period of 38 years 
modern military academies were developed from a humble provincial military 
preparatory school in 1885, to a full- fledged national military academy and a staff 
college in 1912, together with a whole range of military specialist schools.13 
According to one military observer, by 1906 there were about thirty -five military 
schools throughout China offering various types and levels of training, with a total 
enrolment of 6,307 students, including 787 officers and officer- cadets, and about 2,072 
non -commissioned officers. In the overseas military institutions, there were another 
691 officers and cadets studying in Japan and several European countries.2Q By the 
time of its closure in 1923, the Baoding Military Academy had produced 6,574 military 
officers (see Table 2). 
This chapter aims to examine the development of modem military academies in 
China from late -Qing to early Republican. It will attempt to ask four basic questions: 
why did modem military academies introduce in China? Who were the advocates and 
how did they organise them? What were the events that shape the development? What 
is Literature on the growth of Chinese army in the Late -Qing and early Republican periods is vast. 
See for examples, Franz Michael, "Military Organisation and Power Structure of China during the 
Taiping Rebellion." Pacific Historical Review 18, no. 4 (November 1949): 469 -483; Luo Ergang, 
"Qingji bing weí jiang you di qiyuan (The origins of the personal armies in the late period)." Zhongguo 
shehui jingji shi jikan (Journal of Chinese Social and Economic History) 5, no. 2 (1937): 235 -250; Wang 
Ermin, Huaijun zhi (A treatise of the Anhui Army). Taibei: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1967; and Ralph L. 
Powell, The Rise of the Chinese Military Power, 1895 -1912. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1955. 
's See Richard J. Smith, "The Reform of Military Education in Late Ch'ing China, 1842 -1895." 
Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 18 (1978): 16 -39; Wang Jiejian. 
"Beiyang wubei xuetang di chuanshe jiqi yingxiang (The establishment and influences of the Beiyang 
preparatory school)." Lishi xuebao (Bulletin of the Historical Research, National Taiwan Normal 
University), 4 (April 1976): 317 -343. 
2° Powell, The Rise of the Chinese Military Power, 235 -6. The author cites a report by the French 
General Staff in the Second Bureau of the General Staff, "La reorganisation militaire de la Chine." 
Reveue militaire des armees etrangeres 67 (March 1906): 242 -271. 
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was the impact of these military academies on Chinese modern history? 
Before turning to Chinese military academy some basic concepts and 
framework may be helpful in the analysis. Education for a profession can only be 
sensibly discussed in terms of its function in preparing those being educated for roles 
in the profession. Accordingly, any analysis of the development of the military 
academy should begin with a brief description of the profession of arms, its duties and 
skills essential to the practitioners. The literature of Western military sociology has 
long used the concept of military professionalism for the discussion of military's role in 
society. Two concepts, in particular, have been widely discussed and could be useful 
in this study. They are, firstly, the concept of the military as a profession. A 
profession is usually defined in terms of an occupation whose members possess three 
characteristics.21 The first is "expertise" or "specialised theoretical knowledge ", which 
is the product of education and experience setting them apart from those without such 
preparation. A second characteristic is "responsibility ", or a system of ethics, which 
guides their behaviour in a social context and involves the performance of a service for 
the society. The third characteristic is "corporateness ", or esprit de corps, which 
constitutes a high degree of consciousness of themselves, and others of the profession, 
as a group, distinct from other groups. Bengt Abrahamsson has said that this "stems 
from their collective attachment to certain doctrines and methods" u Samuel 
Huntington's classic work on civil -military relations, The Soldier and the State, 
concludes, "the modem officer corps is a professional body and the modern officer a 
professional man".23 
The other useful analytical tool in the discussion is the concept of military 
professionalisation. The professionalisation of the officer corps is a relatively recent 
development brought about by the twin forces of industrial development and modem 
nationalism. New technology and the more complex forms of organisation that 
Z' See Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil -Military 
Relations, New York: Random House, 1957, 8 -9; Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalism and 
Political Power, Beverly Hills: Saga Publications, 1972, p. 15; Gerke Teitler, The Genesis of the 
Professional Officers' Corps, Beverly Hills: Saga Publications, 1977, 6 -8; Monis Janowitz, The 
Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, New York: The Free Press, 5 -7. 
22 Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalism and Political Power, p. 15. 
v Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 7. The analysis of this work has formed part of 
the foundation for much of the social science work on military organisation. Huntington's argument 
centred on the concept that the "expertise" of the officer corps is essentially "the management of 
violence" as stated by Harold Lasswell, "and not the violence itself." The duties of the officer, 
Huntington states, "include (1) organising, equipping, and training of this force; (2) the planning of its 
activities; and (3) the direction of its operations in and out of combat." Ibid., 11-13. 
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corresponded to it have progressively raised the level of skill required to direct troops 
in battle. These and other activities related to the management of armed forces could 
no longer be performed simply as honorific avocation. Thus, officership ceased to be a 
part-time pursuit and became a lifetime career. Meanwhile, with the emergence of new 
political forces, armies whose officers were tied to the sovereign by an oath of personal 
fealty increasingly took on the character of a national military establishment whose 
officers, even more than the men they led, were responsive to patriotic appeals. To be 
sure, some ingredients of the old status honour did survive in the codes of professional 
officers, but their meaning and significance changed once they became assimilated and 
subordinate to more inclusive notions of duty to people and nation.24 
The concept of professionalism provides a useful framework for the analysis of 
many aspects of the military education and of the officer behaviour. In the case of 
modern Chinese military, although China did not experience the industrial revolution, 
she experienced the twin developments of modern military technology and nationalism 
at the turn of the century. Western- styled military academies were founded to train 
professional officer corps for the modern warfare. The process of professionalisation 
also coincided with the development of Chinese nationalism. Events of the 1911 
Revolution and the subsequent internal conflicts between the central and the provincial 
governments had greatly politicised the officer corps. 
There are risks, however, in adhering too closely to the method of analysis that 
has been developed from the European and American armed forces. Although the 
Chinese military traditionally had been an important political force as almost all 
dynasties were established by military force, the Chinese miiitary did not enjoy high 
social status culturally. Despite some well -known military commanders in history, 
political leadership was the domain of Confucius scholar- officials. In addition, unlike 
the European nation -states or the independent United States of America where military 
academies were established on a national basis for a national army, modern military 
academies in China were provincial based serving primarily provincial armies. It was 
only after the beginning of the twentieth century that efforts were made to create a 
modern army and a national military education system. This effort of creating a 
centralised national army through a centralised military education system suffered a 
large setback following the 1911 Revolution. The closure of the Baoding Military 
Academy, the first national military academy, in 1923 marked a complete collapse of 
24 The development of professionalism has been a major theme in many historical studies of the 
officers in particular nations, such as M. Kitchen, The German Officer Corps, 1800 -1914 , Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1968; M.A. Lewis, England's Sea Officer: The Story of the Naval Profession, London: 
Allen & Unwin, 1939; A. Vagts, A History of Militarism, 2nd ed., New York: Meridian Books, 1959. 
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the plan. 
It is in this context this chapter aims to examine Chinese military academies. It 
will first look at the decline of the Qing central armies and attempts to rebuild the 
armies at the provinces. The process coincided with the introduction of modem 
military technology and military academies to China. Although the plan for creating a 
national army did not materialise military academies were built throughout the country 
in the 1920s. Military academies became political bases for various power groups and 
their products --the officer corps --the political brokers in early Republican China. 
Decline of the Qing Central Armies 
Prior to the mid -nineteenth century, the Qing dynasty's regular army, qing zhi 
jun (nationally instituted army), consisted of two main forces. The first was the Banner 
Army (baqi, literally the "eight banners ") established before the Manchu conquest of 
the China proper.25 The Banner Army derived its name from the individual "banners," 
or units each with its own distinctive coloured flag. The membership of the Banners 
was hereditary and originally reserved for the Manchu but later expanded to include 
Mongols and the Han Chinese in the course of military conquest into the central China. 
For most of the Qing period, the Manchu soldiers outnumbered both the Mongols and 
Han by about three to one. By the mid- nineteenth century the Banners probably had 
about 250,000 soldiers, including some 10,000 officers and an additional 45,000 
supernumeraries and retainers.26 As most of the Banner Army was deployed in 
garrisons around Beijing or along the northern frontiers protecting the Manchu 
homeland and key strategic locations, it was considered as the national guard. 
The other regular imperial army of the Qing armies was known collectively as 
the Army of the Green Standard (luying). It was formed after the Manchu conquest of 
China from the remnants of the Ming dynasty originally an auxiliary military force, it 
u The most detailed English -language treatment of the Qing's Eight Banner and Green Standard 
armies is Thomas Wade, "The Army of the Chinese Empire." The Chinese Repository 20, no. 5 -7 (May 
1851): 250 -280; 300 -340; 363 -422. For the Chinese sources see Luo Ergang. Luying bingzhi (A treatise 
of the Green Standard Army). Chongqing: 1945; for recent works, see Richard J. Smith, "Chinese 
Military Institutions in the Mid -nineteenth Century, 1850- 1860." Journal of Asian History 7 (1974): 
122 -161; Liu Kwang-ching and Richard J. Smith. "The Military Challenge: The North -west and the 
Coast." The Cambridge History of China, Late Ch'ing, 1800 -1911, Volume 11, Part 2, 202 -273. Editors 
John K. Fairbank and Kwang -Ching Liu. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980. 
26 Fang Chao -ying. "A Technique for Estimating the Numerical Strength of the Early Manchu 
Military Forces." Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 13 (1950): 208; Robert H.G. Lee, The 
Manchurian Frontier in Ch'ing History. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970, 24 -33. 
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was created to preserve order in the provinces. The officers of these units could be 
either Manchu or Han, but enlisted soldiers were Han. The soldier's tenure of the 
Green Standard army was hereditary, and the system was called shibing.27 The Green 
Standard forces were distributed in small numbers throughout China, and by the 
nineteenth century their numbers probably totalled about 660,000.28 Although the 
Green Standard Army was over twice as large as the Banner Army, the Banner Army's 
garrisons were larger. They were deployed in key strategic points to protect the 
imperial court and check upon the more fragmented Green Standard forces as we11.29 
The Banner Army began to decline soon after the Manchu had conquered 
China. The quality of Banner officers suffered as talented Manchus found better career 
opportunities within the dynasty's civil administration, Ieaving less able men to 
command the Banner forces. With fewer wars to fight, sedentary garrison life also 
quickly blunted the military skills and martial ardour that had originally characterised 
the frontier soldiers of the Banner Army. Banner soldiers, were forbidden to leave 
military service for other occupations. Yet, they were also demoralised by policies that 
kept their pay constant despite rising prices. By the mid -eighteenth century the Banner 
Army had become an indolent force that could no longer be relied on to meet the 
dynasty's defensive needs.30 
The Green Standard forces maintained their effectiveness for a longer period, 
but standards also decline when officers who ignored military training and lined their 
pockets from their men's which was already very low pay. In order to survive, Green 
Standard soldiers were forced to moonlight; often they simply deserted. This only 
encouraged officers who embezzled further and maintained the fiction of full- strength 
units. By the nineteenth century, many Green Standard units were reduced to one -half 
and in extreme cases to one- sixth, of their official size.31 
27 Under the system of shibing the father joined the service for life and the sons were put on reserve. 
When the father retired at the age of sixty, the son then entered the active service. The hereditary 
soldiers, whose files were kept in the Board of War, were distinguished from the common people. A 
military career became a hereditary profession. 
28 Luo Ergang. Luying bingzhi (A treatise of the Green Standard Army), p. 2. 
25 At different times, the official number of Banner Army troops ranged from around 170,000 to 
almost 300,000 men, while the Green Standard Army varied from 590,000 to 660,000 men. The actual 
rather than official number of troops was often considerably less in both forces. See Powell, op. cit., 11- 
13. 
3° Wu Wei -ping, "The Development and Decline of the Eight Banners ", Ph.D dissertation., 
University of Pennsylvania, 1969, 75 -112. 
31 Michael, "Regionalism," xxxiii -xxxv; Luo Ergang, Xiangjun xínzhí [A new record of the Xiang 
Army] (Changsha: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1939), 2 -15. 
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The serious consequences of the decline of the Qing army did not become fully 
apparent until the nineteenth century, when the dynasty faced a series of external and 
internal military threats. The White Lotus uprising of 1802 in Hubei and Sichuan, for 
example, had exposed the impotent of the Qing regular armies. Instead, it was the 
militias (tuanlian) and more highly militarised local mercenary corps (xiangyong, 
literally "viIIage braves ") raised by local elite for community self -defence that 
eventually suppressed the rebels.32 Externally the Opium War (1839 -42) initiated a 
period of more forceful Western pressure on China to open up to foreign trade and 
religions. China's defeat in this war exposed the weak and demoralised condition of its 
armies and raised questions about the Qing dynasty's ability to provide more than 
minimal defence, but Western military threats were for a time blunted by treaty 
concessions. 
Zeng Guofan and the Xiang Army 
A more serious challenge came from a series of internal rebellions, the most 
significant of which was the Taiping Rebellion (1851 -64). In 1850 when the Taipings 
first initiated their uprising, the Green Standard army was again proved to be no match 
for the rebels. The Jiangnan headquarters of the Green Standard army was twice 
routed. The steady defeat of both Banner and Green Standard forces by Taiping armies 
endangered the very existence of the dynasty and the court's attention was drawn to the 
only forces that showed some success against the rebels, namely, the militia. The 
central government, in the past, did not sanction local paramilitary units because of 
concern that the militia could potentially become landlord vigilantes. The leaders of 
local militia were often members of the local gentry and sometimes even connected 
with local secret societies and gangsters.33 They came from the same social stratum 
that produced the Taiping Ieaders such as Hong Xiuquan and his cousin Feng Yunshan. 
If the Qing court were to name the official gentry34 as militia leaders, the upper gentry 
32 Luo Ergang argues that the Banner forces were ineffective as early as the time of the White Lotus 
Rebellion at the end of the eighteenth century. The Green Standard's decline followed and this was 
throughly exposed at the time of the Opium War. See his "Qingji bing wei jiang you di qiyuan (The 
origins of the personal armies in the late period) ", 237 -240. 
33 For example, the Society of God Worshippers (Baishangdi hui) which was established by the 
Taiping leaders was in contact with the anti -Manchu Triad Society that was active in southern and 
central China. Though differences in creed and practice prevented any formal merger, the Triad 
members joined as individuals which required them to disavow earlier triad commitments and accept the 
Society's religious tenets. Later, the Taiping's accepted tactical alliances with the Triads and others. This 
form of alliance is typical of Chinese power games. 
34 There are several definitions of the gentry. Chang Chung -li in his work divides the gentry into two 
strata. The lower gentry includes those who passed the first level of examinations, those who purchased 
their academic title, and certain other holders of minor titles. The upper gentry comprises the holders of 
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might transform their militia into the constituents of a provincial military machine. In 
normal time such risk was considered too great. But during the Taiping Rebellion, 
besides the impotent of the regular armies, there was an additional factor that 
convinced the central government that it could rely on the official gentry against the 
rebels. The Taipings were not only fighting against the imperial government, they 
were engaged in a crusade to establish a new order, at least in the beginning, which 
was anti- Confucian and anti -gentry. It was seen as a threat to Confucian culture and 
the dynasty that claimed to preserve it. Believing that the gentry's allegiance was 
secure because of these circumstances, the throne decided in late 1852 to appoint the 
first of 43 militia commissioners from among high officials home on leave. The 
appointment of the imperial commissioners (qiuchai dachen) was the first important 
step toward the formation of the regional armies to fight the rebels.35 
One of these commissioners, and the most important person in the subsequent 
development of new military forces, was Zeng Guofan. Returning to his native Hunan 
in 1852, Zeng realised that purely local -level militarisation would be insufficient to 
defeat the Taipings. While retaining the impression that he was simply promoting 
militia recruitment, Zeng set about creating a new and larger military organisation. He 
was not only absorbing local mercenary corps but also recruiting new soldiers. Zeng 
eventually raised over 130,000 men for his Xiang (Hunan) Army. This army became 
the model for the formation of other similar forces, the most important of which was Li 
Hongzhang's Huai (Anhui) Army. These new forces, the yongying (literally "brave 
battalions "), provided the military power that finally ended the mid -century rebellions 
and restored peace to the empire.36 
Militarily, the Xiang Army was modelled on the well -known Ming general Qi 
higher examinations degrees and those holding official titles, whether in combination with or without 
higher degrees, The basic difference between these two groups is that only the upper gently qualified for 
appointment to office, the lower gentry to purchase office or pass higher examinations. The status 
differences between these two groups were made clear in every aspect of life. See Chang, Chung Li. 
The Chinese Gentry: Studies on their Role in the Nineteenth -Century Chinese Society. Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1955, 5 -8. 
35 For a discussion of the preservation of the Confucian culture and social system as a factor in the 
Qing's suppression of the Taiping rebellion, see Xi Yan, "Wu ben zhe lie, you ben zhe Chang: Xiang jun, 
Taiping jun yu wenhua chuantong" (The cultural tradition and the armies of Xiang and Taiping), 
Yuandao, 1 (1995). 
36 For studies of the Xiang Amy and the Huai Army, see Luo Ergang's Xiangjun xinzhi and Wang 
Ermine Huaijun zhi [Treatise on the Huai Army] (Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo, 
1967). Philip A. Kuhn's Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China" Militarisation and social 
Structure, 1796 -1864 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970) shows that the yongying 
represented a new form of military organisation, correcting the tendency of many scholars to view them 
simply as enlarged militia. 
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Jiguang: Qi was disillusioned by the ineffectiveness of the hereditary Ming garrison 
forces against the Japanese pirates, so he reorganised and re- trained them into a 
fighting fit army.37 Taking Qi's method as his model, Zeng attempted to do likewise 
with the Xiang Army. Zeng's military organisation and training emphasised smaller 
but effective tactical units; rigorous standards for recruitment and selection; the 
fostering of personal loyalties within a tight command structure; and strict discipline 
and training. In short, the emphasis was on command and control of troops. rather than 
on weaponry or tactics. 
Unit cohesion was given high priority in the formation of the Xiang army. 
Departing from the bureaucratic structure of the regular military system, the Xiang and 
Yong commanders often chose their subordinate officers from among relatives, friends, 
or classmates. These commanders then elected subordinate staff and commanders, 
who in turn, personally supervised the recruitment of their soldiers. Reflecting this 
contact based organisation, these units at the lowest level were often identified by the 
names of the men who both recruited and led them. These units were in fact so closely 
identified with the individual leaders who formed them that they often had to be 
disbanded upon their deaths. In addition, soldiers of individual yongying units were 
usually recruited from specific localities, and the army as a whole came from a 
particular region or province. Close personal ties among officers, and between officers 
and their men were encouraged. 
Officer candidates were carefully screened and included a high percentage of 
literati. The selected officers were relatively well paid. As for the rank and file 
soldiers, preference was given to those with peasant backgrounds. They were 
considered hardworking, hardy and obedient.38 Soldiers were treated decently and 
strict moral standards accompanied by neo- Confucian indoctrination were imposed on 
officers and ordinary soldiers. 
To finance his army, Zeng realised that the usual revenue sources for the 
militia, namely contributions from the wealthy gentry in an area, would be inadequate, 
'7 For Qi Jiguang's effort against Japanese pirates, see James F. Millinger, Chi Ch'i- kuang, chapter 
2. 
's A gentry officer and peasant soldiers combination had been a constant feature in both the Taiping 
and the Xiang armies. The preference for peasant soldiers was sometimes interpreted as proletarians' 
participation in the peasant movement by Marxist historians. But in most instances, it was for practical 
military rather than ideological consideration that peasants were considered good material soldier. For 
more information on Zeng's Xiang Army, see Wang Kaiyun, Xiangjun zhi (A treatise of Hunan Army)_ 
Taibei: Wenyuan Publisher, 1964, 443 -4. 
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especially since he intended to pay his troops well.39 Zeng therefore was obliged from 
the start to resort to a variety of fiscal expedients, the most notable being a new excise 
tax, the lijin.40 The increase in revenue allowed Zeng in bringing various local militia 
units together into a large organisation, giving them a unified strategic direction, and 
providing them with access to broader sources of financial support. 
Zeng's contributions, in the words of one scholar. can be summarised as 
follows: "...his unique clarity of orientation, added to his high official connections, 
provided a standard around which he could rally the ablest of the provincial elite. His 
deep- rooted neo- Confucianism, added to Qi Jiguang's scheme of military organisation, 
provided a framework within which personal loyalties could be reconciled with central 
command. "41 Although the Xiang Army eventually failed to achieved the ideal that 
Zeng and his followers envisaged, it represented a marked improvement over the 
Banner and the Green Standard forces. The success of Zeng's Xiang Army was highly 
praised and was endorsed by the imperial court as a standard and model for all the rest 
of Chinese armies.42 
Li Hongzhang and Western Military Training 
During the Taiping Rebellion, foreign military forces were involved in the 
protection of installations and counter- rebellion campaigns. The British and French 
troops played a significant role in the defence of Shanghai up to 1862. Western nations 
also offered military training and equipment. The Chinese leader who was responsible 
for co- ordinating this effort was Li Hongzhang. Li was then still below the age of forty 
but was already on his way to a Iong and prestigious career.43 His first major 
39 Although Zeng held a special commission from the throne to oversee the organising of the militia 
in Hunan, for several years after he had launched his army, Zeng was not assigned any official post in 
the regular bureaucratic hierarchy of the province which would allow him to tap this conventional of 
revenue. 
40 Introduced in 1853, the lijin was essentially a transit tax on various commodities. Because it was a 
new tax no yet under the control of the central government, it was a flexible fiscal instrument. For a 
detailed discussion of lijin, see Luo Yudong, Zhongguo lijin shi (History of China's lijin), Shanghai: 
Commercial Press, 1936. 
41 Philip Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China, p. 167. 
4z Zeng's methods of organising and managing the army were subsequently documented by Cai E in. 
the Zeng Hu zhibing yule zhushi (Interpretation of Zeng Guofan and Hu Runzhi military quotations) 
when he was commanding the Yunnan Army. Chiang Kaishek re- edited and reprinted the book while he 
was the Commandant of the Huangpu Military Academy in 1924. This book was a training manual for 
the commanders, staff and students of Huangpu. 
43 References on Li Hongzhang see Li Wenzhong gong guanjí (Complete Papers of Li Hongzhang). 
Nanjing, Shanghai and Taibei: Commercial Press, reprint of 1908, Nanjing; Wenhai, 1962; Spector, 
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assignment came in 1861 when he was put in charge of an army formed recently out of 
units from Zeng's Xiang Army. As the majority of the soldiers were recruited in the 
Huai River valley, this army was known as the Huai Army. In 1862, Li's force was 
shipped to Shanghai with the help of British transports and Li took over command of 
the Shanghai's defence. The imperial court concurrently appointed him as the governor 
of the neighbouring Jiangsu province. By mid -May of 1862, the Huai Army had gone 
into action, operating in close conjunction with the American adventurer Frederick 
Townsend Ward's small independent unit of some 200 -300 men 44 In the summer, Li's 
units were also aided by the participation of regular British and French forces. Though 
frequently outnumbered, this combination of forces repeatedly thwarted Taiping efforts 
to capture Shanghai. Foreign mercenaries also played an active role when the Chinese 
forces moved to regain eastern Zhejiang and Jiangsu provinces. Frederick T. Ward 
was wounded in late September in a battle at Ningpo. Henry Burgevine, and then a 
British officer, Major Charles Gordon took his place. Major Gordon assumed 
command on 24 March 1863 of the "Ever- Victorious Army" numbering 5,000 to 6,000 
men. This force operated under the general command of Li Hongzhang.45 
The better than expected performance of the combined forces impressed the 
imperial Qing government and convinced them of the value of Western training. In 
1865, six Green Standard units were chosen from the capital for Western -style training 
in Zhili. They were equipped with modern arms and trained in the Western battle drill. 
These units were known as the Disciplined Force (Lianjun, or the retrained army). In 
addition, an imperial edict of 1862 directed Zeng Guofan and others to select a group 
of officers for training by foreign officers stationed at Shanghai and Ningpo. These 
officers were assigned to take over the roles played by foreigners in the "Ever - 
Victorious Army ". At this point, Li wanted to send officers to the US Military 
Academy at West Point, and explore the possíbílity of establishing a military school in 
China with the help of the American general Emory Upton, but the plans did not 
Stanley. Li Hung -chang and the Huai Army. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964; and Bland, 
John O. P. Li Hung- Chang, New York: Constable, 1917. 
44 For accounts of the Western military involvement in China during the Taiping Rebellion see 
Richard J. Smith, Mercenaries and Mandarins: The Ever - Victorious Army in Nineteenth Century China. 
New York: Millwood, 1978; Robert Rantoul, Frederick Townsend Ward. Salem: The Essex Institute, 
1980; and for French military, the diary of a French commander of the "Ever- Triumphant Army" see 
Steven A. Leibo, A Journal of the Chinese Civil War 1864 By Prosper Giquel. Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1985. 
45 For Charles Gordon, Richard J. Smith, Mercenaries and Mandarins; Bernard Allen. Gordon in 
China. London: Macmillan, 1933; and Demetrin Boulger Demetrin. The Life of Gordon. London: T.F. 
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materíalise.48 
By the mid- 1870s, although Li was fully aware of the value of a modern 
military education, his priority then was to train a small group of Chinese officers to 
take over the foreigners' roles in the army. However, this need, was in sufficient to 
justify the cost of establishing a military academy then. Li sent the first group of 
Chinese officers to the German Kriegsschulen for training in 1876.47 Seven officers 
were selected from the Huai Army, and a German instructor named Lehmayer 
accompanied them. Li planned to employ these officers as instructors in the Huai 
Army upon their return. However, this plan fell short of expectations. Of the seven 
sent to Germany for training, two were recalled before they completed their three -year 
course because of frivolous attitude and poor progress. One became sick and died, and 
only three successfully completed the course. One of the three, Wang Desheng, stayed 
on in Germany until 1881, receiving additional specialised training in Berlin. Wang 
was later to emerge as a prominent figure in the Huai Army commanding Li's crack 
personal guard unit Jinjun. Wang eventually achieved the rank of zongbing, the 
commander- in- chief.48 In the meantime, Li continued to hire a small group of French 
and Germans as instructors. 
Financial constraint was important in limiting Li's military reform efforts. His 
incessant struggle against declining revenues has been amply documented.49 During 
the 1870s, the entire Huai Army's annual income averaged well above three million 
taels but in the late 1880s, it had dwindled to less than two- and -a -half million. The 
high cost of modern arms forced Li to continue paying his army three -quarters of their 
original salaries, leaving one quarter in permanent arrears paid upon retirement. In 
addition, the central government also sought to oversee some army expenditures such 
d6 Sending Chinese students to West Point did not materialise because of the American Civil War. 
The proposal by Emory Upton to establish a military academy in China was rejected by Li as it was too 
expensive. Upton's proposed to employ nine professors and instructors from the United States, and to 
have a six -year program of instruction in English. Charles Gordon in 1880 also urged Li to set up a 
military academy. See Holcombe, Chester. China's Past and Future. London: 1904, 82 -3; Michie, Peter. 
The Life and Letters of Emory Upton. New York: 1885, 309 -310; Li Wenzhong gong quanji (Complete 
Papers of Li Hongzhang), "Letters to Zongli Yamen ", 4: 39a -41a. 
47 Qing shigao, Bing, Chapter 3. 
" a See Wang Ermin. Huaijun zhi (A treatise of the Anhui Army). Taibei: Shangwu yinshuguan, 1967, 
p. 203; Li Wenzhong gong quanji (Complete Papers of Li Hongzhang), "Letters to Zongli Yamen ", 4:39- 
43 and "Memorials ", 27: 4 -5. 
'9 Spector, Li Hung -chang and the Huai Army, chapter 7; Wang Ermin, Huaijun zhi (A treatise of the 
Anhui Army), 275 -290. 
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as transport, fuel and the wages of changfu labourers as legitimate disbursements.'° 
Military Self- Strengthening 
Despite the dynasty's eventual success in quelling internal rebellions, the defeat 
in the Anglo- Chinese War in 1860 was a reminder of its continued vulnerability to 
foreign threats. Even as they emerged as the dynasty strongest forces, the Xiang and 
Huai armies remained vastly inferior to the foreign armies. Therefore, as part of a 
more general program of self -strengthening, the dynasty approved a number of 
measures aimed at revitalising its armed forces through the adoption of Western 
armaments. The Tongzhi Restoration, as it was called, was launched in 1862 and 
extended to the 1870s. It sought to introduce Western technology, especially in the 
military realm to strengthen its military against internal and external threats.5 s 
The Qing dynasty's military self -strengthening was a comprehensive effort that 
involved both its naval and land defences. On the naval side these efforts entailed the 
creation of a modern navy based on the Western model. By the eve of the Sino- 
Japanese War, this new navy, commonly known as the Beiyang Navy, consisted of 
sixty -five warships and forty-three torpedo boats.52 
Efforts to strengthen the dynasty's land forces focused primarily on the 
introduction of modern Western military weaponry into established forces. Some 
yongying had been partially equipped with Western arms during their struggle against 
domestic rebellions. With the restoration of peace, some efforts were made to arm all 
armies including the Green Standard and the Banner forces with modern weaponry. 
The Chinese also constructed arsenals and factories to produce modern 
weapons and ammunition to reduce their dependence on foreign armament sources. By 
1894 there were nearly ten such arsenals. The most famous was the Jiangnan Arsenal, 
° Changfu were labourers recruited by the individual battalions numbered around 100 -150 each, to 
assist in the unit operations. This system was implemented by Zeng Guofan during the counter -Taiping 
rebellion as a form of logistics soldiers. See Wang Ermin, Huaijun zhi, 284 -9. 
51 For the Tongzhi Restoration, see Mary C.Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The 
Tung Chih Restoration, 1862 -1874, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957; and Chen Tao ed. 
Tongzhi zhongxing jingwai zouji yuebian (Compilation of Tongzhi Restoration Memorials). Taibei: 
Wenhai, reprint of the 1875 edition, 1966; Kuo Ting-Yee and Liu Kwang -Ching. "Self- Strengthening: 
The Pursuit of Westem Technology." Cambridge History of China, vol. 10, part 1, 491 -542, Cambridge 
University Press, 1978. 
52 For an account of the naval development during this period, see John L. Rawlinson, China's 
Struggle for Naval Development, 1839 -1895, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1967. 
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established by Li Hongzhang at Shanghai in 1867.53 The production of these arsenals, 
however, was uneven and never completely met the needs of China's armies. In the 
end, many Chinese soldiers, especially those in unreconstructed old -style forces, 
continued to be armed with traditional weapons. 
Tianjin Military Preparatory School 
The Tianjin Military Preparatory School (Tianjin wubei xuetang) was the first 
army training school that adopted a Western military training syllabus and method.54 
Its organisation, finance, enrolment and management policies were in many ways, 
similar to its navy counterparts, the Fuzhou Navy Yard and Tianjin Naval School 
established before it.55 But its aim was different from the Tianjin Naval School. Li 
established the naval school in 1880 to prepare for the formation of the Beiyang Navy 
that was to be formed in 1885. This was not the case for the Tianjin Military School. 
Li's main aim in setting up the Tianjin Military School was to upgrade military skills 
and knowledge and to attract a pool of talents to serve in the army.56 
The Tianjin Preparatory Military School was first proposed by two of Li 
Hongzhang's trusted lieutenants Zhou Shengchuan and Zhou Shengbo.57 The Zhou's 
brothers commanded one of the best units of the Li's Huai Army, the 10,000 strong the 
Sheng Army, Shengjun. From their long association with Li, dating from the Taiping 
period, Zhou Shengchuan was convinced of the value of Western training and arms, 
53 For the introduction of Western arms and a survey of Chinese arsenals, see Wang Ermin, Qingji 
binggong ye de xingqi (The rise of defence industry of the Qing period), Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan 
jindaishi yanjiusuo, 1978; and Thomas L. Kennedy, The Arms of Kiangnan: Modernisation and the 
Chinese Ordnance Industry, 1860 -1895, Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1978. 
54 The military preparatory school, Wubei xuetang, refers to provincial military school set up during 
1885 -1906. The course duration was about two to three years and designed initially for in- service 
officers to be trained in the Western military tactics and operations. But since late 1890s it started to 
train fresh recruits. The most detailed study of the Tianjin Military School so far is Wang Jiejian, 
"Beiyang wubei xuetang di chuanshe jiqi yingxiang (The establishment and influences of the Beiyang 
preparatory school) ", Lishi xuebao (Bulletin of the Historical Research, National Taiwan Normal 
University), no. 4 (April 1976). 
55 For the Tianjin Naval School see Liu Kwang -ching and Richard J. Smith. "The Military 
Challenge: The North -west and the Coast." The Cambridge History of China, Late Ch'ing, 1800 -1911, 
Volume 11, Part 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, 247 -250. 
56 Li Hongzhang, Li Wenzhong gong quanji (Complete Papers of Li Hongzhang). Taibei: Wenhai, 
1968. Memorials 35: 33; and 53: 42 -3. 
57 Zhou Shengchuan, Zhou Wuchuan gong yiji (Zhou Shengchuan's papers, posthumously collected), 
1, 4: 36b -32; Wang Jiejian. "Beiyang wubei xuetang di chuanshe jiqi yingxiang (The establishment and 
influences of the Beiyang preparatory school) ". 
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and he took pride in his knowledge of Western military science and technology-5 But 
Zhou resisted any suggestions by foreign advisers to modify the military system or 
command structure.59 Zhou lauded the paternalism and interpersonal rapport that 
characterised the Huai Army. He in fact, employed many relatives in his own units. 
Despite his great admiration for the skill and knowledge of foreign- trained officers 
such as Jia Lianbiao, one of China's first three returned German- trained officers, Zhou 
did not recommend him for higher appointments in the Green Standard Army. Zhou 
took pains to point out that foreign -trained officers trusted only by their own 
commanders and not well accepted in other units, even in the Huai Army. In addition, 
Zhou also lamented that although Western arms were used, the spirit of the Western 
drill had not permeated the Chinese armies. The Huai Army officers had an inherited 
distaste for the active involvement in drill, especially the Western- styled dri11.60 Zhou 
was unsuccessful in getting his battalion and company officers to involve in training 
despite repeated warnings. Zhou admitted in several occasions during the early 1880s 
that his vaunted Shengjun had declined after two decades of existence. He complained 
that the experienced officers lacked vigour while the new and brave officers lacked 
knowledge.61 Zhou 's difficulty in maintaining the standard of the Huai Army during 
peacetime was typical of Chinese armies. The Chinese officer corps constantly sought 
to identify with the civil officials and higher civil offices in the imperial bureaucracy. 
To be in high command, one sought advancement not so much in military 
appointments but in the civil service offices, just like Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang, 
Zuo Zhongtang and many other civil officials who held both high civil and military 
offices. Chinese military officers did not value too greatly military expertise and 
professionalism and did not regard a military career as a permanent profession. In any 
case, to halt this declining trend in the Huai Army, Zhou suggested to Li Hongzhang 
shortly before his death, that a foreign -style military school be established.G2 Zhou was 
apparently fearful of upsetting vested interests within the Huai Army, he proposed that 
only selected officers in the Huai Army needed to train there. 
58 In his writings, Zhou exhibited a very progressive outlook in that he appreciated not only Western 
weapons and tactics but also certain aspects of Western science and medicine. See Zhou Wuchuan gong 
yiji, 1.1.2: 17b -18; Wang Ermin. Huaijun ahi, 146 -7. 
59 For example, on the question of universal conscription, although Zhou was fully aware of the 
system practiced in France and Germany, he mied out the possibility of adopting it in China. 
6o Zhou Wuchuan gong yiji, "Supplement ", l: 14b, 20, 23b, 35b -37b; 1.4: 36b -37. 
Si Zhou Wuchuan gong yiji, 1.1: 196; 1.1.2: 41b -42; 2.2: 22b. 
62 Wang Jiejian. "Beiyang wubei xuetang di chuanshe jiqi yingxiang ", 3-4; 23 -24. 
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There were additional factors favourable to setting up a new training school. 
Zhou's proposal came at a time of the Sino- French War (1884 -85) where there was a 
demand for military officers. There was also a group of German officers in Tianjin 
who had completed their assignments. This group of German officers provided the 
necessary Western instructors to assist in the new military training school. Li 
Hongzhang took up Zhou's proposal and the school was soon established. 
Three types of courses were offered in the Tianjin Military School. A one -year 
(but later extended to two) short course for in- service Huai Army officers. The first 
class of about one hundred and fifty men was selected from various units of the Huai 
army stationed in Zhili (Hebei), Guangdong, Guangxi, Sichuan and some units of the 
Green Standard who were trained in Western drills (Lianjun). It also included some 
civil officials who were "willing to learn about military affairs ".63 The basic 
requirements for entry were good health, intelligence and literacy. This course offered 
training in artillery, infantry, cavalry and engineering. The second type was the five - 
year course offered to those without prior military training. Students were recruited 
from outside the army aged between thirteen and sixteen. There were forty students in 
the first course that began in the spring of 1887. In the first three years, the emphasis 
was on general education. The main subjects included Chinese studies and history, 
mathematics, foreign languages, astronomy, geography, natural sciences, surveying 
and drafting. The last two years of the course were mainly military subjects that 
included weapon studies, tactics, military strategy, fortifications, operational procedure 
and drill. In 1890, railway engineering and administration was included.64 This was to 
meet the manpower demand for the construction of Luhan railway line. The third type 
of course was only for the Manchu Banner officers and the members of the royal 
family.65 
Foreign instructors were responsible for the instruction in Tianjin Military 
School. The classroom lessons conducted by the German instructors were extremely 
slow and painful. A typical classroom lesson would require three persons: the German 
instructor would give the lesson in German, a Chinese translator would translate into 
Chinese, and a Chinese instructor would write it down and then explain it to the class. 
In a single lesson, about 300 to 400 words were said yet the process was usually 
63 Ibid., "Memorials ", 53: 43. 
64 Wang Jiejian. "Beiyang wubei xuetang di chuanshe jigi yingxiang ", p. 4. 
65 The Tianjin Military School was the predecessor of the Manchu Military School set up at the turn 
of the century. 
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confusing and chaotic due to difficulties in translating technical terms and lack of 
preparation. Apart from the classroom lessons, field- training exercises formed an 
important part of the curriculum. Two garrison camps, one in Weihaiwei (Port Arthur) 
and the other in Shanghaiguan were used for this purpose. In addition, students were 
attached to active units for real operations. In 1891, for example, it was reported that 
students were sent to the front line to observe actual battles against rebel forces at Jehol 
and elsewhere.66 
They were three main departments in the military school, the superintendent 
office, the faculty, and the general affairs office. The faculty was the largest 
department, which included the Chinese and foreign instructors, translators and drill 
instructors. The foreign instructors were all Germans numbered about twelve. The 
first superintendent was Yang Zonglian, a civil official with a rank of taotai. Although 
Yang had served under Li Hongzhang and was experienced in administering the Huai 
Army, the Germans did not respect him. In 1889, after a serious conflict with the chief 
German instructor, Major Richter, who threatened to resign if the problem was not 
resolved, Yang left the military school. After that, the post of the superintendent was 
left vacant for many years.67 
The main financial source for the Tianjin Military School came from the 
Beiyang maritime defence budgets with annual operational costs of 50,000 taels.ó8 The 
highest expenditure of the school was the salary of the instructors and students' 
subsidies. 
In addition to the Tianjin Military School, Li Hongzhang had also sent a group 
of five artillery graduates to Germany for advanced studies in 1889. They were Duan 
Qirui, Wu Tingyuan, Shang Dechuan, Kung Qingtang and Xi Yuzao. After about a 
year of instruction at the military academy in Berlin, they were attached to the Krupp 
factory in Essen for practical lessons on gunnery and construction of fortifications.69 
The Tianjin Military School was in operation for sixteen years. It trained about 
1,500 officers from 1885 to 1900. Most of the graduates were appointed as military 
instructors in various units and the better ones were retained in the school. Although 
66 Wang Jiejian. Op. cit., pp. 8, 10. 
fi7 Ibid., p. 5. 
68 Li Hongzhang. Li Wenzhong gong quanji, "Memorials", 63, 64, 70, 71; Wang Jiejian. "Beiyang 
wubei xuetang di chuanshe jigi yingxiang", p. 7. 
ó9 Wang Jiejian. "Beiyang wubei xuetang di chuanshe jigi yingxiang", 8-9. 
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plagued by poor management, limited finances, problems with foreign instructors, and 
difficulty in attracting young talents to attend the course, it survived until 1900. In that 
year, the Boxer rebels destroyed the school premises and this brought the military 
school to its final closure. 
The Tianjin Military Academy had achieved little in terms of upgrading modem 
military skills. The overall standard of military training was poor. Modem weapons 
were generally inadequate and lacked standardisation. Cavalry training were 
superficial, as there were insufficient horses to conduct any meaningful training.70 The 
military defeat during the Sino- Japanese War of 1894 -95 testified to basic weaknesses 
of the Chinese armies and the war almost wiped -out the entire Huai Army. 
The impact of the Tianjin Military School, however, was stronger in the 
political and social fields. The new content of military education, which emphasized 
modem military techniques, qualified graduates to assume the role of military experts. 
AIthough their number was small and did not play any significant role initially, the 
graduates of the Tianjin Military School were the pioneers of the professional military 
officers. In the post -1895 military build -up and the formation of the New Army, the 
Tianjin graduates occupied the front rows of the new military establishment. 
According to one account, among a group of thirty prominent military leaders in the 
early Republic, twenty -five of them had attended the Tianjin Military School and later 
served in the Yuan Shikai's New Army during the period of 1895 -99.71 
The Tianjin Military School also helped to forge a common identity and 
allowed greater career mobility among its graduates. Before the Tianjin Military 
School, military officers in the Chinese armies came mainly from the rank and file. 
Their identity had always been with the units in which they served rather than with the 
officer corps as a whole. By attending courses in Tianjin where officers from various 
units were put together, studying under the same roof and living in the same quarters 
for two years or more, the comradeship, and above all, the qualification of a trained- 
professional military officer would provide a common identity among them.72 This 
70 Ibid., p. 11. 
7I Other than the first class graduate such as Duan Qirui, subsequent courses graduates included Cao 
Kun, Sun Chuanfang and Wu Peifu. This was the so- called "Xiaozhan clique ". They were not only 
furnished the leadership but also marked the beginning of the two big factions of the northern Beiyang 
Army, the Zhili and Anhui cliques. During the 1911 revolution, they showed remarkable unity in giving 
support first to the Manchu throne and later to Yuan Shikai. See Chen, Jerome. "Defming Chinese 
Warlords and their Factions." Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 31, no. 3 (July 
1968): 575. 
72 Before the Tianjin Military School, military training in the Xiang and Huai Armies was on a 
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marked the formation of the modern military -officer corps in China. In addition. being 
a modern military school, Tianjin provided a common basis of professional education 
which allowed more readily the modern principle and practice of inter -postings of 
officers, at least within Yuan Shikai's armies. This was a significant departure from the 
Xiang and Huai armies' practices.73 
The Guangdong Naval & Military School 
Zhang Zhidong was another key reformer and one of the prime movers of the 
Qing government policy.74 He had been the governor of Guangdong, Jiangsu and 
governor -general of Hubei -Hunan for nearly thirty years since the mid- 1880s. He was 
one of the earliest and most enthusiastic advocates of modern military school and was 
keen to send Chinese students to overseas, especially Japan, for further training and 
education. Zhang's efforts in promoting military schools in central and southern China 
had long and Iasting effects on the development of military school in modern China. 
Apart from the Tianjin Military School, the Guangdong Naval and Military 
School was the other modern military school established before the Sino- Japanese War 
of 1894 -95. In 1885, Zhang Zhidong began to employ German instructors in his newly 
organised Changshengjun, the Guangdong Victorious Army. Two years later, to 
"entice men from good families" into the new officer corps in Guangdong, he founded 
the Naval and Military School at Huangpu, near Guangzhou, the venue of the 1920s' 
Huangpu Military Academy. AIthough Zhang, in theory, felt that naval and military 
training were equally important, in practice he placed greater emphasis on the navy 
because of the Guangdong's long coastline. The naval part of the school was modeled 
after the Fuzhou Naval School and Tianjin Naval School. It drew some of its early 
faculty and students from both institutions. Wu Zhongxiang, who had served for ten 
years as the chief administrator at the Fuzhou Naval School and had assisted Li 
Hongzhang in setting up the Tianjin Naval School, became the first director of the 
battalion basis; officers and men from different battalions had never attended training together. As the 
saying went :'jiang yu jiang bu xiang xi, bing yu bing bu xiang zhi" (officers from different units did not 
meet each other and their soldiers did not know each other either), Xiangjun zhi, vol. 20, p. I. 
T For details see Mackinnon, Stephen R. "The Peiyang Army, Yuan Shih -kai, and the Origins of 
Modem Chinese Warlordism." Journal of Asian Studies XXXII, no. 3 (1973): 415 -422. 
74 For Zhang Zhidong's biography and reform programs see Xu Tongxin. Zhang wenxiang gong 
nianpu (Chronological biography of Zhang Zhidong), 10 juan. Shanghai: Shangwu, 1944; Zhang 
Wenxiang gong quanji (Complete works of Zhang Zhidong). Wang Shudan ed., reprint, Taibei: Wenhai, 
1963; William Ayers, Chang Chih -tung and Educational Reform in China. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1971; and Bays, Daniel H. China Enters the Twentieth Century: Chang Chih -Tung and 
the Issues ofA New Age, 1895 -1909. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1978. 
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naval division of the Guangdong Naval and Military School. Like Li Hongzhang's 
Tianjin Military School, Zhang followed the German model and offered courses in 
artillery, infantry, cavalry and military engineering. It also offered foreign languages- - 
German and English --and the best graduates were sent abroad for advanced courses." 
While Li Hongzhang's military school at Tianjin would not allow students to 
take civil examinations, Zhang would permit his students to do so. Zhang gave dual 
emphasis on both Chinese studies as general education, and military studies as 
professional training. Students in the school were required to read from the Chinese 
classics in order to "strengthen the roots" everyday before the classes commenced.76 
Instructors were mainly Chinese and only one or two German instructors taught in the 
first class of seventy students. 
Graduates of the Guangdong Naval and Military School were served in 
provincial establishment. Before 1895, graduates were absorbed into military school or 
as instructors in various mílítary units. After 1896, some graduates were selected to 
staff Zhang's Self -Strengthening Army, and some were employed as instructors in the 
Hubei Military School set up by Zhang in 1896. 
The existence of the Guangdong Naval and Military School was short. Zhang's 
transfer in 1894 first to Nanjing and later Wuchang was nonetheless a serious setback 
to the military school. His successor Li Hanzhang, was not keen on military reform 
and thwarted plans for expansion. The school was eventually closed during the tenure 
of the conservative Guangdong's governor Kangyi. The Tianjin and Guangdong were 
the only two military schools established in the 1880s. It was not until the mid -1890s 
that the military schools were set up in greater number. 
The Hubei Military School 
When Zhang Zhidong was transferred from Guangzhou to Nanjing in 1894, he 
opened the Jiangnan Military School the following year. Five German instructors were 
engaged to train about 150 students. The military school also included a railway 
engineering course to meet the demand for railway construction personnel. The school 
was funded mainly by the customs revenue and supplemented by the Jiangsu provincial 
75 Ayers, William. Chang Chih -tung and Educational Reform in China, I08 -110. 
76 Ibid., 108-113. 
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budget.77 When Zhang again transferred to Wuchang as Governor -general of Hunan 
and Hubei, he set up yet another military school in 1896, the Hubei Military School. 
The background for Zhang's further attempts to build more military schools was 
the disastrous and humilating Chinese defeat in the Sino- Japanese War of 1894 -95. A 
direct consequence of the Sino- Japanese war was the demise of Li Hongzhang, his 
Beiyang Navy and the Huai Army. In 1895, the central government approved plans to 
construct two military units based on the updated organisational and technical 
procedures. One of these units was the Self -Strengthening Army under Zhang Zhidong 
with its headquarters in Nanjing. The other was the Newly Created Army under Yuan 
Shikai based in Zhili. Both armies followed some of the techniques of Zeng Guofan 
but placed much greater emphasis on German and later Japanese training and 
weaponry. Military schools were set up in various provinces to meet the demand of 
this military expansion. 
The Hubei Military School, operated on similar lines to the hangnail Military 
School but with larger course capacity and number of staff. When it opened for 
enrolment in 1897, about four thousand applied for entrance even though the course 
capacity was only 120. Zhang was forced to restrict the entry age to 18 and below, and 
raise qualifications to those who possessed the civil or military degrees, and sons of 
reputable gentry or official families.78 In addition, interviews and preliminary tests 
were conducted to select the qualified candidates. The interest in enrolment in the 
Hubei Military School was in sharp contrast to the Tianjin Military School about 
twelve years ago. When its first five -year course was launched, it could assemble only 
40 students. This suggests a new attitude toward the profession of arms inspired by 
rising Chinese nationalism and new career opportunities in the military. 
The teaching faculty consisted of about ten instructors, three Germans, one 
Japanese and the rest Chinese, and about twenty supporting staff. From 1904, Zhang 
employed three more Japanese instructors to the faculty. The German designed 
curriculum placed great emphasis on military subjects and practical field exercises. 
General education subjects such as Chinese studies and history were not included in the 
three -year course. The Hubei Military School also assisted the provincial army by 
See Zhang Wenxiang gong quanji (Complete works of Zhang Zhidong). Wang Shudan ed., reprint, 
Taibei: Wenhai, 1963, Memorials 41, 8 -9; Li Shoukong. "Qingji xinjun zhi bianlian jigi yanbian (The 
organisation and development of the new army during Qing period)." Zhongguo lishi xuehui shixue jikan 
(Collected Papers on Chinese History of the Chinese Historical Society), no. 2 (April 1970), p. 85. 
8 Zhang Wenxiang gong quanji (Complete works of Zhang Zhidong), 120 juan: Correspondence 35, 
14 -15; 17 -19. 
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forming a special Training Regiment to teach the battalion Western- styled drills and 
tactics.79 
The graduates of the military school were in demand as more military schools 
were set up in various parts of China. In 1898, twenty -four graduates and the next year 
nineteen were selected for further training in Japan. In 1902, Zhang instituted an 
advanced course modelled on the Japanese military academy. Rikugun shikan gakko. 
This was a two -year course designed for graduates in advanced infantry, cavalry, 
artillery, and engineering training. In the first year, students attended classes in the 
school, and in the second year on unit attachments. Under Zhang's leadership, the 
Hubei Military School became one of the best military schools in China prior to 1904 
military education re- organisation.80 
By 1904, all except three provinces in China had military schools. According 
to one account, there were three military schools in Zhili, two in Hubei and all but 
three of the remaining sixteen provinces had one with a total enrolment of 3,344 
(2,100) students. The three provinces without military schools were, Guangxi, where 
governmental control was constantly challenged; Gansu which was too poor, and 
Henan where the governors were too reactionary.81 Chinese, Japanese and German 
military instructors were employed in these schools. The emphasis of the training was 
on practical military subjects with fewer or no general education subjects. 
Japanese Military Training 
While the military schools continued to grow after the Hubei Military School,82 
there was a trend towards replacing the German with Japanese military instructors and 
sending more students to Japanese instead of European military training institutions. In 
79 Ibid 104 juan: Correspondence 19, 24 -25. The Training Regiments set up to train military units 
were a common feature in the Chinese army since then. The Huangpu Military Academy had also the 
same arrangements to train the party army. 
8° Hu Junzhong ed. Zhang wenxiang gong nianpu (Chronological biography of Zhang Zhidong), 6 
juan, Taibei: Wenhai, 1964, in juan 5, p. 14. 
n The North China Herald, 27 January 1905, an article on "Military Academies in China ", 209 -210. 
82 According to one Chinese source, in late Qing Dynasty there were over 200 military schools all 
over China. This number could be exaggerated. By 1906, one can identify about 27 military schools. 
There were organised by provincial governments with little or no guidance from the central government. 
As a result, there was a lack of standard of organisation, weapons, drills and operational procedures. See 
Sheling Waishi (pseud.). "Baoding junguan xuexíao cangsang shi ( A turbulent history of the Baoding 
military academy)." Chunqiu, no.63 (16.2.1960), p. 2 and Powell, Ralph L. The Rise of the Chinese 
Military Power, 1895 -1912. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955, 235 -6. 
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the past, the Chinese were great admirers of the German military system. To the 
Chinese officials, German troops were an impressive sight when performing precision 
drills and marching, which the Chinese called the "yabucao ", the duck march. 
Moreover, Germany did not pose any threat to China, at least before the 1897 German 
seizure of Jiaozhou and Shandong, which Chinese officials found it difficult to trust 
Westerners that offered to share their military knowledge.83 Furthermore, the presence 
of the German officers could be used to offset British domination of such organs as the 
Maritime Customs Bureau, thus playing one country off the another. For their part, the 
Germans cultivated Chinese officials in order to provide a market for arms, in 
particular, those manufactured by Krupp.84 Krupp manufacturers offered subsidies to 
German instructors in China if they could persuade the Chinese army to use German 
weapons.85 
The Japanese military had definitely impressed the Chinese when they defeated 
them in 1894 -95, and the Russians in 1904 -05. But there were also a number of 
practical reasons why the Chinese military turned to the Japanese during the turn of the 
century. Japanese instructors were cheaper than Europeans. This was an important 
consideration for provincial governors and governors -general who had to finance 
military schools from their own treasuries. In addition, at a time when advanced 
military training was unavailable in China, using the Japanese model would permit 
Chinese military students to supplement their basic training in China with higher 
education in Japan, at far less cost than at equivalent French and German institutions.86 
The shorter distance between Japan and China also made supervision of Chinese 
students there easier and less expensive. The Japanese language is easier than German 
or French for Chinese to learn. The pool of Chinese interpreters was greater to assist in 
83 See Biggerstaff, Knight. The Earliest Modern Government Schools in China. Ithaca: Cornell Press, 
1961, p. 72. 
84 During and after the Taiping Rebellion, Li Hongzhang through the arrangement of the German 
Ambassador in Tianjin purchased 102 Krupp artillery pieces; 5000 each of the Hoschkiss and Mauser 
rifles for the Chinese army. The new artillery battalions formed in the 1870s were equipped with Krupp 
artillery guns. Li Wenzhong gong quanji (Complete Papers of Li Hongzhang), Memorial 49: 4 -5. 
85 See Schrecker, J. Imperialism and Chinese Nationalism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1971, pp.7 -11; and Gadoffre, C. "Vallee du Yangtze: les Troupes Chinoises et leurs Instructeurs 
(translated by James Rockwell)." Journal of the United States Infantry Association, no. 1 (July 1904): 
11. 
86 Take the case of the Tianjin Military School: the monthly salary of the Chinese Chief Instructor, 
who also had to perform translation, was earning about silver 100 taels; the Personnel Officers 50 taels; 
and the Chinese Instructor 20 taels. For the German instructors, the monthly salary ranged from 120 to 
300 taels depending on seniority and appointments. In addition, they were also given travelling 
allowance for home leaves and other incentives. Li Wenzhong gong quanji (Complete Papers of Li 
Hongzhang), Translated Correspondence 19, "On the resignation of the German instructor ", p. 28. 
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the Japanese instructors in various military schools. On the other hand, Japanese could 
generally learn Chinese more easily than a European, so the number of Japanese who 
knew Chinese was also larger. 
Zhang Zhidong came out strongly in support for Japanese education in 1898. 
He argued that not only was study in Japan cheaper and more convenient than Europe, 
but it had less language problems and would also be easier to supervise and control 
students' activities.87 Moreover, Confucian ethics were still stressed in Japanese school 
system and that would be a good moral influence upon the Chinese students.$$ 
Beginning in 1898, Zhang sent frequent inspection missions to Japan to learn how to 
build a modern school system in his own provinces, and he sent ever increasing 
number of civil and military students on provincial government stipends to pursue 
training courses in Japan.89 Zhang strongly believed in the value of study in Japan and 
took great care to look after those students whom he sent there. During his tenure as 
the Governor- general of Hubei and Hunan provinces in the years between 1889 -1907, 
he sent more young Chinese to Japan from his provinces than any other province. In 
fact, many students from other provinces came to enrol schools in Hunan and Hubei in 
order to qualify for study in Japan. Zhang used to talk to students, as a kind of pep 
talk, before their departure. He urged them to work hard, be serious in their studies, 
stay away from troubles and returned to serve the country upon completion. He was 
conscientious to look after each returning student by arranging good jobs or 
recommending them to central government, other provincial officials and schools 
around the country.90 Many of the returned students were in fact taken away from 
Hubei by various military commands, the Ministries of Finance and Education in 
Beijing, top schools and other leading officials.91 
n According to one study, by 1911 the total number of Chinese studying in Japan had reached at 
least 18,000 and effective students' supervision had become an important issue. Despite the very active 
students' movement in Japan, the Qing government had quite a good control of the situation. Shi Jin, 
Zhongguo xiandaihua yundong yu Qindmo liu Ri xuesheng (The modernisation of China and Chinese 
Students in Japan during the late Qing period). Taibei: 1967. On the supervision by the Qing officials of 
Chinese students' activities in Japan, see Bays, Daniel H. 'Chinese Government Policies Towards the 
Revolutionary Students in Japan After 1900: Reassessment and Implications." Journal of Asian Studies 7 
(1973): 152 -177. 
88 Zhang Wenxiang gong quanji (Complete works of Zhang Zhidong), 203:7. 
89 For the discussion of Zhang Zhidong's policy in sending students to Japan, read one of the returned 
students comment, Ji Yiqiao. "Xianxian wenxiang gong shijitan" (Talking about the life of the former 
worthy Zhang Zhidong), Hubei wenxian (Documents of Hubei) 2 (1967); and also Bays, Daniel H. 
China Enters the Twentieth Century: Chang Chih -Tung and the Issues of a New Age, 1895 -1909. USA: 
Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1978, chapter 6. 
90 Ibid. p. 20. 
91 Zhang Wenxiang gong quanji (Complete works of Zhang Zhidong), 228: 17b. This is an important 
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The number of Chinese students studying in the Japanese military institutions 
grew rapidly after 1903. It is estimated that between 1904 and 1911, about 800 
Chinese officers in the Chinese army had graduated from or studied in the Japanese 
military schools, some 630 officers had been trained in the prestigious Japanese 
Military Academy.92 All of them had to attend the Rikugun seijo gakko, a preparatory 
school designed specially for Chinese Students, for two (before 1906) to three years, 
before proceeding to shikan gakko, the Japanese Military Academy, or lesser military 
schools such as the military police, survey, and logistics. All of them while in Japan 
had been subject to a variety of influences. Foremost was the first -hand experience of 
seeing Japan, a nation strengthened to a point of superiority over both China and 
Russia, and realising more than ever the impotence of the Chinese government.93 
China's inability to keep the Russians out of Manchuria in 1903 particularly provoked 
the students' rage at their government.94 Furthermore, students in Japan must have 
noticed the high status accorded soldiers there, in sharp contrast to their own status in 
traditionally. Nor could they have been unreceptive to the debates ranging among 
Chinese reformers and revolutionaries in Japan at the time. The horizons of students 
were also broadened by their contacts with non -military students in Japan and with 
translations of Western political literature. Jiang Fangzhen, for instance, was active in 
reformist debate in his capacity as editor of the Tide of Zhejiang. This journal and 
others like it broadened the awareness of their readers by reports and opinions on 
scholarship, current events and literature.95 Upon graduation, most were immediately 
employed as instructors in their provincial military schools. New political and military 
ideas and opinions such nationalism, monarchical- constitutionalism, republicanism, 
evident that a provincial -based military academy had a national outlook. 
92 Main references for the Chinese students in Japanese military schools include, Riben lujun shiguan 
xuexiao Zhonghua minguo liuxuesheng minbu (Students records of graduates of the Shikan gakko during 
the Republican China). Guo Rongsheng ed., Taibei: Wenhai, 1976; Shi Jin. Zhongguo xiandaihua 
yundong yu Qindmo liuRi xuesheng (The modernisation of China and Chinese Students in Japan during 
the late Qing period). Taibei: 1967; Saneto Keishu. Chugokujin Nihon ryugaku shi (A history of 
Chinese students in Japan). Tokyo: 1960; Wang Longzhong reprint. Liudong lujun shiguan xuexiao 
tongxuelu (Records of the Chinese shikan gakko graduates). Taibei: Kept in the library of the Zhongyang 
yanjíuyuan jindaishi yanjiu shou (Institute of Modern History, the Academia Sinica). As well as Fung, 
Edmund S.K.. The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution, Canberra: Australian National 
University Press, 1980, 72 -73; MacKinnon, Stephen R., Power and Politics in Late Imperial China, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, 93 -94. 
93 See for example Yen Xishan's comment in Li Shoukong. "Qingji xinjun zhi bianlian jiqi yanbian 
(The organisation and development of the new army during Qing period)." Zhongguo lishí xuehui shixue 
jikan (Collected Papers on Chinese History of the Chinese Historical Society), no. 2 (April 1970): 136. 
94 Harrell, Paula. "The Years of the Young Radicals: The Chinese Student in Japan, 1900 -1915" . Ph 
D dissertation, Columbia University, 1970, p. 111. 
95 Ibid., 48-49. 
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and militarism that many students acquired in Japan were passed on to their fellow 
officers when they returned to China. Since the Japanese trained students were 
employed nationwide, their thinking and influence in the military schools became 
fairly well spread throughout the country. 
The New Armies and the National Military Education System 
The ignominious defeat of imperial forces along with the Boxers in 1900 
provided further evidence of the urgent need to create a new military force on the 
Japanese- Western model. A comprehensive and ambitious military reform plan was 
formulated in Beijing. The military reform of 1901 -1907 covered essentially three 
broad directions. First, the abolition of the old examination system; second, the 
creation of a system of recruitment, training, equipping and organisation similar to any 
of the world advanced armies; third, the formation of a truly national armed forces with 
the central government taking over the tasks of co- ordination and ultimate authority. 
The traditional military examinations were eliminated in 1901 after a series of 
petitions submitted by Zhang Zhidong and Liu Kunyi.96 New directives from the 
central government also ordered all governors -general and governors to establish 
military schools in each province. The military schools created earlier by Zhang 
Zhidong, Li Kunyi and Yuan Shikai served as models. These three men supervised the 
drafting of new regulations to govern military education. At the same time, a new 
organisation structure for the military was formulated. A national standing army was 
to be formed, together with reserve units that could be mobilised in the event of war. It 
also proposed the establishment of a separate national police force. Personnel for these 
units were to be selected from the Army of the Green Standard, provincial militia, and 
other existing forces. Those judged unfit were to be discharged. Those chosen for the 
new army and police force would be given specialised training, modern equipment and 
uniforms and better salary. These were ambitious proposals, if fully realised on a 
national scale would have had far- reaching repercussions. However, this national 
reform program was at first focused primarily on a few regions and was carried out 
chiefly in armies under Zhang Zhidong and Yuan Shikai. 
96 For Zhang and Liu memorials, see Powell, Ralph L. The Rise of the Chinese Military Power, 
1895 -1912, p. 132. For more recent study see Mackinnon, Stephen R. "The Peiyang Army, Yuan 
Shih -kai, and the Origins of Modem Chinese Warlordism." Journal of Asian Studies, XXXII, no. 3 
(1973): 405 -423; and Power and Politics in Late Imperial China, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1980; Fung, Edmund S.K.. The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution, Canberra: 
Australian National University Press, 1980. 
In Yuan Shikai's New Army, later known as the Beiyang Army, recruitment 
and training of the army began in February 1902 after Zhili province, where Yuan was 
the governor, received a sum of one million taels from the Empress Dowager.97 The 
funds did not permit Yuan to proceed as rapidly as he originally planned. But over the 
next four years some major progress was made. A provincial Department of Military 
Administration was set up to regulate all military matters. Short- course officers' school 
was created to train or retrain officers of the new army. Fifty -five students were sent to 
Japan for advanced military education and fourteen Japanese instructors were hired to 
teach at the newly established officers' school at Baoding. Yuan Shikai's Beiyang 
Army grew rapidly during 1903 -1905. He had six divisions with a total strength of 
about 60,000 men, trained in accordance with the Japanese -German model. Strenuous 
efforts were made to instill professionalism and discipline in both the enlisted men and 
officers through a network of technical and professional military training centres. By 
1905, apart from Zhang Zhidong's small units of the Self -Strengthening Army 
(Zigianjun), Yuan Shikai's Beiyang Army in the North was the most promising modern 
force and was also becoming the nucleus of a national army. 
The organisation of the new armies was based primarily on Western model with 
a functional division and greater use of advanced military technology. Following the 
German army tables of organisation, the new army was divided into three main arms: 
infantry, cavalry, and artillery, along with separate engineering and other technical 
components. German officers were employed to aid in the initial training and the 
organisation of the new units. 
In December 1903, in the midst of the crisis provoked by the Russian threat in 
Manchuria and the impending Russo -Japanese War, the central government set up a 
Commission for Army Reorganisation (Lian bingchu). Prince Qing was appointed 
director, Yuan Shikai the associate director, and Tieliang, a competent Manchu 
military man, the assistant director. This commission, which actually ran by Yuan, was 
intended to preside over the centralisation of the Chinese military structure. It also 
enabled Yuan to channel funds to his Zhili divisions. The Beiyang Army was 
dependent upon the Empress Dowager and the court for its support; therefore so long 
as Yuan remained on top in Beijing and in Zhili, he could protect his interests. 
Meanwhile, proposals for military reform on a national scale continued to 
97 The funds being collected from provincial sources for military reform were allocated primarily to 
Yuan despite protests from various provincial governors. See MacKinnon, Stephen R. Power and 
Politics in Late Imperial China, 103 -114. 
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emanate from Beijing and most of them reflected Yuan's ideas. The Commission for 
Army Reorganisation soon made its recommendations to provide a comprehensive plan 
for a national army. In essence, the plan called for the creation of a standing army of 
thirty -six divisions each with 12,500 men. This would be accomplished over a period 
of seventeen years. At the same time, there would be a new military education system 
covering elementary military schools to a national academy and staff college. There 
was also plan to establish a common standard of equipment and training procedures 
throughout the new army.98 
The proposal of a military education system, which was an imitation of the 
Japanese system of military training, called for standardisation of training through a 
hierarchy of military schools. In every province and at major garrison posts, there 
would be at least one military elementary school set up to conduct a three -year general 
education supplemented by basic military training. Since military schools had already 
existed in almost all provinces, should be all converted into military elementary 
schools. Four military middle schools to be allocated in Zhili, Hubei, Jiangsu and 
Shensi would offer a two -year course and four months of practical training in the ranks. 
Graduates of the military middle schools would be selected to attend the military 
academy for an 18 -month course and another six months attachment to units for on the 
job training. Two years at the staff college would end the military education for the 
best young officers.99 Under this plan, the initial education would go under the 
auspices of the provinces to ensure a minimally educated lower officer corps. Students 
continuing on to higher school would be put under the central authority. They would 
attend the officers' academy and staff college that would be set up in Baoding to 
provide a national orientation education. 
The number and size of the military elementary schools increased with the 
abolition of the civil service examination system in September 1905. By the 1905, 
every province except Gansu and Henan had its own military elementary schools (most 
of them had one, but bigger provinces were allowed to have two) with a total 
enrolment of about 3,344 students, although the 1904 plan projected about 2,000 
98 For details of the imperial decree, military re- organisation and the Commission report, see 
Guangxu zhengyao (Important political events of the Guangxu reign), Shen Dongsheng, Dong Yuan and 
Dong Run eds., Shanghai, 1909, 25: 37a and 38a -41a; also Powell, Ralph L. The Rise of the Chinese 
Military Power, 173 -180. 
99 Zouding lujun xuetang banfa ershi tiao (Twenty regulations regarding the organisation of the 
military schools), Dongfang zazhi (Eastern miscellany), 1: 12, December 1904. Also, Powell, The Rise 
of the Chinese Military Power, p. I81. 
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students annually.10° About 90 per cent of them would be admitted to the four military 
middle schools. From here, about 1,500 were expected to graduate each year and 
assigned to military units.t01 Military schools previously attracted students mainly 
because they were free. With the abolition of the civil service examinations, the 
military profession seemed more attractive as the government elevated military officers 
to the same rank as civil officials. As a result, a more positive attitude toward the 
military was emerging. A widening circle of people within China's political, economic 
and educational elite began to accept the vital importance of developing a modern and 
effective national force. An image of the new military man was emerging: he should 
be someone who is literate, disciplined, physically and mentally fit, motivated by 
patriotism and capable of handling sophisticated equipment. 
In 1906, the Army Reorganisation Commission and the Board of War (Bingbu) 
were merged into the Ministry of the Army under Tieliang. Greater control now 
exercised by the central and the military authority was in the hands of the Manchu. 
The court attempted in 1907 to consolidate further its control over the military schools 
when Tieliang pressured Yuan Shikai to place the schools at Baoding under direct 
supervision of the Army Ministry. Achieving control over the Baoding military 
institutions was important because many of the students were from other provinces. 
With military schools in virtually every province by 1909, the central government was 
ready to implement the second stage of the 1904 plan for a hierarchy of schools. There 
were sufficient instructors who had trained in Japan and at local military schools to 
supply the new schools. By the end of 1909, four military middle schools were set up 
at Qinghe (Zhili), Nanjing, Wuchang and shortly thereafter Xi'an (Shensi). The next 
step was the setting up of the military academy at Baoding to accommodate the first 
batch of graduates from the two -year middle schools. The military academy was 
opened in 1911 at Baoding with the full -term academy scheduled to commence the 
following year.102 Thus, on the eve of the 1911 Revolution, the Qing government had 
carried out more than half of its original plan for a military education system and laid 
the foundation for a national system to train a corps of officers. 
The progress of the military build -up of the New Army was slow. By the end 
100 The North China Herald, 27 January 1905, an article on " Military Academies in China ", 209- 
210. 
101 Zhu Wu. "Woguo zhi lujun (The army of our country)." Guofang bao (Defence journal) I, no. 2 
(1910): 68 -70. 
102 Zhu Wu, "Woguo zhi lujun (The army of our country)." Guofang bao (Defence journal) 1, no. 2 
(1910): 47 -74, 67. Also The China Yearbook, London: George Routledge, 1912, p. 246. 
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of 1910s, only six of the originally planned thirty -six divisions (two in each province) 
were created. Of the six, four stationed in Zhili and Shangdong were organised by 
Yuan Shikai. Nanjing and Wuchang had one division each set up by Duanfang and 
Zhang Zhidong respectively. In addition, there were twelve mixed brigades in various 
provinces. The Japanese system of training was used in these units.103 The total army 
strength was estimated to be under 200,000, although the Chinese official records 
indicated over one million. i°4 The military reform of the army stressed Iocal 
recruitment of soldiers for divisions stationed in the province rather than the use of 
non -natives, but greater care in selection was emphasised.l0' The main problems 
remained the lack of provincial support, serious financial shortfall, and the delicate 
relationship between the central and provincial governments. Therefore by 1911, with 
the exception of the Beiyang divisions, the national army existed largely in name only. 
The progress of the education reform, on the other hand, though faced with similar 
problems had achieved greater results. Again, Zhili and Hubei led the way. Officers 
who had graduated from military schools were being assigned to various provinces. 
They made great effort to recruit promising officer candidates through various 
promises and emoluments including better pay. 
Politicisation of the Officer Corps 
The humiliation of China's defeat in the Sino- Japanese War, and the subsequent 
Chinese weakness in the face of Western and Japanese military intrusions during the 
Boxer Uprising and the Russo -Japanese War, aroused widespread concern in China, 
especially among the educated elite, that her national existence was endangered by 
encroaching imperialism. A profusion of magazines and newspapers helped to spread 
the nationalist message, while new means of political expression emerged in the form 
of public meetings, petition drives, and political clubs.106 The politicisation of the 
Chinese society that began in late Qing did not cease with the 1911 Revolution but 
103 This observation was made by Col Igata in 1909, the Japanese military adviser to Zhang Zhidong, 
after returning to Tokyo. Col Igata commented although positive reforms were made, the military in 
China was still in "a state of infancy ". He felt that Chinese soldiers lacked "martial spirit" and China 
needed a conscription system like Japan had, to beef up her military power. See "Colonel Igata on 
China ", North China Herald, 3 July 1909, p. 35. 
104 See Powell, The Rise of the Chinese Military Power, 288 -9. 
1°5 The practice of recruiting soldiers from common locals has many practical values. By taking in 
people from the sane area can minimise problems of dialect, food and general customs whereby reducing 
prejudices and conflicts among soldiers. 
106 Mary Rankin's studies has shown the creation of the "public sphere" and the formation of elite 
political activism and oppositional public opinion in the nineteenth century China as a result of foreign 
imperialism. See Mary B. Rankin, Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China: Zhijiang 
Province, 1865 -1911, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986. 
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carried through the first two decades of the Republic to even larger segments of 
society. 
The politicisation of the military was first concentrated in the military schools. 
Lucian Pye has suggested that modern military training in itself sensitises army officers 
in developing nations to their country's backwardness and thus increase their 
inclination to intervene in politics.107 But in the case of China, the politicisation of 
many military students preceded their enrolment in military schools. The 
concentration of large number of students, both military and civil, in urban centres 
created the environment for an uneven greater spread of nationalist and even 
revolutionary ideas. The politicisation of the military students thus had less to do with 
their military studies than with the conditions responsible for the general politicisation 
of China's modern educated students. 
The following discussion will examine the response of the officers corps to 
1911 Revolution, and the rise and fall of the Baoding Military Academy in the first two 
decades of the Republic. The case of Baoding demonstrates the politicisation of the 
officer corps was much more widespread after 1911 and the disintegration of China 
after 1916 created a greater divisive effect than the 1911 Revolution. 
The 1911 Revolution 
Apart from the general political dissatisfaction of the imperial government, the 
military reform in late Qing dynasty could have created unhappiness among the 
military. The drive to modernise the army had produced efforts at stricter discipline, 
more arduous training, and weeded out the unfit. These efforts, together with the 
accelerated attempts to transfer primary authority over the military to the central 
government, had aroused apprehension and resentment. On the other hand, reform was 
not successful enough to eliminate the traditional grievances: inhumane treatment, 
inadequate living conditions and arrears in pay. The Beijing government's financial 
difficulties resulted in pay reductions and inadequate resources for many units. Morale 
correspondingly plummeted. The revolutionaries thus found rich soil to work upon. 
Revolutionaries committed to Sun Yatsen and his program had been manufactured in 
increasing numbers in Japan. By 1910's, many returned to China, and were installed in 
various units as junior officers. They were committed to the overthrow of the Qing. 
Not only the Tongmeng Hui but also the Guangfu Hui played a significant role in 
107 Lucian Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modemisation ", in The Role of the Military in 
Underdeveloped countries, ed. John J. Johnson, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962, 77 -78. 
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subverting elements of the New Army » " 
A significant portion of the military, however, was not prepared to support the 
revolution. In the North, the old Beiyang armies remained largely immune to 
revolutionary influences. One reason lay in the fact that these units were generally 
well- financed, and therefore had fewer grievances relating to pay and rations. Nor did 
the North have a strong anti -Manchu legacy to infect junior officers and men in the 
ranks. In the South, where revolutionary penetration had been much greater. some 
units could be counted within the revolutionary camp, and a large number were 
considered unsafe from the government's standpoint. Yet, except in Hubei, the 
revolutionaries had not scored either the propaganda victories or the organisation gains 
required for sustained support from within the existing military forces. Nor had the 
building of new military units by revolutionaries progressed beyond an embryonic 
stage. There was, to be sure, a sizeable number of military men and units impregnated 
with political doubts but ready to jump on the radical bandwagon if success appeared 
imminent. The younger officers were especially vulnerable. But the military 
assessment at that time would point out that any revolution was likely to prove 
premature. 1°9 
Although a military uprising by the Hubei New Army that set the 1911 
Revolution in motion, those involved were mainly common soldiers and junior 
officers, most of whom ranked no higher than platoon commanders.110 Most career - 
minded middle- and upper -echelon officers were unwilling to risk active participation 
in revolutionary organisations involved in the plotting of the uprising. This does not 
mean that they were necessarily opposed to the idea of revolution once they saw it had 
some chance of success. Whether out of idealism or opportunism, a good number of 
the company, battalion, and even regiment commanders eventually came forward to 
108 For more about the revolutionaries within the armies, see Fung, The Military Dimension of the 
Chinese, 114 -144. Fung gives an extensive account of military participation in various revolutionaries 
societies and groups in Hubei prior to Wuchang uprising. Fung regards the Hubei army as atypical in the 
large number of revolutionaries within it. For the activities of Guangfu and Zhejiang, see Zhang Yufa, 
"The Restoration Society and the Revolution of 1911 ". Paper presented in the Conference on 1911 
Revolution, 1981, Taibei. 
i°9 This point was made very clearly by Sun Yatsen in 1924, his address to the official opening of the 
Huangpu Military Academy. Sun accused the professional military officers who were trained in the 
overseas and local military schools of not playing any important roles in the 1911 Revolution as they did 
not believe the revolution would succeed. See Zhongyang lujun junguan xuexiao shigao (Draft history 
of the central military academy), Nanjing, c1936, vol.1, pp. 1 -107 to 1 -117. The English translation of 
the speech is included in the Appendix A. 
10 Shao Baichang, "Xinhai Wuchang shouyi zhi qianyin houguo ji qi zuozhan jingguo" (The causes 
and effects of the 1911 Wuchang uprising and its military operations), Hubei wenxian, 10 (10 January 
1969): 17 -20. 
43 
support the revolution in the days following the success of the Wuchang uprising. 1 i 
Baoding Military Academy 
Military schools were interrupted by the outbreak of the 1911 Revolution. 
Many students joined in the revolutionary activities but others simply returned home 
when their schools closed. It was not until the fall of 1912 that the political situation 
had stabilised and most of the schools reopened. The new Republican administration 
formed the Department of Military Education as one of the eleven departments in the 
new Army Ministry headed by Duan Qirui, a graduate of the Tianjin Military School. 
The new department had the responsibility for formulating regulations, textbooks, 
courses, discipline and examinations. In 1915 it became the Army Training 
Commission, incorporating the functions of the Military Education Publications Office 
that had been in charge of standardising textbooks.112 
The military elementary schools were retained but the middle schools at Xí'an 
and Nanjing were not reopened, and those at Qinghe and Wuchang were renamed as 
First and Second Military Preparatory School respectively.113 By 1912, there were 
about 1,700 graduates who had completed the two -year middle school course. They 
served six months as student officers in the regular army and passed the examination to 
enter Boading Military Academy forming the first class of this new national military 
academy. t 14 
The Baoding Military Academy,115 was the officers' highest -level school and a 
national meeting ground for China's future military leaders. The academy was located 
on an open plain outside the east gate of Baoding, Zhili province. The area 
"1 A list of seventeen lower officers, mainly company and platoon commanders, who joined the 
revolt in the first day is given in Cao Yabo, Wuchang geming zhenshi (True story of the Wuchang 
revolution), Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1930, 2: 79; for examples of higher officers who hid or fled 
during the uprising but returned to accept positions in the revolutionary armies or government, see Wu 
Xinghan, "Wuchang qiyi sanri ji" (Three -day record of the Wuchang uprising), in Xinhai geming, ed. 
Zhonghua shíxuehui, 5: 84. 
112 Lujun xingzheng jiyao (An account of the army administration), 291 -309. 
113 Lujun bu (Army ministry) comp. Lujun xingzheng jiyao (An account of the army administration). 
Beijing 1906, reprint, Taibei: Wenhai, 1971, pp.327, 229. 
Sheling Waishi (p seud.) . "Baoding jun uan xuexiao can san g shi" ( A turbulent history ry of the 
Baoding military academy). Chunqiu, 63 -73 (16.2.1960 -1.7.1960), no.63, p.3. 
115 The official name in Chinese, Lujun junguan xuexiao, the Army Officers' Academy, was adapted 
from the Japanese Military Academy, Rikugun shikan gakko. After Baoding, the other military academy 
which used the name of Lujun junguan xuexiao was the Huangpu Military Academy. 
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surrounding the academy was particularly suited for military training. The campus 
consisted of a large rectangular area with dining halls and lecture rooms at each end, 
flanked by two one -story buildings that served as student hostels and classrooms. A 
large exercise field, a stable, an arsenal and various storehouses rounded out the 
facilities.116 This campus served as the focus of a 18 -month program in military 
training. The course offered only a few general education subjects. Instead, the 
curriculum stressed military tactics, weaponry, fortifications, topography and minor 
subjects such as management, health, horsemanship and foreign languages. Students 
entering the academy were grouped into various units: infantry, cavalry, artillery, 
engineering or logistics. They would remain with the units throughout the entire 
course. Infantry was by far the most popular, in 1914 there were six infantry 
companies (dui), two each of cavalry and artillery and one each of engineering and 
logistics (see table 3)."7 
The timing of the founding of the Baoding Military Academy, however, was 
most unfortunate because the post -1911 Revolution China was still forging a new 
political system through intense political struggle between the military and 
revolutionaries, and among various political factions. The Baoding Military Academy 
soon fell victim to political controversy and uncertainty. The appointment of the 
academy's first Commandant, Zhao Lidai, triggered -off a series of incidents at the 
academy. Zhao had been the director of the Army Short- Course School18, standard 
was equivalent to, or even lower than the military middle schools. It was reported that 
Zhao was close to the Army Minister Duan Qiruí, and when he appointed many of his 
former students from the Army Short- Course School as instructors, the young and 
idealistic Baoding students were extremely unhappy.119 Troubles between the 
academy's board and students soon started when the commandant tightened the 
discipline and dismissed students who violated its regulations. Many students 
interpreted this move as the Commandant's attempt to get rid of students who 
supported the revolution. They therefore decided to challenge the authorities by 
staging a strike, demanding Zhao's ouster, better instructors, re- admission of expelled 
116 She ling Waishi (pseud.). Baoding junguan xuexiao cangsang shi ( A turbulent history of the 
Baoding military academy)." Chunqiu, no. 63, p.5; Li Zonghuang. Li Zonghuang huiyilu (The memoirs 
of Li Zonghuang), 284 -285. 
117 Liu Zhi. Wo di huiyi (My recollections), p. 7. 
'18 The Tongguo lujun sucheng xuetang, set up by Yuan Shikai was the predecessor of the Baoding 
Military Academy. 
119 For the Baoding Military Academy see Li Zonghuang. Li Zonghuang huiyilu, 28 -39; and Sheling 
Waishi, "Baoding junguan xuexiao cangsang shi ", 2 -4. 
45 
students and non -discrimination against students with radical opinions.t2° But the 
central authorities would not back down. At Duan's orders, two regiments from the 
Beiyang garrison at Baoding surrounded the academy. For over a month the situation 
was deadlocked. Finally, in October, after receiving an ultimatum from Duan to call 
off the strike or face punishment, the students marched en masse to Beijing to garner 
public support. In the capital, the students won overwhelming public sympathy. The 
governors of Hubei, Sichuan, Yunnan, Jiangxi and Anhui urged Duan to compromise. 
Duan was forced to give in, rescind his orders, and appoint a new commandant. The 
thousand students who had marched to the capital returned to Baoding in triumph. 
The Baoding Military Academy's new Commandant was Jiang Fangzhen (Jiang 
Baili), a well trained professional military officer and a graduate of the Japanese 
Shikan gakko. He had only recently returned to China after attending an advanced 
military course in Germany. Jiang was thirty -five years old when appointed. He was 
enthusiastic about making Baoding a first -rate military academy. In his inaugural 
speech to cadets and staff, he stressed patriotism and self -discipline, and urged them to 
set high standard for both training and discipline.121 He replaced the old short- course 
instructors with capable officers from the units and better trained Japanese and other 
overseas military academy graduates. He held frequent inspections and even taught 
courses. He paid particular attention to discipline, welfare, the standardisation of 
working procedures, the physical appearance and uniforms of each student. He 
instituted a mutual supervision where each group of seven students was responsible for 
the conduct of its individual members. To inculcate social etiquette among his students 
and staff, he even introduced the mess dining -in at the academy.122 Within the first 
three months of his appointment, the academy improved vastly. 
Although Jiang was ambitious in his plans for the academy, but Beijing was 
neither keen nor ready for expansion and preferred to maintain the status quo. The 
commandant's reformist approach soon brought him into conflict with the Army 
Ministry. This disagreement mirrored the Iong- standing conflict between new and old 
120 Liu Zhi, Wo di huiyi (My recollections), p.7; Tao Juyin. Jiang Baili xiansheng juan (Biography 
of Jiang Baili), Shanghai: Zhonghua, 1948, p.36; Gong Hao. Gong Hao xiansheng fangwen jilu (Record 
of the interviews with Mr Dong Hao). Taibei: Institute of Modem History, Academia Sinica, 1962, p.26; 
Hu Zongduo. Hu Zongduo xiansheng fangwen jilu (Record of interviews with Mr.Hu Zongduo), Taibei: 
Institute of Modem History, Academia Sinica, 1962, p. 6. 
121 Sheling Waishi, "Baoding junguan xuexiao cangsang shi ", p.3; Li Zonghuang huryilu, p.43. 
122 Gong Hao. Gong Hao xiansheng fangwen jilu (Record of the interviews with Mr Dong Hao), 
p.127; Tao Juyin. Jiang Baili xiansheng juan (Biography of Jiang Baili), 38 -42; Li Zonghuang huiyilu, 
45-46. 
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army styles. Jiang's cadets were not likely to fit in with the old -style approach of 
officers who were in charge of the system and feared the influx of devoted and 
intelligent Baoding officers into the army. Jiang had no supporters within the army to 
defuse the situation. The conflict was finaIIy brought into open by Jiang's repeated 
requests to the ministry for funds to improve the academy. But his proposals were all 
denied. In June 1913, after returning from yet another futile trip to Beijing. Jiang 
ordered students and staff to assemble in the main lecture hall. After a few remarks 
stating that he had failed in his attempt to improve the academy, he drew his pistol and 
shot himself. He was saved by his alert assistant, but injured his arm. Jiang's action 
shocked not only the Baoding cadets and staff, but also political circles throughout the 
country. Provincial governors expressed their distress by sending cables to Yuan 
Shikai. Yuan sent his personal Japanese physician and nurse to attend to Jiang. (The 
Japanese nurse who attended to Jiang later married him.) The incident occurred at the 
end of the academic year. Influenced by the event and spurred on by the outbreak of 
the Second Revolution, a number of students withdrew from the academy. When 
classes resumed later that year, a new commandant (Qu Tongfeng) was appointed. Qu 
was a Shikan gakko graduate and a personal friend of Duan Qirui. Qu took stern action 
against those students who took part in the 1913 "Second Revolution" in the south and 
expelled more than 500 cadets. Sharp divisions between the northerners and 
southerners at the academy were apparent. 
The Baoding Military Academy's third upheaval came in May 1915 when Yuan 
Shikai consented to the Japanese Twenty -One Demands. Joining the nation -wide 
protest against the Beijing government, the Baoding cadets went on strike in defiance 
the authorities. However, without much external support, the students' protest soon 
lost its momentum and the strike was called off.'" But Qu was removed as 
Commandant because he was unable to control the students. A division commander of 
the Baoding garrison, Wan Ruxian, filled his place. Wan was a graduate of the Tianjin 
Military School and later went to Japan for further military training. He had been a 
commander in his entire career and a trusted officer of Yuan Shikai.124 
Throughout its eleven years of existence, the Baoding Military Academy 
conducted nine training courses and produced a total of 6,574 graduates.125 A great 
721 Hebei Baoding wenshi zhiliao yanjiuhui comp. Baoding lujun junguan xuexiao (The Baoding 
military academy). Baoding, Hebei: Remain chubanshe, 1987, pp. 29 -30. 
124 Ibid.; on Wan Ruxian see Wang Jiejian, "Beiyang wubei xuetang di chuanshe jigi yingxiang ", 13. 
'25 The statistical data of the Baoding Military Academy can be found in Lujun bu (Army ministry) 
comp. Lujun xingzheng jyao (An account of the army administration). Beijing, reprint, Taibei: Wenhai, 
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majority of them were infantry, followed by artillery, cavalry, engineering and logistics 
officers (see table 2 and 3). Most of them returned to their own provinces after 
graduation. Many served as instructors in provincial military schools and others as 
staff officers in provincial military headquarters. A few were appointed junior officers 
and then moved up to become company or battalion commanders. :2t' Baoding 
graduates had advantages in certain provinces. In Shanxi and Sichuan, high- ranking 
commissions were assigned to Baoding graduates. In Shanxi, Yen Xishan employed 
graduates from both Baoding and his own Military Instruction Corps to serve in his 
high command. In Sichuan, officers educated at Baoding worked well with local 
military course graduates.127 Baoding's graduates also tended to be concentrated in the 
provincial armies of Hunan, Guangxi, Guangdong. In Hunan and Guangxi, the 
Baoding's graduates emerged to become the most influential leaders in the early 
1920s.'28 
The events of 1915 -6 seriously affected the operation of the Baoding Military 
Academy. The Beijing government was openly challenged when Yuan Shikai's 
declared himself as emperor in 1915. Cai E129 in Yunnan organised a National 
Protection Army (Huguojun) to oppose Yuan's monarchical movement. Yuan Shikai 
was forced to resign in disgrace and died soon after. However, the overthrow of Yuan 
caused the unravelling of centralised authority and inaugurated a long, debilitating 
military separatism commonly known as the warlord era. Many national military 
schools were closed including the First Military Preparatory School at Qinghe. 
1971, in the 1916 edition, p. 327 and 1920 edition p. 229; and also Lujun junguan xuexiao tongxuelu 
(Alumni of the Baoding military academy), in the "Tongxuelu ", 1 -735. 
'26 See the memoirs of the Baoding graduates such as the first batch officer Wan Yaohuang. "Wan 
Yaohuang huiyilu (3)" (The memoirs of Wan Yaohuang), Zhongwai zazhi, 16: 1 -17, 1974 -1975; and 
second batch graduate Qín Dechun, 
127 Sheling Waishi, "Baoding junguan xuexíao cangsang shi, 4 -6; Gillin, Warlord: Yen Hsi -chan in 
Shansi Province, 1911 -1949. Princeton, p.26; Zhou Guokai, Minguo Sichuan Shishi (Historical events of 
Sichuan during the Republican China), Taibei: Shangwu, 1969, p.102; Zhang Zhonglei. Qingmo minchu 
Sichuan di junshi xuetang ji Chuan paixi (Military academies and military cliques in Sichuan during the 
late Qing and early Republic) in Xínhai .kerning huiyilu (Memoirs of the 1911 revolution). Beijing: 1962, 
p.351. 
128 Gong Hao. Gong Hao xiansheng fangwen jilu (Record of interviews with Mr. Gong Hao). Taibei: 
Institute of Modem History, Academia Sinica, 1962, p.5. 
129 Cai E was a Hunanese with a civil degree of shengyuan and a graduate of the Japanese Shikan 
gakko. During his stay in Japan, he had been associated with reformist and revolutionary movement. Caí 
was recruited by Yuan Shikai to Beijing in 1912 to serve in the Ministry of War. But his radical 
activities soon landed him in prison. Caí was released in mid -July 1915 and headed south to Yunnan. In 
the fall, he organised old and newly recruited units into a National Protection Army of 10,000 men. Cai 
was also in touch with Liang Qichao and may have had some Japanese financial support as well. See 
Sutton, Provincial Militarism and the Chinese Republic: The Yunnan Army, 1905 -25, USA: Ann Anbor, 
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Provincial schools were kept in operation solely by provincial authorities. The quality 
of these schools depended on the care that individual leaders took in overseeing them. 
The Yunnan Military School was notable for its high level of instruction.'' After 
1916, the original 1904 national military education plan existed only in name and all 
military schools reverted to the pre -1904 situation of serving the regional armies. The 
Baoding Military Academy also lost its appeal as a national institution and finally 
closed its doors permanently in 1923. 
Conclusion 
In the last century of the Qing dynasty, the structure of the imperial army had 
undergone a fundamental change. The regional -based armies, or yongying, created to 
counter the internal rebellions, had emerged as an important part of the Qing army. 
Although it was originally set up as a stop -gap measure in a crisis situation, the 
regional armies became not only an accepted military system operating alongside the 
two regular systems of the Banner and the Green Standard, but also the dominant 
military system of the late Qing army. 
The development of modern military academies in China was shaped by both 
inherent organisational and institutional factors of the army as well as external 
environment. When the first modern Western- styled military school was founded in 
Tianjin in 1885, it had great difficulty in attracting talent for its courses. The problems 
were multi- faceted which included the traditional lack of respect toward the military 
profession, anti -foreigner sentiments, a contempt for manual labour, and above all, 
competition with the civil service. Before 1898, career prospects for Western- trained 
military officers were limited. The military professional qualifications obtained from 
the military academies was also sometime a liability to career development, since 
officers from the rank and file were preferred and trusted more by unit commanders. 
The situation did not improve until the military build -up following the defeat of the 
Sino- Japanese War of 1894 -5. The demand for more and better -trained military 
officers soon ushered in a surge of military academies in China. In an unprecedented 
administrative reform initiated by the central government, the aged -old examination 
system was abolished, first the military examinations in 1901, and later the civil 
University of Michigan Press, 1980. 
36 The Yunnan Military Academy was renowned for its fine instructors and well -trained cadets. See 
The China Yearbook, 1925 -1926, p. 1139; and Sutton, Provincial Militarism and the Chinese Republic, 
1905 -1925. 
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examinations in 1903. In 1904, a national military education plan was formulated and 
soon implemented. 
The role of the military academies expanded rapidly in the last three decades of 
the Qing rule. When it was first started, the military academy was serving the regional 
army of Li Hongzhang and concentrating on specialised training such as the artillery 
and ordnance. By the first decade of the twentieth century, military education was 
organised and centralised on a national basis. Military academies provided not only 
training for various arms and military supporting services, but also a broad -based 
education and progressive advancement culminating overseas military education for 
the brightest and ablest young Chinese. The impetus for rapid expansion of military 
academies was the creation of a .national army. It was in this context that modern 
military academies became more than technical training schools. They were deemed as 
essentials if China were to become a modern state. 
In its search for a modern army, the Chinese borrowed heavily from foreign 
armies, in particular, the German and the Japanese. In spite of being defeated by the 
Japanese in the war of 1904 -5 and constantly being threatened in the northern 
provinces, the Japanese military system was the model for the Chinese military 
education. The decision was a rational one. It is easier to learn from the Japanese as 
both nations shared many common cultural traditions. But most important for the 
Chinese, the Japanese was an emerging Asian power. Her success in building up a 
strong military could always serve as an example for the Chinese. 
The surge of military schools at the turn of the century was influenced by the 
rise of nationalism. Political issues of great concern to China's survival and her future 
had affected every Chinese student, and educated military students were no exception. 
The availability of print -media and the opportunity to discuss major national and 
international issues in schools, particularly, among the overseas students, military 
students became much more conscious of China's problems and her position in the 
region. The military students heightened political consciousness found expression in 
the domestic political scene. Many were involved in the 1911 Revolution. But greater 
participation of the officer corps in politics came after the North -South division of the 
country following the events of 1913 and 1916. 
The national education program continued to develop even after 1911 but under 
great stress and tension. The most important event was the creation of the Baoding 
Military Academy in 1912. This was the first national military academy based on 
Western military professional concept although many of its organisational and 
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doctrinal principles were Japanese. The Baoding Military Academy, unfortunately, 
was caught in the North -South divide, and after the demise of Yuan Shikai in 1916, 
military separatism soon engulfed the entire country. The Baoding Military Academy 
was seriously affected by these political events and started to lose its appeal as a 
national institution. The pre -1904 situation of regional armies creating their own 
military training schools prevailed once more albeit, this time it was more 
"professional" in some cases ás many regional army commanders were the academy- 
trained officers. 
A divided China and a weak central government was a great setback for many 
young, politically conscious and well -trained military officers. Since the "self - 
strengthening" movement of the 1860s, China had been struggling to stay independent 
and was moving slowly to regain her position as a power in Asia if not the world. All 
this effort would not be sustained without a united China On a personal level, military 
separatism was unfavourable to the professional and academy -trained officers. 
Without a central government, their career opportunity would be confined to a 
particular region. Most would end up in training institutions as instructors or staff 
officers in the command headquarters, few fortunate ones might be appointed as 
commanders. 
Within three decades, the Chinese officer corps was transformed. A modern 
officer corps had emerged in early twentieth century and destined to play an important 
role in the national affairs. Within the officer corps, an internal transformation of the 
leadership had also been taken place. The very first generation of Tianjin graduates 
had, in early Republic, assumed power in the centre. They were perceived, however, 
by the younger generation officers, especially those Japanese and Baoding trained 
graduates, as the main stumbling blocks for building a genuine national army and 
achieving a united Republican China 
The Late -Qing military reform had created a Chinese officer corps but without 
a national army. The emergence of the officer corps with their spread in all over the 
country representing one of the most well -organised forces to be reckon with in the 
early years of the Republican China. Although the development of a national modern 
military education represented by the Baoding Military Academy was terminated in 
1923, attempts to revitalise a national military academy would continue thereafter. The 
founding of the Huangpu Military Academy in 1924 and its successor the Central 
Military Academy in Nanjing in 1927 could be seen in the context of this wider 
development. 
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Chapter 2: The Party Army and Party Army Academy: Sun Yatsen's 
Prescriptions for the National Unification 
"...Our revolution has been in existence for thirteen years, but 
what we now have is a republic in name only and not in 
substance...In the thirteen years of our revolution. there has 
never been a single military organisation struggling for the same 
cause as the revolutionary party. I dare say that in the past 
thirteen years, China did not have any troops that could be 
regarded as the revolutionary armies. ...I am now asking you not 
to fear death and follow the footsteps of the martyrs...to build from 
this five hundred cadets.... an ideal revolutionary army...i131 
On 16 June 1924, Sun Yatsen accompanied by Madam Sun, party leaders, 
commanders of various armies, officials of his government and the Soviet advisers, 
inaugurated the official opening of the Army Officers Academy132 at Huangpu in 
Guangzhou. In this day -long ceremony, Sun presented the academy flag, heard the 
swearing of the academy oath, and reviewed student- cadets on the parade. He then 
delivered a long and inspirational speech. In it, he compared the Russian and the 
Chinese revolutionary experience and wondered why the Russians had succeeded while 
China's results had been meagre after thirteen years of revolution. He then concluded 
that the Russia's secret was its creation of a revolutionary army to consolidate its 
victory. Sun announced that China would soon have its revolutionary army and the 
Huangpu cadets would be its foundation. The academy's purpose was to produce a 
reliable and politically indoctrinated corps of junior officers as essential element in a 
new and loyal party army. i33 
The establishment of the Huangpu Military Academy was an important milestone 
in the Chinese military modernisation process. It was through Huangpu that the system 
of the party control of the military and the party army was endorsed and implemented 
in the Chinese military. This characteristic of the Chinese armed forces has since been 
13' The inaugural speech of Sun Yatsen at the official opening of the Huangpu Military Academy, 
Zhongyang lujun junguan xuexiao shigao (Draft history of the Central Military Academy), Nanjing, 
1936, 1: 5 -10. For the English translation of the speech see appendix 1. 
132 In Chinese, Lujun junguan xuexiao (The central military school), but better known as the 
Huangpu Military Academy. 
133 Zhongyang lujun junguan xuexiao shigao (Draft history of the central military academy), 
Nanjing, c 1936, vol.1: I -107 to 1 -109. An English translation of the speech is included in the Appendix 
1. 
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accepted in both the Nationalist armed forces in Taiwan and the People's Liberation 
Army of China. 
This chapter aims to examine the contributions of Sun Yatsen towards the 
establishment of the Huangpu Military Academy. A central question pertaining to Sun 
Yatsen's contribution is the influence of the Communist ideology and the Russian Red 
Army. The political motives of Sun turning to the Soviet Communist Third 
International (Comintem) are well documented, but not so on the military motives 
concerning the Guomindang (GMD) and Comintern collaboration. What was Sun's 
military thought? How did he perceive the role of the military in his revolutionary 
process? Why did Sun Yatsen turn to the Russians for military assistance? What kind 
of military assistance did Sun obtain from the Russians? How important was Sun's 
roles in the establishment of the party army and party academy? This chapter attempts 
to discuss the above questions. 
Sun Yatsen's Military Thought 
Before looking at Sun's military thought some caveats may be in order. Sun in 
his lifetime spent a considerable amount of time studying and writing, and attempting 
to develop a modern philosophical paradigm for the modern China. However, he was a 
political activist spending most of his time travelling and organising political activities, 
rather than reflecting and writing theoretical treatise. Moreover, many of his 
manuscripts were destroyed when forces under Chen Jiongming bombarded his 
presidential palace in Guangzhou in 1922. In short, Sun's military thought, as 
reflected in various works and speeches, was neither complete nor coherent in style or 
content. The following analysis of Sun's military thought is based on his political 
activities and speeches during the last twenty years of his political career. 
Sun sees war as neither an aberration nor a permanent feature of human 
existence. He defines war as a goal- oriented activity with a specific political objective. 
For him, the use of force has two main purposes. Firstly, it is to overthrow the corrupt 
and ineffective Manchu regime that brought hardship and injustice to Chinese people. 
Secondly, to use force to bring about a conducive condition for national development 
that will benefit its people. Once these two goals are achieved, a democratic 
government will take over the day -to -day running of a country and hereby bring in 
wealth and prosperity to its people. In short, war is a means to political ends. The 
political end is to realise the system of republicanism through the application of the 
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Three Peoples' Principles. Force will be used to abolish the corrupt regime and to pave 
the way for the subsequent national re- construction. 134 
Sun's concept of war was similar to the rational -realist school but was very 
different from the Marxist- Leninist concept of war.135 Karl Marx interprets war as an 
inevitable process of class struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The 
old ruling classes would vainly use any means to postpone their inevitable overthrow. 
Wars cannot be abolished unless classes are abolished and socialism is created.136 
Marx depicts this conflict as basically a vertical conflict between upper and lower 
classes. Lenin carries Marx's doctrine to the horizontal level and includes the clash of 
capitalist powers. Capitalist powers go to war for the right to seize and subjugate less - 
developed peoples, overseas markets, and sources of new materials. This new dynamic 
process, added to Marx's vertical conflict, was the "highest" form of bourgeois 
exploitation, the true manifestation of a dying ancient regime, and the chief cause of 
modem war. 
The main elements in Sun's use of force prior to 1911 Revolution were the 
secret societies and young serving soldiers. Members of the secret societies were 
poorly trained and armed, and they were no matches against the Qing's armies. The 
young, idealist and better- educated Chinese soldiers, on the other hand, were mainly 
from the junior ranks of the New Army and were scattered in various military units. 
They were too weak to stage a revolt against the establishment. Sun had an American 
military adviser Colonel Homer Leo prior to 1911 Revolution. Leo was supposed to 
help raising funds and military training in America to stage revolts in China. Leo was 
supposed to lead the revolutionary army of the secret Heaven and Earth Society in 
China. However, due mainly to lack of financial support, the scheme failed to 
materialise.f37 When the October Revolution occurred, it started very much as a 
military mutiny against poor military management as much as a political revolution to 
14 For a discussion of Sun's military thought, see Wang Yibing. Guofu junguan jiaoyu sixiang zhi 
yuanjiu (A study of Sun Yatsen's thought on military officer education). M.A. thesis, the Political Studies 
Institute of the Political Warfare School, Taibei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1991, 78 -88; Sun Zhongshan junshi 
sixiang yu sh jian (Military thought and practice of Sun Yatsen). Sun Li and Guo Zuyu et al ed., Beijing: 
Junshi kexue chubanshe (Military science publications), 1989, 19 -68; Tai Hung -chao. "The Approach to 
Peace and War ", in Sun Yat -sen's Doctrine in the Modern World, Chu -yuan Cheng ed., Boulder and 
London: Westview Press, 1989, 160 -175. 
tas Main representatives of this rational -realist view of war are Sun Zi and Clausewitz. See Wang, Guofu 
junguan jiaoyu sixiang zhi yuanjiu, 78 -88. 
136 Semmel, Bernard. Marxism and the Science of War. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 
1981, 147 -153, 164 -171; Marxism -Leninism on War and Army: A Soviet View. Translated from Russian by 
Donald Danemanis, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972, 13 -20. 
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topple the Manchu regime. Once the uprising spread over the country, it was the local 
military commanders rather than the Nationalist revolutionists who were in charge of 
the day -to -day affairs. The military although overtly adhering to the revolution was 
beyond the control of neither Sun Yatsen nor the Nationalist Party (see Chapter 1). 138 
The fate for Sun and his party was deteriorated further in the subsequent years. 
During Yuan Shikai's reign Sun went to Japan once again and had a falling out with 
Huang Xing over a change in policy. Sun, who once sought less violent subversive 
means, changed to endorsing a violent military solution, while Huang, who once sought 
military means, now turned to diplomacy. After Yuan's death, Sun set up a rival 
military government in Guangzhou in September 1917. Like the northern government, 
Sun relied on warlord armies in the South for his military, hut the local provincial 
commander, Chen Jiongming, betrayed Sun and drove him out of the city, burning 
Sun's office and papers and forcing him to flee.139 Thwarted by a lack of broad public 
support, unreliable regional militarists, rivalries, betrayals, and military failures, Sun 
spent considerable time writing between 1917 and 1921 on national reconstruction for 
China and planning for the revitalization of his revolutionary movement. 
The Party Army 
After a series of failures since 1911, Sun Yatsen finally wrote his ideology on 
papers in 1924. Sun's revolutionary ideology is revealed in a series of policy 
statements on socio- economic, psychological, and political reconstruction. The Outline 
of National Reconstruction (Jianguo dakang) contains his main ideological precepts 
drafted in 1924. However, many of the ideas in this work were in fact derived from the 
Tongmenhui (the Alliance Party) Manifesto of 1905 but were treated to greater 
refinement and elaboration. 
The primary section of The Outline of National Reconstruction is a short 25- 
article document summarises Sun's priorities and key components of his theory of 
revolution.140 Sun had also sketched the outline of an ambitious work on national 
137 See Wilbur, Sun Yat -sen, 67 -72; Tom Alexander, "Ambitious Little Romancer" --or Visionary 
Genius ? ", Smithsonian, Jul 93, Vol. 24 Issue 4, 102 -115. 
138 For a discussion of the military role in the 1911 Revolution, see Edmund Fong, The Military 
Dimension of the Chinese Revolution. 
139 For a detailed account of Sun -Chen conflict, see Chen INfanling. "Chen Jiongming yi yuejun (Chen 
Jiongming and Guangdong army)." M.A thesis, the Department of History, Taiwan National University 
of Political Science, 1983, 247 -320. 
140 See Guofu quanji, Taibei, 751 -754; Lo, Guofu nianpu, vol. 2, p. 108. 
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defence but he did not complete the work before his death in 1925.141 In The Outline of 
National Reconstruction, Sun divided the revolutionary process into three- stages: 
military dictatorship, political tutelage, and constitutional democracy. The first period 
will be a period of destruction. There would be martial law, and the revolutionary army 
would destroy the old regime, eradicating official corruption, and reforming evil 
practices. During the second period a provisional constitution will go into effect, local 
autonomy would be introduced, and popular rights would be promoted. The first two 
stages were the transitional periods leading to the final goal of the constitutional 
democracy. 
Sun's main contribution to the revolutionary theory was his introduction of the 
intervening stage of the political tutelage.142 According to Sun, the Guomindang's 
major responsibility during the political tutelage stage included mobilising people to 
participate in the political process, electing and recalling local officials, and legislating 
or abrogating local laws. The party should help local government achieve fiscal 
independence through promotion of economic reconstruction in industrial and 
commercial investment, exploitation of natural resources, the development of 
transportation and land reclamation. Finally, the party should help local governments 
to promoting justice and social welfare. This would include census surveys, land tax 
and land reform, education policies implementation, medical care, relief, and care of 
the young and aged.143 In short, Sun perceived that before democracy could be realised 
in China, the Guomindang would have to guide the government with the help of its 
army. 
The roles of the military in the Nationalist revolutionary process are also 
touched upon in Sun's Three People's Principles (Sanmin zhuyí). This document is the 
most important work of Sun Yatsen as it set forth the basic policy to bring about a new 
141 Sun Yatsen divided the National Defence into sixty -two chapters. His intention was conveyed to 
Liao Zhungkai in a letter dated 8 July 1921. Guofu quanji, Taibei, vol. 3,789-790. 
142 While other revolutionary theorists either insisted on perpetual dictatorship of a particular class or 
group, or expect democracy to follow revolution immediately, Sun introduced the period of political 
tutelage during which the revolutionary party was assigned the role of educating the people and training 
them to assume increasing responsibilities in self -government. The emphasis on political tutelage is 
clearly shown in his work Jianguo dakang. While constitutional democracy was discussed in seven 
articles (19 -25); the stage of military dictatorship was only two articles (6 -7); the political tutelage was 
discussed in eleven articles (8 -18). 
IOa 
"Jian o dakang", , in Guofu chuanji, 1: 1-15; 6: 160-65. 
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political and economic structure in China.144 Sanmin zhuyi discusses nationalism, 
democracy and livelihood as the main ideological doctrine to guide the nationalist 
revolution. In his discussion of nationalism, Sun expounds his concepts and principles 
for which the military will have to work within the context of the new political 
structure. 
Sun Yatsen looked at nationalism in China as an evolutionary process. He 
described nationalism both as an immediate objective to overthrow the Manchu rule 
and as a process of political reconstruction in the post -revolutionary periods. To 
achieve these goals, he emphasised developing a deep- rooted consciousness of 
nationalism among the Chinese people. Nationalism was to serve as a rousing creed to 
unite dissident individuals and groups throughout China. In short, Sun perceived that 
before democracy could be realised in China, the Guomindang would have to guide the 
government with the help of its army. 
What is missing is the specific role of the military in this revolutionary process, 
surprisingly for a party that depended on armed revolt. Sun's scant attention to military 
matters can be partially attributed to his unfamiliarity with military matters but more 
fundamentally to his basic commitment to Western- styled constitutional democracy. 
Thus, once the Republic was proclaimed in 1911, he was ready to let the Guomindang 
play by parliamentary rules. Even in the post -1911 period, although Sun was 
convinced, reluctantly, that the party required an army, during the last years of his life, 
he devoted far more attention to refining his theoretical construct than to assuming 
active leadership over military affairs. 
Influence of the Russian Revolution and the Civil War 
Preoccupied with military unification of China, Sun Yatsen and his supporters 
were impressed by the Bolshevik experience in the revolution and the civil war. In 
1919, Sun was said to have sent several of his associates to Russia to study the Russian 
revolution. They included Liao Zhongkai, Zhu Zhixin and Li Zhangda.145 Li Zhangda 
subsequently visited Russia in January 1921, accompanied by a pro -Bolshevik Liu Qian 
144 Sanmin zhuyi may have developed in the early 1890s. The term was officially proposed by Sun 
Yatsen on 20 October 1905 and publicised on 2 December 1906. Sun rework his material in the form of 
public lectures and he nearly completed most of his work in 1924. Sun Zhongshan chuanji, Beijing, vol. 
I, 288 -289; Guofu chuanji, Taibei, vol. 2, 80 -81. 
X45 A Russian tutor was engaged to teach them Russian. Xie Xiangning, Huiyi Sun Zhongshan he Liao 
Zhongkai (Remembering Sun Yatsen and Liao Zhongkai), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1957, p. 2. 
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who was the head of an organisation of the Chinese inhabitants living in the 
northeastern borders of Amur province.746 
Chiang Kaishek recalled some years later how he regarded the Bolshevik 
Revolution as "the dawn of a new era ". He was also reported to have said at that time 
"if anyone should denounce the Russian Revolution, I would vigorously defend it, and 
should anyone voice criticisms against the Chinese Communist Party, I would 
resolutely refute them ".147 In 1921 when drawing up a set of military plans for Sun 
Yatsen, he had the idea of going to Russia to prepare a portion of the strength there.148 
Dai Jitao in an open letter to Chen Jiongming in 1920, who was leading the 
Guangdong Army in Fujian, urged Chen to emulate Leon Trotsky, the Bolshevik War 
Commissar, who had created the Red Army and used it for popular indoctrination. Dai 
proposed to adopt the Red Army system selectively arguing that the Guomindang keep 
its own ideology, while emulating the model of a revolutionary army. He defined the 
revolutionary army as "a body of men capable of propagating the party's ideology" in 
which every soldier possessed "initiative and discernment ". Only such an army, Dai 
maintained, was "capable of sweeping away the old and creating a new order" in 
China.149 
Zhu Zhixín treated the concept of the party army in greater detail in an article 
entitled 'The Psychology of the Soldiers and its Reconstruction" .15° Zhu singled out 
two obstacles to building a new order in China during the late 1910s. They were: 
j46 Li Yunhan, Gong ronggong dao gingdang, 1: 115, 124, n.75. 
147 Jiang Zhongzheng, "Zhongguo guomin geming he E guo gongchandang gongchan geming de 
qubie" (The different between the Chinese nationalist revolution and the Russian communist revolution), 
Xinshengming (The new life), 2, 5: 4, 1 May 1929. 
i49 Mao Sicheng, Minguo shiwu nianqian zhi Jiang Jieshi xiansheng, 112 -114. The plan will be 
discuss in the chapter later. 
149 Dai Jitao, "Zhi Chen Jiongming lun geming dexin" (Letter to Chen Jiongming concerning the 
revolution), 13 January 1920, Jianshe, 2. 1: 177 -I84, February 1920. A good discussion of Russians' 
influence on the Nationalist Party, see Leong, Sow -theng. Sino- Soviet Diplomatic Relations, 1917 -1926. 
USA: University Press of Hawaii, 1976; and 'Sun Yatsen's International Orientation: The Soviet Phase, 
1917 -1925." in Sun Yatsen: His International Ideas and International Connections, 53 -88. Editor. Wong, 
J.Y. ed. Australia: Wild Peony Pty Ltd, 1987, 60 -71. 
i$0 Zhu Zhixin. " "Bing de gaizao yu qi xinli" (The psychology of the soldiers and its reconstruction)." 
Zhu Zhixin jí (Collected works of Zhu Zhixín), 2: 359 -409. Zhu was an active Guomindang leader who 
had been a trusted staff of Sun Yatsen before his sudden death in 1920. He was a military reformer. For a 
study of Zhu Zhixin, see Lu Fangshang, Zhu Zhixín yu Zhongguo geming (Zhu Zhixin and the Chinese 
revolution). Taibei: Dongwu University, 1978. 
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firstly, the omnipotence of the military; and secondly, the use of the military by those 
with money to pay for its services. Every student demonstration and every workers' 
strike in recent years, he stated, had been suppressed with the help of mercenaries by 
those who were determined to preserve the status quo. Money and soldiers, the two 
ingredients of the reactionary power, were the same indispensable ingredients for its 
destruction. However, the character of the armed forces would have to be vastly 
different from a mercenary army with soldiers who were servile, unreliable. or prone to 
desert. Such soldiers would be useless for social reform unless instilled with a new 
consciousness. "Our immediate task ", Zhu wrote, "is to create a life for the soldier 
which is permeated with ideological consciousness, so that every soldier is hopeful, 
self -reliant, and possesses a sense of spiritual equality with everyone else, i.e. a 
complete reconstruction of the psychology of the soldiers ". 
According to Zhu, one way of achieving the new consciousness was to create an 
army of soldiers who were part-time workers. Each soldier then could earn a living 
while being a soldier. Such a semi -worker army would be equivalent to the newest 
Soviet Russian worker -army. In Russia, employment ensured a living for the Red 
Army soldiers while Bolshevism gave them a sense of purpose in life. Free from 
immediate material want and certain of the long -term goal, the Red Army was able to 
march from victory to victory. Zhu evidently learned about the fact that the Russian 
Red Army had many Chinese within it, and he took this as proof that there was no 
inherent obstacle to reforming the psychology of the Chinese soldier.151 The ideology 
that would appeal to the soldier would be one that could satisfy his immediate needs as 
well as promise him a new life in the future. Zhu believed that 'if we (the Chinese) 
want to reconstruct the society we must destroy the social stratification based on wealth 
and Iay the foundation for socialism. If we can persuade the Chinese working people 
with the argument that their misery is rooted in the defects of the social structure, they 
will embrace such an ideology of their own and lay down their lives for it ".152 
Although both the Chinese peasants and workers would be susceptible to such an 
appeal, Zhu nevertheless believed that urban workers made better soldiers in a 
revolutionary army because they were economically worse off. He pointed to the 
worker origin of the Red Army to support his point of view. Because of their working 
class background such soldiers would be better able to understand the real interest of 
151 Ibid., p. 393. 
`52 Ibid., p. 394. 
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workers, and he therefore most likely to lay down their Iives on behalf of his 
ideology.153 
It is interesting to note that the attention of Sun Yatsen and his associates was 
confined exclusively to the military aspect of the Bolshevik Revolution. They said 
hardly anything about the Leninist party organisation or the mobilisation of mass 
support as the means to power, which played such a key role in the coming to power of 
the Bolsheviks. Instead, what Sun and his supporters admired most was how the new 
regime maintained power through the Red Army created after the October Revolution. 
Sun's military preoccupation is easily explained by the fact that he had time and again 
been frustrated in his endeavours by the lack of an army that was obedient to his will. 
Sun Yatsen's Delegation to Moscow 
Sun Yatsen's interest in the Russian Red Army, however, did not exclude his 
attempt to obtain Russian military aid to fight the Chinese warlords. During the 
summer of 1923 Sun Yatsen sent a delegation, headed by General Chiang Kaishek, to 
Moscow to negotiate for military aid. Besides Chiang, the delegation included Wang 
Tengyun, Shen Dingi and Zhang Tailei, the Iatter two were Communists who were also 
members of the Guomindang. The purpose of the delegation, according to a highly 
classified introductory letter written by Sun Yatsen, was to "discuss ways and means 
whereby our friends there (the Soviet Union) can assist me in my work in this country. 
In particular, General Chiang is to take up with your government and military experts a 
proposal for military action by my forces in and about the regions lying to the 
Northwest of Beijing and beyond. General Chiang is fully empowered to act on my 
behalf "tsa 
The Delegation arrived in Moscow on 2 September. On 9 September, Chiang 
met the deputy chief of the Revolutionary Military Council, E. M. Skliansky, and the 
commander -in -chief of the Red Army, General S. S. Kamenev. In this meeting Chiang 
requested specifically for three kinds of military assistance, namely: (1) more military 
advisers to assist in the setting up of an army along the line of the Red Army; (2) the 
opportunity to learn about the military organisation, training and operations of the Red 
153 Ibid., p. 409. Zhu appended to his article the statutes of the Red Army, issued by the Soviet 
government on 15 January 1920. 
154 Professor Allen Whiting obtained this letter from Louis Fischer who knew Karakhan personally. 
Karakhan showed the letter to Fischer who published part of it in his autobiography, Men and Politics, 
New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1941, p.138. Cited in Whiting, Soviet Policies in China, p.243. 
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Army; (3) to negotiate with the Russian authorities the war plan for the Northwest 
China. us 
"The Northwest Plan" 
Sun Yatsen's proposal for joint military actions with foreign powers m the 
Northwest China can be traced as early as in 1918.156 In the closing months of the 
Great European War, Sun argued that Germany and China should cooperate to free 
China from the dominance of England, Japan and their allies. Sun sent Abel Cao'57 to 
Berlin with a proposal that Germany and Russia should jointly organise and equip 
about 12,000 Chinese living along the border of Russia, together with about 10.000 (a 
division) German troops supported by 3 to 5 aircraft, to capture Beijing. In exchange, 
Germany could procure food and raw materials in China and transport them home by 
the Russian railways. Once the Beijing government was overthrown, Germany could 
assist China financing, help her regain control of maritime customs and construct 
railways. Germany could also help modernise China education system and develop 
technical skills so that Chinese products could be transported across Russia to 
Germany. Although this was a very unrealistic scheme, and bad timing since Germany 
was on the road to surrender, the proposal contained several ideas that Sun Yatsen 
continued to pursue in later years. 
Early in 1920, Sun Yatsen met a Chinese communist Liu Chang in Shanghai 
who showed him a military plan involving the Soviet Union to overthrow Beijing 
government. Liu, better known to the Russians as Federov, was a member of an émigré 
group, the Organisation Bureau of Chinese Communists in Russia. The plan, 
presumably formulated by the group, called for a march to Beijing in conjunction with 
the drive from the South. It proposed an immediate unification of the revolutionary 
movement of Chinese forces situated in the territory of South China, Central Russia and 
the Far East. "From the Russian borders the drive would proceed through Xinjiang and 
iss Dieter Heiznig, Sowjetische Militanberater bei der kuomintang,1923 -1927, Baden -Barden: 
Nomos Verlagsgesellchaft, 1978, p.111. Heiznig's source is based on the Russian Baranovskij- Protokolle 
archives. 
156 Li Guoqi, "Dequo dangan zhong yonguan zhongguo canjia ti ! ci shijie dazhen ti jixiang jizai" 
(some records in the German archives concerning China's entry into the first world war), zhongguo 
xiandaishi zhuanti yanjiu baogao, no.4, Taibei: Zhonghua minguo zhiliao yanjin zhongxin, 1974, 317- 
343. 
157 Chinese name is Cao Yabo. A Christian and Oxford university graduate, he joined the 
Revolutionary Alliance Party, Tongmen hui, in 1905. He was a member of Sun Yatsen's southern 
military government since 1917. Minguo Renwu Dacidian (Biographical dictionary of the Republican 
China), Hebei renmin chubanshi, 1991, p.811. 
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Manchuria and the leading centre of the revolutionary march would be in 
Blagoveshchensk on the Amur.158 
Sun Yatsen's request for the Soviet military aid was made officially in a letter to 
Adolph Joffe of 20 December 1922. In the letter, Sun told the emissary that he planned 
to reform his army and the party, and also intended to organise an expedition to take 
Beijing. He outlined a scheme to lead an army of about 10,000 from Sichuan through 
Gansu to Inner Mongolia for a northwest attack on the Chinese capital. Sun explained 
that since his resources were insufficient and he lacked specialists capable of organising 
an army, he would like to receive financial and advisory aid from the Soviet Union.19 
Following a series of talks between Sun and Joffe in Shanghai in January 1923, 
they issued a joint statement on 26 January to the press. Although the Joint Statement 
publicly acknowledged the official relationship between the Soviet Union and the 
Southern government, it revealed nothing about agreements by the Soviet to help 
Sun.160 After Joffe had left Shanghai for Japan, Sun sent his closest associate, the 
American-born and Japanese educated Liao Zhongkai to Tokyo to continue discussion 
with Joffe. The Nationalist. Chinese sources are particularly reticent about these 
meetings. No substantial sources have been revealed on these supposedly month -long 
talks in Tokyo. It is not known that whether any further agreement was reached. But 
in March 1923, the Soviet Russians moved actively to assist Sun by sending some $2 
million to the revolutionary government. On 1 May, they sent a telegram to Sun 
expressing "readiness to render necessary assistance to China.i161 In June, a team of 
158 Liu Chang submitted a report of the plan which is preserved in the Russian archives. M.A. 
Persists, "The Eastern Internationalists in Russia and Some Questions of the National- Liberation 
Movement (1918 -July 1920) ", in Komintern: Vostok; Bor'baza leninskuiu Strategiu i Taktiku v 
Nasional'no Osvoboditel'nom Dvizhenii (Comintem and the East; the struggle for the Leninist strategy 
and tactics in the national liberation movement), Moscow: Glay. Red, Vost. Lit., 1969, 87 -89. Cited in 
Wilbur, Sun Yatsen, p.116. 
159 During the period from August to December 1922, Sun and Joffe exchanged at least seven letters: 
four from Joffe and three from Sun are preserved in the Soviet Archives. In recent years, the PRC Central 
Archives in Beijing and the Soviet Archives have been exchanging sources. Two letters by Sun to Joffe 
dated 27 August and 20 December 1922 have been published by the PRC Central Archives. See "Sun 
Zhongshan shuxin Iiangfeng" (Sun Yatsen's two letters), Dang de wenxian (Party Archives) no.1, 1991, 
54 -56. 
160 The statement first appeared in the China Press on 27 January 1923. The complete text is included 
in Wilbur,Sun Yatsen, 137 -138. 
161 R.A. Mirovitskaia, "Mikhail Borodin (1884 -1951) ", in Vidnye Sovetskie Kommunisty-- Uchastiniki 
Kitaiskoi Revolutsii (Outstanding Soviet communists --the participants in the Chinese revolution) 
Moscow: Akad. Nauk SSSR, Institut Dal'nego Vostoka, "Nauka ", 1970, 22 -40. Sources are based on the 
Soviet archives. Cited in Wilbur, Sun Yatsen, p.148. 
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five military officers, originally despatched for Beijing, visited Guangzhou to advise 
Sun on military matters.162 
As a result of these positive moves, Sun's optimism increased. He instructed 
Chiang Kaishek in July to organise a delegation representing him to visit Russia 
"reciprocating an ambassadorial visit and to investigate government and party 
affairs. "163 Chiang Kaishek was then thirty -five years old and had been a staff officer in 
Generalissimo Sun's field headquarters at various times. He had earlier indicated to 
Sun of his desire to be assigned the mission to the Soviet Union.164 Chiang was 
selected to head the delegation despite his junior status as the mission was to be 
military in nature, and top on the agenda was the discussion of "the Northwest Plan". 
Chiang Kaishek's first meeting with Skliansky and General Kamenev took place on 9 
September in Moscow.165 Chiang's presentation consisted of three parts: (1) the current 
military and strategic situation; (2) proposal of two military bases; (3) plans for the 
invasion of Beijing. The delegates first analysed the vulnerability of the Sun Yatsen's 
southern government. The southern army lacked manpower and arms; soldiers' morale 
was low and commanders were unreliable. To make the situation worse, Guangdong 
was in a precarious strategic position. In the rear was hostile British Hong Kong; in the 
front, the British and American gunboats patrolled the Yangtze River. The foreign 
imperialist powers would not allow the southern army to defeat the northern Wu Peifu 
decisively since this might disrupt the balance of power and thus the interests of foreign 
powers. Given this situation, the southern army's general staff resolved to transfer the 
centre of military operations northwest along the Sino- Russian and Sino- Mongolia 
borders. Therefore, the Guomindang sought the co- operation of the Soviet military on 
162 I.A. Chereparov, Zapiski Veonnogo Sovetnika v Kitae i iz Istorii Pervoi Grazdanskoi 
Revolutsionnoi Coiny, 1924 -1927 (Notes of a military adviser in China: from the history of the first 
revolutionary civil war in China, 1924 -1927), 1: 6 -7, 11, Moscow: Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 
Institute Norodov Azii, "Nauka ", 1964. 
163 Mao Sicheng, Shiwu man yiqian zhi Jiang Jieshi xiansheng (Mr Chiang Kaishek before 1926), 
HongKong: Longman shudian, 1965, p.218. 
164 The desire was indicated in a letter dated 17 July 1923 which he left behind before departing 
Guangzhou. See Pichon P.Y. Loh, The Early Chiang Kaishek: A Study of His Personality and Politics, 
1887 -1924, New York: Columbia University Press, 1971, 86 -87. 
165 The following account is based on Chiang Kaishek's "A New Future for the Chinese Revolution"; 
supplemented by Heiznig, Sowjetische Mititanberater bei der kuomintang, 1923 -1927, 111 -6. "A New 
Future of Chinese Revolution" (Zhongguo geming sin qiantu) was shown to the author in Beijing by Mr 
Yang Kuisong, a research fellow with the Institute of Modem Chinese History, Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences. Mr Yang was a researcher in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Archives 
(Zhongyang dangan guan) before coming to the Institute of Modem History. This document is kept in 
the Central Archives which is closed to the general public and has not been published. 
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their military plan. The delegates identified the enemies in this operation as Wu Peifu 
and his allies. 
Since the primary military objective would be Beijing with the two secondary 
objectives being Taiyuang and Xi'an, the delegates proposed to set up two military 
bases in the northwest. They were Urga (present day Utan-Batar or Utaanbaator) in 
Mongolia; and Urumchi (Wulumuqi in Chinese, present day Urumqi) in Xinjiang. 
Based on the time and space analysis of the routes of advance to Beijing, Urga was an 
ideal base for launching offensive operations, where Urumchi an ideal rear base. The 
delegates realised the diplomatic difficulty of using these bases and suggested that the 
initial military build -up to be in the Soviet territory and in the Red Army's name. They 
proposed to recruit Chinese and Chinese soldiers living along the borderlands and in 
western Manchuria. The new army would be organised on the pattern of the Red 
Army. The strategic advantages of these two bases would help to balance the 
deficiency of the southern army. 
The delegates went on to elaborate the plan for the military build -up at Urga, 
which would be the location of the main attack force. A time frame of one and a half 
years and in three phases had been planned for this project (details are in the Appendix 
2 -1). 
Chiang argued that the northwest offensive would coordinate forces in Central 
China -- guerrillas and bandits in Shenxi, who had already started fighting with Wu 
Peifu's forces. The main tasks of the guerrillas would be to carry out operations- -such 
as to sabotage railway lines, bridges and organise propaganda activities -- behind the 
enemy lines. The delegates therefore proposed to organise the masses and guerrillas in 
Central China and reinforce them with units from the South to create an anti -Wu Peifu 
front in Shenxi.766 A list of cities and publications for the propaganda campaign was 
attached in the appendix to the report. At the end of the presentation, the Russians 
requested a written plan and time to learn more about the actual conditions in China. 
On 11 November, a second meeting was called and the reply from Skliansky 
and Kamenev was unfavourable. Skliansky told the Chinese Delegation "to begin 
military operations in the way stated in the submitted project would be an adventure 
166 Chiang Kaishek's "A New Future for the Chinese Revolution" did not mention the guerilla 
activities in Shenxi. But the Soviet archives have such a record. A.I. Kartunova, "Sun Yatsen and 
Russian Advisers: Based on the Document from 1923- 1924" (in Russian), in Sun Yatsen, 1866 -1966: 
Sbornik Statei Vospominanii, Materialov (Sun Yatsen, 1886 -1966: a collection of articles, reminiscences 
and materials), Moscow: Glay. Red. Vost, Lit., 1966, pp.170 -189. Cited in Wilbur, Sun Yatsen, 152 -3. 
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doomed in advance to failure." He emphasized the need for careful and prolonged 
organisational and political work among the masses, as well as military preparations. 
Only thereafter could large -scale military operations be undertaken successfully.167 
However, Skliansky offered the Chinese military training in the Soviet Union. The 
Chinese could send 3 -7 officers with the rank of above battalion commander to the 
General Staff College, and 30 -40 officers to various military schools every year. As for 
the request for more Soviet military advisers, Skliansky expressed the difficulty in 
recruiting senior officers with Chinese backgrounds. But the decision would depend on 
the feedback from the first team of advisers who were already in China. Skliansky also 
organised visits to the army, air force, navy training institutions and arms industries for 
the Chinese Delegation.168 On 27 November, during his farewell call on Trotsky, 
Chiang was told to take a verbal message to Dr. Sun, telling him that "except direct 
participation by the Soviet troops, Soviet Russia will do her best to help China in her 
national revolution by giving positive assistance in the form of weapons and economic 
aid. "t69 
The Soviet Russian rejection of "the Northwest Plan" came when Chiang 
Kaishek attended the Comintern's Executive Committee meeting on 25 November, 
where he was invited to give a speech. A resolution "On the National Liberation 
Movement in China and the Guomindang" was then passed by the Presidium. The 
resolution began with a statement that the national liberation movement in China 
headed by the Guomindang was at the organisational stage. After its successful 
revolution against the Manchu dynasty, the Guomindang failed to complete the 
destruction of feudalism mainly because it did not bring the broad masses of peasants 
and townsmen into the struggle but depended, rather on military means against the 
reactionary agents of imperialism. The Presidium however, noted that revolutionary 
elements in the Guomindang headed by Dr. Sun now realised the need for close union 
with the masses to expand the base of the revolutionary movement in China.17° This 
resolution depicted the reformation of the Guomindang and the direction of the future 
Chinese revolution that leaders in the Soviet Union intended it should bring about --a 
broad based political revolution rather than a simple military solution. Michael 
167 Kartunova, 179 -160; Wilbur, p.153: Heiznig, 115 -7. 
168 Mao Sicheng, op.cit., 206 -208, 211 -212. 
169 Chiang Kaishek, Soviet Russia in China: A Summing -up at Seventy, New York: Farrar, Strans and 
Cudahy, 1957, p.22. 
170 Resolution, Presidium, Communist International Executive Committee, On the National 
Liberation Movement in China and the Guomindang, Mao Sicheng, p.234. 
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Borodin, an experienced and senior Comintern leader, had been chosen to guide this 
political process. '71 Given such a reply, the dream of "the northwest plan" was 
virtually shattered. Chiang Kaishek's enthusiasm for the Russian military aid turned 
from disillusionment into anger.'` The delegates departed Moscow earlier than 
scheduled. When Chiang arrived in Shanghai, he submitted a report to Sun Yatsen 
expressing doubt of the Russians' intention and sincerity, and cautioned against Sun's 
collaboration with the communists.173 
Russian Advisers' Assessment of the Guomindang Armies 
Other than the Comintern Presidium resolutions, the first group of the Soviet 
Russian military advisers who came to Guangzhou in October 1923 reported 
unfavourably of the military situation in the Sun Yatsen southern army.174 They found 
the situation in Guangzhou totally confused and chaotic. The only military unit 
completely subject to Sun's orders was his 150 -200 strong personal bodyguards. The 
other military forces were independent units, which could be categorised, in three main 
groups. First, the Yunnanese army comprising Generals Yang Xiwen and Fan 
Shisheng, and the Guangxi army of General Liu Zhenghuan. These units had been 
expelled from their native provinces, entered Guangzhou, the richest province in the 
South, in order to improve their financial condition and return to their own provinces. 
Their individual allegiances to Sun Yatsen and his "grandiose plans" were of a hesitant 
and tentative in nature. The Russian called these military leaders "the old -style 
warlords" and their units "the allied armies ". Secondly, the Hunanese army of Generals 
Tan Yankai, and Fan Zhongxiu175 and Cheng Qian; and a peace preservation force the 
gendarmerie of General Wu Tiecheng. Although they were supposed to be old 
comrades -in -arms of Sun Yatsen, they maintained strict independence when it came to 
questions about the management and provision of their own units. The third main 
'7' For a good account of Borodin's activities in China, see Lydia Holubnychy, Michael Borodin and 
the Chinese Revolution, 1923 -1925, East Asian Institute, Columbia University, UMI, 1979, 220 -45. 
in It was reported that he fell ill and was hospitalised after learning the outcome. Heiznig, p.I21. 
in The report, according to Li Yunhan of the Guomindang Archives in Taibei was lost during the 
1920's. Several statements expressed by Chiang on Russian communists are included in Mao Sicheng, 
op.cit., 215 -217. 
17" The following account is based mainly on "The National Revolutionary Army: Short History of its 
Origins, Development and Organisation" (Hereafter "N.R.A. "). Although this represents the Russian 
perspective, apart from the cultural bias and some inaccurate facts, it is a realistic and down to earth 
assessment of the Sun Yatsen's southern army in 1923 -1924. 
15 Fan Zhongxin was Henanese army rather than Hunanese army. 
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group of the military was the Guangdong army under General Xu Chongzhi. The 
Russians saw General Xu as a cunning opportunist who represented Guangdong 
provincial comprador and the Guomindang right interests. In addition, many "petty 
armies" of individual generals, often no more than a hundred men each. inundated 
Guangzhou. 176 
The Russian found Guangzhou divided into various regions and each under the 
loose control of one or another "allied general ". In each of these regions, the 
commanding general was responsible for management of political, military and 
economic affairs. Thus, each of these armies was able to accumulate wealth for his 
own use. As their independent status was guaranteed by sufficient force of arms and 
financial autonomy, the military commanders felt constrained to obey only those orders 
of the Sun's southern government, which happened to coincide with their desires and 
interests. The Russian saw these "allies" ruining the material well being of Guangdong 
province. Their predatory policy toward the population had resulted the people's hatred 
of the army and the government. 
Military administration was as disjointed and beyond the political control of the 
headquarters. Each of the independent armies managed its own account and 
responsible for its own organization. The absence of unified budgetary procedures and 
a centralised paymaster system produced a great deal of graft and inefficiency. 
According to the Russians, the quality of the officer corps was very Iow. They 
believed among the higher- ranking officers, a majority had no military training. Many 
senior officers had only recently emerged from banditry.'77 They turned everything 
over to officers of middle or lower rank who had had some military education. Middle - 
ranking officers were often appointed by virtue of familial ties or friendship with their 
unit commanders. Junior officers were usually old soldiers who rose from the rank and 
file. They had survived long years and had obtained sufficient experience to lead 
troops. These men served as small unit commanders in both training situation as in 
actual combat. In all officers grades, political convictions was weak. The senior 
officers were members of the Guomindang in name without much conviction or 
X76 N.R.A., 480 -481. 
X77 This is quite exaggerating. For example, of the eight military leaders mentioned in the early part 
of the account, Cheng Qian and Xu Chongzhi were graduates from the Japanese Shikan Grakko; Fan 
Shisheng and Yang Xiwen were graduates from Yunnan Military Academy; Tan Yankai and Wu 
Tiecheng did not have a military education but certainly were not emerged from bandits. Minguo Renwu 
Daicidian (Biographical dictionary of the Republican China), 377, 588, 1144, 1227, 1502, 1644. 
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dedication. The middle range officers were not interested even in joining the party, and 
junior officers were almost universally illiterate and therefore without political interest. 
As for military logistics, the Russians noted that supply was haphazard. Each 
military commander occupying an area was responsible for collecting taxes in that 
region. He was free to consider the tax revenue as his own income. He spent as little 
as possible on the maintenance of his troops and units. What he did locate passed down 
through subordinate officers, each of whom kept a proportion for himself so that very 
little reached the soldiers. "Everybody was stealing, beginning from the commander of 
the army down to the company commanders." 78 The rifles carried by combat troops 
were of various calibres and models from various Chinese arsenals and foreign 
suppliers. Ammunition was purchased from any one of a number of available arsenals 
but no one was able to keep accurate records of them. Commanders at all levels were 
able to stockpile ammunition for their personal advantage (which might mean either 
sale or unauthorised use). 
Regarding the training of troops, there were neither specialised training cadres 
nor organised training programme in most units. Little or no emphasis was given to 
rifle shooting practice. Soldiers were not taught the value of scouting and 
reconnaissance nor communication service and engineering work in operations. 
In sum, the Russian advisers viewed the fighting value of Sun's armies in 
Guangzhou as virtually nil. They assessed that in the face of any serious armed 
invasion; the forces would be at a tremendous disadvantage. By virtue of the tenuous 
relationship between Sun Yatsen and his subordinate military leaders, the southern 
government was unable to act forcefully. The independent subordinates diluted its 
authority. Its energy was used in negotiating and cajoling with the military leaders 
under its supposed control. The high command was more concerned with maintaining 
the goodwill of its subordinate generals than with military operational matters.179 This 
was the situation that confronted the Russian advisers when they first arrived in 
Guangzhou 
In conclusion, Sun Yatsen's main contribution to the Huangpu Military 
Academy was two -fold. It was his revolutionary ideology that gave a positive role for 
the military. However, Sun was vague on detail as to how the military specific roles 
178 "N.R.A." p.483. 
19 "N.R.A.", p.484. 
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were in the movement. It was not only Sun but other Guomíndang's members were 
equally concerned about the reform of the military in order to convert them into a 
positive force of the Nationalist revolution. The other main contribution of Sun was 
his attempts to solicit Russian military support. 
Since the rebellion of Chen Jiongming in 1922, Sun needed to re- establish a 
new party army and a new base to free himself from dependence on mercenary armies. 
Desperately, he sent Chiang Kaishek to Moscow to seek a new solution. Chiang 
proposed to establish an army along the line of the Soviet Red Army and build two 
military bases along the Sino- Soviet borders to prepare for an offensive drive against 
Beijing. Setting up a new military academy would be a first small step toward 
achieving this military plan within two years. 
It is difficult to determine how much the Russian Revolution and the Red Army 
have inspired Sun Yatsen and Chiang Kaishek. But one thing is clear, Sun and the 
Guomindang were seeking desperately for foreign aid and assistance to revitalise the 
nationalist struggle against the military separatists and foreign powers in China. To this 
end, Sun Yatsen, the Guomindang and Chiang Kaishek were prepared to accommodate 
Communism and accept the practice of political control of the army in exchange for 
Soviet -Comintern aid. 
Militarily, the Northwest Plan" was against the Soviet Russian national 
interests. The Soviet Union main security concerns in China were north -eastern coastal 
provinces and Siberia. Security dictated that the Soviet Union control of the Chinese 
Eastern Railway and that it maintained the dominance position in northern Manchuria 
and Outer Mongolia against Japan. Sun Yatsen's "Northwest Plan" was not only unable 
to contribute to this security interest but also risked war with Japan and other powers. 
As the Soviet Union emerged from the devastations of revolution and civil war, the last 
thing it wanted was to be drawn into another war in China. Moreover, Sun Yatsen was 
not in total command of the southern army. As the Soviet military advisers rightly 
pointed out, Sun had to clean up the mess in Guangdong and established his own army 
before any military offensive could be contemplated. The Russians decided to support 
Sun's southern government because they saw Sun as a potential leader of the Chinese 
national liberation movement. The Russians were ready to back Sun conditionally if he 
would reform his party, make anti -imperialism its goals, accept the communist party 
working within to create a mass proletarian movement. 
The proposal for a new party military academy was reportedly endorsed in the 
Guomindang First National Congress held in Guangzhou in January 1924. The new 
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academy would differ in basic and substantial ways from any existing Guangzhou 
military schools.180 Of primary importance were the academy's subordination to the 
Guomindang and its cadet corps would be from all over the country rather than from a 
single region of one or another military separatist. This would form the basis upon 
which a new national revolutionary army was to be built upon. 
The birth of the Huangpu Military Academy seemed to be a satisfactory 
compromise by all except one person -- General Chiang Kaishek. Being a young and 
able military upstart,' ° Chiang was more interested in military action than military 
training. The Soviet Russian rejection of his "northwest offensive plan" was a great 
disappointment. Chiang's background, however, made him a very ideal candidate for 
the post of the Commandant of the party military academy. He was a well -trained 
professional soldier, a party and Sun Yatsen loyalist, and above all, a military leader 
who had no troops of his own. But Chiang was not keen on the job. He resigned from 
the Chairmanship of the Preparatory Committee and refused to return to Guangzhou 
even after several appeals by Sun Yatsen and other members of the Guomindang. 
Chiang finally returned to Guangzhou after much persuasion and took up the 
Commandant post only a month before the beginning of the first course of the Huangpu 
Military Academy.182 Yet, Chiang had not given up his hope. As the years unfolded, 
he made serious attempts to make the Huangpu Military Academy a military unit and 
constantly prepare it for campaigns against the regional armies. 
tB0 The existing military school in Guangzhou under General Chen Qian was a good example. The 
cadets and staff of Chen Qian's military school had been recruited almost entirely in Guangdong and 
Hunan. These were the provinces where Chen Qian maintained his base of power and network of 
relationship. For a detailed discussion on this aspect, see John J. Fitzgerald, Chapter 3, "Military 
Politics ", in "Hollow Words: Guomindang Propaganda and the Formation of Popular Attitudes toward 
the National Revolution in Guangdong Province, 1919 -1926." Ph.D. diss., Australian National 
University, 1983, 68 -73. 
181 Chiang gained Sun Yatsen's confidence and trust mainly during the Cheng Jiongming's revolt in 
1922 where he risked his life to protect Sun. 
102 Zhongyang lujun junguan xuexiao shigao (Draft history of the central military academy) vol. I. 
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Chapter 3: Chiang Kaishek and the Huangpu Military Academy 
The development of the Huangpu Military Academy in Guangzhou can be 
divided into distinctive two periods. The first period covers from its inception in May 
1924 to January 1926 when the academy was named the Army Officers Academy (Lujun 
junguan xuexiao). This was the most eventful and traumatic time for Huangpu. The new 
academy had to train not only officer cadets but also to form its own army to fight for its 
own survival. In less than two years, three classes of cadets graduated and Huangpu 
developed from two infantry regiments to a corps known as the I Corps of the National 
Revolutionary Army. During this period, Huangpu's units participated actively in 
Guangdong's unification and the subsequent re- establishment of the Nationalist 
Government in Guangzhou on 1 July 1925. In the second period, Huangpu was renamed 
the Central Military and Political Academy. The roles of Huangpu expanded to training 
officers from other units of the National Revolutionary Army. The main role of the 
Central Military and Political Academy was to prepare the National Revolutionary Army 
for the Northern Expedition.'$' The next two chapters will focus on the first period. The 
second period will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
The history of the Huangpu Military Academy has been dealt with in various 
aspects such as the political struggle between the Chinese Communist Party and 
Guomindang, the role of the Russian advisers and the rivalries between the Guomindang 
Left and Right factions. But few scholars have paid attention to the role of the Chinese 
officer corps. It is ironic, since Huangpu was a military academy and the majority of the 
staff were military officers. This chapter will focus on the role of the Chinese officer 
corps represented by Chiang Kaishek, the Commandant of the Huangpu Military 
Academy, in the early years of the establishment of the academy. It will examine the 
following key questions. What were the problems of the Huangpu Military Academy 
during its early years? What kind of assistance the Russians had given to the academy? 
Who were in control of the academy? Why was Huangpu Military Academy turned out 
to be an army? 
The Military Staff 
When the Huangpu Military Academy was first established, the main bulk of its 
Á1 Huangpu junxiao ,rhigao (Draft history of the Huangpu military academy), 1: 203 -220, 
military officers came from the Guangdong Army.184 Heading the list was its 
commandant Chiang Kaishek. Although Chiang knew Sun Yatsen when he was a cadet 
in Japan, he began working directly for him only in 1918 when Sun invited him to join 
the Guangdong Army. Chiang came to know Sun Yatsen through the introduction of 
Chen Qimei who was a strong supporter of Sun's revolutionary cause. After the death of 
Chen Qimei in May 1916, Chiang Kaishek began to work for Sun Yatsen. Sun first sent 
him to serve Ju Zheng, the head of the revolutionaries' Northeast Army in Shandong who 
was against Yuan Shikai. But the sudden death of Yuan Shikai had changed the entire 
political scene and he was no more required. Chiang then moved from Beijing to 
Shanghai. It was during his stay in Shanghai that he drafted several military plans of the 
southeast regions for Sun.185 
In 1918, Sun invited Chiang to join the newly formed Guangdong Army under 
the command of Chen Jiongming. He was made head of Field Operations, and later, the 
commander of the 2nd Detachment in Yongtaí, which was about 20 kilometers from 
Fuzhou. It was here that his forces were defeated and Chiang wanted to be relieved from 
command but Chen Jiongming insisted that he remained.186 It is clear from his personal 
account that Chiang was very dissatisfied with the Guangdong Army. He frequently 
complained of "factionalism" among fellow officers that conspired against him. He 
thought one reason for this might be that most of the officers were Guangdong natives 
whereas he was a Zhejiang native.187 
184 See Liu Fenghan, "Huangpu lao qi zuzhi ji ren shi fen xi (An analysis of the organisation and 
personnel during the early years of the Huangpu military academy)." Huangpujianxiao liushi zhounian 
lunwenji (Papers on the 60th anniversary on the founding of the Huangpu military academy), 212 -321. 
Guofangbu shizheng bianyi ju (National military history and translation bureau) edited. Taibei : Guofangbu 
shizheng bianyi ju (National military history and translation bureau), 1984. 
1fl9 See Zongtong Chiang gong dashi zhangbian chugao (Preliminary draft of important affairs based 
on various sources and arranged chronologically relating to President Chiang), 1:20 -25, Taibei: 
Guomindang, 1978; Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 27 and 30; Furuya, shokai -seki hiroku, 5: 99/1119- 
107/1127; also Scalapino, Robert A., and George T. Yu. "On the Horizon: Young Chiang and Mao ", in 
Modern China and its Revolutionary Process: Recurrent Challenges to the Traditional Order, 1850 -1920, 
Chapter 12, Berkeley, Los Angles, London: University of California Press, 1985. 
186 It was reported that in this battle, Chiang volunteered to lead a surprise attack (qi bing) on Fuzhou 
in order to break the stalemate, but the reinforcement from the defenders thwarted the assault. See Yuejun 
shishi jiyao, p.13; and Mao, JiangJieshi nianpu, p.30. 
in Chiang at this time was having some emotional and physical problems as well. In a letter dated 9 
July to Deng Keng, Chiang said he was suffering from gastric problems and insomnia, and that he was 
mentally exhausted. He also complained that other officers were discriminating against him. See Furuya, 
shokai -seko hiroku, 5: 155/1175- 156/1176; Mao, Jiang Jieshi nianpu, 35 -6. 
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Chiang complained that he could do little to improve the 2nd Detachment since it 
was well entrenched in old habits when he took command. His ideas to improve the 
fighting capabilities could not be carried out in the unit. He found the quality of the 
officers deplorable. Most of the officers were collected haphazardly, so he could not get 
experienced and competent men to assist him. Once they were engaged, it was 
practically impossible to get rid of them.188 On 12 July, Chiang handed his resignation 
although he appeared to have remained in Fujian until September. Since then until the 
end of 1921, Chiang spent much time in Shanghai and Zhejiang, although at the urging 
of Sun and other Guomindang leaders, he made several brief trips to Fujian and 
Guangdong but always retreating after a few days or weeks. 
There were other military officers in the Guangdong Army who joined Huangpu 
in 1924. Most of them were graduates of Baoding, Yunnan and Japanese Shikan Gakko 
military academies (see table 10). They first served as the academy's military instructors, 
and later commanders of the academy army. Among them, graduates from the Shikan 
Gakko and Baoding occupied middle and higher appointments; whereas the lower 
ranking officers were mainly from the Yunnan Military Academy.' Until the 
reorganisation of the academy in March 1926, the instructors in Huangpu were 
predominantly Baoding graduates, and the infantry and artillery were the main two 
arms.190 As for the junior officers at the company and platoon levels, they were from the 
Guangdong Guards' Military School (Jingwei jun jianwu tang) and Xijiang Military 
School.191 As the majority of these officers were not natives of Guangdong (see table 12 
1B8 See Chiang's letters to Deng Keng, dated 21 June and 7 July 1919, in Mao, Jiang Jieshi nianpu, 35- 
6. 
89 The Baoding and Shikan Gakko graduates were the better trained officers and naturally the 
preferred candidates for the Huangpu Military Academy. But more important perhaps, they were also 
being discriminated against by the regional armies whose commanders always preferred "trusted" rather 
than well -trained officers to be their subordinates. For the general discrimination against the Baoding 
graduates among the regional armies, see Lin Dezheng, "Baoding junguan xuexiao zhi yanjíu, 1912 -1924" 
(A study on the Baoding military academy, I9í2- 1924), M.A. thesis, National Political University of 
Taiwan, 1980, p. 188. The lower ranking officers from the Yunnan Military Academy was mainly 
introduced by Wang Boling where he had been teaching for seven years before joining Huangpu. See 
Wang Boling in Liu Shaotang ed. Minguo renwu xiao zhuan (Brief biographies of Republican 
personalities). Taibei: Zhuanji wenxue, 1972, 3: 9; and Wang Boling, "Huangpu chengli zhi huiyi" 
(Recollections of the founding of the Huangpu), in Zhuanji wenxue (Biographical literature) 15: 95, and 
16: 86. 
190 Among the 69 Baoding graduates, 14 were infantry, 10 from artillery, 10 each from logistics, 
engineering, the calvary, and the rest were unknown. Among these, 22 came from the Third Class, 15 from 
the Second Class, 14 from the Sixth Class. See table 11 for details. 
191 Huangpu junxiao shigao (Draft history of the Huangpu military academy), vol. 1, part 1, 1 -102. 
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for the provincial background of military staff), they could be seen as the southern 
representation of the new Chinese officer corps. 
Not only the key founding military officers of Huangpu came from the 
Guangdong Army, but few even held concurrent appointments in both Huangpu and the 
Guangdong Army. For example, the commandant Chiang Kaishek was the Chief of 
Staff, and the head of Training Department of the Guangdong Army;192 and Li Jishen, 
head of the Training Department of Huangpu, was the commander of the 1st Division of 
the Guangdong Army.193 Others like Yu Feipeng, who was one of the Preparatory 
Committees and subsequently Deputy Head of the Academy's Logistics Department, 
served in the Guangdong Army's Command Headquarters as acting Chief Auditor (dui 
shen ji chu)194. Deng Yanda, the deputy head of the Training Department was the 
commander of the 3rd Regiment, the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division concurrently.'95 
Qian Dajun, one of the military instructors in Huangpu, was the Chief of Staff of the 1st 
Division of the Guangdong Army.'96 Liu Zhí, another instructor, was the Chief of Staff 
of the Guangdong Army Command L97 Yan Zhong, was a battalion commander and 
deputy commander of the 3rd Regiment in the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division.196 Others 
such as Ye Jianyin, the Deputy Head of the Instructional Department, was a native of 
Meixian, Guangdong, and a graduate of Yunnan Military Academy. He joined the 
Guangdong Army since its inception in 1918. Ye's position in the Huangpu Military 
Academy thus placed him at a level equivalent to that of Zhou Enlai, the deputy head of 
the Political Department, and Deng Yanda, the deputy head of the Tactics Department.'99 
X92 The appointment was made on 13 October 1924. See Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, p. 249; Loh, 
Pichon P.Y., The Early Chiang Kai -shek, New York: Columbia University Press, 1971, p. 101. 
193 When Deng Keng was the chief of staff of the Guangdong Army and commander of the 1st 
Division in 1921 he invited Li Jishen to Guangzhou. Deng appointed him chief of staff of the 1st 
Division. When Deng was assassinated in March 1922 and Chen Jiongming staged a coup in Guangzhou 
on 16 June, Li Jishen participated in the campaign that drove Chen from Guangzhou in the spring of 
1923. See Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, editors Howard L. Boorman, and Richard C. 
Howard. II: 293 -99, New York: Columbia University Press, 1967; Liu, Shaotang ed. Minguo renwu xiao 
skean (Brief biographies of Republican personalities), 5: 123. 
194 See Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, 4: 181. 
195Ibid. 3: 313; and Zhang Guang Yu. Deng Yanda chuan (The biography of Deng Yanda). Wuchang: 
Wuhan University Publication, 1993, 17 -18. 
'6 Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, 6: 442. 
197 Ibid. 2: 271; and Liu, Zhi. Wo di huiyi (My recollections). Taibei: Guanglong, 1966, p. 21. 
198 It is probably this close association with the group of the Huangpu's staff that he turned to 
communism. Ibid. 4: 426. 
149 For the biography of Ye Jianyin, see the Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, 4: 23 -26 ; 
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The experience of the Guangdong Army during 1918 -1923 apparently was useful when 
they embarked on setting up a military academy and an army at Huangpu in 1924. 
Chiang Kaishek's Resignation 
On 16 January 1924, Chiang Kaishek arrived in Guangzhou in time for the 
convening of the Guomindang's First National Congress of Delegates although Chiang 
was not a delegate. On 24 January, Sun appointed an eight- member Preparatory 
Committee headed by Chiang to organise the new academy.200 But after only two 
meetings Chiang suddenly decided to leave Guangzhou. Before he left, he gave some 
money to the committee members telling them to return to their original posts.261 Chiang 
was persuaded to resume his chairmanship only on 21 April, two weeks before the first 
class was to start their training in the new academy. Chiang's resignation on 21 February 
1924 as head of the Preparatory Committee was an early indication of discord and lack of 
agreement on the question of setting up a party-army academy. 
Different reasons have been advanced for Chiang's departure.202 Bao Huiseng 
gives the reason that Chiang refused to serve under Cheng Qian, who was Sun's first 
choice to head the new academy. According to Bao, it was Zhang Jingjiang who went to 
Guangzhou to persuade Sun to appoint Chiang head of the academy 203 MacFarquhar, on 
the Far East Economic Review, 6 November 1986, p. 32. 
200 Other than Chiang Kaishek, other members were: Wang Boling, Deng Yanda, Lin Zhenxiong, Yu 
Feipeng, Sung Rongchang, Zhang Jiarui, Shen Yingshi. For detail of appointment and the names of the 
Preparatory Committee, see Luo Jialun and Huang Jilu eds. Guofu nianpu zengding ben (A chronological 
biography of the father of the country, enlarged and revised edition). 3rd ed., 2 vols. Taibei: Zhongguo 
Guomindang, Party History Commission, 1969, 1059; 1073 -4. 
201 See one of the committee members Wang Boling's account in "Huangpu chengli zhi huiyi 
(Recollections of the founding of Huangpu), Part 1." Zhuanji wenxue (Biographical literature) 15, no. 6 
(December 1969): 82 -86. Wang said that the Preparatory Committee initially could not find a proper place 
to start their work. The allied armies did not like the idea of another military academy in Guangzhou. The 
first few meetings had to convene in Sun's cabin on board of a ship, ibid., p.82. Chiang's resignation in 
early 1924 was also criticized by Ye Jianying, who was the Deputy Head of the Training Department in 
Huangpu. Ye later became one of the People's Liberation Army Field Marshals after 1949. See Ye 
Jianying, "Sun Zhongshan sansheng de jian jun sixiang he da wu wei jingshen (Mr Sun Yatseñ s thought 
on the building of the army and the spirit of fearlessness)." Wen hui bao (Wen hui newspaper), (1956). 
2°z John Erickson, The Soviet High Command, 229 -230, in paticular, argues disagreement between 
the Chinese officers and the Russian advisers, and suspicion of the Russian's motives; see also Geming 
wenxian (Documents on the revolution), 11: 1239 -1300. 
?03 Bao Huiseng was a member of the Chinese Communist Party, and in 1925 he was appointed as 
the Head of the Political Department of the Huangpu Army during the First Eastern Expedition. See his 
memoir Bao Huiseng Huiyilu (Reminiscence of Bao Huiseng). Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1983, p. 151. 
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the other hand, thinks that once Chiang Kaishek had the experience of his Russian 
journey, he became the prime candidate for the position of chairman of the preparatory 
committee, and as head of the preparatory committee he was the obvious candidate for 
the job of commandant.204 But there is no available document indicating that the 
selection of Chiang as head of the Preparatory Committee was made because Chiang was 
to be the Commandant. There is, however, some evidence regarding the change of 
appointment of the head of the new academy. According to an early set of regulations 
for the academy which may have been drawn up by the Preparatory Committee. the first 
general rule stated that the Generalissimo (Sun Yatsen) was the chief principal 
(commandant) of the academy; and Rule 15 states that there was to be an assistant chief 
who would be second in command.205 But in fact, when Chiang Kaishek fmally returned 
to Guangzhou, it was reported that Sun "especially appointed" him principal of the 
Huangpu Military Academy on 2 May.206 
Finance and Arms 
The most crucial factor in determining the Huangpu Military Academy's future, 
however, was sources of financial support and arms procurement. Chiang Kaishek's 
resignation Ietter stressed the financial uncertainty of the new academy.207 In reply, Sun 
Yatsen reassured Chiang on 29 February 1924 that the financial problem had been 
settled, although he did not explain how it was done.Z08 Liao Zhongkai also telegraphed 
20" Roderick L. MacFarquhar, "The Whampoa Military Academy." Harvard Papers on China Vol. 
IX (1955): 150 -1. 
203 The Whampoa Military School: A Report Complied from Soviet Documents. U.S. National 
Archives: Record Group 165, Military Intelligence Division of the War Department General Staff, 2657 - 
I- 281 /120, articles 1, 15, and I7a. This report is written by the Russian advisers in Guangzhou and the 
document was seized during the 1927 raid of the Soviet Embassy in Beijing and compiled by the 
American military attache's office. 
Z06 The Guomindang Archives account of the founding of the academy states that Sun appointed 
himself leader (zongli) of the academy with Chiang Kaishek as principal. See Geming wenxian, 8: 1167-8; 
and Qian Dajun, "Huangpu junxiao kaichuang zhiqi zhi zuzhi" (The organization of the Huangpu military 
academy in its initial period), Geming wenxian, 10: 1465 -1470. The Russian adviser's account also 
confirms that Sun was to be the head of the academy and Chiang, presumably would be deputy director. 
See Cherepanov, A.i. Zapiski Vennogo Sovetnika v Kitae; iz Istorii Pervoi Grazdanskoi 
Revolutsionnoi Cony, 1924 -1927 (Notes of a military adviser in China:from the history of the First 
Revolutionary Civil War in China, 1924 -1927). Moscow: Academy of Sciences of USSR, Institute 
Norodov Azii, Nauka, 1964, p. 85. 
247 Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 12 January 1924, p. 156. 
208 Ibid., 26 -29 Febuary 1924, 159 -160. 
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Chiang on 3 April saying "as to the funds for the military academy, I will not ask about 
disbursements, and you will not ask about their sources. There is no lack of funds and 
you can proceed to administer with peace of mind.i209 According to the Guomindang 
sources, the initial funds for the founding and maintenance of the new academy came 
mainly from Guangdong taxpayers. Wang Boling states that Liao Zhongkai, whom he 
called the academy's "kind mother" (cimu), did valuable works in raising funds and 
winning people over to the idea of the academy. Liao obtained a grant of about $233,250 
(or $186,600 silver dollars) for initial expenses from the Guangzhou government.210 
Chiang's diary also states that on 22 May, the Financial Council of Guangzhou decided 
that, apart from the founding funds, the Provincial Finance Office, the Guangzhou 
Municipal Finance Office, and the Army Estimates Office would each provide $5,000, 
and the Public Safety Bureau (the Guangzhou Police) contribute $15,000 monthly?" 
The total monthly expenses for the academy were $30,000. As there are very little 
available sources on Huangpu's budget, it is extremely hard to tell how much of the funds 
were actually delivered to Huangpu.212 What is certain, however, is that the commanders 
of the allied armies frequently interrupted payments.213 Moreover, the budget accounts 
preserved in the Guomindang Archives only document the running costs of the academy 
and contain nothing dealing with the academy army (for the first six months of the 
academy's budget see tables 4 and 5). 
It has been traditionally believed that the main financial sources for the founding 
209 Ibid., 30 March 1924, p.1 75. For an analysis of correspondence between Chiang and his 
colleagues in Guangzhou during this period see Loh, The Early Chiang Kai-shek, 92 -96. 
210 The amount of $233,250 was in Guangdong dollars. The original figure was in silver dollars of 
$í86,600. But not all the full amount was eventually delivered, see tables 4 and 5 for details; also Wang 
Boling. "Huangpu chuangshi zhi huiyi (Reminiscences conceming the founding of Huangpu)." Huangpu 
jikan (Huangpu quarterly) 1, no. 1 (3 January 1939), p. 9; and also Yu Feipeng, "Huangpu junxiao kaijian 
shi zhi huiyi" (Reminiscence of the founding of the Huangpu military academy), Geming wenxian: 10: 
1453, Yu was a member of the preparatory committee and when the Huangpu Military Academy was 
founded he was the deputy head of the Supply Department. 
'1 Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 22 May 1924, p.I92. 
212 The Guomindang Archives has only one account balance sheet for January-May 1924 indicating 
that the Huangpu expenditure was within the allocated budgets for both the initial founding and monthly 
expenses; see Zhongyang shang zongli ji zhi jian weíyuan hui qing zhun he Huangpu baoxiao cheng han 
(Document on the budget of Huangpu for the zongli 
(Sun Yatsen) and inspection committee approval), 454/47.5. 
21 Liao Zhongkai complained to Chiang Kaishek that he had to chase after tl-e payments personally 
late into the night after some allied commanders had finished their opium smoking sessions. See Huangpu 
junxiao shigao (Draft history of the Huangpu military academy), Zhongyang lujun junguan xuexiao 
(Central military officers' academy), Nanjing, The Second Chinese Historical Archives, 1936, Part 2, p.1. 
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of the Huangpu military academy came from Soviet Russia?' In February 1924. a joint 
commission of Chinese officials and Russian advisers under the chairmanship of Sun 
Yatsen prepared an estimate of the funds needed to set up the academy. The figures given 
by the chief Russian military adviser, V. K. Bliukher, in his diary indicate that the Soviet 
Union supported the Huangpu Military Academy financially until October 1925.215 He 
also stated that Borodin regularly subsidised the Huangpu Military Academy and by 
October 1924 the monthly subsidy may have been $100,000 Guangdong dollars »ó In an 
interview, Borodin, the chief political adviser, said that the Russian government made a 
grant of three million roubles for the organisation of the new military academy and its 
initial running expenses?" The Guomindang's historians challenged this figure although 
they do acknowledge Russian financial support.216 But how and when these Russian 
funds were spent remains a mystery.219 What is important to note is that the Russian 
funds were used not only to establish the new academy but also to build the army at 
Huangpu. Above all, the academy expanded very rapidly after its inception. In May 
214 C. Martin Wilbur holds strongly to the view that large Russian funds were spent on the new 
academy, see "Military Separatism and the Process of Reunification Under the Nationalist Regime, 
1922- 1927." in China in Crisis, vol. 1, eds. Ping -ti Ho and Tang Tsou. USA: University of Chicago, 1968, 
233 -234; and Sun Yat -sen.' Frustrated Patriot. New York: Columbia University Press, 1976, 209; 
351. 
215 See Kartunova, A. I. V. K. Bliukher v Kitae, 1924 -1927 gg : Documentirovannyi ocherk 
dokumenty (V. K. Bliukher in China, 1924 -1927: document outline, documents), Moskva: Nauka, 1970, p. 
54. 
216 In a conversation between Bliukher and Liao Zhongkai on 18 November 1924, Liao told Bliukher 
he was still waiting for the remainder of last month's (15 October -15 November) funds and requested that 
in the future the monthly funds should be in one or two instalments. Bliukher also mentioned that the 
Yunnan Military Academy had also received Russian financial support although on a less regular basis. 
See Kartunova, A. I. V. K. Bliukher v Kitae, 1924 -1927 gg, 54 -5; and Holubnychy, Lydia. Michael 
Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, 1923 -1925. New York: East Asian Institute, Columbia University, 
UMI, 1979, 412 -3. 
2" Three million roubles would have amounted to about Chinese $2,700,000. The money was given 
in instalments. See Fischer, Louis. Men and Politics: An Autobiography. New York: Duell, Sloan and 
Pearce, 1941, p. 138. Fischer interviewed Borodin ten times between 26 February and 4 June 1929. 
218 See in particular Wang Zhenghua who argues that there is no convincing evidence to indicate that 
all the Russian financial contribution was spent on Huangpu; see "Huangpu jianxiao jin fei cu tan 
(Preliminary study of the finance of the founding of the huangpu military academy)." Huangpu jianxiao 
liushi zhounian lunwenji (Papers on the 60th anniversary on the founding of the Huangpu military 
academy), 437 
-482. Guofangbu shizheng bianyi ju (National military history and translation bureau) 
edited. Taibei: Guofangbu shizheng bianyi ju (National military history and translation bureau), 1984, 
437 -482. 
SIS It is interesting to note that Huangpu's sources including participants' reminiscences and the 
academy's records have never mentioned the Russian funds. This is in marked contrast to the arms 
supplies from Soviet Russia, which most of the Huangpu sources acknowledged. 
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1924, soon after the academy opened, it had about 407 staff and 499 students, a total 
strength of 906. In November, the academy staff had increased to 1,500 and students to 
2,200, with a total strength of 3,700, a fourfold increase in just four months. If one were 
to calculate the salary required for the expansion, and base this on the July salary 
standard of an average of $16 a person, the salary cost per month would have been about 
$14,498 in May 1924, in November $59,200, and thereafter $60,000 or more in the 
following months (see table 6 for the salary scale). 
In September 1924, Chiang Kaishek also proposed setting up two Training 
Regiments (jiaodao tuan) in Huangpu consisting of three infantry regiments, one artillery 
and one engineering battalion with a total strength of 3,769. The initial cost of this 
military build -up was $2,720,000,220 The 1st Training Regiment was formed in 
November commanded by He Yingqin, and on 26 December the 2nd Training Regiment 
came into being under Wang Boling. The Russian chief military adviser V. K. Bliukher 
estimated the cost of one Training Regiment at about $85,000 per month.'-2' 
The arms supply sources to Huangpu are less controversial than those of financial 
aid. Arms supply came from three main sources. Before Huangpu commenced its first 
training class in \fay 1924, the academy had only 230 rifles and limited cartridges.222 
Sun Yatsen had ordered 600 rifles from the Guangdong Shijing Arsenal but only 230 
were delivered. The Guangdong arsenal was under the control of the Yunnan Army and 
they resisted handling over the rifles to the Huangpu Military Academy. It was only 
after Sun's personal intervention that the rest of the rifles were eventually delivered.223 
Another source of arms came from the seizure of armaments from the Guangzhou 
Merchant Corps.224 On 9 August, Sun ordered Chiang, as the commander of Changzhou 
22° This figure excludes 12 field artillery pieces. The proposal was submitted by Chiang Kaishek and 
Liao Zhongkai to the Guomindang Central Executive Committee, 19 September 1924, file no. 454/49. 
Unfortunately, there is no detailed plan attached to this letter. Chiang's proposal for setting up two 
Training Regiments, see Jiang .1 ieshi nianpu chugao, 11 August, 3 September 1924, 225 -6, 231. 
In See "Bliukher's Grand Plan of 1926 ", the China Quarterly, no.35, Jul -Sept 1968, p.26. 
222 In a letter to Liao Zhongkai, Chiang requested another 350 rifles and 50 to 100 cartridges for each 
rifle to be sent to Huangpu before 15 May 1924 when the academy commenced its training. The original 
letter is on displaced in the Exhibition Hail of the Guomindang Archives in Taibei. 
223 The manager of the arsenal Ma Chaoju was kidnapped by the Yunnan Army for supplying 
Huangpu rifles. It was only after Sun Yatsen`s intervention that Ma was released. See Ma Chaoju's speech 
in Lujun junguan xuexiao sishi zhounian xiaoqing zhuanji (The 40th anniversary magazine of the 
Huangpu military academy), Taibei, 1965, p. 15. 
224 See Huangpu junxiao shigao (Draft history of the Huangpu military academy), 10 parts, 8 vols, 
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fort, to seize a consignment of armaments for Guangzhou. According to British 
accounts, this arms consignment ordered by the Guangzhou Merchant Corps contained 
4.850 rifles with 1,150,000 cartridges; 4,331 automatic rifles and 2,060,000 cartridges; 
and 660 pistols with 164,000 cartridges.22s Cherepanov recalled that when the 
armaments were finally returned to the Merchant Corps on 10 October, there were only 
about 2,149 rifles, 1,851 pistols and 125,000 rounds of ammunition.226 Apart from those 
distributed under the orders of Sun Yatsen to his Northern Expedition forces, most of the 
armaments were retained at Huangpu. The last but the most important source of 
armaments was from the Soviet Russia. The first shipment of Russian aims which 
arrived on the Vorovsky on 8 October 1924, consisted of eight thousand rifles with five 
hundred cartridges per rifle, and some machine guns and artillery pieces. The Russian 
ship was greeted with cheers when it arrived at Huangpu.227 Sun Yatsen was then at 
Shaoguan organising his northern expedition campaign, and when he heard of the 
Russian ship's arrival, he ordered Chiang to off -load the armaments directly at Huangpu 
in defiance of customs regulations 228 Before the end of 1926, another two to three 
Russian arms shipments arrived in Huangpu229 Among the armaments procured for 
Huangpu, the most valuable perhaps were the artillery pieces, which formed the main 
bulk of the artillery units of the Huangpu army. There was also a number of aircraft, 
Zhongyang lujun junguan xuexiao (Central military officers academy) comp. Nanjing, The Second 
Chinese Historical Archives: Huadong gongxueyan chubanbu yingyin (Huadong industrial college 
photocopied), 1936, vol. 1, 1 -129 to 1 -136. 
223 See the report of the British Consulate General (Canton) to the British Legation (Peking), dated 21 
August 1924, F.O. 228/3109, p.320. This report was shown to me by Mr. Chen Cungong of the Institute of 
Modem History, the Academia Sinica during my research field trip in Taibei. 
2?Ó A. I. Cherepanov, Zapiski Vennogo Sovetnika v Kitae; iz Istorü Pervoi Grazdanskoi 
Revolutsionnoi Cony, 1924-1927, p. 97. 
221 Wang Boling, "Huangpu chengli zhi huiyi" (Recollections of the founding of Huangpu), Zhuanji 
wenxue (Biographical literature) 16, no. 6 (December 1969): 95 -96. 
zza Guofu quanji, 5: 571, which has Sun's hand written note to Chiang dated 3 October 1924. 
u9 Taiwanese scholar Sun Zihe argues that there were at least three more arms shipment from Russia 
before the end of 1926, see "Cong Huangpu jianjun dao belfa" (From the military build up at Huangpu to 
the (1926) Northern Expedition), Zhonghua minguo lishi yi wenhua taoluhui (History and culture seminar 
on the republican period), 4: 16 -17; whereas Chen Cungong argues there were five shipments: see his 
article "Huangpu jianxiao qianhou zai hua nan de su'e junshi guwen (The Russian military advisers' 
activities in southern China during the founding of the Huangpu military academy)." Huangpu jianxiao 
liushi zhounian lunwenji (Papers on the 60th anniversary on the founding of the Huangpu military 
academy), 367 -436. Guofangbu shizheng bianyi ju (National military history and translation bureau) 
edited. Taibei: Guofangbu shizheng bianyi je (National military history and translation bureau), 1984, 
131 -2. Chiang Kaishek in his book however, mentions only two Russian arms shipments to Huangpu; see 
Su'e zai zhongguo (Soviet Russia in China), Taibei, Zhongyang wenwu gongying shi, 1957, p. 271. 
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aviators and navigators, sent to Guangzhou during 1925 and 1 926.230 
The Recruitment Plan 
The documentary evidence of the Guomindang reveals that the party's Central 
Executive Committee (CEC) maintained some control in the early preparation of the new 
academy. This was apparent in the cadets' recruitment policy. The Preparatory 
Committee headed by Liao Zhongkai decided on the original plan for the recruitment of 
cadets on 10 February. Party members who attended the First National Guomindang 
Congress would carry out recruitment. A total student body of 324 and a quota of each 
province were established?" Twelve students each were to come from the following 
provinces: Hunan, Guangdong, Yunnan, Shanxi, Guangxi, Anhui, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Sichuan, Shaanxi, Hubei, Hunan, Shandong, and Hebei which constituted 168 students. 
Fifty students would come from Manchuria, Jehol (Rehe) and Harbin. Another fifteen 
students each would come from Guangdong, Hunan, Yunnan, Guangxi and Henan armies 
stationed in Guangdong. Twenty places were reserved for family members of the 
Guomindang's martyrs. Lastly, the remaining eleven places were allocated to less 
qualified students, or the reserve as they were called.232 
From this student quota, we can discern several points of the initial planning. 
Firstly, in the minds of the key Guomindang leaders, the Huangpu Military Academy 
was to be a national institution where the majority of the provinces would be represented. 
This idea coincided with the Russian Red Army policy but it was also a pattern of the 
Baoding Military Academy when it first established in 1912 (see chapter one). The 
multi -provincial quota was also consistent with Sun's attempt to establish a multi - 
provincial personal bodyguard earlier in 1910 when he first set up his Guangzhou 
Military Government. Party members in Sun's confidence recommended candidates for 
recruitment. Until Chen Jíongmíng's rebellion in the summer of 1922, the bodyguard 
had less than 100 men. But after Sun's return to Guangzhou in February 1923, this unit 
230 See Cherepanov, A. I. Severnyi Pokhod Natsional'no- Revoliutsionno Armii Kitaya (Zapiski 
Voennogo Sovetnika) 1926 -1927 (The Northern Expedition of the National Revolutionary Army of China: 
Notes of a Military Adviser, 1926 -1927. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1968, p. 202. 
23' Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 156 -7. This number of 324 was decided, according to Chiang 
Kaíshek, based on the maximum capacity of the buildings of the former army and navy schools on 
Changzhou Island. Also in Huangpu congshu (Huangpu Collections), Shanghai: 1928, part 1, "The 
Twenty -Fifth Speech of the Commandant ", 149; also in Richard Landis, 'Institutional Trends at the 
Whampao Military School" chapter 3. 
232 Huangpu junxiao shigao, vol. 1, bian 1, 1:102 -103. 
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size had increased to 360 men and been divided into two companies. Most of them came 
from Hunan and Guangdong, and smaller numbers from Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
Guangxi, and other northern provinces. In early 1924, Yao Guanshun, a native of Sun's 
own hometown, commanded the force. Secondly, the Manchuria quota is an interesting 
one. This high quota of fifty students represents Sun's plan of military alliance with 
Zhang Zuolin against the Zhili faction of Wu Peifu even after accepting Russian 
assistance. Sun's goal was to develop his relationship with Zhang Zuolin in preparation 
for the development of a joint military effort against the Zhili faction. This plan was 
evidenced when Zhang Zuolin launched his offensive in the north in 1924, and Sun 
responded with the ill- prepared Northern Expedition.233 
Thirdly, the allocation of fifteen students to the allied forces in Guangzhou 
signifies the Guomindang's policy of integrating the main allied armies through 
Huangpu. Seen in this light, in the eyes of the party, the Huangpu Military Academy was 
to be a common training school for future military officers of the Guomindang. 
The recruitment was carried out secretly in most provinces by party members, 
mostly those who attended the First National Congress held in Guangzhou in January 
1924. At the congress, party members were told to recommend potential candidates from 
their provinces. Shanghai and Guangzhou became the screening and testing centres.234 
An Examination Committee was established to administer the final test in Guangzhou. 
And to the surprise of the committee, they found many more students were arriving in 
Guangzhou than they expected. About 3,000 applicants appeared in Guangzhou during 
March and April. But only 1,200 were examined in the first round written test on 27 
March at the Guangdong High Normal School (the predecessor of the Guangdong and 
later Zhongshan universities) and only 200 to 300 passed the test 235 Between March and 
April, when lists of successful candidates were published, the Examination Committee 
made major changes to the original plan. Subsequently, they administered a second 
233 For an account of the 1924 Northern Expedition, see C. Martin Wilbur, Sun Yat -sen: frustrated 
Patriot, 254 -58. 
234 The recruitment had to be carried out in secrecy as the military warlords in these provinces were 
hostile to Sun and his party. According to the original plan, all candidates were to be tested twice, one in 
the screening centres and another in Guangzhou. But this was not made clear to the candidates and thus 
created such confusion. See Richard Landis, "Institutional Trends at the Whampao Military School ", 71- 
77. 
235 See Leng Xin. "Huangpu shenghuo zhuiyi (The huangpu military academy life remembered)." 
Ziyou tan (Free speech), 15: 3, March 1964; and F.F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China, 
1924 -1949, p. 9. 
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examination with emphasis on the oral interview to give due consideration to those 
candidates weak in written work. The final enrolment for the first class rose to 470, 
consisting of 350 fully qualified and 120 reserve students.216 
In view of the fact that a second oral examination was needed, the conclusion is 
quite clear that the vast majority of the 1,200 who took the first test had serious difficulty 
expressing themselves in writing. This could mean that many applicants did not have the 
equivalent of a middle school qualification, the standard admission requirement for the 
Baoding Military Academy. The Guomindang deemed this education qualification as 
important but not the Commandant Chiang Kaishek. In a telegram to Liao Zhongkai 
from Shanghai, Chiang expressed his preference for northerners. He told Liao to take in 
as many northerners as possible even at the expense of lowering the educational standard. 
To remedy the education gap, he proposed that the class be divided into two --a senior 
class for fully qualified students and a junior class for the reserve students who would 
eventually be promoted qualified students 237 
Chiang's preference for northerners is interesting. While Sun Yatsen was 
interested in forging a military alliance with Manchuria's warlord Zhang Zuolin, Chiang's 
interest in the northerners was a tactical and purely military consideration. The 
northerners were physically fitter, more hard working and obedient. This made them 
better soldiers. Perhaps more importantly, taking in northerners gave access to useful 
information about places, where operational maps were lacking. This factor was proved 
to be critical in the subsequent campaigns during the Northern Expedition. 38 
The First Class also included twenty -nine candidates who had failed in the 
qualifying examinations for the Iower ranking officers; twenty students who came from 
Sichuan, and 146 students from the original Chen Qiari s Army Officers' School who 
joined the First Class only in November (see tables 7 and 8 for detail). The cadets were 
divided into five companies (tui). The first three companies were made up of fully 
qualified students. The fourth was the reserve company, and a special sixth company 
236 Huangpu junxiao shigao, 1: 102 -103. 
237 The telegram to Liao Zhongkai dated 2 April 1924 can be found in Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 2 
April 1924, p. 176. 
2J8 In view of the severe limitations of operational maps and military intelligence available to the 
subsequent National Revolutionary Army, the advantage of local knowledge would be an important factor. 
This was well demonstrated in the subsequent Northern Expedition that will be discussed in the later 
chapter. 
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was later created from Chen Qian's defunct army school.239 
When the academy finally commenced its training, the actual provincial 
breakdown of student differed greatly from the original party's quota. If we were to look 
at the first four companies of the original recruits, among 489 of them, 106 (or 21.7 per 
cent) were from Guangdong; 69 (14.1 per cent) from Hunan; 57 (11.6 per cent) from 
Shaanxi. These three provinces constituted 47.4 per cent of the total students' strength. 
Manchuria and north -east regions fell far short of expectation, only four of the original 
quota of fifty joined in. Shaanxi was the only exceptional one consisting of 57 (8.98 per 
cent) students. If we were to add the sixth company in the table, the cadets from Hunan 
rank top on the Iist with a high 29.13 per cent and cadets from Guangdong came second 
with 17.17 per cent. 
Those who failed to qualify for the first class, about 730 of them, were given an 
option to join the preparatory course or entry into 2nd and 3rd classes. They had come 
from various parts of China and were afraid to return to areas controlled by warlords 
hostile to the Guomindang. Therefore, many who joined the second some join the third 
class were those who failed the entrance examinations for the first class Z40 
Recruitment for the third, fourth and later classes appeared to be much better 
organised.241 During the recruitment for the third class, Chiang Kaishek personally put 
Chen Guofu, a Zhejiang native, in charge of the recruitment in Shanghai. Chen was not 
only recruiting cadets but also soldiers for the Huangpu Army.242 
The classification of students in each class and the dates of graduation can be very confusing. For 
example, for the First Class, some sources include only the first four companies but others include all the 
five companies. The sixth company is more correctly considered an integral part of the First Class as the 
pictures of its members appeared in the First Class Students Directory (tongxue lu). Similar confusion 
abounds also for successive classes as branches were established in Chaozhou, Nanning and Wuhan. This 
situation would improve only after the academy had moved to Nanjing in 1927. 
240 Leng Xin, "Huangpu shenghuo zhuiyi", 15: 3. 
141 The recruitment drives were launched at the end of 1924 and early 1925; and in the summer and 
autumn of 1925 at the beginning of the recruit training periods. The recruiting training was introduced in 
the Third Class and after. 
242 In his reminiscence, Chen notes that the Third Class was recruited during the First Eastern 
Expedition. However, at least part of the class may have been recruited prior to the expedition because it 
was included in the list of units comprising the Huangpu army. See Chen Guofu. "Jianjun shí zhi yi ye 
(One page in the history of creating the army)." Geming wenxian (Documents on the revolution), Taibei: 
Zhongyang wenwu kungying she, 1973, vol.10, 27 -8. 
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Apart from cadet recruitment, the party CEC was also involved in the selection of 
lower ranking officers to lead the cadets' units, and the financial disbursements of the 
academy expenses 243 The Committee monitored closely the recruiting standards of the 
staff and students and, in some instances, did not hesitate to interfere and exercise its 
decision -making authority. For example, Liao Zhongkai, acting for the standing 
committee of the CEC, informed the Shanghai recruitment personnel that middle school 
(zhong xue) graduates were qualified to take the entrance examination for the engineering 
class only if they had graduated under the old middle school system. If the prospective 
students had undergone a new system of education, then graduation from high school 
(gao xiao) was required.244 The CEC was also the communication channel between 
Huangpu and the two recruitment centres operating in Shanghai and Guangzhou.245 
Throughout this early period, most of the documents dealing with Huangpu matters had 
official seals and were co- signed usually by Liao Zhongkai and other CEC committee 
members. Liao's position in the CEC worked in combination with his role as Party 
representative of the Huangpu Military Academy, and his prestige in the Guomindang 
make him a very potent figure in Huangpu affairs. His authority and influence, however, 
are seldom mentioned in the writing of the official history of the academy. 
The Party Representative System 
246 
The system of the Party representative, similar to the Soviet Red Army political 
commissar, was introduced in Huangpu since its inception. Structurally, the Party 
representative shared the power and responsibility with the commandant in making all 
major decisions with regard to the school's administration within the academy. The 
For example, in reply to a request from Shanghai recruiters for reimbursement of $3,500 already 
spent, Liao Zhongkai indicated he did not understand how the money had been used. He wanted specific 
information before he undertook reimbursement. He reiterated that successful candidates were be given 
only $15 travel expenses. Guomindang Archives, 52/454 -1, 
244 There are several pieces of correspondence dated August 1924 between the CEC and the 
Academy dealing with recruitment of officers to lead a new engineering class. Guomindang Archives, 
52/454 -7; 52/454-8,-9,-10, August 1924. 
zas For example, the committee informed Huangpu when successful applicants had been sent from 
Shanghai and when they might be expected at Guangzhou. In addition, the committee had also coordinated 
with Ho Yingqin, the Chief Instructor of the Huangpu Military Academy on the arrangements for the 
entrance examinations that was held at the Guangdong University for lower ranking officers. Ibid.. 
246 For example, in Huangpu junxiao shigao, which was compiled during the 1930s, the position of 
Liao Zhongkai always appears after Chiang Kaishek. There is just one of the examples of the Huangpu 
history complied by the Guomindang's officials the tendency of giving Chiang much more prominent than 
he deserved. 
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commandant's orders were invalid unless countersigned by the Party representative. 
When Chiang Kaishek was named the Commandant (xiaozhang) on 2 May 1924, Liao 
Zhongkai was appointed as the Party representative (dang daibiao) of the Huangpu 
Military Academy on 9 May the same year. 
Unlike the dual leadership in the Red Army officer -commissar system which had 
a confrontation tendency, the two Guomindang colleagues agreed most of the time on 
policy of the academy. In fact, Liao and Chiang formed perhaps the best civil -military 
team the Guomindang could offer at the time. Both of them possessed similar qualities 
such as pragmatism, dynamism and were extremely capable in administration. 
Moreover, thanks to the heavy burden of Liao's many concurrent responsibilities. Chiang 
soon gained tremendous authority within the academy, even to the point of acting as a 
chief political instructor for indoctrinating staff and cadets.247 
The party control of Huangpu, which was dependent on individuals rather than 
the institution, however, disappeared soon after Liao Zhongkai's assassination in August 
1925. Liao's death caused fundamental changes in officer -commissar relations in the 
highest echelon of the Guomindang's military hierarchy. The cordial and cooperative 
relationship was replaced by distrust and conflict between the next Party representative 
Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kaishek.248 The tense relations reached its climax in the 
Zhongshan Gunboat Incident on 20 March 1926 when Chiang unilaterally declared 
martial law in Guangzhou and took into custody the Russian advisers and the Chinese 
Communist members in the academy.249 After this incident, the position of the Party 
representative in the academy was left vacant for some time, and was abrogated later as 
247 For example, in the first seven months after the opening of the Huangpu Military Academy, 
Chiang Kaishek gave about 49 lectures, where Liao Zhongkai gave four, Tai Jitao, Shao Yuanzhong, and 
Hu Hanmin one each, the Russian advisers two. See Guojun zhenggong shigao, 1: 93 -95. The high 
frequency of Chiang Kaishek's speeches and the all- inclusiveness of their contents partly explained why 
the Huangpu graduates would later view Chiang as their political leader when the Guomindang was 
divided by political and ideological confusion soon after Sun's death. 
248 Wang was another senior member of the Guomindang who succeeded Sun Yatsen as the chairman 
of the party and military council. He was, however, seen by many Guomindang conservatives as a pro - 
Communist and pro- Comintern. See Li, Yunhan. "Sun wen zhuyi xuehui yi zao qi fan gong yun dong (Sun 
Yatsenism society and the early years of anti -communist activities)." Huangpu jianriao liushi zhounian 
lunwenji (Papers on the 60th anniversary on the founding of the Huangpu military academy), Guofangbu 
shizheng bianyi ju (National military history and translation bureau) edited. Taibei: Guofangbu shizheng 
bianyi ju (National military history and translation bureau) , 1984, 71 -114. 
2" Although this event had great impact on the Guomindang and Comintern -Chinese Communist 
United Front collaboration, the detail of the incident remains a historical enigma, This topic will be 
discussed in greater detail in the subsequent chapter. 
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Wang Ieft China in self -exile to France, allegedly for medical treatment 250 
Subsequently, no one was appointed Party representative of the Huangpu Military 
Academy. 
The Political Department 
The other department staffed by civilian officials was the Political Department. 
Until February 1926, eight heads and deputy heads were appointed to the Political 
Department of the Huangpu Military Academy (see table 9). Dai Jitao (or Dai 
Chuanxian), the first head of the Political Department, was assisted by three high -ranking 
Guomindang members assigned as instructors. Wang Qingwei taught the Guomindang 
history, Hu Hanmin the party ideology of the Three Principles of the People, and Shao 
Yuanzhong taught political economy Z' It should be noted that like Liao Zhongkai, the 
Party representative of the Huangpu Military Academy, Dai, Wang, Hu and Shao were 
all senior civilian Guomindang members. They held both greater prestige and higher 
positions in the party than the Commandant Chiang Kaishek at that time. They were all 
full members and Shao was an alternate member of the first Central Executive 
Committee (CEC) of the Guomindang set up in January 1924. Chiang Kaishek, who 
then held the rank of Major -General, was not a CEC member and was a subordinate of 
Xu Chongzhi who was the head of the Guomindang Military Affairs Committee, an 
alternate member of the CEC, and Commander of the Guangdong Army where Chiang 
was his Chief of Staff.252 This arrangement clearly demonstrated the ideal of civilian 
party control over the military. This ideal, however, was not realised in practice. These 
party members simultaneously held so many other important positions in the civil sector 
that they had little time to do party -political work at the academy. The first head of the 
Political Department, for example, seldom came to the academy, and his duties were 
devolved upon Zhou Enlai, who formally assumed the head in April 1925.253 
Furthermore, in the situation when the political instructors were unable to teach regularly 
and when there were no formal curricula to follow, the ideological -political education 
was substituted by commandant Chiang's intensive "spiritual speeches" to the cadets, 
zso Wang was implicated in the assassination of Liao Zhongkai; his exile was a face -saving measure 
for the Guomindang and him. 
253 See Huangpu junxiao shigao, bian 7, 7 -229. 
252 Guojun zhenggong shigao (A draft history of the political work of the national army), 1: 38 -39, 
48 -49, and 95; and Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, 2: 125. 
zs3 Guojun zhenggong shigao 1: 102. 
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especially during the First and Second Classa' 
Political education, which was the main responsibility of the Political 
Department, in the Huangpu Military Academy was not institutionalised until the 
reorganisation of academy in January 1926. The political training curricula were more 
systematically organised and taught beginning from the Fourth Class. Political training 
then became required subjects for all students regardless of their specialties. And a 
special political class for intensive political training was formed for those who majored 
in politics 255 Political education covered a wide variety of topics including: Party 
Ideology, Basic Party Policies, Party History, Comparative Political Economy, Party 
Organisation, Party Leaders' Speeches, Comparative Politico- Economic, Finance, and 
Analysis of Social Movements. In addition, practical skills for conducting propaganda 
and social mobilisation such as oration, drama, singing and leaflet posting were required 
for all students.256 
The Political Department did not play a very active role in the early period. But 
once the Training Regiment was formed, it became the main organisation responsible for 
the political work of the unit. Their activities and contributions were more clearly 
demonstrated during the two eastern expeditions in 1925. [Detail will be discussed in the 
next chapter.] 
Military Training 
Three departments took charge of military training at the Huangpu Military 
Academy. There were: the Instructional Department (jiaoshou bu), which was 
responsible for doctrinal and theoretical subjects; the Training Department (jiaolian bu), 
that looked after the tactical and technical lessons, and cadets' daily routine; and the 
Chief Instructor Office (zong jiaoguan shi), which supervised the instructors and the 
conduct of the lessons.257 On 30 January 1925, the departments of instruction and tactics 
254 See Huangpu junxiao shigao, 1: 102 -3. 
255 The non -politics majors of the Fifth Class, for example, received a political education of 162 
periods, about 70 minutes for each, while the politics majors received 445 periods. Guojun zhenggong 
shigao (A draft history of the political work of the national army), 1: 105 -110. 
256 The topics for political education were better organised only after Sixth Class, yet one should take 
into consideration this was during the time of the Northern Expedition where the priority of the academy 
was to train more cadets to fill in the front line of the battle. 
25' See Huangpu junxiao shigao, 2: 55. 
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merged to form a single Education Department (jiaoyu bu). 
Well -qualified Chinese instructors with the assistance of foreign advisers staffed 
the Instructional Department of the academy at the beginning. The head of the 
Instructional Department was the thirty -six years old Wang Boling. Wang was a Jiangdu 
native in Jiangsu, and a graduate of the Baoding Preparatory Course, the Japanese Shikan 
Gakko, a contemporary of Chiang Kaishek in Tokyo. Before arriving in Guangzhou, he 
had been head of the Education Department of the Yunnan Military Academy.-' Wang 
believed that the academy's aim was to train junior commanders who could be deployed 
at the front line of the battle. He, therefore, emphasised individual field -craft such as 
weapons handling; shooting and bayonet fighting, and tactical formation training for 
platoon and section levels.259 During the preparatory stage of the academy Wang had the 
assistance of a small group of Japanese military officers in the planning of the military 
training curriculum 260 Wang's deputy was Ye Jianying, a very capable staff officer from 
the Guangdong Army261 There were about 18 Chinese instructors and three Russian 
military advisers under Wang. Three Russian advisers were assigned to assist Wang in 
early 1924, they were Alexander I. Cherepanov, Vladimir Poliak and Nikolai Tereshatov, 
all fresh graduates of the Red Army's Military Academy. They were also the first three 
Russian military advisers to work with the Guomindang in Guangzhou262 In addition, 
258 For Wang Boling, see his account in "Huangpu chuangshi zhi huiyi (Reminiscences concerning 
the founding of Huangpu)." Huangpu jikan (Huangpu quarterly) 1, no. 1 (3 January 1939); and Wang, 
Boling, He Yinggin, Chen Zhicheng et al. Huangpu jianjun shihua (Historical Notes on Whampoa and its 
Founding of the Army). Chongqing: Da Di Bookstore, 1944. According to one source, Wang was a very 
well trained and talented military officer. See Liu Fenghan, p. 221. 
259 Wang Boling. "Huangpu chengli zhi huiyi" (Recollections of the founding of the Huangpu), 
Zhuanjiwenxue (Biographical literature), 16, 3: 87; 4: 87. 
265 It is believed that the Japanese military advisers were invited by Wang Boling, see Sasaki Toichi. 
Nanpô kakumei seiryoku no jisso to soho hiham (The situation report and commentary on the strength of 
the southern revolution). Osaka: Takshi / Osakayagshoten, 1927. The author of this report was the 
Japanese military attache in Beijing who knew Wang Boling personally. See Takeuchi Minoru's "The 
Huangpu military academy ", p. 60 / 714. 
26' Ye Jianying was one of the ten field- marshals of the Chinese Communist People's Libration Army 
promoted in 1955. He was a native of Meixian, Guangdong and a graduate of the Yunnan Military 
Academy. Prior to joining the Huangpu Military Academy, Ye was a general staff officer of Xu Chongzhì 
and Deng Keng in the Guangdong Army. For his biography see Biographical Dictionary of Republican 
China, editors Howard L. Boorman, and Richard C. Howard. vol. 1, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1967, 23 -26. 
262 See Cherepanov, A.I. Zapiski Vennogo Sovetnika v Kitae; iz Istorii Pervoi Grazdanskoi 
Revolutsionnoi Cony, 1924 -1927 (Notes of a military adviser in China: from the history of First 
Revolutionary Civil War in China, 1924 -1927). Moscow: Academy of Sciences of USSR, Institute 
Norodov Azii, Nauka, 1964, 90 -103. 
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there were also a few Japanese military instructors teaching bayonet fighting and other 
military lessons to the First Class.2' 
The Training Department was in charge of training of cadets. Its head was Li 
Jishen, a graduate of the Beijing Staff College and a veteran of the 1st Division of the 
Guangdong Army. Li was a Guangxi native and a graduate of the Guangdong -Guangxi 
Military Middle School in Guangzhou and the Military Staff College at Beijing. After 
graduation, he remained at the staff college as an instructor. He also served as an editor 
in the Research Bureau of the Ministry of War. In 1921 Li went to Guangzhou at the 
invitation of Deng Keng, the chief of staff of the Guangdong Army and commander of 
the 1st Division. Deng appointed him chief of staff of the 1st Division. When Deng was 
assassinated and Chen Jiongming staged a coup in Guangzhou on 16 June 1922, Li 
participated in the campaign that drove Chen out of Guangzhou. 
Li's deputy was Deng Yanda, a native of Huizhou, Guangdong. Deng enrolled at 
Guangzhou's Huangpu Military Primary School when he was 12 and his classmates 
included Hsueh Yueh and Yeh. Deng was the youngest cadet in the class but his 
performance as a student soon brought him to the attention of the school's dean, Deng 
Keng. He entered the Guangdong Short-Term Military School and graduated in 1914. 
After studying at the Second Military Preparatory School in Wuchang from 1914 to 
1916, he spent the years from 1916 to 1919 at the Baoding Military Academy. In 1919 
he was assigned to field duty as a junior officer in the Northwest Frontier Defence Army 
of Xu Shucheng. In 1920 Deng Keng summoned his former pupil to Zhangzhou and 
placed him in command of a unit there. Following the reoccupation of Guangzhou by 
the Guangdong Army in October 1920, Deng Keng became commander of the 1st 
Division of the reorganised Guangdong Army, and Deng Yenda became his staff officer 
and commander of an infantry battalion. Deng Yenda and his battalion were assigned in 
Iate 1921 to serve as a garrison unit guarding Sun Yatsen's Guilin field headquarters. 
After the assassination of Deng Keng at Guangzhou in March 1922, and the subsequent 
attempted coup by Chen Jiongming, and the flight of Sun Yatsen to Shanghai, Deng 
Yanda and other officers such as Zhang Fakui and Chen Jitang worked to preserve the 
integrity of the 1st Division in supporting Sun Yatsen against Chen Jiongming. In winter 
267 According to Song Xilian, a graduate of the First Class, about two to three Japanese non- 
commissioned officers (NCOs) specialised in bayonet -fighting and grenade- throwing drill were hired by 
the Huangpu Military Academy for three months; military subjects such as tactics, weapon training, field 
fortifications, and topography etc., were modelled on the Japanese Shikan Gakko and Baoding Military 
Academy. See his Yinquan jiangjun: Song Xilian zishu (The lackey general: memoir of Song Xilian). 2 
vols., Taibei: Li Ao chubanshe, 1990, 1: 17. 
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1922, the 1st Division joined with armies from Yunnan and Guangxi in driving Chen 
Jiongming out of Guangzhou. During this period, Li Jishen became the commander of 
the 1st Division, and Deng Yanda was named commander of its 3rd Regiment.264 
Finally, there was the Chief Instructor whose main responsibility was to supervise 
the military instructors of the academy. The first Chief Instructor was He Yingqin, one 
of the most highly trained professional officers in the Huangpu Military Academy. He 
was a product of the late military education reform and received the best military 
education possible for an officer of his generation. He began his military education at the 
Guizhou Army Primary School when he was eleven, and he graduated and continued to 
study the Third Army Middle School at Wuchang. He attended the Shimbu Gakko, and 
later, the Shikan Gakko under the sponsorship of the Imperial Qing War Ministry. But 
he returned to China to serve under Chen Qimei when the 1911 Revolution exploded at 
Wuhan. In 1913 he led an infantry battalion of the Jiangsu Army in his home province. 
He returned to Japan to finish his military education in 1913 and graduated from the 
Shikan Gakko and returned to Guizhou in 1916. He was assigned various appointments, 
which included the commanding officer of the 4th Infantry Regiment and the dean of 
studies at the provincial Guizhou Military Academy. He became very active in reform 
activities and established the "Young Guizhou Society". Many important political and 
military figures saw He as a threat to local stability. Under great pressure he fled 
Guizhou and took refuge with in Yunnan under Tang Jiyao. He served as dean of studies 
at the Yunnan Military School in Kunming since summer of 1922. However, his 
Guizhou opponents seemed to have followed him to Yunnan He was shoot by an 
assassin and seriously wounded, and retreated to Shanghai for about a year to recuperate. 
In early 1924 he joined Sun Yatsen as a staff officer in the Sun's Guangzhou 
headquarters. He was thirty -four when he arrived for what was evidently his first 
assignment with the Guomindang.265 
Officers' Cadets Training 
During the time of the Army Officers' Academy, which trained the First to the 
Third Class, the Huangpu cadets' military training was similar to the curriculum of other 
regional military schools of the time. It drew heavily on Japanese training teachings and 
techniques. The original duration of the course was only six months. The course was 
264 See Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, editors Boorman and Howard. III: 260 -61. 
ass See Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, editors Boorman and Howard. II: 79 -84. 
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extended to a year from the Third Class. The emphasis of the training was on fieldworks 
training and operational procedures rather than parade ground marching and ceremonies. 
The First Class cadets' six -month training program was divided into two general phases: 
preparatory training for basic military skills, and a course proper, where classroom 
instruction and field training lessons were taught. The First Class received only the 
infantry training but infantry tactics and operations became the major focus of the 
subsequent classes. The curriculum expanded in the Second Class and cadets were 
organised into infantry, engineer, artillery, logistic and military police units. In the Third 
Class, a calvary course was added on, and in the Fourth Class, a political propaganda 
course' was introduced. 
For the first half of the six -month cycle, the cadets had no free days. Engaged in 
the daily routine of classroom lectures, field exercises, and political training, no one was 
allowed to leave Huangpu Island 267 Special political instructors, such as Hu Hanmin, 
Wang Jingwei, Shao Yuanzhong, Liao Zhongkai, and Kan Naiguang were invited to 
provide Iectures even on Sundays.268 During these months, cadets received no homework 
assignments. They merely reviewed each day's work during the two evening hours set 
aside for self -study (zixiu). At the end of the first three months, they took a mid -term 
examination. And all but half a dozen or so of the students passed onto the second half 
of the cycle.269 
During the remaining three months, cadets received regular homework 
assignments in tactical problems. The students were allowed to journey to Guangzhou 
every Sunday on boats provided by the school. At the end of the cycle in late October 
1924, the First Class took a terminal examination that merely tested the students' Ievel of 
knowledge and proficiency, but did not deny anyone the opportunity to continue in the 
266 For the Fourth Class, which came about during the transition from the Army Officer's Academy to 
the Central Military and Political Academy, there were more than 2,600 cadets on the course. The cadets 
were organised into two regiments, one regiment for the infantry, and the other regiment for special arms 
such as artillery, engineering, logistic, cavalry, military police and politics. See Huangpu junxiao shigao, 
2: 137 -138. 
267 MacFarquhar, Roderick L. "The Whampoa Military Academy," p. 158, Chart 2 indicates the daily 
time schedule, and on p. 160 states that the instructional staff were not permitted to maintain their families 
on the island. Chung Wei, Personal Interview indicates in some detail the restricted nature of cadet life 
during the first three months of the first class cycle. 
266 Chung Wei, Personal Interview; and Gaming wenxian, 11: 1765. 
269 MacFarquhar, op. cit., p.158, Chart 2 refers to the self -study period as "6.15- -8.30 Preparation ". 
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revolutionary profession. Upon completion of their training cycle in October 1924, the 
majority of the First Class students were appointed as probationers (¡ianxi guan) to the 
1st and 2nd Training Regiments. For each two months of training at Huangpu a cadet 
was obliged to serve the Guomindang for one year. In effect, the majority of the 
graduates had obligated themselves for three years' service.270 
From the Second Class onwards, cadets were organised into units representing 
various branches of military work: infantry, engineer, artillery, and transportation.27 
Beginning with the Third Class, a recruit -training period of approximately six months' 
duration became a standard part of the training cycles. The launch of the first and second 
Eastern Expeditions coincided with the recruit training periods of the Third and Fourth 
classes. Cadets took part in these expeditions as support units at Huangpu or 
Guangzhou. The conclusion is inescapable that one reason for the extended recruit status 
lay in the need to engage in non -school activities.272 As with the second class, the 
majority of the cadets in the latter classes were formed into infantry units during the 
training periods of the class cycles. The third class comprised only infantry and cavalry 
students, while the fourth consisted of infantry, artillery, engineer, intendancy, and 
polítícaI units. 
In the rapidly evolving military- political situation at the end of 1925, and 
beginning of 1926, many graduates of the Second and Third classes were appointed 
directly to posts as officers and party representatives in successive Training Regiments. 
They did not serve their probations as the first class graduates did. 
Formation of the Training Regiments 
Despite the intended plan of the Guomimdang's efforts to build a party academy, 
the condition of Guangzhou, however, was hostile to its development. The first serious 
crisis after its inception came in August 1924, two months after its official opening. The 
event is commonly called the Guangzhou Merchants' Corps Incident. Essentially, the 
incident was a contest of power between leading merchants of Guangzhou and the 
government of Sun Yatsen. The incident became a crisis for the Guomindang because it 
270 See Huangpu zongshu, I: 143, "Commandant's Twenty -fourth Speech ". 
271 See the Thirteenth Class Directory, 41 -43. 
nz Beifa zhanzhi (A war history of the northern expedition), I: 295, 307 indicates the support status 
of the later classes. 
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occurred at a time when Sun Yatsen was preparing his Northern Expedition in 
Shaoguan.27 With the main bulk of the Guomindang's forces concentrating around the 
Guangdong -Hunan borders, the responsibility of defending Guangzhou fell on the party 
academy. As the details of the incident are fairly well known, only an outline of the 
events will be given here.274 
Towns in Guangdong had traditionally kept self -defence corps maintained by the 
contributions from shop owners and well -to -do residents. In 1923, when the Yunnan and 
Guangxi armies, or commonly called the "guest armies ", entering Guangzhou under the 
invitation from Sun Yatsen, the Guangzhou Merchants' Corps was revived- Other self - 
defence units in the neighbouring towns were also established or enlarged their corps. 
The strength of the Merchants' Corps in Guangzhou alone, excluding Honam, consisted 
of close to 4,000 recruits plus about 2,000 reserves. Outside Guangzhou the strength of 
the corps varied greatly. One of the largest corps the Foshan unit was made up of about 
1,600 men. The Jiangmen Corps, on the other hand, claimed to have 600 men.275 
Initially, the Merchants' Corps was to defend their interests against the "guest armies" in 
the cities who were causing financial hardship for local merchants. By early 1924, 
however, the ill- feeling among leading merchants in Guangzhou against Sun Yatsen 
reached a new height when they saw the growing Guomindang connection with the 
Communist party and its attendant policy of organising labourers in union against the 
merchant class and traditional craft guilds. 
In May 1924, a federation of the Guangdong Merchants' Corps was formed which 
`" This is also another example of Sun Yatseñ s priority of his northern military expedition over the 
slow and painful build -up of party academy. For an account of the 1924 Northern Expedition, see C. 
Martin Wilbur, Sun Yatsen, 254 -58. 
274 Details of the Merchants' Corps incident can be found in Wilbur, C. Martin. "Forging the 
Weapons: Sun Yat -sen and the Kuomintang in Canton, 1924 ". Mimeographed, New York: East Asian 
Institute of Columbia University, 1966, 89 -93, 100 -5; and his Sun Yat -sen: Frustrated Patriot. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1976, 249 -264; a detailed pro -merchants account is "Guangdong kouxiechao 
(The retention of arms crisis in Guangdong)." Reprinted in Yijiuersi man Guangzhou shangtuan shijian 
(The merchants's corps incident of 1924), Hong Kong: 1974, and in Zhonghua minguoshi dangan ziliao 
huibian, dishi ji (Archival materials for the history of the Republican China, volume 10), 2:117 -9, 
complied by the Second Historical Archives, Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji chubanshe; Record of correspondence 
during the incident can be found in Zhonghua minguo shi dangan ziliao huibian (Archival sources of the 
Republican China), volume 4, part 1, 767 -93, complied by the Second Historical Archives, Nanjing: 
Jiangsu Guji chubanshe. 
275 "Guangdong Kouxiechao", p. 94; Zhang Jungian and Chen Guo, "Foshan shangtuan jianwen 
(Information of the Foshan merchants)." Foshan wenshi ziliao (1982): p. 43; and Huang Dingsan and Zhu 
Liyu. "Yijiuersi pian qianhou Jiangmen shangtuan huodong jianwen huiyi (The activities of the Jiangmen 
merchants' corps in 1924 remembered)." Wenshi ziliao xuanji, 2 (1961): 128. 
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had a central command (lianfang zongbu) for all the Guangdong Merchants' Corps and 
Chen Lianbo was the commander-in-chief. n6 The Guomindang administration was 
understandably wary of the creation of a united force which was spreading through the 
Pearl River Delta area and potentially hostile to the regime. In July, the Merchants' 
Corps tested its strength against Sun's government by using the corps to picket 
Guangzhou in protest against a fifty percent sales tax on land transfers. They won the 
case and the tax was withdrawn. The merchants Iater created a Traders' Protective 
League to decide what new taxes they would accept. Such independent body was a 
threat to Sun's government who was always in need of funds. 
The immediate cause of the conflict between Sun Yatsen's Guangzhou 
government and the merchants was the dispute over the establishment of a shipment of 
armaments ordered by the Merchants' Corps. Chen Lianbo placed a large order of arms 
in Belgium, and in mid -1924, the arms were shipped on a Norwegian freighter, the Hay, 
destined for the Merchants' Corps and some units of the Yunnanese forces. When the 
vessel arrived in Guangzhou waters on 8 August, Sun, in anticipating of a crisis, ordered 
Chiang Kaishek and the Huangpu's cadets with the help of two gunboats from the 
Guangzhou Navy to escort the vessel to Huangpu and detained all the arms in the 
Huangpu Military Academy. The shipment consisted of nearly 10,000 German rifles, 
Mauser pistols and revolvers, and more than three million rounds of ammunition.277 Sun 
proposed to hold the arms pending an investigation. He suspected that Chen Lianbo was 
in alliance with Chen Jiongming. 
A long and protracted negotiation between the government and the merchants 
took place in the next two months. The merchants demanded the return of their arms and 
threatened a general strike. Early in October, General Li Fulin, who succeeded Sun Fo as 
acting mayor of Guangzhou, attempted to mediate the matter. He worked out an 
agreement for the return of 5,000 rifles to the merchants for which they would pay 
$200,000 and permit a citywide assessment equivalent to one month's house rent. 
276 The head of the Guangzhou Merchants Corps was Chen Lianbo, a former chairman of the 
Guangzhou General Chamber of Commerce who was also a comprador of the Guangzhou branch of the 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Chen and his brother, who was the chairman of the 
Guangzhou General Chamber of Commerce, were active in shipping, mining, banking and insurance. 
They were the leaders of the Chinese business community and had ties with the British. 
277 Zuo Lu, Zhongguo Guomindang shigao (A draft history of the Guomindang). 2nd ed., Taibei: 
Commercial Press, 1965, . 1158 -9; Chen Xunzheng. "Guangzhou shangtuan shibian (The Guangzhou 
merchants corps incident)." Geming wenxian (Documents on the revolution), 10: 1470 -3. List of arms 
seized see China Weekly Review, 6 September 1924, p. 27. 
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According to a public statement from the Sun's government, the rifles were handed over 
to Li Fulin on 9 October in the presence of the representatives of the Merchants' Corps, 
although at the last minute, the government hold back 1,000 rifles and some of the 
ammunitions.Z7' 
On 10 October, the Republican national day, while the Merchants Corps were 
unloading its arms on the Guangzhou waterfront, a violent clash erupted between them 
and a parade of Huangpu cadets, labourers and students. The parade Ieaders demanded 
the right to march along the waterfront but the Merchants' Corps refused to give way. 
Someone started shooting, and the Merchants' Corps opened fire on the parade 
contingents. About a dozen parade marchers were killed, eight Merchants' Corps militias 
wounded, and many spectators killed, wounded, or drowned trying to escape from the 
fighting.279 The merchants immediately ordered a general strike, asserting that less than 
half of their arms and ammunitions had been returned. On 13 October, the government 
brought some 5,000 troops into Guangzhou and ordered to disarm the Merchants' Corps. 
It also declared martial laws and ordered the shops to open immediately. The next day, 
Sun ordered the following units placed under the command of Chiang Kaishek: the 
Gendarmes, the workers and farmers' self -defence corps, the aviation unit, the armoured 
car battalion, the Huangpu Military Academy, and the Yunnan Army School. According 
to Chiang, on the night of 15 October, he ordered an attack on the stronghold of the 
Merchants Corps that ended in a complete victory for the Guomindang.28° 
What is interesting to note is that at the heat of the incident Sun Yatsen was 
prepared to give up Guangzhou and Huangpu. In a letter to Chiang Kaishek dated 9 
September, Sun stated "three vital reasons" why it was necessary to carry out the 
Northern Expedition. He argued he would be dead if he were to remain in Guangzhou. 
He said there were three main threats to his position: the British navy (which presumably 
would be supporting the merchants); forces of Chen Jíongming in the eastern 
278 Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 9 October 1924, 242 -45. 
279 Ibid., 12 -17 October 1924, 248 -51; Geming wenxian, 10: 1471. 
280 Ibid., 14 October 1924, 249 -50. According to A.I. Cherepanov, forces under Chiang included: 
800 Huangpu cadets, 320 members of the Workers Militia and Peasant Detachment, 220 cadets from the 
Hunan Military School and 500 from the Yunnan Military School, 250 servicemen from two armoured 
trains, and about 2,000 from the police units (Gendarmes) of Wu Tiencheng. But he disputed Chiang's 
account by saying these units designated to crush the rebellion were under the command of Sun Yatsen 
personally who directed all the operations. See Severnyi Pokhod Naisional'no- Revoliutsionno Armii Kitaya 
(Zapiski Voennogo Sovetnika) 1926 -1927 (The Northern Expedition of the National Revolutionary Army 
of China: Notes of a Military Adviser, 1926- 1927). Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1968, 115 -6. 
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Guangdong; and the "guest armies" which were ruining the city. The only hope, 
therefore, was to abandon Guangzhou and find a new opportunity through the battlefield 
in cooperation with the warlords of Fengtian and Zhejiang in the effort to overthrow Cao 
Kun and Wu Peífu 28' He instructed Chiang on 7 October to transfer the Russian arms 
immediately to Shaoguan. Two days later, when the Merchants Corps trouble was at its 
height, he sent Chiang a secret telegram with orders to abandon Huangpu and to send all 
weapons and students to Shaoguan to concentrate on the Northern Expedition.' Chiang 
turned down Sun's order and insisted that he should abandon the Northern Expedition 
instead and concentrate his forces to suppress the Merchants Corps in Guangzhou.'" 
This incident is also a telling example of the importance of foreign arms and the viability 
of Guangzhou as a revolutionary base for the Guomindang. 
It was during the trouble of the Merchants' Corps that the Training Regiment 
(jaodao duan)284 was formed. In August 1924, Chiang Kaishek wrote to the 
Guomindang CEC and proposed that work should proceed towards the organisation of 
two Training Regiments in Huangpu.285 Each regiment would consist of three infantry 
battalions, one artillery battery and one engineering company with a total strength of 
3,769sß6 Chiang delegated responsibility for setting up these units to his staff in 
2%1 Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 9 September 1924, 232 -234. In a proclamation on the objectives of 
the Northern Expedition issued on 18 September, however, the Guomindang declared that the Northern 
Expedition was anti- imperialist and anti -militarist. Geming wenxian, 10: 1489 -1491. 
282 Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 7 October 1924, 241; 9 October, 242 -245. 
263 Ibid. 
284 Some scholars such as Landis and Williamsen translate the term Jiaodao tuan as "the 
indoctrinating regiment ". They might have felt the regiments received more political and psychological 
training then military training. But in this thesis, it argues the opposite, that in Huangpu, the main 
emphasis is on military training and supplemented by political and psychological training to strengthen the 
military command and control system. It's therefore translated the term as the training regiment, closer to 
its original meaning from the Japanese terminology. 
285 The Guomindang had, in the past, attempted to form its own armies, but, none of these attempts 
lasted for more than few months. As early as in November 1923 the plan for creating a party army was 
again proposed by Liao Zhongkai when Guangzhou was under the threat of forces of Chen Jiongming but 
the idea was soon dropped when the threat subsided. "Minutes of 5th Meeting of the Provincial CEC of the 
Guomindang, 12 -15 November 1923 ", cited in Lu Fanshang, "Xian zongtong Jianggong yi huangpu 
junxiao de chuangjian (Former President Chiang Kaishek and the founding of the Huangpu military 
academy) ", Huangpu jianxiao liushi zhounian lunwenji (Papers on the 60th anniversary on the founding of 
the Huangpu military academy), 25 -50. 
286 Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 11 August 1924, 225 -227; Guojun zhenggong shigao (A draft history 
of the political work of the national army), 134 -5. 
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Huangpu. He appointed He Yinggin,287 then the Chief Instructor of the academy, and 
Wang Boling was appointed as commander, the head of the Instructional Department, to 
manage the work for organising the Training Regiments. The 1st Training Regiment was 
established in October and the 2nd Training Regiment was formed in December 1924. 
Both He and Wang were appointed the regiment commanders respectively. The Training 
Regiments were organised in the triangular pattern of three battalions per regiment, three 
companies per battalion, and three platoons per company.288 The academy military staff 
took up the appointments of commanders and staff of the regiments and battalions. At 
the company and platoon levels, positions were filled by the First Class of the Huangpu 
graduates either as commanders or probationary officers (l'ianzi guan). 
The recruitment of soldiers for the two regiments was assigned to Chen Guofu, a 
close associate of Chiang Kaishek. The enlisted men of the two regiments were recruited 
primarily from the Yangzi River basin, much in the same places where most of the cadets 
of the first three classes came from. Chen's memoirs describe how he led a group of nine 
men to three provinces, namely Jiangsu, Zhijiang, and Anhui, and the cities of Jinhua, 
Wenzhou, and Xuzhou provided the most of the recruits.'" 
The organisation of the Training Regiment is another manifestation of the 
Japanese and the Russian military influence on the Chinese army. The term Training 
Regiment is adopted from the Japanese name for military preparatory training, rikugun 
kyodo ( lujun jiaodao). While the Japanese preparatory concept implied preparation for a 
subsequent basic and formal military training, the Huangpu training concept implied 
preparation for subsequent organisation into active duty units. Setting up training 
regiments for recruits were common among the Chinese armies in the 1920s. Cheng 
Qing in 1923, for example, also wanted to establish a Central Army Training Regiment 
(Zhongyang lujun jiaodao tuan) under the Guangzhou military administration. 
The Huangpu's Training Regiments, however, had a new element- -the Party 
representative system, which was based on the Soviet Red Army model of political 
257 Another native of Chiang Kaishek's Zhijiang province but a very well- trained officer who was a 
graduate of Baoding and Japanese academies. He came to Guangzhou in January 1924 at the age of 34 and 
was involved heavily in most of Huangpu's affairs. He was also a staunch supporter of Chiang Kaishek. 
2" Huangpu junxiao shigao (Draft history of the Huangpu military academy), 5th bien, 6: 115 -6. 
tag Chen Guofu. "Jianjun shi zhi yi ye (One page in the history of creating the army)." Geming wenxian 
(Documents on the revolution), 27 -36. 
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commissar. The initial Japanese concept, kyodo, continued to be used at Huangpu (as 
jiaodao), but in a distinctive sense of a combined military training and operational unit in 
one. This particular Huangpu formulation was just another example of the distinctive 
atmosphere surrounding the academy, and symbolised the wedding of Japanese military 
learning with the unique revolutionary technique of the Russian Red Army_ 
Apart from the Japanese and Russian organisational concepts and techniques, the 
Training Regiment had also absorbed the traditional Chinese military management 
methods. In October 1924 Chiang Kaishek published the Zeng -Hu military quotations as 
a training manual for the staff and students of Huangpu.24° Chiang explains he was 
particularly impressed by Zeng Guofan's efforts in transforming the ill- trained and poor 
morale militia troops into a fighting -fit army. Chiang believed that the very basis of 
Zeng's success was "morality ". It was the high moral standard practice based on 
Confucian ethics in the army, combining the military talents of Hu Runzhi and Zuo 
Zongtang that finally defeated the Taiping rebels. Chiang expressed his gratitude to Cai 
E who first compiled the quotations of Zeng Guofan and Hu Runzhi when he was in 
charge of the Yunnan Army. In addition, Chiang also included Zuo Zongtang's quotation 
in the work. He strongly believed that winning "the hearts and minds" was the basis to a 
strong army 291 Chiang felt that the Guomindang's Three Principles of the People could 
be used as a moral standard and destiny for the new army. 
To maintain high military discipline, the "Code of Reciprocal Responsibility" 
(lianzuofa), was promulgated in January 1925.292 The code stated that in order to achieve 
national unification and implement the Three Principles of the People, an officer had to 
adopt a spirit of sacrifice. When in battle with the enemy, there would be no retreat. The 
code also spelled out the punishment for retreating. If the unit commanders, from corps 
m Zeng Hu zhibing yulu zhushi (Interpretation of Zeng Guofan and Hu Runzhi military quotations), 
edited and interpreted by Cai E, Jiang Zhongzheng, and Fei Nuchun. Guangzhou, Taibei: Huangpu 
Military Academy, Liming wenhua shiyeh, 1924. The book contains 13 chapters was first compiled by Cai 
E when he was commanding the Yunnan Army. 
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'bid, "Preface ", 1 -3. According to Chiang, he selected these quotations when he was looking 
through the war history of the Taiping Rebellion. Initially, his interest was the Taiping's reforms. But was 
attracted by the military talents of the Qing's official- generals such as Zeng Guofan, Hu Runzhi and Zuo 
Zongtang and decided their ideas should be studied first as these were most relevant to his officers. This is 
a good example to show that when confronting with the question of military management, practical ideas, 
such as how an army be best organised and managed, ranks much more important than ideology of the 
Taiping Rebellion 
292 Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 4 January 1925, p. 293, which lists the five basic regulations of the 
lianzuofa. 
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to section commanders, retreated with his unit, the commander would be executed. If the 
commander stayed and killed by the enemy but the rest of his unit retreated, then the 
subordinates at the next level would be executed. In the extreme, if a section retreated 
and the section commander stayed and killed, the entire section was to be executed.'-93 
With the basic ideology and the code of conduct promulgated, the mechanism 
that put these ideas into practice was the Party representative system. The term dang 
daibiao, literally means "Party representative ", is supposed to represent the interests of 
the party and to do its bidding within the military organisation.'94 The title was the same 
as that of the party official at the top of the Academy hierarchy. The system of the Party 
representative, or the political commissar in the Soviet Red Army, in the military was 
designed for civilians and the party control of the military. its main responsibilities 
included two types of work- -the party work and political work. In some literature, these 
two terms have been used simultaneously or interchangeably, but in fact, there are two 
different activities. The party work was conducted by the Party representative through 
the Special Party Headquarters (tebie dangbu)295 to ensure party leadership and the 
implementation of the party policies in the military. Its functions were basically 
political. The political work, on the other hand, was conducted by the Political 
Department to promote military effectiveness through handling human affairs concerning 
the military. Its functions were military. The term "political work" is rather misleading, 
as the nature of its work was not handling "political" affairs. In fact, the so- called 
"political work" was more closely resembled to the modern concept of the management 
of human factors, as oppose to material factors such as weapons and logistics, in 
promoting military effectiveness. The real political function in which party's control of 
293 Confusion has arisen over the code of the Iíanzuofa. Some scholars have treated it literally, as if 
they were the martial laws that were to implement in all cases. In fact on record, there was only one case 
that an officer was being executed for treating during the 1930s. This was the case of Yang Shaoqiu, a 
graduate of the Third Class of Huangpu who was the commander of the 8th Regiment of the elite 2nd 
Division in 1931 against the CCP. See Wang Zhonglian, Zhengchen huiyilu (Reminiscences of a distant 
joumey), Taibei: privately printed, 1979, 86 -87. The code should be seen as a goal to which the officers 
strove. It was also the formal embodiment of these same officers' own pride in their spirit and motivation. 
294 See Chen Xunzheng, "pang jun zhi jianli" (The founding of the party army), Gaming wenxian, 
10: 4. 
299 When the first executive committees were elected on 3 July 1924, it was named the Special District 
Party Headquarters (tebiequ dangbu) which come under the direct control of the Central Party 
Headquarters. Its name changed to Special Party Headquarters (tebie dangbu) in September 1925 which 
was the standard name used by the rest of the National Revolutionary Army. In each of the election of the 
executive committee, the Commandant had always the head rather than Academy Party Representative. It 
just to show the limits of party control of Huangpu. Huangpu junxiao shigao, 7: 17 -25. 
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the military was exercised through the party work.296 
Theoretically, Liao Zhongkai being the Academy's Party representative would 
select and appoint men to serve as Party representatives in the Training Regiments. In 
this way, Liao was their superior officer at the top of a direct chain of command. The 
Party representative at company level reported directly to his superior, the regiment -level 
representative. The regimental Party representative reported only to Liao Zhongkai, who 
was operating as Academy Party representative.297 Party representatives were assigned to 
their separate but equal command roles soon after the units of the Training Regiments 
were organised.298 They were assigned to every echelon from the company level and 
above. Although in most cases the Party representative held a rank lower than the 
commander at each echelon, the line of command had to accept his position as equal to 
him. Each Party representative was subordinated only to his higher echelons and not to 
the commanders.299 In practice, however, Liao was hardly presence in Huangpu as he 
was always tied up with party and provincial government affairs as mentioned earlier, 
and the staff of the Political Department carried out most of his works. In the end, it was 
Chiang Kaishek who was really in- charge of the Party representatives and the political 
work in Huangpu. 
In a sense, the system of the Party representative was introduced to the Training 
Regiments to promote military efficiency and to check on the abuse among the ranks. 
There were at least four known missions specified for the Party representatives. Firstly, 
they were to teach the revolutionary values of the Guomindang. These instructional or 
indoctrination efforts of the Party representatives enabled the troops and officers of the 
regiments to understand the meaning and significance of the national revolution. 
Secondly, they were to promote discipline, and this was to be done through the 
inculcation of spiritual unity, the Guomindang's version of esprit de corps. The third 
mission was that of supervising, or at least overseeing, the actions of officers in their 
units. In so doing the representatives would be able to do their parts in improving the 
296 The Soviet Red Army had made such an distinction as early as in the 1920s. For a discussion of the 
party and political work, see Cheng Hsiao -shih, Party- Military in the PRC and Taiwan: Paradoxes of 
Control. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990, 38 -45. 
137. 
297 Ibid., p. 5. 
298 For the list of the names of the initial Party representatives, see Guojun zhenggong shigao, 136- 
299 Ibid, 1: 135. 
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living conditions and general situation of the enlisted men. The fourth area of activity 
specified was a responsibility for all propaganda work conducted within the military 
organisation. In short, the main responsibility of the Party representative was primary 
the political work.' 
In conclusion, from the above discussion the basic character and nature of the 
Huangpu Military Academy has already taken shape in its formative years. Although the 
Guomindang, with the aid from the Russian advisers, might have planned to set up a 
national party military academy based on the Russian Red Army Command School, 
Huangpu was in fact a military training course (ganbu xuexiao). The Guomindang's plan 
could not be realised given the conditions in Guangzhou then. The hostile environment 
in Guangzhou towards Sun Yatsen and the party, and the rivalries among the various 
armies of the Guomindang soon forced the new academy to embark on building its own 
army units. To some extent, this pattern of development was common in any military 
build -up (such as the Guangdong Army) then, but this also coincided with the plan 
Chiang Kaishek presented to the Russians in Moscow a year early. The main differences 
were that, the sequence of the buildup was supposed to be the military build -up first 
followed by the cadets training; the base was to be at the northwest borders rather than in 
Guangzhou. In a sense, this proved that Chiang Kaishek's reading of the military 
situation was realistic. 
Contrary to most of the studies on the Huangpu Military Academy, the roles of 
the cadets were less important given the short time available for their stay in the academy 
and their training being constantly disrupted by various events in Guangzhou The party 
officials were given a dual command role in Huangpu but did not fully exercise their 
power to control the academy. They were too busy with party affairs and Huangpu was 
simply too insignificant to attract their attention. Most of their works were left to junior 
deputies or assistants. It was the military staff, headed by the Commandant, who was in 
control of the academy. Their past military education and experiences serving various 
00 The political work in the military covered a wide range of activities, most were directly or indirectly 
relating to military operational matters. In a talk given by a Russian adviser to the Chinese audience in 
October 1925, he explains briefly the main duties and responsibilities of a Party representative in the 
military which include the following: I. maintenance of the party discipline; 2. performing the education 
and propaganda work among soldiers and the people; 3. internal surveillance of the behaviour of military 
officers and the treatment of soldiers; 4. to minimise soldiers' desertion, in particularly, during wartime. V. 
A. Stepanov, "The Political Commissar System in the Russian Red Amy." Zhongguo junren , no. 17 
(recorded by Huang Jinhui in Chinese entitled " E' guo hongjun dangdaibiao zhidu): October 1925, 5 -12. 
At the end of the speech, there was also an question- and -answer session where several questions on the 
practice of the party representatives system in the military were raised. 
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armies, in particular, the Guangdong Army were more decisive in shaping the academy. 
The Russian assistance in the forms of financial support and arms supplies were 
crucial in the setting up of Huangpu. Apart from the material aid, the Russian advisers' 
contribution in the early years was not as great as described by some studies. The highly 
volatile and emotional charged situation in Guangzhou was even too much for the 
Guomindang leadership to grapple with, not to mention foreigners whose knowledge and 
language were lacking. However, the Russian advisers' contribution would increase 
when the armies of the Guomindang moved into operations and expansion. 
As the Party's military school faced a great problem trying to survive in a hostile 
environment, with the greatest threat came from within, it had to form its own army to 
defend for itself. The Huangpu's Training Regiments offered the most interesting 
features of the East -West military concepts of organisation and training. In essence, it 
adopted the Japanese basic tactical training, the traditional Chinese emphasis of human 
management, but with a Russian Red Army command and control system in the form of 
Party representatives in its units. 
With the formation of the Training Regiments, Huangpu was in effect, a military 
unit. The academy's headquarters turned command headquarters; its staff were appointed 
commanders, staff officers, and political officers; and its graduates the junior officers or 
ganbu. Once the Academy's Army (xiao jun) was in place, it was ready to take part in 
military campaigns to break away from the restrictions imposed by the conditions in 
Guangzhou. 
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Chapter 4: The Emergence of the Party Army 
The year 1925 was a turning point for the Huangpu Military Academy. Firstly, 
Huangpu was converted from an academy to an army and participated actively in the 
campaign to unify Guangdong. The success of this campaign, although was not 
achieved by the Huangpu units alone, had contributed to the re- establishment of the 
National Government on 1 July 1925.'01 Secondly, through these campaigns conducted 
in Guangdong, a new operational doctrine was worked out against the local militarists. 
The favourable results of this doctrine helped to boost the confidence of the military 
leadership and paved the way for the launching of the Northern Expedition in mid - 
1926. Thirdly, Huangpu's Academy Army was officially endorsed as the Party Army 
of the Guomindang on 12 April 1925 and by the second quarter of 1925; it became the I 
Corps of the Guomindang's National Revolutionary Army.302 With this endorsement 
Huangpu was elevated to the central stage of the Party Army. 
This chapter aims to analyse the process of transforming Huangpu from an 
insignificant academy to become a leader of the Guomindang's National Revolutionary 
Army: how it came about; and why it succeeded. Specifically, it will deal with two 
main subjects: the nature of conflict in Guangdong prior to its unification under the 
Guomindang; and the role of Huangpu in this unification process. The emphasis of the 
analysis will be on the power relations among the militarists in Guangdong as well as 
the operational aspects of the unification campaigns. The basic thesis of the chapter is 
301 The Guomindang's works on Guangdong unification usually attribute its success either to Chiang 
Kaishek and the Huangpu's Academy Army (xiaojun) almost single handedly. Examples of this 
distortion in favour of the Huangpu's units to the exclusion of seasoned troops of the Guangdong Army 
can be found in all descriptions of the 1925 campaigns published in Taiwan. See for examples, Guojun 
zhenggong shigao (A draft history of the political work of the national army). Taibei: Central Political 
Department, Ministry of National Defence, 1960, p. 149; Lujun guanxiao sishi zhounian xiaoging 
zhuanji (A special magazine commemorating the forty anniversary of the army officers' school). 
Fengshan: Huangpu Publication, 1964, p. 2. 
02 The Guomindang historians use the term "Party Army" very loosely. It sometimes refers to the 
armies of the party such as the Guangdong Army. Before the First Eastern Expedition, Huangpu was 
officially called the Party Military Academy. It was named the Party Army by the Guomindang's CEC 
only after the expedition on 12 April 1925. When the National Revolutionary Army formed in August 
1925 it was also called the Party Army. See Zhongguo Guomindang jiushi pian dashi nianbiao (Major 
events of the Guomindang in the last ninety years), Guomindang Party History Committee compiled, 
Taibei: 1984, 181 -2. 
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that the Guangdong unification was brought about not by any deliberate policy by the 
Guomindang or the United Front but through a series of external and internal threats 
from both within the province and the party. 
Nature of the Conflict 
Since Sun Yatsen's return to Guangzhou on 21 February 1923, the Guomindang 
faced difficulty in trying to organise a government without adequate funds and no real 
command over military forces. Sun tried to arrange for a large development Ioan from 
the British interests and secure a few million dollars from Chinese businessmen in 
Hong Kong, but to no avail. The failure was mainly due to Guangdong's unstable 
military situation. Then the Guomindang government in Guangzhou controlled only 
about a third of the province. This covered the central part which included the north- 
south railway from Guangzhou to Shaoguan; the region along the Pearl River 
(Zhujiang), and the deltas of the West River (Xijiang) and East River (Dongjiang). The 
rest of the province was in the hands of Chen Jiongming and his allies.343 Within the 
Guomindang controlled region, various armies nominally under Sun Yatsen occupied 
different areas in a semi -autonomous state.344 
In April, Shen Hongying, one of the generals who assisted Sun in ousting Chen 
Jiongming, tried to seize control of Guangzhou. After nearly a month long battle by the 
combination of forces collaborating with Sun, Shen was driven back. However, shortly 
after Shen Hongying' suppression, a coalition of generals under Chen Jiongming closed 
in to capture Guangzhou from the east. In retaliation, Sun tried to organise an attack on 
Chen's base at Huizhou. This campaign went on intermittency during the second half 
of 1923. Sun's armies demanded cash to go into battle. Money was raised through 
imposing extra levies and the sale of public properties to finance this campaign?' 
43 Cherepanov, Zapiski, p. 150, Map I. 
According to Cherepanov among them the Yunnan Army was the strongest and best armed. In 
Guangzhou, it had about 23,000 troops and the tax revende it collected estimated to about $3,190,000 
per month. Zapiski, p. 36. 
D45 For an interesting discussion of Sun Yatsen's problems in Guangzhou, see C. Martin Wilbur, 
"Problems of Starting a Revolutionary Base: Sun Yatsen in Guangzhou, 1923 ". Bulletin of the Institute of 
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During this time Sun Yatsen and the Guomindang's popularity in Guangzhou 
was also at its lowest. Besides heavy taxation and the presence of extra -provincial 
armies in the city, Guangzhou residents were afraid of Sun Yatsen and his party 
ympathetic attitude towards the Communist Party and the Russian Comintern. They 
were worried that Sun might turn Guangzhou into a Bolshevik state. By early 1924, 
this fear among leading merchants in Guangzhou against Sun Yatsen was growing 
acute. They hoped to build up their forces and ultimately to expel him (see chapter 
3 ). 46 
The condition in Guangzhou was so hostile that Sun Yatsen considered giving it 
up as a revolutionary base. The opportunity came in September. In central China, Wu 
Peifu had been attempting to unite China by force. And only Manchuria, Zhejiang, 
Shanxi, and the southernmost provinces of China were outside the sphere of the Zhili 
clique. Opposing Wu was a loose alliance headed by Zhang Zuolin, leader of the 
Fengtian clique, Duan Qirui, leader of the Anfu clique, Lu Yongxiang, military 
governor of Zhejiang, and Sun Yatsen. In mid -1924, a contest for control of Shanghai 
had been brewing between a member of the Zhili faction, Qi Xieyuan, military 
governor of Jiangsu, and Lu Yongxiang, who controlled the Shanghai area through his 
subordinate, He Fenglin. General Lu telegraphed Sun Yatsen on 4 September, asking 
him to help by sending troops to threaten the rear of Wu Peifu's subordinates.34' 
During the first week of September, Sun Yatsen decided to launch a Northern 
Expedition from Shaoguan, the end railway station located about 140 miles from 
Guangzhou near Guangdong's mountainous border. From here he set up his military 
headquarters and gradually assembled various "guest armies" from Henan, Hunan, 
Jiangxi, and Yunnan. General Tan Yankai, the leader of the Hunan Army, was 
appointed commander -in- chief, and the various units were named the National 
Modern History, Academia Sinica (Taibei), IV, pt.2 (1975): 1 -63. 
Jab For a discussion of the Guangzhou merchants against Sun Yatsen, see Chapter 3. 
For the general account of the Zhili -Fengtian conflicts, see Li Chien-nung. The Political History 
of China, 1840 -1928, pp. 468 -470; James E. Sheridan, Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu- hsiang, 
130 -133. 
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Reconstruction Army (Jianguojun). In addition, Sun also took with him his own guard, 
a company of cadets from Huangpu Military Academy, part of the Gendarmes of Wu 
Tiecheng, and a "farmers' army" under Tan Pingshan, compressing students of the 
Second Class of the Farmers' Movement Training Institute. Yang Ximin's Yunnanese 
forces and the Liu Zhenhuan's Guangxi troops would not participate in the expedition. 
Sun left Hu Hanmin to look after Guangzhou and appointed him the acting 
Generalissimo.348 
Although the decision to launch a Northern Expedition was reached in meetings 
cf the Guomindang Political Council and a military conference in the Generalissimo's 
Headquarters between 3 and 10 September, there was considerable opposition to the 
expedition within Sun's staff.349 Liao Zhongkai wanted to resign on 23 September as 
Finance Minister on the ground that he was unable to provide Sun with supplies. 
Chiang Kaishek asked to resign as the Commandant of the Huangpu Military Academy 
on 16 September because he refused to send more than one company of cadets for the 
expedition. The Russian advisers were also against it. Borodin wanted Sun to 
concentrate on the mass movement rather than military adventures. And Bliukher, who 
had just arrived in October, felt that Sun military effort should first wipe out Chen 
Jiongming's forces.35o The Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee was also 
against it, according to Qu Qiupai.351 On 10 October, Chen Duxiu wrote to Voitinsky, 
stating, "we consider that the Guomindang should discontinue its military actions 
(including the Northern Expedition) and leave the Guangdong Government. "352 Deng 
348 For accounts of the expedition, see Geming wenxian, 10: 1484 -1498; Guofu nianpu, 1128 -1145. 
49 See Guofu nianpu, p. 1133; Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 16 September 1924, p. 235. 
35° According to Lydia Holubnychy, Borodin's stand on this issue was uncertain, see her work 
Michael Borodin and the Chinese Revolution, 1923 -1925, 449 -450; Bliukher, who arrived in Guangzhou 
only in October 1924, according to Kartunova, believed the first task for the Guomindang was to finish 
off Chen Jiongming and secure the Guangzhou base, see "Vasilii Bliukher (1889- 1938)." Vidnye 
Sovetskie Kommunisty -- Unchastniki Kitaiskoi Revolutsii (The understanding Soviet communists, 
participants in the Chinese revolution), 41 -65. 
Js] Qu Qiubai. Zhongguo geming zhong zhi zhenglun wend (The controversial questions on the 
Chinese revolution), p. 165. 
3sz Glunin, "Comintern and the Formation of the Communist Movement in China," p. 274, which 
quotes part of Chen's letter to Voitinksy. 
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Zhongxia voiced his opposition in the October issue of a new labour journal. stating 
plainly that, "the Northern Expedition had nothing to do with the true revolution of 
national liberation and the unions' and farmers' associations should not get involved in 
t.i353 Cai Heshen opposed it in the Communist journal Xiangdao zhoubao (Guide 
Weekly).354 
Two major events that occurred in October and November, however, soon 
changed Sun Yatsen's mind on the Northern Expedition. In October, the Merchants 
Corps Incident ended with the Guomindang government troops led by Chiang Kaishek 
storming of its headquarters. A dramatic political change in Beijing also altered the 
situation in Guangdong. The Second Zhili -Fengtian War which began in the summer 
of 1924 reversed completely when Feng Yuxiang brought his troops back to Beijing 
instead of fighting the opponent Zhang Zuolin's Manchurian Army. Caught between 
Zhang's forces on the front and Feng and his fellow conspirators at his rear, Wu Peifu 
was forced to flee from Tianjin by sea and eventually made his way to Wuhan. On 2 
November Cao Kun, whose presidential palace in Beijing was surrounded by Feng's 
forces, announced his resignation though he remained under house arrest for two 
years i55 Soon after the coup, Feng Yuxiang and his allies invited Sun to Beijing to 
participate in national unification.356 Under these circumstances Sun decided to 
abandon the Northern Expedition although some of the forces were already in Hunan 
and Jiangxi. He made the journey to Beijing, which turned out to be his last. He died 
of cancer in Beijing on 12 March 1925. 
In the winter of 1924 -25, after Sun Yatsen's departure from Guangzhou to 
Zhongguo gongren (The Chinese workers) October 1924. 
sa Xiangdao zhoubao, no. 83, 17 September 1924. 
sss James E. Sheridan, Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu- hsiang. USA: Stanford University 
Press, 1966, 130 -148. The author gives no suggestion that Sun Yatsen was involved in the plot nor knew 
anything about it. 
356 In the two telegrams sent on 27 October, Sun indicated his interest in going to Beijing; he then 
returned to Guangzhou from Shaoguan on 30 October, and on 1 November, he received an invitation. 
Sun made public his intention to proceed to Beijing on 4 November. Sun Zhongshan nianpu changbian , 
2:2043 -2052. 
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Beijing, Chen Jiongming began preparation for a comeback. Interestingly, Chen named 
his coalition of forces, allegedly numbering some 50,000 men, the "Save- Guangdong" 
Army (Jiuyuejun).357 Its main objective was the unification of Guangdong by getting 
rid of the extra -provincial armies and returning the power of provincial government to 
Guangdong people. The principal commanders under this army were Ye Ju. Yang 
Kunru, Hong Zhaolin, and Lin Hu. Merchants of Guangzhou might have supported 
Chen financially after the defeat of the Merchant Corps by Sun's forces in mid -October. 
He assigned three fronts to retake Guangzhou: Ye Su commanding the centre. Hong 
Zhaolin the left (south), and Lin Hu the right. Yang Kunru garrisoned the fortress of 
Huizhou.358 
Seen from this perspective, the unification campaign in Guangdong was an 
internal provincial war for the control of Guangzhou. Militarily, Guangzhou would be 
secured only if the hinterlands of the east and south of the province were occupied. Sun 
Yatsen was not confident of victory, whether by force of arms or mass movement. 
Instead, he was looking for military alliance with the northern warlords so as to launch 
his Northern Expedition from Shaoguan_ When Chen Jiongming's forces approached 
the northern border of Jiangxi and Guangdong, threatening the rear of the Northern 
Expeditionary troops, the Guomindang was forced to fight a two -front war, one in the 
north at Hunan and Jiangxi, the other in eastern Guangdong. Internally, the 
Guomindang also had to content with the unreliable Yunnan and Guangxi extra - 
provincial armies in Guangzhou. The challenges to the Guomindang in this war were, 
therefore, one, to assemble sufficient troops to defend Guangdong; and second, to 
357 Deng Wenjiang, "Guangdong jun jishi" (A record of the Guangdong army), Jindai shi ziliao, no. 
3, 1958, 68. 
358 For a full account of the First Eastem Expedition from the Guomindang sources, see Huangpu 
junxiao shigao (Draft history of the Huangpu military academy), 6: 121 -157; Geming wenxian 
(Documents on the revolution), vols 10 and 11: 1523 -1677; "Di yi ci dongjiang shizhanji (A record of 
the first eastern expedition)." Junshi zhengzhi yuekan (Military and political affairs monthly) , (March 
1926) 3: 1 -29; "Dongzheng canzhan baogao (A report on joining the second eastern expedition)." Junshi 
zhengzhi yuekan (Military and political affairs monthly), (February 1926) 2: 20 -46.. For detailed day -to- 
day battle reports of the 1st Training Regiment of the Huangpu Military Academy, see Liu Bingcui. 
Geming jun di yi ci dongzheng shi than ji (Factual battle reports of the revolutionary army during the 
first eastern expedition). Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1928; for the Russian's account, see his detailed 
memoir by Cherepanov, Zapiski Vennogo Sovetnika y Kitae (Notes of a military adviser in China). 
Moscow: Academy of Sciences of USSR, Institute Norodov Azii,Nauka, 1964, 148 -207. 
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attack forces of Chen Jiongming in eastern Guangdong if Guangzhou were to continue 
to be the revolutionary base for the Guomindang. 
The Guomindang Forces 
In January 1925, the units available to the Guangzhou government against Chen 
Jiongming's forces were formed into an " Allied Army" under the titular command of 
General Yang Ximin.359 The Allied Army also envisaged three fronts of battle: on the 
north, designated as the Left Wing force; one in the Centre as the Central force; and one 
in the south as the Right Wing force to answer each of the threat. On 1 February when 
the expedition began, two Yunnanese corps under Fan Shisheng were assigned the Left 
Wing force facing Lin Hu;360 in the centre, the Guangxi army of Liu Zhenhuan was 
assigned to capture Huizhou; and in the south, the Right Wing force consisted of 
several units of General Xu Chongzhi's Guangdong Army and the two Huangpu 
training regiments. This force was to clear the Guangzhou -Jiulong (Canton -Kowloon) 
railway and then advance on a route near the southern coast to seize Chaozhou and 
Shantou.36' 
In this campaign, commonly known as the First Eastern Expedition, the Yunnan 
and Guangxi armies did little fighting, but the southern Right Wing carried through its 
mission in about six weeks. This force numbered over 10,000 men when all were 
committed. Of these the Huangpu contingents, the Academy Army (xiaojun) 
commanded by Chiang Kaishek contributed less than 3,000 men without battle 
359 This was a separate force from General Tan Yankai's Northern Expedition Army. Although the 
Guomindang's forces were superior in number compare to Chen Jiongming's units they had to look after 
two fronts: the Northern Expedition in Hunan and Jiangxi in addition to the East River region in 
Guangdong. Yang Ximin was given command simply because he had the largest troops, about 30,000 
men, of all the rest of the armies. Chen Xunzheng, "Ti yi ci dongzheng" (The first eastern expedition), in 
Geming wenxian, 10: 1522. 
360 In the original plan, the Right Wing force was assigned to the Yunnan army but during 
implementation it became the Left Wing force. No specific reasons were given except that the situation 
had changed. Gemingjun tí yi ci dongzheng shizhanji (The war diary), 5, 9. 
361 In the earlier plan, the Yunnan Army under Yang Ximin was assigned as the Left Wing force but 
on 1 February it changed roles with the Guangdong Army. No specific reasons were given although it is 
generally assumed that Yang Ximin was not interested in the fight against Chen's forces. Chen 
Xunzheng, op. cit., 10: 1527 -1528. 
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experience. In a nutshell, the First Eastern Expedition encompassed two main phases 
of operations.362 The first phase which began early in February 1925 involved the 
successful clearing of the railway to Jiulong, and the eastward drive through Danshui to 
Haifeng, and onward to Chaozhou and Shantou. They were captured on 5 -7 March. 
Chen Jiongming fled to Hong Kong. On 1 March, however. General Fan Shisheng 
withdrew his troops facing Lin Hu, took them off to Guangxi to block an attack on 
Guangzhou by forces sent by Yunnan governor, Tang Jiyao. The second phase of the 
Eastern Expedition saw the defeat of Lin Hu's forces, which threatened the rear of the 
troops that had pushed rapidly to Shantou. Part of these troops wheeled back and 
defeated Lin's forces at Mianhu in a fierce and costly battle in which the 1st Regiment 
of the Academy Army distinguished itself. The victors then pursued their enemies 
toward the northeast direction, taking Wuhua and Xingning on 18 -20 March. The 
Guangdong 2nd Division captured Meixian on 22 March. Most of the remnants of Lin 
Hu's army retreated to the Jiangxi border while troops of Hong Zhaolin and Ye Su 
found haven in Fujian. On 20 April, Yang Kunru surrendered the Huizhou fortress to 
the Yunnan Army on the promise that his troops would be incorporated into it. Thus, 
the Guangzhou government's power was extended into eastern Guangdong. 
Although most Guomindang and Russian works stress the decisive role of the 
Huangpu units in the Eastern Expedition, the Academy Army was originally excluded 
from the expeditionary forces. It was through Chiang Kaishek's insistence, as chief of 
the general staff of the Guangdong Army, that Huangpu forces were eventually grouped 
under the Guangdong Army.363 The reasons for excluding Huangpu were 
understandable. In January 1925, it was only seven months old, its 1st Training 
Regiment was founded only in October 1924, and the 2nd Training Regiment in 
December the same year. What is intriguing is the question of why Huangpu want to 
participate in this campaign? 
362 Details of the Eastern Expedition are well described in the war chronicles such as Beifa zhanshi 
(A war history of the northern expedition); "Beifa tongyi" (The northern expedition and unification of 
China), Chief editor Wego W.K. Chiang {Wei -Kuo }. The History of the Chinese National Revolutionary 
War, Part II ed. vol 2. 
b3 Geming jun di yi ci dongzheng shi zhan ji (War diary o f the revolutionary army during the first 
eastern expedition). Liu Bingcui comp., Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1928, 5 -9. 
1;1 
According to 1st Training Regiment's Wang Jun. one of the battalion 
commanders, the original intention of the Huangpu units joining the First Eastern 
Expedition was to allow the officers and soldiers a chance to witness a real operation. 
There was no plan to participate in the battle as the other "Allied Army" would not 
allow Huangpu's involvement.364 In addition, Liu Bingcui, who was the general staff 
officer of the 1st Training Regiment and complier of the war diary of the first Eastern 
Expedition, explains that since Sun Yatsen left Guangzhou for Beijing, Huangpu was 
without Guomindang protection and was in danger of being eliminated by the hostile 
generals of Yunnan and Guangxi armies. And instead being a vulnerable target, it was 
better to take part in the campaign and moved out of Guangzhou.365 
In this expedition, the 2nd Division and the 7th Brigade of the Guangdong 
Army had the responsibility of securing the right (south) flank of the battle line 
extending from the Pearl River near the mouth of the East River moving north -west 
toward the North River valley 366 Considering the superior forces available to Chen 
Jiongming to counter the Right Wing forces, which numbered only about 10,000 men, 
this mission was formidable. 
The Soviet military advisers were important to the campaign according to 
Cherepanov's detailed and vivid account. Twenty of them participated.367 General 
64 In addition, Wang Jun also summarised two important reasons that contributed to Huangpu's 
success: the situation (tianshi) and the good working relationship (renhe) apart from the ideological 
indoctrination. Wang Jun. "Di yi ci dongzheng jishi (A factual account of the First Eastern Expedition)." 
Junshi zhengzhi yuekan (The military- political Affairs Monthly) , no. 3 (March 1926): 24. Wang was the 
commander of the 3rd Battalion in the First Training Regiment during the First Eastern Expedition. He 
was a native of Guangdong Deng Mai (Hainan) and a graduate of the 14th Class (Engineer) Japanese 
Shikan gakko (July 1923). 
365 Liu gives three reasons which led to Huangpu's participation in the Eastern Expedition. The other 
two reasons were that: Huangpu was set up by Sun Yatsen and should participate in all Guomindang's 
campaigns; and that Huangpu units were better trained and better armed than most the other 
Guomindang forces. Gemingjun di yi ci dongzhengshi zhanji, Liu Bingcui comp., p. 10. 
366 Chen Xunzheng, Geming wenxian, 10: 1594; Liu Bingcui, Gemingjun di yi ci dongzheng shizhanji 
(Factual battle reports of the revolutionary army during the first eastern expedition). Shanghai: 
Zhonghua shuju, 1928, map 1. 
367 See Cherepanov, A. I. Zapiski, 148 -207. The list of nineteen Soviet officers who participated in 
the Eastern Expedition is included in Sulian yinmou wenzheng huibian, "Guangzhou ", 3: 104 -106. 
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Bliukher accompanied the field commander, General Xu Chongzhi, and offered day -to- 
day tactical advice. General V.A. Stepanov was adviser to General Chiang Kaishek, 
Cherepanov accompanied General He Yingqin, commander of the 1st Training 
Regiment of Huangpu. Artillery expert General Timothy A. Beschastnov and 
cavalryman Colonel Nkulin assisted him. Colonel Pallo (or Pollo) advised General 
Wang Boling, commander of the 2nd Training Regiment, assisted by Colonel N.G. 
Vasillev. General I. Zilbert served as adviser to general Wu Tiecheng, commander of a 
brigade of gendarmes. General Zhang Mingda, commanding an infantry division of the 
Guangdong Army, had Shneider as his civilian political adviser. General E.A. 
Yakovlev and Colonel Vasillev were engineering experts; and Colonel M.I. Dratvin 
was the communications specialist. Admiral Smirnov advised the commanders of a 
river gunboat flotilla, which proved ineffective. These and other advisers marched with 
the troops, some covering as much as 750 kilometres. They also fought in some of the 
battles, under considerable danger. Before the campaign was over it became streaming 
hot in eastern Guangdong. Cherepanov contracted dysentery. 
From February, March and April 1925, the Guangdong Army's units executed a 
series of highly successful flanking manoeuvres. It started in the south of Dongguan, 
near the mouth of the Pearl River, and north toward Hailufeng and Meixian areas 
respectively_ In this operation, the Guangdong Army units defeated Chen Jiongming's 
forces. In about sixteen main encounters with the Chen Jiongming's forces in the 
February to April for example, the Academy Army fought side by side with one or 
more Guangdong units in a few battles. The first battle was Dongguan on 4 February; 
seizure of Danshui on 14 February including an attack on Chen Jiongming's forces the 
next day; and the battle of Xingning on 20 March. While the Guangdong Army fought 
ten battles independently, the Academy Army fought only two battles without the 
additional strength of the Guangdong Army.368 A number of The Guangdong Army 
units performed heroically in the campaign, they borne the brunt of combat and thus 
held down Huangpu casualties 369 
368 A Chronology of Important Military Events in the Republican China, Yeh You -kang and T. M. 
Williamsen comp., Part I: 1924 -1928, Taibei, 1971, pp. 1925 -4 to 1925 -9. 
369 This point is not well- recognised in most of the battle accounts. The commander of the 1st 
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The Academy Army in the Eastern Expeditions 
Although Huangpu's units were operational inexperienced and only two 
regimentsof about 1,200 combatants in each regiment, it was a close -knit formation. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, its faculty members served as senior 
commanders and Party representatives; First Class graduates filled the junior 
commander and Party representative posts; and enlisted men, recruited principally from 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang, came from the senior officers' natives places. 
The Academy Army was also well equipped and armed by Chinese standards. 
Officers were equipped with mauser pistols, while enlisted men carried the 7.9 mm 
mauser rifle which was manufactured at the Shijing Arsenal in Guangzhou. Each 
regiment included a machine gun company, equipped with six French -made air- cooled 
machine guns.370 Cherepanov's discussion of the ammunition shortage, which beset 
most armies in 1925, is revealing about the margin of superiority sustained by the 
Training Regiments in this area. Although the Huangpu units were only issued some 
200 -250 cartridges to their soldiers for the entire First Eastern Expedition, about 50 
rounds per battle, Cherepanov states that their ammunition supply exceeded that of the 
bulk of the rest of the other units.37' 
Although operating alongside the Guangdong Army, the Training Regiments 
had contributed decisively at certain crucial junctures. The mobility and physical 
stamina the Training Regiments exhibited in their advance to Haifeng and Meixian 
proved comparable, if not superior, to that of the many other armies. This can be 
Regiment He Yingqin recalls that in the Battle of Mianhu, about two thirds of one of his battalion was 
wiped out. Among them, two of the three company commanders and seven platoon commanders were 
killed in action. If not for the 7th Brigade of the Guangdong Army, the casuality rate could even be 
higher. He Yingqin, "Mianhu zhanyi zhi huiyi" (Remembering the battle of Mianhu), Zhonghua minguo 
shishi jiyao, January-June 1925, 244. 
See Collier and Lai, Organisation Changes in Chinese Army, 1895-1953, footnote 3 to Chart 16, 
p.78. 
371 Cherepanov, As Military Advisers, p. 132. 
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attributed to their realistic field training and the quality of the Huangpu troops. 
Impressed by the hardy Chinese soldiers, Cherepanov comments: 
"...During the advance we were repeatedly forced to leave the railway and this to some 
extent reminded us of usual theatres of military operations. We felt ill at ease in 
completely unfamiliar conditions. .The soldiers were lightly dressed: tunics of fine blue 
cotton fabric, short trousers ending above the knees, sandals woven out of a certain 
type of twine, puttees, and the Red Army -type caps covered with oilcloth for protection 
against the rain. Some of them had large round grass hats hanging on their backs, 
others carried umbrellas or rolled rubberised tent -cloth. All of these supplies protected 
the soldiers from tropical rains on the march. ...While marching the Chinese did not rest 
for 10 minutes after every 50 minutes. The soldiers did not tire as easily because of 
their light uniforms and because they marched in single file. Only 15 to 20 minutes 
stops were made very 2 to 3 hours depending on the steepness of the hills. Longer 
stops for dinner were not made as they were no field kitchens. The soldiers ate in the 
morning, before setting out, and at night. Since the food consisted mostly of rice and 
greens, it was cooked very quickly.i3" 
In battles, the Huangpu's units stood out in two areas: their tenacity and 
aggressiveness in pitched battle, and their political mobilisation activities. This was 
witnessed during the two most critical junctures of the campaign: the assault on the 
fortified city of Danshui, and the subsequent battles of Mianhu and Xingning. Both 
regiments participated in the assault on Danshui, on 13 February 1925, an attack which 
had to be planned and executed quickly before Chen Jiongming's reinforcements could 
arrive. Russian reports commended the initiative of the regiments in improvising 
ladders and ladder- substitutes to scale the walls on short notice, and also their 
aggressiveness in securing the city. On 13 March both regiments also battled the forces 
of Lin Hu, which were threatening the advance of the Right Wing toward Haifeng on 
the flank, at Mianhu. The 1st Regiment inflicted particularly severe casualties on Lin 
Hu's forces, which was several times the size of the Huangpu units. The Huangpu's 
units forced the their withdrawal. The 2nd Regiment bore the brunt of the assault on 
Xingning, which was also strongly defended by Lin Hu on 21 March. Both regiments 
Cherepanov, Zapiski, 184 -185; As Military Adviser in China, p. 119. The marching schedule is 
also stated in Gemingjun ti yi ci dongzheng shizhanji (War diary), 60 -61. 
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also operated better than most of the Guangdong units in the subsequent pursuit of 
Chen Jíongming's defeated units. Casualties sustained by the staff and First Class 
graduates were 156 killed and 182 wounded.37 Over 600 non -commissioned officers 
were also killed or wounded.34 
The Political Work 
The Guomindang army faced the major of winning the support of the local and 
rural population as it moved into eastern Guangdong. A friendly and cooperative local 
population was important in ensuring smooth military operations in these areas. The 
local residents could supply the Guomindang army with rice, water, and shelter while 
on the march in the villages along the route of advance. In addition, the movement of 
supplies forward once the luxury of rail transport had ended required the contracting of 
local "coolie" labour.35 To solve the problems the army would negotiate with the 
village head person to purchase goods and services required for the entire unit. The 
army strictly forbid its troops to loot, requisition food and housing individually, exploit 
porters, or carry out unfair business dealing with merchants. Party representative 
attached to each unit down to company level tried to uphold these ideals. Apart from 
the logistics and supplies, the rural people were also an important source of combat 
intelligence. They could guide the army through the rough rural countryside and they 
could also collect intelligence about enemy locations and numbers. With little or no 
intelligence support of their own this was a valuable contribution.36 
Huangpu junxiao shigao, 6: 197. 
Beifa zhanshi (A war history of the northern expedition) 1: 137 -263. 
35 In the war diary of the lst Training Regiment reveals a pattern of the anny arriving at a new 
destination and going through the important routine of negotiating with local villagers for supplies of 
rice and shelter for the soldiers. Genzingjun di yi ci dongzheng shizhanji, 18, 57, 60 for examples. 
36 Cherepanov complained of the serious lack of topographic maps in the 1st Training Regiment. In 
his memoir, he says "...instead, they were given schemes without a scale. The schemes did not show the 
nature of the terrain, roads, etc. and there were only straight lines between large settlements indicating 
the existing lines of communications; telegraph or telephone. We had no military or geographical 
descriptions of the area and tried to make up for this lack of information by questioning the officers who 
were familiar with the area. We also made extensive use of local guides ". A.I. Cherepanov, Zapiski, 
184 -185; As Military Adviser in China, p. 119. 
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The personnel available and competent to operate in this military- civilian 
cooperation sphere were the Huangpu's Party representatives (dang daibiaoj. The 
eastern expedition campaign was a test of the efficacy of the earlier training at 
Huangpu. Party representatives were charged with several responsibilities. Firstly, the 
political education of the troops as a continuation of the political training had already in 
progress.377 While on the march, soldiers' behaviour would have to be carefully 
directed and monitored so that the villagers would not be unnecessary disturbed by the 
rowdy troops. Several devices were designed to serve this end. Wall posters, 
pamphlets and printed bulletins were used to inform soldiers and peasants alike. Large 
numbers of Guomindang's friendly newspapers, which probably sponsored by the party 
were carried to the military units from Guangzhou and Shanghai. Since soldiers in the 
Guomindang ranks, like soldiers everywhere in China, still were illiterate, these 
newspapers of the Republican Daily (Minguo ribao) must have been distributed only to 
the officers of the regiments and to the cadet formations.378 
Another responsibility of the Party representatives was the collection and 
reporting of military intelligence. The timely intelligence secured from local residents 
made it possible for the Huangpu troops to envelop enemy formations and surprise 
them in other ways.379 Cherepanov reports there were no aircraft or cavalry for 
battlefield reconnaissance missions,380 and thus we may understand that the value of 
local intelligence contribution. 
The propaganda teams (xuanchuan dui) were assigned to clandestinely penetrate 
enemy -held areas. These teams came under the command of the Special Party 
Headquarters (tebie qu dangbu) that was responsible for political proselytising and 
propaganda work outside of the military formations in the villages and towns of rural 
377 Huangpu junxiao shigao, 7: 258; Guójun zhenggong shigao, p. 152. 
3'8 Huangpu junxiao shigao, 7: 261; states that one hundred copies of each newspaper were ordered 
for each distribution. 
Guojun zhenggong shigao, 200-202. 
380 Cherepanov, Zapiski, p. 184. 
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Guangdong.381 
Saz 
The propaganda teams duties were to spread the news that the Guomindang's 
revolutionary troops would in no way abuse their fellow residents.382 Nationalistic 
propaganda emphasised the dual themes of foreign anti -imperialism and local 
militarists oppression. Once a military objective was selected, villages in the vicinity 
became the targets of the propaganda teams. Once team members in civilian clothes 
had slipped through territory occupied by the opposing troops of Chen Jiongming_, they 
proceeded to paint slogans on walls, put up wall poster propaganda, distribute leaflets, 
and through discussions and other means generally pass the word that the Guomindang 
revolutionary soldiers would not make themselves unwelcome guests.383 The songs and 
slogans developed as indoctrination instruments at the Huangpu Military Academy now 
proved useful in persuading the people of the small villages and towns in southern 
China of the essential difference between the Guomindang revolutionary military men 
and the desperate men serving as soldiers under warlords who threatened local residents 
with loss of life and property. 384 Their propaganda efforts to win the people's support 
and create unity between troops and the people paid off. Farmers responded by acting 
18' While the Party representatives who were working within the army were under the control of the 
Political Department, the propaganda teams went under the Special Party Headquarters of the Huangpu 
Military Academy. In 1925 Liao Zhongkai controlled the Special Party Headquarters. For information on 
division of labors between the Political Department and the Special Party Headquarters, see Huangpu 
junxiao shigao, 7: 261; Guóiun zhenggong shigao, 147 -148, 152. 
Guojun zhenggong shigao, p. 152. 
38' Ibid., 150, 201 -202. The true significance of propaganda teams on the First Eastern Expedition 
may not lie in the quantity of work, as Cherepanov attempts to relate by indicating numbers of pamphlets 
distributed: 100,000 for the peasants, 500,000 for soldiers. The large number of leaflets for soldiers 
indicates they were distributed not primarily to troops trained at Huangpu. While one may speculate they 
were intended for persuasive use against the armies of Chen Jiongming, the printed hand -outs may also 
have been useful within the ranks of Xu Chongzhi's units among soldiers less committed to revolutionary 
ideals than those influenced at Huangpu. Cherepanov testifies that peasant response to the leaflets, and 
presumably the other activities of propaganda squad members, was very favourable. He gives evidence 
of this by mentioning that a large number of volunteer porters and workers who helped the Guomindang 
in the Haifeng -Lufeng area in north- eastern Guangdong. 
784 In much of the area under the administration of Chen Jiongming, this kind of propaganda strayed 
somewhat from the truth. The conclusions of two scholars indicate that Chen's administration generally 
was enlightened and progressive. C. Martin Wilbur, "Military Separatism and the Process of 
Reunification Under the Nationalist Regime, 1922- 1927." in China in Crisis, editors Ho Ping -ti and 
Tang Tsou, p. 216; Winston Hsieh. "The Ideas and Ideals of a Warlord: Chen Chuing -ming, 1878 -1933." 
Papers on China (1962): 198 -252. 
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as guides. message carriers, spies, and porters. Chiang Kaishek's recalls lively 
vignettes of the work of the propaganda teams and the popular response in his diary.38s 
Cherepanov also claims the successes for the propagandists.386 For example, it 
was reported that at Luojingha in the celebrated battle for Mianhu, one thousand 
farmers took up primitive arms -- spears and farming implements --to engage in combat 
with the contingent of enemy troops under Chen's subordinate commander Liu Hu.387 
They had also participated with the Guomindang units in pursuit of Lin Hu's defeated 
soldiers.38s 
At Haifeng, Cherepanov attributes the cordial welcome received the Guangdong 
Army units to the aggressive political mobilisation work by the Party representatives in 
collaboration with the local 1,000 -man Guomindang organisation. Before departing 
Haifeng, they took measures to establish peasant guerrilla companies, which included a 
military training school and thirteen teaching staff who were Huangpu First Class 
graduates. The school also set up peasant agitators training assisted by the Party 
representatives. However, the organisational work done by the Communist Peng Pai389 
together with large numbers of peasants in Haifeng. Chen Jiongming's recent 
385 Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao (A draft chronicle of Chiang Kaishek), 304 -306, 317, 324 -325; 
Cherepanov also talks about the preparation and distribution the propaganda pamphlets in Zapiski 
Vennogo Sovetnika v Kitae, 201 -202; the chief of staff of the Huangpu 1st Training Regiment Liu 
Bingcui attributes the success of the first expedition to the extraordinary good military- civilian 
relationship and the ways in which the local populace aided the military campaign, see Liu Bingcui. 
Gemingjun di yi ci dongzheng shi zhan ji (Factual battle reports of the revolutionary army during the 
first eastern expedition). Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1928, 336 -337. 
356 Cherepanov, Zapiski, 200-201. 
387 Lin Flu and his troops were in fact at Mianhu; they also engaged Guomindang units in several 
other encounters as well. This is described by both Cherepanov and Guomindang historians. 
8ß Guojun zhenggong shígao, p. 151. 
389 Peng Pal was a Haifeng native who undertook to organise Haifeng Peasants' Association in 1921. 
The Association was crushed by Chen Jiongming in March 1924. Peng fled to Guangzhou where he soon 
became the most active leader in the Guomindang's hesitant move towards the rural population. The 
Guomindang established a Peasant's Bureau in its central headquarters with Peng Pai as its secretary; and 
its sanctioned the creation of a Peasants' Movement Training Institute to prepare cadres to organise 
peasants' associations. Mao Zedong directed the Institute's final session in mid -1926. For detail, see 
Fernando Galbiati, Peng P'ai and the Hai -Lu -Feng Soviet, Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 1985, chapter 5. 
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disbandment of that union organisation, may have been much more effective in 
motivating peasants in that locale to do voluntary work than the pamphleteering of 
propagandists.390 
Three out of six Party representatives in the battalions of the I st and 2nd 
Regiments three were Communists. The Propaganda teams had a mixture of 
Communist and non -Communist members, but the Communist Party sent its own 
cadres into conquered areas to organise farmers associations and labour unions.391 
Competition soon broke out between activists in both camps -- "pure Guomindang 
members" and those "sitting on the fence" of both parties. Cherepanov relates that the 
Party representative of the I st Regiment, Miao Bin, organised within his unit "a 
department of a so- called Society for the Study of Sun Wenism, which perverted the 
revolutionary character of the teachings of Sun Yatsen, and came out against the unity 
of the national front ". Li Zhilong, a Communist Party representative of the 2nd 
Battalion, came out in opposition of Miao. Chiang Kaishek immediately transferred Li 
to Huangpu. Miao then tried to organise a department of the Society in the 2nd 
Regiment, but he "received due rebuff from the regiment's Party representative," as 
Cherepanov put it.'" 
This was an early glimpse of a very bitter conflict between two factions in the 
emerging Party Army. The most probable date for this emergence of an anti- 
790 Guojun zhenggong shigao, 200 -202. An impartial student of the peasants' movement in 
Guangdong reports that in the area of Haifeng, Lufeng, and Wuhua, organisers directed a peasants' corps 
to help the revolutionary troops in transport, secret service, and labour. They attacked the rear of Chen's 
amies, interrupted communications, and seized enemy supplies. On 28 February, the day after the city 
had been taken by the revolutionary army, Peng Pai arrived in Haifeng, and worked to restore his 
previously developed peasants movement. Xiangdao zhoubao, 1 May, 12: 1030 -1036; Chang Tzu- 
ch'iang, The Farmers' Movement in Kwangtung. Translated by the Committee on Christianising 
Economic Relations. Shanghai: National Christian Council of China, 1928, 9, 31. 
'91 Chen, Nengzhi. "Huangpu jianxiao chu qi zhong gong fen zi de shentou huo dong (The 
communists' infiltration activities during the early years of the founding of the Huangpu military 
academy)." Huangpu jianxiao liushi zhounian lunwenji (Papers on the 60th anniversary on the founding 
of the Huangpu military academy). 155 -212. Guofangbu shizheng bianyi ju (National military history 
and translation bureau) edited. Taibei: Guofangbu shizheng bianyi ju (National military history and 
translation bureau), 1984, 182 -184. 
02 Cherepanov, Zapiski, p. 289. 
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Communist organisation within the army seems to be between 12 and 24 April, 
according to the deductions of Li Yunhan. Chiang Kaishek's position in this conflict 
seems ambiguous. Bao Huizeng who was a Communist recalled Chiang making a 
speech at a banquet in Chaozhou in honour of officers who participated in the 
campaign, in which he said: "Although counter -revolutionary forces are very powerful, 
the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist Party are cooperating and we have the 
support of the people of the whole country. The Leader is dead, but there still is 
Adviser Borodin to Iead us." So, Guomindang rightists accused Chiang of joining the 
Communist Party, according to Bao.393 
Rebellion of the Yunnan and Guangxi Generals 
The First Eastern Expedition was a fruitful campaign for the Huangpu units. 
Units fighting in eastern Guangdong captured large stocks of equipment. They 
captured almost 12,000- 13,000 rifles, 110 machine guns, 30 ancient cannons, 6 modern 
mountain guns, 8 million cartridges of various gauges, and 1,500 shells. The Academy 
Army got about one -third of this large quantity of arms_ These arms would be useful, 
for Moscow had just given General Bliukher 450,000 roubles for the formation of new 
units.394 The officers and troops of the two regiments gained valuable battle experience, 
and Chiang Kaishek's prestige grew. On 13 April, the Guomindang Centrai executive 
Committee resolved to reorganise the Academy Army as the Party Army, and on 1 May 
it appointed Chiang Kaishek its commander. 
The Eastern Expedition, however, weakened the position of the Guomindang 
leaders in Guangzhou, since the main bulk of its loyal troops were away in the newly 
393 Bao Huizeng. Bao Huizseng Huìyilu (Reminiscence of Bao Huizeng). Beijing: Renmin 
chubanshe, 1983, 171 -172; and Li Yunhan. "Sun wen zhuyi xuehui yi zao qi fan gong yun dong (Sun 
Yatsenism society and the early years of anti -communist activities). ", 71 -114. Huangpu jianxiao litcshi 
zhounian lunwenji (Papers on the 60th anniversary on the founding of the Huangpu military academy), 
p. 83. 
3sa Cherepanov, Zapiskt Vennogo Sovetnika v Kitae, p. 200. A letter from Moscow to the Russian 
Military Attache informed him of this allocation, and also 100,000 roubles for the upkeep of the 
Huangpu Military Academy for two months. Mitarevsky, N. World -wide Soviet Plots, as Disclosed by 
Hitherto Unpublished Documents Seized at the USSR Embassy in Peking, Tientsin: Tientsin Press, n.d., 
p. 39. 
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conquered territories. This left Guangzhou and its neighbouring towns more firmly 
under the control of the Yunnan and Guangxi forces. Hu Hanmin headed a government 
that had little power to govern. The Yunnan and Guangxi commanders also tended to 
monopolise tax revenues. They were thought to be conspiring to overthrow the pro - 
Leftist Guomindang leaders.395 
During May 1925 some Guomindang leaders in Shantou planned to bring troops 
back from eastern Guangdong to drive out the Yunnan Army of General Yang Ximin 
and the Guangxi troops of General Liu Zhenhuan. The political situation in Guangzhou 
became tense, and by 22 May, Hu Hanmin and other members of the civil government 
had withdrawn to Henan Island (opposite Guangzhou) under the protection of Li Fulin 
and Wu Tiecheng. It was during this critical period that some members of the 
Guomindang Central Executive Committee (CEC) met for the Third Plenum, from May 
18 to 25. A manifesto announced the acceptance of Sun Yatsen's will as the 
Guomindang's guide, and the CEC declared that all who accepted it would be 
considered comrades. The party made clear its stand of its revolutionary struggle 
against imperialism and warlords, and continue to aid farmers and workers in mass 
movement. The plenum confirmed the policy to admit of Communists to the 
Guomindang and affirmed the intention to fight imperialism together with Soviet 
Russia. It cited Sun Yatsen's letter to Soviet Russia (read to him and signed the day 
before his death) as the basis for the Manifesto on the Current Situation. In it, the CEC 
declared that Soviet Russia had abolished the unequal treaties between Russia and 
China, and supported the Chinese people's struggle in the movement for abolition of 
the unequal treaties. The Third Plenum also adopted resolutions on the reorganisation 
of the army with the warning that all who opposed it would be dealt with severely. 
According to Wang Jingwei, the plenum also decided to keep the Political Council.396 
195 "Hu Hanmin guanyu yanzhong chufa panjun Yang Ximin Liu Zhenhuan bu tongdian" (Telegram 
from Hu Hanmin announcing Yang Ximin and Liu Zhenhuan be punished), Hailujun dabenyíng 
gongbao, no. 14, 1925, reprint in Zhonghua minguoshi dangan ziliao huibian, 4 b: 846. 
396 Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyao xuanyan xunling ji (Important declarations and instructions of 
the Guomindang of China). n.p.: Political Department of the Military Academy of the Guomindang of 
China, December 1925, 41, 60 -64; Li, Yunhan. Cong ronggong dao qingdang (From the communist 
admission to the party purification), 364 -367. 
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The radical tone-of the manifestos, the reaffirmation of admission of Communists into 
the Guomindang, and the reassertion of close relations with Soviet Russia mark the rise 
of a Leftist leadership in Guangzhou and their defiance of the Party's conservatives. 
In a well -planned, brief military campaign during the first two weeks of June 
1925, the Leftist Guomindang leaders solidified their control over the Guangzhou area. 
The battle for Guangzhou lasted from 6 June through 12 June.'97 Major fighting took 
place along the Jiulong- Guangzhou Railway. The combined Guomindang forces that 
marched back from eastern Guangdong took Shilong, a town on the approach to 
Guangzhou on 8 June. Another element of the Guangdong Army marched on to 
Guangzhou from Sanshui to the city's western outskirts. The Hunan and Jianguo 
armies descended the Guangzhou -Hankou Railway and were at the north of the city. 
The ring round Guangzhou was closed. On 11 June, the Guomindang's forces started a 
drive in two columns toward the high ground north and east of Guangzhou, where the 
Yunnan and Guangxi armies had prepared defences. 
Before joining the battle in Guangzhou, the Academy Army was enlarged to a 
brigade of three regiments through incorporation of additional First Class graduates and 
soldiers from a reorganised Guangdong unit. He Yingqin, the 1st Regiment 
commander, was promoted concurrently to command the brigade and Zheng Yingshi 
and Chen Dajun served as the 2nd and 3rd Regiment commanders respectively. The 
Huangpu regiments in eastern Guangdong formed part of Chiang's Eastern Group of 
Guangzhou's forces. Meanwhile, the Huangpu cadets in Guangzhou joined the 
Guomindang's Southern Group forces. Both participated in a successful assault on 
Guangzhou on 12 June. While the Training Regiments besieged the city from the east, 
the Huangpu cadet regimental force (8 companies) under the command of the acting 
dean Hu Qian combined with other units of the Southern Group to cross the Pearl River 
and launched a flanking attack on the Yunnan forces defending Guangzhou in the 
south. After occupying the city, cadets and portions of the Training Regiments 
s97 For a general account of the campaign, see Geming wenxian, 11: 1704 -1706; Jiang Jieshi nianpu, 
1 -14 June 1925, pp. 369 -376; Bao, Huizeng. Bao Huizseng Huiyilu (Reminiscence of Bao Huizeng), 
170 -178. 
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temporarily formed the city garrison. As such, they participated in the disarming of the 
Yang -Liu 20,000 -man force. According to Cherepanov, combing with the Huangpu 
cadets in crossing the Pearl River were some 500 soldiers of Wu Tiecheng, 1,000 of Li 
Fulin's troops, Sun Yatsen's former bodyguard company, and 250 cadets from the 
Hunan Military School (/iangwutang). The force numbered 2,880 men. The cadet 
units, augmented by artillery, constituted the 1st Regiment; the remaining units formed 
the 2nd Regiment.398 After the battle, Chiang Kaishek became garrison commander of 
Guangzhou and soon brought the disordered city under control. 
The Formation of the National Government 
After the victory, the Nationalist leadership began to re- establish a National 
Government in Guangzhou. On 14 June the Political council, which had met only once 
since Sun Yatsen's departure for the North, resolved that the government should have 
nine ministries. These ministry heads would form a council and elect a chairman The 
Guomindang's Political Council would decide on government policy and executed in 
the name of the government. The men who made this decision were Hu Hanmin, Wang 
Jingwei, Liao Zhongkai, Wu Chaoshu (C.C. Wu), with Michael Borodin as adviser.399 
The next day the Guomindang Central Executive Committee passed four resolutions: 
The Guomindang Central Executive Committee shall be the supreme organ; the 
Generalissimo's Headquarters shall be reorganised as the National Government; the 
jianguo armies and the Party Army would be renamed the National Revolutionary 
Army; and military administration and fiscal administration shall be reformed. During 
the next two weeks the small group of men began to implement these resolutions by 
selecting officials, writing regulations, and issuing pronouncements. On 1 July they 
formally established the National Government of the Chinese Republic; on the third 
they announced a new Guangdong Provincial Government, and a new Guangzhou 
Municipal Government the following day. The Central Executive Committee 
98 A.I. Cherepanov, Zapiski, 263 -264; As Military Advisers, 152 -153. A short summary of the 
campaign against Yang -Liu is contained in Military Campaigns in China: 1924 -1950, document 
prepared under the auspices of the office, Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. 
39e Li Yunhan. Cong ronggong dao gingdang, p. 373. 
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appointed a new National Government Military Council and proclaimed its regulations 
on 5 July. On 24 July regulations for the National Governments Ministry of Finance, a 
key organ in the effort to centralise revenues, were announced.400 
Fifteen men in Guangzhou held all the positions of importance in these various 
organs, but among them six stood out: Wang Jingwei, Liao Zhongkai, Hu Hanmin, Tan 
Yankai, Xu Chongzhi, and Wu Chaoshu. Wang Jingwei, however, was chairman of the 
National Government Council and of its five -man Standing Committee (hence 
"chairman" of the government), chairman of the Military Council, and early in July had 
become chairman of the Guomindang Political Council.401 Anti- Communist sources 
charge that Borodin and the members of the Guomindang Political Council engineered 
Wang Jingwei's election as chairman of the National Government. Previously, Hu 
Hanmin had been acting generalissimo and governor of Guangdong province. In the 
reorganisation, the latter position was left vacant and the province was to be governed 
by a council of seven. Hu Hanmin's new position was as foreign minister of the new 
National Government, which had no international status. Clearly his colleagues, 
probably on Borodin's insistence, had demoted him.402 Liao Zhongkai, the Left Ieader 
who most firmly supported Sun Yatsen's Russian orientation, was named minister of 
finance, a key position because the Guomindang was determined to centralise in its own 
hands the financial resources controlled by army generals. In addition, Liao kept his 
posts as Party representative to the Huangpu Military Academy and the Party Army and 
remained chief of the Guomindang Labour Department and of its Farmers Department, 
and minister of finance in the Guangdong Provincial Government. 
According to its charter, the Military Council of the Government of the Chinese 
Republic would be directed and supervised by the Guomindang. It would control all 
ao° Geming wenxian, 20: 3801-3820. 
401 Li Yunhan, Cong ronggong dao qingdang, 374-375; Geming wenxian, 20: 3808-38I4. 
402 According to Chen Gongbo, Xu Chongzhi had a long feud with Hu Hanmin, Tan Yankai and Zhu 
Beide. See his Ku xiao lu, 28 -29; Jiang Yongjing, Hu Hanmin xiansheng nianpu gao (Chronological 
biography of Hu Hanmin). Taibei: Guomindang Executive Committee Historical Commission, 1978, 
232 -237. 
125 
military, naval, and air forces and all military organs within the territory of the 
government. The minister of military affairs would be one of its members. The 
Military Council was conceived as a body coordinate to the Government Council. Both 
received their orders from the Guomindang," and the Military Council would have 
various functional offices in charge of military matters, just as the government had 
ministries in charge of civil affairs.403 As matters evolved, both councils came under 
the authority of the Guomindang Political Council. Party control of the Military 
Council was apparent from the appointment of the Military Council members. Four of 
the original eight members --Wang Jingwei (chairman), Liao Zhongkai, Hu Hanmin, 
and Wu Chaoshu --were civilian party members all with seats on the Political council. 
The others were commanders of troops, Tan Yankaí, Xu Chongzhi, Chiang Kaishek, 
and Zhu Beide. Tan and Xu had recently been added to the Guomindang Political 
Council. As chairman of the Military Council, Wang had the power to make final 
decision on all questions.404 In a letter to all officers and men, the Military Council 
summed up the principle of Party control of the military. The Guomindang, it said, 
should direct and supervise all political and military organs of the government 40i The 
Military Council had the functions of the supreme command with a General Staff 
directly subordinate to it.406 
The day after the victory, the Guangdong Regional Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party issued a proclamation directed nominally to workers, farmers, 
revolutionary soldiers, and all oppressed people. After denouncing warlords, 
imperialists, and reactionaries, it offered an ambitious list of nine reforms that a truly 
revolutionary government should institute: protection of the basic rights of free speech, 
publication, assembly and association; unified government administration, and 
prohibition of local rule by military; unified finances, reformed taxation, and prevention 
Geming wenxian, 20: 3805-3806, 3818-3819. 
404 For the organisation of the Military Council see "Notes on Several Meetings of the Military 
Council ", Document 10, Missionaries of Revolution, p. 4. 
405 Zhongguo Guomindang zhongyao xuanyan xunling ji, 48-50. 
400 "The National Revolutionary Army: Short History of its Origin, Development, and Organisation ", 
Document 3, Missionaries of Revolution, p. 485. 
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of armies from usurping tax -collecting organs; unified military administration and 
prohibiting armies from harming the people; prohibition of [opium] smoking and 
gambling; regulation of commerce, opening riverine communications. and road 
building; increase in educational opportunities, teachers, and expenditure; 
extermination of bandits; and reduction of the numbers of defence forces. The 
proclamation also listed eleven specific reforms required by workers, farmers, and 
soldiers, such as protection of the right to organise and to strike, workers' insurance, a 
minimum income law for farmers and protection against rack rents, guaranteed wages 
for soldiers, etc.407 
Assassination of Liao Zhongkai and the Military Reorganisation 
As the Guomindang's Left Wing leaders were on the rise in August 1925, 
several sources of resentment against their policies also emerged. There was 
resentment about the economic disruption brought on by the anti -British strike and 
boycott, the power of Communists in the Strike Committee and its organs, and the 
pickets's enforcement of a blockade against shipment of goods to Hong Kong in regions 
that normally traded with the colony. Hostility focused on the Leftist leaders, their 
Russian advisers, and the Communists in Guangzhou Their opponents charged them 
with toying to "Bolshevise" Guangdong. A power struggle emerged between those who 
saw their economic and social positions threatened and those who were determined to 
create a new, revolutionary social and political structure. The conservatives main 
targets apparently were Liao Zhongkai, Wang Jingwei, and Chiang Kaishek.408 
The main oppositions to the radical wing of the Guomindang in Guangzhou 
d07 Guangdong qu dang, Tuan yanchiu shiliao, 1921 -1926 (Historical materials on the Communist 
party and youth corps in Guangdong), 144 -148. 
40R Wang Jingwei, "Political Report made to the Second Congress of the Guomindang ", 6 January 
1926, Geming wenxian, 20: 3851 -3870; Chiang Kaishek, "Military Report made to the Second Congress 
of the Guomindang ", 6 January 1926, Geming wenxian, 11: 1756 -1763; for an analysis of the 
assassination of Liao Zhongkai, see Chan Fook -lam, Gilbert. "A Chinese Revolutionary: The Career of 
Liao Chung -k'ai (1878 -1925) ", a Ph D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1975, 403 -423; for an analysis 
based on the Guomindang's archives, see Li Yunhan, Cong ronggong dao qingdang (From the 
communist admission to the party purification). 2 vols., Taibei: Zhongguo xueshu zhuzuo jiangzhu 
weiyuanhui, 1966, 375 -392; 
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included the following. General Li Fulin and Wei Panging on the Henan Island, and 
Liang Hongkai and Zheng Runqi in the west of the Pearl River and southeast of 
Guangzhou. In addition, Chen Jiongming's generals were expanding their areas of 
control in the eastern Guangdong , while General Deng Benying in the southwest was 
still hostile to Guangzhou. There was also pressure form the British. British and 
Chinese merchants in Hong Kong were suffering serious losses due to the Guangzhou - 
Hong Kong strike and boycott. 
By mid -August Guangzhou was filled with apprehension and rumours that some 
alliance of external and internal foes of the radicals Guomindang would emerge. The 
government began to send in troops to various potential danger spots and the military 
Council imposed censorship to all reports of troop movements except those sanctioned 
by them. Trouble erupted on the morning of 20 August 1925, when three assassins shot 
and killed Liao Zhongkai and his companion Chen Qiulin editor of the Minguo ribao, 
in front of the party headquarters. A Special Committee was set up consisting Xu 
Chongzhi, Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kaishek with full authority to deal with the 
crisis.4 °9 Evidence began to point suspicion toward a group of conservative 
Guomindang veterans and some higher officers of the Guangdong Army.41° It was 
suspected that Zhu Zhuowen, Hu Yisheng, Lin Zhimian and other members of the 
conservative political club, the Wenhuatang, under Hu Hanmin's patronage had plotted 
the assassination in conspiracy with generals Wei Bangping and Liang Hongkai.`" The 
Special Committee ordered their arrest. The task was given to the garrison command of 
the Chiang Kaishek. On 25 August the Huangpu forces began their arrests. Several 
generals and higher officers of the Guangdong Army were arrested and their troops in 
404 Chiang Kaishek's appointment to the Special Committee was a turning point in his career. He 
had previously held no important political post in party or government; he was not a member of the 
CEC, the Political Council, or the National Council. Chiang's military position was also considerable 
strengthened when portions of Xu Chongzhi's Guangdong Army were incorporated into his I Corps. 
410 The Guomindang's archives on the investigation of the assassination of Liao Zhongkai can be 
found in Zhongguo minguoshi dangan ziliao huibian, vol. 4 a, 274 -286. 
41 For more on political activities of the Wenhuatang, see Chen Gongbo's report on the investigation 
on the Liao Zhongkai assassination, in Zhongguo minguoshi dangan ziliao huibian, 4 a: 280 -281; and Li 
Yunhan, Cong ronggong dao qingdang, 382 -384. 
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and around Guangzhou were disarmed.' 
Hu Hanmin's and Xu Chongzhi's positions became precarious after their 
arrests. Hu Hanmin was implicated since Lin Zhimian was one of his followers and Hu 
Yísheng was his younger cousin. Chiang Kaishek placed Hu under detention at 
Huangpu and later despatched him to the Soviet Union 41 Other party conservative 
stalwarts such as Lin Shen and Zou Lu were also sent out of Guangzhou in a 
"Diplomatic Delegation ". Most of the officers charged with participation in military 
plot were Xu Chongzhi's subordinates. Xu although a Special Committee member was 
also kept under surveillance and later departed for Shanghai.4" In a long letter which 
was tantamount to a verdict and a criminal sentence, Chiang Kaishek spelled four main 
charges against Xu Chongzhi. He first accused Xu's Guangdong Army of being a 
warlord army interested only in getting rich and ignoring the Guomindang's 
revolutionary cause; he then accused Xu of embezzing a large amount of tax revenue 
belonging to the Guangzhou government and funds for the eastern expedition against 
the forces of Chen Jiongming; thirdly, Chiang accused Xu of monopolising the 
revenues of the Central Bank and refusing to distribute them to other armies; lastly, of 
being involved in Liao Zhongkai's assassination:' It is interesting to note that of the 
four main crimes, two were alleged embezzlement of funds. Xu and his army, in this 
case, was a major obstacle to Guangdong's unification apart from Chen Jiongming and 
other extra- provincial forces. Thus, between 19 and 23 September 1925, the balance of 
412 Early reports mention that about a hundred officials and officers were arrested. Jiang Jieshi 
nianpu chugao, 23 -25 August 1925, 409 -410; Wang Jingwei, "Political Report Made to the Second 
Congress ". 
°" For a detailed account of Hu Hanmin, see Jiang Yongjing, Hu Hanmin xiansheng nianpu 
(Chronological biography of Hu Hanmin), Taibei, Guomindang Central Executive Committee Historical 
Commission, 1978, 337 -350, which describes Hu Hanmin's departure for Russia after the event of the 
Liao's assassination. 
414 Chiang Kaishek's overt thrust against his rivals began on 19 September, with the approval of 
Wang Jingwei. Chiang sent the powerful 1st Division of the NRA to guard the capital against any 
internal revolt, and secretly mobilised other units to disarmed the forces of Zheng Runqi, commander of 
the 3rd Division at Humen and Dongwan, and Mo Xiong, 3rd Brigade commander stationed at Shilong 
east of the city. The next day Chiang Sent Chen Mingshu to escort Xu Chongzhi onto a vessel bound for 
Shanghai. The Political Council resolved to "permit" Xu to relinquish his posts as minister of war and 
commander of the Guangdong Army. Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 425 -429. 
415 Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 19 September 1925, 425 -428. 
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power in Guangzhou shifted dramatically in favour of the radical Guomindang 
members headed by Wang Jingwei, and the emerging Party Army commander Chiang 
Kaishek. 
On 26 August, the day after the initial arrests, the Military Council decided to 
organise the National Revolutionary Army. There would be five main corps. The Party 
Army commanded by Chiang Kaishek was to become the I Corps. The Hunan 
commanded by Tan Yankai would lead the II Corps. The III Corps was created from 
the Yunnan army under Zhi Peide. The Guangdong Army would become the IV Corps 
commanded by Li Jishen 416 Li Fulin's Fu Army was designated the V Corps. Other 
smaller units would retain its command structure but they would come under a unified 
administration.4" 
The sweeping military reorganisation that led to the creation of the National 
Revolutionary Army (NRA) in August 1925 provided the opportunity for the rise of the 
Huangpu's Party Army. Three divisions were organised to constitute the I Corps' 1st 
and 2nd Divisions in the late summer, with Third Class graduates filled in the 3rd 
Division in October. The rank and file of the three divisions comprised soldiers from 
the disbanded Yang -Liu forces (3,000- 4,000) and the reorganised 4th Guangdong 
Division.d18 The I Corps assumed the stance of an elite group, receiving top priority 
with regard to equipment and supplies. 
The Huangpu system for creating a disciplined and committed party armed 
force was been fully endorsed by the party by the time of the second Eastern 
Expedition. As further campaigns were successfully completed, Huangpu staff and 
graduates filled in warlord units reorganised and incorporated them into the growing 
016 Li Jishen was the commander of the 1st Division of the Guangdong Army numbering about 6,000 
men. His connection with the Guangdong Army went back to 1921 when Deng Keng appointed him 
chief of staff of the 1st Division (see previous chapter for detail). The Russian advisers identified Li and 
the Ist Division as reliable. 
4" Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 26 August 1925, p. 410. 
418 Collier and Lai, op. cit., p. 85; Beifa zhanshi, I: 291. 
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units of the I Corps. Basic to the process remained the Training Regiments. which 
increased to a total of six prior to the end of 1925. A look at the top -level command 
structure of the I Corps would testify to this. During the second Eastern Expedition, the 
1st Division commander, five of the ten principal commanders of the 1st and 2nd 
Divisions and two regimental Party representatives had served earlier in the first two 
Training Regiments.419 
The Second Eastern Expedition 
In late 1925, the Guomindang government's position in Guangzhou was once 
again seriously threatened.420 On the east, Chen Jiongming's forces were closing in on 
the city. It seemed that the Sichuan general Xiong Kewu in the north, and Deng 
Benying and Wei Bangping in the south were joining in the attack. Faced with this 
hostile coalition, the Guangzhou government decided to put down Chen Jiongming's 
forces first, since he was the most dangerous and the most closely connected with Hong 
Kong. Hong Kong was said to be supporting Chen Jiongming financially. 
Xiong Kewu would be disarmed. Thereafter, the rebellions in the south 
suppressed. 
After that 
would be 
With great effort, the newly formed National Government was able to raise 
several units out of reliable forces although they were extremely heterogeneous in 
numerical strength and armament. "21 A preparation for the second Eastern Expedition 
was a main item on the agenda at a joint meeting of the Guomindang Political Council 
019 Geming wenxian, 10: 1469 -1470; Beifa zhanshi, 1: 150 -151. The eight officers were He Yínggin 
(1st Division commander), Liu Zhi, Shen Yingshi, Jin Fozhuang, Chen Dajun, Liu Yaochen, Jiang 
Dingwen and Yan Fengyi. 
420 Although historical accounts of 1925 most frequently define two separate military expeditions 
into the East River region, it is well understood that the break -off of hostilities toward the end of May 
1925 was necessitate by the higher military priority arising back at the revolutionary centre at 
Guangzhou and not because the objectives of the expedition had been secured. The second eastern 
expedition was but a continuation of the first and was fought over the same political and military 
objectives. 
421 "The National Revolutionary Army: Short History of its Origins, Development, and 
Organisation ", Document 3, Missionaries of Revolution, p. 486. 
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and the National Government Military Council in September 1925422 The budget for 
military expenditure was the main subject. Wang Jingwei called upon the new minister 
of finance, T.V. Song for a report and then asked each commander to present his 
financial statement. From the replies it is evident that the effort to centralise tax 
collection and military payments had not progressed. Revenue lagged behind expenses 
in that every major component of the National Revolutionary Army, and payment of 
troops was seriously in arrears. General Cheng Qian had to sell rifles in order to feed 
his men. Thus, the plan to create five corps and to rationalise the army's structure was 
still far from realisation.423 
The strengths of Chen Jiongming's forces were estimated to be around 30,000 
supported by some machine gun and artillery forces. It began its advance from 
Haifeng, Hepu, and Meixian on 1 October.424 According to the Russian adviser, there 
was a danger that the enemy might overrun the government forces and take 
Guangzhou 425 To counter this threat, the Military Council assigned some 21,000 men 
422 The meeting was held after the assassination of Liao Zhongkai as the minutes of the joint 
meeting was dated 22 September 1925. The Russian version of the minutes, captured in the Beijing raid, 
is included in Sultan yínmou wenzheng huibian (Collection of documentary evidence of the Soviet 
Russian conspiracy). Beijing jingcha zongju bianyi (Beijing police headquarters compiled and 
translated). Beijing: Beijing Metropolitan Police Headquarters Inspection Bureau, Commission for 
Translation and Compilation, 1928, II: 45 -53. The account of the minutes of meeting is based on this 
text. 
423 Ibid. According to the Russian minutes, T.V. Song reported that the ministry collected between 
$1.9 and $2 million a month, and that for the October the figure would be $2.2 million. Monthly 
expenditure, however, was $2,420,000 of which $1,870,000 was required for troops and military 
installations, excluding the Huangpu Military Academy's expenses. Based on these estimates, we may 
deduce that 93 percent of the ministry's current revenue and at the least 83 percent of the projected 
income would go towards routine military purposes. These figures did not take into account the costs of 
the projected Eastern Expedition, which was estimated at $700,000. Li Fulin's army received nothing 
from the ministry. 
d24 See Chen Xunzheng, Geming wenxian (Documents on the revolution), 11: 1733, for more on 
the enemy strengths. It mentions an additional two to three thousand troops under Yang Kunju and 
several hundred under Mo Xiong garrisoning lluizhou. But Cherepanov says the enemy troops 
numbered only 20,000- 22,000. See also Cherepanov, A. I. Zapiski Vennogo Sovetnika v Kitae, p.334. 
For a full account of the Second Eastern Expedition, see Huangpu junxiao shigao (Draft history of the 
Huangpu military academy). 6: 172 -198; Geming wenxian (Documents on the revolution), 11: 1733- 
1744; Sultan yínmou wenzheng huibian, "Guangzhou ", 3: 34-48. 
425 "Kuibyshev's Report on Military Development in Kwangtung ", Document 22, Missionaries in 
Revolution, p. 566. This document presents a general picture of military developments in Guangdong in 
the last three months of 1925 as understood by the new head of the Russian military mission in the south, 
N.V. Kuibyshev. In his report to Beijing, written in January 1926, he emphasised the dangerous threat to 
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to the eastern front commanded by Chiang Kaishek, commander of the I Corps. He 
controlled the 1st and 3rd divisions of the I Corps (about 6,000 men) and the IV Corps, 
minus the 10th Division (6,000 men); a Danshui Group made up of two brigades and 
two independent regiments of the former Guangdong Army (3,000 men); seven 
battalions of the Independent Division under Wu Zhongxi; four regiments under Cheng 
Qian (1,500 men); and a miscellany of extra -provincial units from Jiangxi, Hunan, and 
Hubei (2,500 -3,000 men). Guangzhou was guarded by part of the 2nd Division of the I 
Corps, cadets in the schools of the I, II, and [II Corps, and the navy 426 
The first important objective was Huizhou, a nearly impregnable fortress, 
garrisoned by Yang Kunju.427 In a typical seize battle against fortress, the attack began 
with many hours of artillery bombardment on 13 October. It was followed by specially 
selected units of the "braves" who rushed to the walls with scaling ladders but they 
were driven back with heavy losses. The attackers only succeeded in mounting the 
walls and capturing the city after intensively bombarding the fortress the next day. The 
casualties of the 4th Regiment that led the attack were high. The regimental 
commander Liu Yaochen was killed and nearly half of the regiment were wiped out.42s 
The National Revolutionary Army captured 3 cannons, over 2,000 rifles, few machine 
Guangzhou posed in September 1925 by its enemies. The government faced total destruction but was 
able "by swift and determined measures" to resist internal opponents and the enemy armies, "thereby 
acquiring a strong and firm position by November 1925". 
426 Geming wenxian, 11: 1734, provides a detailed list of units. For Chinese sources on the second 
Eastern Expedition see also "Di er ci dongzheng jiliü, September- November 1925 (A brief account of the 
second eastern expedition)." Guomin zhengfu junshi weiyuanhui dangan (Military council archives of 
the national government), in Zhonghua minguoshi dangan ziliao huibian (Archives of the Republican 
China), 4 b: 859 -878. 
42' For a detailed account of the battle for Huizhou and other major battles; see "Dongzheng 
canzhan baogao (A report on joining the second eastern expedition)." Junshi zhengzhi yuekan (Military 
and political affairs monthly) , no. 2 (February 1926): 20 -46; Xie Cilin, "Dongzheng jingguo gingxíng 
(The second eastern expedition)." Junshi zhengzhi yuekan (Military and political affairs monthly) , no. 2 
(February 1926): 47 -57; He Chi, "Dongzheng zhanshi: di er ce Dongzheng zhanji (A war history of the 
eastern expedition: a battle record of the second eastern expedition)." Junshi zhengzhi yuekan 
(Military- Political Affairs Monthly) , no. 4 (April 1926): 1 -28; Gu Zhutong. "Huangpu dongzhen." 
Huangpu jianxiao liushi zhounian lunwenji (Papers on the 60th anniversary on the founding of the 
Huangpu military academy), 52 -62. 
428 "Di er ci dongzheng jilu, September- November 1925 (A brief account of the second eastern 
expedition) ", p. 867. 
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guns.4zv 
In his memoirs, A. I. Cherepanov, adviser to General He Yingqin, commander 
of the first Column, gives a vivid and detailed account of the battle, which he witnessed 
at close range. Huizhou city was protected by high walls and water on all sides except 
for a land approach to the north gate and a narrow causeway leading through a lake to 
the west gate. He describes the assault by hastily organised teams which though 
covered by artillery bombardment, were mowed down as they tried to rush the north 
wall or were pinned into a ditch some fifty meters away. Snipers picked off the officers 
and Party representatives, who wore khaki uniforms that distinguished them from the 
troops in blue. The second assault was better prepared and was led by a Communist 
party representative. The Russian engineer, E. A. Yakovlev, was among the first wave 
of attackers to scale the wall. The fortress of Huizhou was actually taken by 
Communists, says Cherepanov, who disparages Chiang Kaishek's role in this battle.430 
With Huizhou captured, the National Revolutionary Army now faced the 
enemy's main forces, but intelligence concerning its concentrations was poor. 
Understanding that its main strength was in the Hepu -Heifeng region, the National 
Revolutionary Army decided to send the I Corps (minus the 2nd Division), the IV 
Corps (minus the 10th Division), and the Danshui Group against the enemy's main 
force around Haifeng. General Cheng Qian, with reinforcements and the extra - 
provincial units, was sent to take Heyuan and Laolong in the north -east to cut off the 
enemy's escape routes to Jiangxi and Fujian.431 
424 Xie Cilin, "Dongzheng jingguo qingxing (The second eastern expedition) ", Junshi zhengzhi 
yuekan (Military and political affairs monthly), no. 2 (February 1926): 55. 
4'0 Cherepanov, A.I. Zapiski Vennogo Sovetnika v Kitae, 334-354. 
4J' The Russian adviser N.I. Konchits was accompanied Cheng Qian on this march. In his diary 
account Konchits describes the second Eastern Expedition campaign from 17 October to 16 November 
1925, the Huizhou battle to the drive against enemy remnants on the Guangdong- Fujian border. 
Konchits, N. I. "In the Rank of the National Revolutionary Army of China." Sovetskiie Dobrovoltsy v 
Pervoi Grazhdanskoi Revolutsionnoi Voine v Kitae; Vospominaniia (Soviet volunteers in the first 
revolutionary civil war in China; reminiscences) , 24 -95. Akademia Nauk SSSR. Institut Norodov Azii. 
Moscow: Izdatel`stvo Vostochnoi Literatury, 1961, 37 -62. 
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In the meantime, the situation in the south and west of Guangzhou became 
critical to the National government. The Military Council had to withdraw the IV 
Corps from the East River area and send it to assist the campaign against Deng Benying 
at the northern front. In spite of this weakening, the 1st Division and the Danshui 
Group each defeated strong enemy units under Lin Hu and Hong Zhaolin, opening the 
way for the recapture of Shantou. The Danshui Group fought a major victory by taking 
5,000 prisoners, 5,000 rifles, 15 cannons, and 50 machine guns.432 With the recapture 
of Haifeng and Lufeng, the Communist peasant organiser Peng Pai was able to return 
and start rebuilding the shattered peasants' movement. 
In the North River region the Guomindang was also successful in disarming and 
driving off the Sichuan forces of Xiong Kewu, an old revolutionary and a member of 
the Guomindang Central Executive Committee. Xiong had brought his Sichuan troops 
into northern Guangdong in August 1925. According to Wang Jingwei's report to the 
second Guomindang Congress, the Nationalist Government assigned General Xiong 
four counties in the extreme north -west of Guangdong for his source of income. On 1 
October, according to Wang, a representative of Chen Jiongming came to see Zhu 
Peide, telling him that Chen and Xiong long had an agreement. He even offered Zhu 
S300,000 to persuade him to join them. This led to the discovery of much evidence 
leading to the arrest of Xiong Kewu and some of his staff on 3 October in Guangzhou. 
Hence it was necessary to send the II and III Corps of the National Revolutionary Army 
to disarm the Sichuan Army.433 
432 Battle accounts of Danshui varied greatly in the Chinese and the Russian versions. In Geming 
wenxian, 11: 1740 -1741, gives the credit of defeating the enemy to Huangpu 1st Division although it 
acknowledges the contribution of General Feng Yipei forces in this battle. The Russian account by 
Teslenko, however, gives the greatest credit in defeating the enemy to Feng Yipei forces. It describes 
General Feng's forces penetrating deep into the enemy's rear thereby closing -off its retreat. Thus, when 
the Huangpu 1st Division and the Guangdong Army 1st Division attacked, the enemy collapsed. In this 
battle, 10,000 soldiers were taken prisoners, and 8,000 rifles collected. See Teslenko, Ye V. "From 
Guangzhou to Wuhan." Sovetskiie Dobrovoltsy v Pervoi Grazhdanskoi Revolutsionnoi Voine y Kitae; 
Vospominaniia (Soviet volunteers in the first revolutionary civil war in China; reminiscences) , 96 -125. 
Akademia Nauk SSSR. Institut Norodov Azii. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi Literatury, 1961, p. 107. 
Cherepanov on the other hand, mentions about 6,000 prisoners, 15 cannons, 50 machine guns, and 6000- 
7000 rifles captured. See Zapiski Vennogo Sovetnika v Kitae, p. 359. 
a3a Wang Jingwei's political report made to the Second Congress of the Guomindang, on 6 January 
1926, in Geming wenxian, 20: 3868 -3869; and Chiang Kaishek's military report made on 1 January, in 
Geming wenxian, 11: 1762. 
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The pacification of southern Guangdong began on 24 October. Chen Mingshu's 
force was compelled to retreat westward to Dansuike. Chen was determined to hold 
because of an important railway bridge (on the Sunning Railway).434 It had been under 
the enemy attack until 29 October when rescuing forces arrived. These were Jiangxi 
troops from Wuzhou,435 and units from the II and III Corps, redeployed after their attack 
on the Sichuan Army. General Zhu Peide was put in command of the campaign around 
late October. He drove the enemy south and west, and from this time on the National 
Revolutionary Army made steady progress in clearing south -western Guangdong of 
bandits and Deng Benying's armies. By mid -December, the IV Corps under Li Jishen 
had been assembled around Gaozhou; Li replaced Zhu Peide as general commander of 
the southern campaign, and the II and III Corps units were sent back north. On 21 
December, the VI Corps prepared its assault on Hainan Island where Deng Benying had 
retreated.436 
Political work was also featured prominently in second Eastern Expedition. 
When the Military Council was established early in July 1925 a Political Training 
Department was set up within it. On 27 July, the Guomindang Political Council 
appointed Chen Gongbo as its director.437 On 28 September, the Guomindang Central 
Executive Committee appointed Chou Enlai as the Party representative of the I Corps 
and other men as Party representatives in each of its eight regiments. At least three of 
the eight were Communists.438 
434 Geming wenxian, 11: 1740. According to this account, the 12th Division revolted at Jiangmen 
forcing Chen Mingshu's retreat. It was at this time the Military Council decided to re- deploy elements of 
the 4th Corps led by Li Jishen from the East River back to southern Guangdong. 
435 Chiang Jieshi nianpu, 12 October 1925, p. 439. According to Chiang, the participation of the 
Guangxi troops was preceded by a conference at Wuzhou on the unification of Guangdong-Guangxi. 
436 Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 20 December 1925, p. 483. 
437 Chen Gongbo was a founder of the Chinese Communist Party but was by now no longer a 
member. Chen had only recently returned from the United States and had joined the Guomindang, 
apparently as a protege of Liao Zhongkai. 
4'a The Communists who could be identified were Zhou Enlai, Bao Huizeng, Jiang Xianyun, and 
Zhang Jiyun. See Guojun zhenggong shigao (A draft history of the political work of the national army), 
157 -167. 
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As in the previous eastern campaign, political work took two main forms- - 
among the troops and among the populace. Political workers in the units were expected 
to be exemplars of valour. In his description of the battle for Huizhou city, Cherepanov 
reports that the Party representatives (or "Commissars" in his word) of the 4th 
Regiment, which would lead the attack, were assembled and instructed to serve as 
examples to the soldiers during the assault. In the second assault, it was Communist 
company Party representatives who led the three -man teams with ladders to the city 
walls. Cherepanov saw one of them right under the wall waving the company flag 
before the ladders were set up. Summing up the victories of the East River campaign, 
Cherepanov gives great credit to the Party representatives of the I Corps at the 
regiment, battalion, and company levels, the majority of whom, he says, were 
Communists. And they rapidly won the confidence of the soldiers.A39 
As for the work of the propaganda squads that were deployed in front of the 
operational units, the second Eastern Expedition saw an improvement in organisation 
and quality of work. Company or squadron sized propaganda unit was formed with a 
strength of 237 men, a majority of whom could speak local dialects, was organised by 2 
October.44° Its members were attached to the headquarters of the three manoeuvre 
columns of the expeditionary forces (for a report of one of the propaganda squads, see 
Appendix 2). 
Chiang Kaishek's personal records contain accounts of triumphal entries into 
captured places during the eastern campaign where carefully organised welcoming 
crowds were on hand with banners, slogans, and songs for his entry. For example, after 
elements of the I Corps had taken Shantou, Chiang entered the city by boat on 6 
a3s Cherepanov, Zapiski Vennogo Sovetnika v Kitae, 339, 360. 
aao Of utmost significance for the propagandist's work was his ability to communicate with the 
peasants. Within the squadron 18% of the personnel were felt to be able to speak the local dialect 
peculiar to the rural areas of the East River basin. Another 30% spoke the species of Guangdong 
language spoken pre -dominantly in the large city of Guangzhou, and 5% of the men could speak Hakka, 
a valuable skill in Guangdong. Sixty -five percent of the personnel spoke Mandarin as their native dialect 
and only 5% were unable to speak the "national" language. Although there is no indication how language 
skills were spread throughout the propaganda platoons and squads, there is reason to believe the 
language problem was appreciated and that dialect speakers were identified for utilisation in propaganda 
work. Huangpu junxiao shigao, 263 -367. A summary of this document is attached in the Appendix 2. 
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November. A large gathering was at the dock, and the next day, Saturday, there was an 
even larger welcoming meeting followed by a parade.141 In this gathering, Zhou Enlai, 
He Yingqin, Chiang Kaishek, and his adviser, General Rogachev addressed the crowd. 
Chiang praised the cooperation of the people and the troops, which he said, had made 
the victory possible. He proclaimed his program: to restore the labour unions and self - 
governing organisations of all classes, to abolish unequal treaties, to control the 
maritime customs, and prohibit gambling and opium smoking. He ended with praise 
for the Russian Revolution and slogans of support for the World Revolution. A few 
days later, on reading the report of the propaganda squads, Chiang was favourably 
impressed by the effects of the propaganda upon the discipline and morale of the troops 
as well as by the help it elicited from the public.°°' 
Workers and farmers were said to have assisted in the eastern and southern 
campaigns. According to Deng Zhongxia, striking workers organised a transportation 
corps to move supplies to the fighting front, a propaganda corps to work among the 
people, and a medical corps to rescue wounded from the battlefield. The strikers's 
picket corps petitioned to be allowed to join the eastern campaign, but the government 
assigned the corps to stabilise the rear. Deng says that several tens of workers died 
during the campaign and many hundreds fell ill from overwork.4d3 Lo Qiyuan asserted 
that more than 500 farmers lost their lives during the East River campaign while 
assisting the revolutionary army, and that the quick defeat of Deng Benying owed much 
to the help given by the farmers.444 
The success of the political work in the Huangpu units forced some senior 
officers in the National Revolutionary Army to change the attitude toward the 
introduction of political training in their units. Until June 1925 only Huangpu troops 
441 Jiang Jieshi nianpu, 6 -7 November 1925, 453 -454. 
442 Ibid., 15 November 1925, 459 -460. 
443 Deng Zhongxia, Zhongguo zhigong yundong jianshi (A brief history of the Chinese labor 
movement). n.p.: Hua Zhong xinhua shutian, 1949, p.132. 
444 Lo Jiyuan, "General report on [farmer] association business." Zhongguo nongmin (Chinese 
farmers) (June 1926): p. 660. 
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had political training. In other units there were only occasional political lectures. This 
was because of resistance by the generals, who feared the loss of their independence. 
To counteract this attitude, the Russian advisers explained to them that the political 
work did not threaten them with diminution of their authority but, on the contrary, 
would increase it; that, in connection with the growth of political consciousness, the 
fighting capacity of their units was growing too.445 The fighting capacity of the 
Huangpu troops was always cited as an example of the advantage of carrying out 
political work. 
For the Russian advisers, however, there was a special purpose for introducing 
political training in these units. "Our leaders wanted, of course, quite the contrary, i.e. 
to undermine the authority of several independent generals and to disorganise their 
units. The subsequent events confirmed the soundness of our line of conduct --the 
destruction of Yunnan and other troops, the dismissal of counter -revolutionary 
generals ".d46 These events, according to the Russians, forced the generals to 
acknowledge, in principle, the necessity of political work and they began to request the 
Russian mission and the government to assign instructors and political workers to their 
units. This change of attitude took place toward the end of 1925, but due to shortage of 
personnel it was possible only to organise political sections at the corps level. An 
exception was the 10th Division of the IV Corps, in which political work had been 
introduced much earlíer.44' 
In conclusion, Huangpu's participation in Guangdong's unification was a matter 
of its own survival. By September of 1924, Sun Yatsen would abandon Guangzhou in 
favour for a northern expedition. But once the main bulk of the Guomindang armies 
moved into the Hunan and eastern Guangdong, Guangzhou came under threat and 
Huangpu's position was in great danger. The threat came not only from externally 
forces of Chen Jiongming but also internally from units of the "Allied Army" of the 
"45 "Report on the National Revolutionary Army and the Kuomintang, Early 1926 ", Document 26, 
Missionaries of Revolution, p. 606. 
446 Ibid. 
94J Konchits, N. I., op.cit. This was the division to which Konchits was its adviser. 
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Yunnan and Guangxi. 
The premature and inexperienced Huangpu Training Regiments fought hard in 
battles together with experienced Guangdong Army units. They had also learned how 
to cultivate local population to support its operations. The good performance of the two 
Training Regiments was the results of better command and control of the units by 
officers and Party representatives. Command and control was extremely important as 
most battles involved were fought at battalion and company level, and its areas of 
operations were hostile to the Guomindang's army. Although the achievements of the 
propaganda squads were difficult to assess44B the abiding significance of this early 
employment of propaganda teams inspired the military and political leadership of the 
Guomindang for future work. The military- political campaign, however, was a two - 
edged sword. The seeds of political rivalry between members of the Guomindang and 
the Communist were sowed in the units of the Party Army. 
For the Russians, the campaign for the unification was also a learning 
experience. Trained in European combined -arms tactics and operational staff work, the 
Russians expertise found little relevant in this campaign. The rugged closed terrain of 
the rural Guangdong and low -level infantry operations were hazardous to Russian 
officers and mainly were down with dysentery. However, the Russian advisers 
performed a useful role in coordinating operations between front line units and 
headquarters. They also contributed to the organisation of the political work both 
within the army, and between troops and local residents. 
Finally, the rise of the Huangpu's units to become the first Party Army was 
attributed to, not just their battle performance, but also the demise of powerful regional 
army commanders such as Yang Xiwen, Liu Zhenhuan and Xu Chongzhi In the course 
of the rivalry within the Guomindang, Huangpu sided with the radical left -wing group 
to continue the united front policy. It was a policy that Huangpu could depend upon 
°48 Tt is interesting that no source is able to provide any sort of detailed story of propaganda squad's 
achievements. Combined with the absence of reporting on the part of the willing Russian adviser, this 
lack leads to the suspicion that the quantity of effort and achievement on the part of propaganda squads, 
however many were formed, could not have been great. 
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and developed it further to take on more crucial role in the future. 
By 1 July 1925, when the National Government was established the armies of 
the Guomindang was also reorganised. Leading the formation of the National 
Revolutionary Army were Huangpu's Training Regiment units that had expanded to 
become the I Corps. The year 1925 was truly a turning point for the Guomindang and 
the Huangpu Military Academy. The success of the unification marked the end of 
militarists' domination in Guangdong. For the first time in the Guomindang history, the 
centralise control of the administration and the army seemed to be insight. The success 
of this centralisation process, however, depended on the party ability to control the 
provincial finance as well as the willingness of the Party Army under its control. 
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Chapter 5: The Central Military Political Academy: Centralisation, Politicisation 
and Conflict 
On 12 January 1926, the Guomindang Military Council, the highest military 
decision -making body of the National Government in Guangzhou, decided to change 
the name of the Army Officers' Academy at Huangpu to the Central Military Political 
Academy. According to the Council, the change was necessary to amalgamate various 
military schools of the National Revolutionary Army into one training institution.449 
This decision was significant at least in two aspects. One, it represented the party's 
serious attempt at military centralisation and reform; and two, it wanted the Central 
Military Political Academy to carry out centralised training for all the units under the 
party. Huangpu was given a key role in shaping the future of the National 
Revolutionary Army in both aspects. 
Traditionally, the Central Military Political Academy has received only a scant 
treatment from scholars. Most would assume it was similar to its predecessor.°`° The 
aim of the chapter is to analyse the centralisation and politicisation process of the 
military under the Guomindang by looking at the restructuring of the Huangpu Military 
Academy into the Central Military Political Academy. It argues that the Central 
Military Political Academy was the party academy Sun Yatsen and the Guomindang 
wanted to create in 1924. The partys involvement in the academy affairs and the 
Russians' participation in the military of the Guomindang government reached a new 
height with the reorganisation of Huangpu in 1926. However, greater participation 
does not always lead to greater unity. In fact, the opposite seems to be the case. Just 
before the launching of the Northern Expedition in mid -1926, the Guomindang 
confronted an internal crisis which nearly broke up the United Front of the Guangdong 
government. What came out in this crisis were the limit of the role of Russian advisers 
and the power of the Chinese officer corps in determining the course of the Nationalist 
Revolution. 
Chiang Kaishek's Proposal for the Military Expansion 
a49 Jiang Jieshi nianpu, 12 January 1926, p. 515. 
450 See for example, the works of C. Martin Wilbur, Richard Landis, and articles in Huangpu jianxiao 
liushí zhounian lunwenji (Papers on the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Huargpu military 
academy) published in Taiwan, and Huangpu junxiao shiliao published in mainland China. Donald 
Jordan even mistakenly regards the Central Military Political Academy as the official name of Huangpu, 
see his The Northern Expedition, p. 231. 
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When the National Government was formed on 1 July 1925, Chiang Kaishek 
had already worked out a plan for the reorganisation and expansion of the National 
Revolutionary Army. This plan was first sent to Bliukher for his comments.451 In his 
covering letter, Chiang explained the plan was first formulated at the height of the 
Shamian Incident when the threat from Britain in Hong Kong seemed imminent. In 
view of the Guangzhou's highly dangerous location, he proposed that a special 
committee on military contingency planning be set up within the Military Counci1.452 
In essence, Chiang's proposed military expansion touched on three major 
questions: the military budget, military reorganisation, military preparation for the 
Northern Expedition after Guangdong's unification. He correctly predicted that the 
Guangdong conflict would be settled in three months. He estimated once Guangdong 
was unified, provincial revenue would increase to between $35 million and $40 million 
a month. This amount could support army 65,000 to 70,000 strong; a small navy fleet; 
defence fortifications of Guangzhou; expansion of arsenals, training schools and other 
expenditures necessary for the preparation for the Northern Expeditionary force (see 
tables 12 and 13). 
Chiang's ambitious proposals were discussed subsequently in the Military 
Council meeting on 7 July. In the meeting, he summarised his ideas into six main 
points: (1) the development of a closer relationship with the revolutionary forces in the 
south -west (in particular Guangxi and Sichuan) and the opening of a second front by 
joining north -west (Gansu and Shaanxi) progressive forces to form a north -western and 
south- western line against the northern warlords;453 (2) the retrain the warlord soldiers 
to become a revolutionary army; (3) the centralisation of Guangdong finance in order to 
support military expansion; (4) the reorganisation of the National Revolutionary Army; 
(5) the employment striking labour to construct the railway line; (6) the merging of 
451 Chiang Kaishek. "Junzheng yijianshu" (Paper on military policy proposal)." Jiang Jieshi 
nianpu chugao (A draft chronicle of Chiang Kaishek's life), 1 July 1925: 380 -383; there was no 
addressee on this record. However, in the Russian document this paper was addressed to Bliukher dated 
on 26 June 1925, see "Chiang Kaishek's Letter to Bliukher ", Document 7, Missionaries of Revolution, 
502 -5. 
452 "Chiang Kaishek's Letter to Bliukher ", p. 502. 
453 This was essentially the North -west plan of 1923. Chiang envisaged decisive battles being 
fought in Hunan and Jiangxi, and proposed merge with Guangxi and ally with the forces of Feng 
Yuxiang and Tan Xishan. 
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Guangdong with Guangxi so as to expand the revolutionary base.454 Among the six 
main proposals, two were concerned with the re- training and reorganisation of the 
National Revolutionary Army. 
Bliukher's Grand Plan 
At the end of summer of 1925, the foremost of the Russian military advisers, 
General Bliukher, had also sketched out the essential moves and basic goals for a 
reorganisation and consolidation program for the National Revolutionary Army.'-' The 
major problem Bliukher wrestled with his "grand plan" was the core issue of centralised 
control of the military units. The reorganisation of forces associated with the 
Guomindang in order to consolidate command and control would become a military 
problem of highest priority once operations against Chen Jiongming was over. 
When BIiukher wrote his prognosis in September of 1925 he was determined to 
improve the quality of leadership in the National Revolutionary Army through training. 
He was concerned about both the tactical and political cadres and saw the need to train 
lower and higher level officers. He recognised the need to form several schools within 
the next few months. He wanted a staff training school for the headquarters' staff 
personnel- a school located at or similar to the Huangpu Military Academy that would 
train tactical, small unit leaders for command of platoons, companies, battalions and 
regiments; schools for military- political workers; a non -commissioned officers 
academy for the most advance enlisted men. Bliukher wanted a refresher course for the 
middle and upper rankirg officers (presumably officers who were too old and too 
454 Chiang Kaishek. "Jianyi junshi weiyuanhuí geming liuda jihua' (A six -point proposal on 
revolution for the military council). Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao (A draft chronicle of Chiang Kaishek's 
life), 7 July 1925: 384 -392. 
ass This is difficult to tell whether Chiang Kaishek or Bliukher originated the military plan for 
reorganisation. What is certain is that both, as military men, had identified the military problems of the 
Guomindang although the emphasis of each solution varied. This will be discussed later. Vasilii K. 
Bliukher, "Prospects for Further Work in the South, or the Grand Plan of Kuomintang Military Activity 
for 1926." Missionaries of Revolution.- Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920 -1927, 508 -516. C. 
Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien -ying How. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1989. This a 
reprint of the article "Blucher's "Grand Plan" of 1926 ", in the China Quarterly, no. 35 (July- September 
1969): 18 -39. This document was first published by A.I. Kartunova in Narody Azíi i Afrika (Peoples of 
Asia and Africa), the fiftieth anniversary issue, no. 5, 1967, 144 -156. The document was obtained from 
the Central Archives of the Party, Institute of Marxism and Leninism, Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Bliukher left Guangzhou in the summer of 1925 because of 
conflict with the chief Political Adviser Borodin. He wrote this on his way out of China at the 
conclusion of his first period service. He was out of China during the Second Eastern Expedition and the 
period of centralisation and reorganisation of the National Revolutionary Army. 
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senior to have benefited from training Huangpu's. In short, Bliukher was concerned 
with developing all the specialist skills and technical abilities that are integral to a 
modern military establishment particularly, artillery and machine -gun training, 
communications and combat engineer, military medicine, logistics and naval training.456 
Bliukher was explicit about the need for all training facilities to be under control 
of the Military Council. He wanted a uniform tactical and political doctrine in all 
curricula. Bliukher was also concerned about the forthcoming campaign to the north. 
In this regard, he was concerned with the problems posed by Iocal dialects within 
China, a point of concern shared by Chiang when soldiers of the Huangpu Training 
Regiments were recruited. He expressed preference for officers and non -commissioned 
officers to be recruited from Hunan and Jiangxi, the first two provinces in the northern 
expedition campaign. Bliukher's preference in establishing this requirement was both 
political and tactical. He wanted them to be representatives between the army and 
peasants because of their ability to communicate with the local people. From the 
military point of view the men from Hunan and Jiangxi would know the terrain of their 
home provinces, and that knowledge was critical since the army lacked good quality 
military maps.457 
It is clear that both Chiang and Bliukher shared many common concerns over 
the problems regarding the military reorganisation and expansion since the National 
Government was established. Their proposed solutions, however, differed in emphasis 
and details. Chiang's main preoccupation was the Northern Expedition. He was less 
concerned with or simply ignored the immediate organisational and technical problems 
of the military reorganisation.458 Bliukher, on the other hand, was concerned with the 
fundamental structure of the military system. He wanted to transform the National 
Revolutionary Army to a fighting fit army equipped with modern weapon system, 
operational doctrine and capable military leadership.459 Theoretically, these two sets of 
ase Bliukher, Vasilii K. "Prospects for Further Work in the South, or the Grand Plan of 
Kuomintang Military Activity for 1926 ", 513 -514. 
an Ibid. 
458 The reorganisation of the Guomindang's armies was a daunting task which required much 
more effort, money and time then what Chiang and other Military Council members predicted. The 
problems of military reorganisation will be discussed in the later part of the chapter. 
4s9 The Russian archival records on the Central Military Political Academy were complete than 
those of its predecessor the Army Officers' Academy. This is one indication that the Russian advisers' 
influence in Huangpu is much greater during this period. 
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proposals seemed complementary- -one stressed on the overall objective and the other 
on organisation. But on practical terms, they varied a great deal. Bliukher's plan was 
sensitive and hit at the very basis of the Chinese army- -the person relationship between 
commanders and their troops. The Russian's proposed centralisation process by the 
Russian would, in effect, transfer the loyalty of the soldiers to the party depriving the 
commanders of the only asset they possessed. They had already given up the territory 
they occupied and the practice of collection of tax revenue to the National Government 
Chiang's plan, on the other hand, demanded only the loyalty of the commanders to the 
party and retained the original structure of unit loyalty to its commander. The party 
would encourage the establishment of the system of Party representative in all the units 
but the appointment would be made with the consent of the commanders. To an 
example, Chiang was the first to carry out the reform in the I Corps. In the meantime, 
work soon began to centralise the military command and reorganise the National 
Revolutionary Army. Although BIiukher left Guangzhou in the summer of 1925 and 
returned to the Soviet Union, his plan was carried by his successors in early 1926. 
Central Military Policy Making Organs 
The first step towards the military reform was to institutionalise the process of 
policy making. The Guomindang's Political Council would now determine the political 
character of the army, fix its budget and numerical strength, and decide on questions of 
peace and war. (see the organisational chart attached).460 It would also appoint the 
chairman of the Military Council, the chief inspector, and the minister of war, and 
confirm the appointments of members of the Military Council, corps commanders, 
chief of the central administration of the army, chief of the Naval Bureau, of the army 
air service, and of the Central Military Political Academy.461 
460 According to the Russian advisers' report, the Political Council was the supreme organ of the 
National Revolutionary Army. It recorded that Guomindang Political Council would deal with "all 
questions of principle, of a military character ", and until the end of 1925 even technical questions of 
army administration were discussed there in order to protect the government from excessive demands of 
the generals. "Report on the National Revolutionary Army and the Kuomintang, Early 1926 ", Document 
26, Missionaries of Revolution, p. 602. 
46' "Organisation of the highest Organs for Administration of the Army ", Document 27, 
Missionaries of Revolution, 616 -618. Within the report, submitted by L. Grey, there is an attached copy 
of what appear to be statutes of the Political Council in its military capacity. However, who the members 
were in the Political Council is not stated in these statutes. (The council was translated as "bureau" in the 
report.) The true identity of Grey is not clear. According to Wilbur, Grey was sent to Guangzhou to 
replace Smirnov ( "Svetlovsky ") who was to be sent back to the Soviet Union on 1 September 1925 to 
finish his studies in the Navy Academy. Grey signed the Document 36, which was a report on the 
Guangzhou navy on 15 March 1926. Presumably he was the Soviet adviser to the navy in Guangzhou. 
See Document 36, Missionaries of Revolution, p. 653. 
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Under the Political Council was the Military Council. Members of the Military 
Council were ex- officio members of the Guomindang. By March 1926 it had eighteen 
statutory members of whom three- -the chairman, the chief inspector (or inspector 
general of the National Revolutionary Army), and the minister of war -- formed a 
Presidium. The Presidium which, in mid -March would have consisted of Wang 
Jingwei, Chiang Kaishek and Tan Yankaí, met twice a week, before decisions were 
presented to the weekly council meetings. Next came the heads of the three central 
organs under the Military Council --the General Staff, the Political Department, and the 
Department of Supplies (translated as Administration in the Russian report). The six 
corps commanders, the heads of the navy, army air service, and the Central Military 
Political academy were also members of the council. And finally three ministers in the 
government -- foreign affairs, internal affairs, and finance made six. Looking at this 
organisation the Military Council appeared to have considerable authority since it was 
made up of men of the highest command and administrative responsibility.462 
The Military Council had the authority to approve all fundamental planning 
conducted by the subordinate offices. Their power encompassed plans for military 
organisation, military supply, training, all service responsibilities and duties of all 
personnel. The Military Council, in short, constituted an additional level of authority 
above that more usually provided by the general staff office and commanders. By 
placing the supply and political departments outside the general staff, additional weight 
could be given to those two extremely important functions. 
In December 1925, the Military Council began to exercise its control on various 
military units through the allocation of the military budget. Each corps' commander 
joined his unit's Russian adviser and the Chief of General Staff to form a corps -level 
reorganisation task force. Each task force was required to develop the measures either 
to reduce or expand corps manpower to fit budgeting constraints. Operating with a 
temporary force structure of five corps and two independent divisions, units, which 
were not integrated into these forces, were to be disbanded. The Chief of Staff was 
responsible for submitting plans for this type of disbandment. The task force was also 
required to form corps and division -level staff. It required to submit to the General 
Staff honest, regular reporting of troop strengths" that would support realistic budgeting 
aes In January 1926, a monthly journal began publication in the name of the Military Council, 
entitled, Junshi weiyuan hui junshi zhengzhi yuekan (Military and Political Monthly of the Military 
Council). This series is a valuable source material as it contains details of the key military decisions and 
campaigns, and reflects the revolutionary elan of the times. 
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procedures. °3 The task force was charged to begin work as soon as the reorganisation 
directive was received from the Military Council. Their first effort would be directed at 
becoming intimately familiar with the unit. On the basis of this familiarity, the task 
force developed its plan. The corps commander was then responsible for 
implementation. Disagreements within the task force would be handed over to the 
Military Council for adjudication. The Military Council set the completion date for 
reorganisation on 30 January 1926.464 
The first of the central organs under the Military Council was the General Staff. 
The General Staff was in charge of the actual execution of unit reorganisation and 
operational readiness of the National Revolutionary Army. This was an extremely 
difficult task as it entailed direct encroachment into the "private property" of the 
National Revolutionary Army's senior officers. Therefore, the commanders did not 
readily accept it. It could get in touch with the military units, much less direct the units' 
administration.46' To enhance the authority of the General Staff and create a closer 
connection between it and the army units, General Li Jishen was appointed chief of the 
General Staff. This was done on 23 February 1926. His adviser was General Victor P. 
Rogachev.466 
The Political Training Department, which came directly under the Military 
Council, and was the same level as the General Staff and the Supply Administration, 
was given much more prominent role.46' It was modelled after the Soviet Central 
Political Administration (P.U.R.), and Party representatives were equivalent to the 
political commissars in the Red Army. The underlying purpose of this system may be 
summarised as politicisation, reformation, and control. To be effective revolutionary 
instruments, the officers and troops in the National Revolutionary Army must be 
463 "Instructions to the Commission for the Reorganisation of the National Revolutionary 
Army ", Document 21, Missionaries of Revolution, 562 -563. 
Ibid., p. 563. 
463 "General Characteristics of the Armed Forces of the National Government ", Document 28, 
Missionaries of Revolution, p.620. 
466 See Jiang Jieshi nianpu, 23 February 1926, p. 540; "Instructions to the Commission for the 
Reorganisation of the National Revolutionary Army ", Document 21, Missionaries of Revolution, p. 562. 
467 The Political Department is discussed in detail in several long reports by the Russian 
advisers, see for examples, "Political Work in the National Revolutionary Army ", Document 37, 655- 
667; "Regulations Governing the Political Directorate of the National Revolutionary Army ", Document 
38, 669 -671, Missionaries of Revolution. 
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infused with the Guomindang's ideology. It was the duty of the Party representatives to 
indoctrinate them. Another purpose of the system was to provide the Guomindang with 
an instrument for control over commanding officers. The Guomindang faced a problem 
similar to that of the Russian Communist Party during the Civil War days_ the officer 
corps inherited from and trained under a previous regime which was not necessarily 
trustworthy. However, these were high ideals and required great effort and longer time 
to implement. In addition, reform could be abused easily. The Chinese Communist 
Party, for example, was using the system to gain influence in the Guomindang's armed 
forces, assisted by the Russian advisory mission abs 
The Department of Supplies had a crucial role in the centralisation process. 
National Revolutionary Army saw logistic support and pay as functions of service of 
supply. The key challenge to the department was firstly, how to compel independent 
commanders to permit taxes in their territories to be collected by the central authority 
instead of the commanders appointed agents. Only if revenues were centralised and 
military payments controlled by the centre could the armies be reorganised and 
converted from private empires into a unified military force. 
There were other reasons why implementing a centralised supply system was 
extremely difficult. Apart from avarice and self -aggrandisement there were other 
problems peculiar to the Chinese cultural milieu. A commander who recruited 
subordinates assumed a personal obligation, one which was clearly recognised by 
subordinate and superior alike, to house, cloth, feed, and pay his men. The commander 
was not perceived as simply the uninvolved agent of a superior officer or a provincial 
or even national government, no matter what name his army might bear. This tradition 
was strong and unyielding and no commander could easily escape his responsibilities 
under it. 
By January 1926, the Department of Supply seemed to have made some 
progress in achieving its objectives. One of the Russian advisers commented on the 
"adoption by the whole army of a plan of regular supply of finances, artillery, material, 
etc., through the central military organs" and was impressed by a "gradual departure 
468 
"political Work in the National Revolutionary Army", Document 37, Missionaries of 
Revolution, p. 661. This document provides a short history of political work in the National 
Revolutionary Army, a comprehensive view of its accomplishments as of about mid -March I926, and 
also an intimate account of Communist penetration of the army's political apparatus -all through Russian 
eyes. 
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from the most characteristic features of the Chinese militarism.i46' The Department of 
Supply had succeeded in becoming the actual paymaster of the National Revolutionary 
Army according to the Russians. The system of the military collecting taxes directly 
from the local population to support itself was under control, except in the frontier 
regions which were beyond the government reach.47° The department also began to 
supervise the work of Guangzhou's arsenals and all its production was at its disposal. 
This was another crucial element of centralised control. By the end of March, the 
department expected to have enough data on the armament of the National 
Revolutionary Army to develop a general plan of procurement for re- equipping the 
forces. The department also had a plan and a budget allocation of $194,444 
(Guangzhou dollars) per month.471 Despite many limitations in the work of the 
Department of Supply it had achieved some success in its attempt to eliminate the 
system of tax collection by independent commanders. 
Reorganisation of Training- -The Central Military Political Academy 
On 12 January Wang Jingwei, chairman of the Military Council, formally 
proposed to the Council that military and political training be uniform, and all 
academies established by the several armies and all separate officer training units be 
brought together at Huangpu. The new school should be called the Central Military 
Political Academy (Zhongyang junshi zhengzhi xuexiao). This resolution was 
unanimously adopted, but it would take some time to carry out. The academy opened 
officially on 1 March 1926.472 By concentrating the best instructors and training means 
in one centralised training institution, it hoped to achieve the following four major 
objectives: 1). to provide the best political training possible for the officers; 2) to 
overcome the provincial separatist tendencies of the officers; 3) to provide the best and 
469 "Characteristic feature" refers mainly the system of military units collecting taxes form the 
local population. "General Characteristics of the Armed Forces of the National Government ", Document 
28, Missionaries of Revolution, 620 -621. 
470 "Report on the National Revolutionary Army and the Kuomintang, Early 1926 ", Document 
26, Missionaries of Revolution, p. 605. 
471 "Report: The Department of Supply ", U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China, 1911 -1941, 
Reel XI, 0822, US National Archives: A Microfilm Project of the University Publications of American, 
Inc, 1983. 
472 Jiang Jieshi nianpu, 12 January, 1 March 1926, 515, 541. However, the Russian reports 
ofthe opening date as 8 March 1926. See "The Kuomintang Whampoa Military School: A Report 
Complied from Soviet Documents." US. Military Intelligence Reports: China, 1911 -1941, Reel XI, 
0469. 
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uniform military training for the officers; and 4) to provide the best equipment and 
provisions for all forms of training.47J 
Consolidation of training in one location offered a number of advantages to the 
Guomindang leaders. Apart from saving costs and easier management, they could 
expect improved instruction if the best instructors were selected to teach at Huangpu. 
The uniform teaching of political subjects, which had been developed in Huangpu, 
could also be implemented."' Above all, they could also hope to integrate officers into 
the Guomindang revolutionary movement and educate them about concept of service to 
the party, and the nation. In this way, the army building would serve as a positive part 
of the general process of nation building, 
Reorganisation of Huangpu 
The reorganised Huangpu Military Academy would take on the expanded roles. 
For the first time, a formal organisational structure was created to regulate the activities 
of the academy. The first task was the establishment of a Advisory Council consisting 
of the Commandant, as chairman, and the Russian adviser with the Military Council, 
the Chief of General Staff, the head of the Guomindang's Political Council, and the 
principal Russian adviser to the academy as members. The board's main function was 
to ensure that academy policy was in accordance with Guomindang policy. It would 
also look after matters such as student recruitment and the posting of graduates upon 
completion of the course. The second was the Academy Staff Council chaired by the 
Commandant to oversee the training programs and regulations of life and work at the 
academy. Its members included all heads of departments and the Russian advisers 4 "s 
Besides the two councils, the structure of the reorganised academy had also 
expanded to include a Commandant, a deputy, three main departments, and five major 
4'3 The Kuomintang Whampoa Military School: A Report Complied from Soviet Documents." 
U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China, 1911 -1941, Reel XI: 0469, p. 12. This is a detailed and a 
complete 36 -page prospectus for the new academy (but we are not certain whether it is a draft or the 
finally approved document); also in "Plan and Regulations for the Central Military Political Academy of 
the National Revolutionary Army ", Document 24, Missionaries of Revolution, 584 -593. 
Before the consolidation, there were officers' schools in the I (Huangpu), II, III and IV corps 
of the National Revolutionary Army. "Kuibyshev's Report on the military Developments in Kwangtung ", 
Document 22, Missionaries of Revolution, 569 -570. 
475 "The Kuomintang Whampoa Military School: A Report Complied from Soviet Documents." 
U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China, 1911 -1941, Reel XI, 0469, p. 13. 
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instructional programs, each under a section chief (see the organisational chart 
attached). Chiang Kaishek was the commandant. Three main training departments 
were Education (the former Education and Training departments had merged into one), 
Sanitation/Medical service, and Politics. The head of the Education Department was 
also the deputy Commandant. Various chiefs of sections, such as tactics and arms of 
the special branches, and an officer with the rank of a colonel who was a direct 
subordinate for political training assisted him 4'6 
The head of the Political Department served as the Commandant's assistant for 
political affairs. But his appointment was by the party Political Council. Its main 
responsibilities were to mould the political attitudes -- conduct training in political 
indoctrination and propaganda at Huangpu.47' In addition to providing political lessons 
for the normal military courses, it introduced a new political course for the Fourth Class 
to train political specialists to work in the units of the National Revolutionary Army. 
Within the academy, a Technical Department (only section -sized) was created 
and directly under the Commandant. This department was responsible for the training 
of military engineer and communications. It offered a twelve -month course for serving 
officers from the units. 
The primary aim of the academy was to train all the junior officers (ganbu) 
required by the National Revolutionary Army. The number of admissions was 
determined by the expected requirements of platoon and company leaders. Most of the 
training programs had two sections, one for non -commissioned officers (or the NCOs) 
brought in from the ranks, and the another for potential officers recruited from students, 
cadets in other corps' schools, and enlisted men of great promise. When the academy 
opened under its new name, there were more than 2,650 students, including those from 
the Fourth Huangpu Class and cadets from the other military schools.478 
Most of the students were trained as infantry officers, but there were also small 
classes in artillery, engineering, communications, and supply work (quartermaster). In 
476 The colonel had dual role to fulfil in that he also the direct subordinate of the head of the 
Political Department. "The Kuomintang Whampoa Military School ", 16 -17. 
47 This responsibility was mainly the province of the Party Representative of the academy two 
years ago. 
°'e Jiang Jieshi nianpu, 8 March 1926, 542 -544. 
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each case, the chief instructor was responsible to both the head of the Academy's 
Training Department and to the relevant inspector in the General Staff or to the 
Department of Supply. 
In October 1926 the Fourth Class, the first batch of 2,500 men of the 
reorganised central academy graduated. They included, 800 officers, 850 non- 
commissioned officers, 450 political officers, and about 150 specialists each in artillery, 
engineering, and supply service, according to the Russian adviser to the academy 
Kumanin. Almost a third of the men were Hunanese; the rest were natives of 
Guangdong, Sichuan, and the Yangzi Valley provinces. As for social origin, nearly 
half were reported to be peasants, 350 merchants, 347 students, and 63 labourers. 
Eighty percent were middle school graduates, 10 percent high school graduates, 8 
percent graduates of military schools, and 2 percent had only a primary school 
education.479 After graduation, the majority of them were assigned to Chiang's 
headquarters. Some 150 were sent to the I Corps, 100 to the training division of the 
school, and another 150 to other corps.48° In a different report, Naumov ("Kalachev") 
stated that the graduates of the Fourth Class were of a pronounced Left disposition, and 
that almost 500 of them were Communists.`$' 
Another Russian adviser S. N. Naumov ( "Kalachev ") gives an interesting 
account of how the political course came about and how political officers were trained. 
At the end of I925, he writes, "the Chinese Communists brought up the methods of the 
establishment of a political class at the Huangpu in an especially acute manner....Zhou 
Enlai took active part in working out the program of study and the regulations of the 
political class. He was aided by Russian military advisers: I. Ya Razgon, A. I. 
Cherepanov, Stepanov, V.P. Rogachev, I. K. Mamaev." In February 1926, 500 students 
started their course in political training; "the best and most literate students made up the 
4'9 
"The Central Military Political Academy (October 1926), a report by F.M. Kumanin ", 
Document 70, Missionaries of Revolution, 777 -780. This report dated 30 October 1926, was presumably 
by F M. Kumanin, who was the deputy senior adviser to the Central Military Political School at 
Huangpu. Kumanin ( "Zigon ") took up this Guangzhou job in the autumn of 1926. According to 
Vishniakova -Akimova, Kumanin arrived in Guangzhou in the autumn of 1926 and went north on 15 
November with the first group of the National Revolutionary Army officers. Vishniakova -Akimova, Two 
Years in Revolutionary China, 1925 -1927, 313, 225. Wilbur thinks that the report was Kumanin's first 
impression on an inspection shortly after the graduation of the Fourth Class in October 1926. 
480 Ibid., p. 780. 
487 
"Naumov's Report on Military and Political Conditions in Kwangtung ", Document 72, 
Missionaries of Revolution, 791. 
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political class." The students had to master political sciences topics such as "the three 
principles of Sun Yatsen; the national revolution in China; the international political 
and economic situations; the political and economic situation of China and the USSR; 
the history and theory of socialism; the history of the world revolutionary movement." 
Other topics were the peasant movement, the trade union movement, and the youth 
movement in China; and questions of agitation, propaganda, and political work in the 
army. After A. S. Bubnov arrived in Guangzhou on 13 March, he lectured on Russian 
military thought. The program also provided practical training and the students had to 
learn military science.''Z 
The Central Military Political Academy was in bad shape when Kumanin 
inspected it after the graduation. Furniture and rubbish were scattered about, and there 
was a shortage of books and equipment for the incoming class. The Russian rifles and 
machine guns were dirty. Officers and cadets did not seem to understand the use of the 
sighting mechanism, Kumanin observed. "' He was particularly critical of the 
performance of the Fourth Class. Cadets' discipline was poor, and he found much to 
criticise in the mock battles he observed carried oht by the graduate of the class. 
Planning for the exercises was fairly satisfactory, but operations in terms of scouting, 
skirmishing, and rifle fire were poor. "The marksmen can produce only the effect of 
crackers, but by no means an effective fire.' Commanders "act without thinking and 
only in order to do something and not remain inactive." He saw practically no 
communication between units, only bungling. The attacks were slow --the two sides lay 
facing each other at a distance of about 1,000 meters "and continuing to shoot to the last 
cartridge ". 
As other Russian advisers before him had done, Kumanin made a number of 
suggestions for improvement. According to him, all articles belonging to the school 
must be inventoried and properly distributed to storehouses. The men must be trained 
to handle and keep their arms properly. Classes must be supplied with textbooks and 
other requisites before the next term commenced. It was scheduled for 1 November, 
two days after the report. The curriculum should be revised to place special attention 
upon shooting and training for field service. A shooting gallery and small target range 
462 S. N. Naumov, "The School of Huangpu ", 131 -134, in Akademiia Nauk SSSR. Institu 
Narodov Azii. Cited in Wilbur and How, Missionaries of Revolution, p. 278, n. 70. 
463 
"The Central Military Political Academy (October 1926), a report by F.M. Kumanin ", 777- 
778. 
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must be constructed, and training be given in firing small calibre arms. Kumanin also 
advocated that a Military Scientific Society be organised in the school.484 
Although the Russians advisers' reports may be unduly critical of the Huangpu's 
students, it showed that, to some extent, the rapid expansion of the academy might have 
created some deterioration of the standard of training. 
Ideological Conflicts 
The politicisation of the National Revolutionary Army, in particular the I Corps, 
had its negative effects. The most serious negative impact ideological conflict that 
occured at the Central Military Political Academy. Although the ideological conflicts 
in the National government did not start from the military, it had certainly provided a 
site for an open confrontation since the Central Military Political Academy was now at 
the centre stage of the United Front politics. At the climax of the Guangzhou 
Merchants Corps incident in October 1924, the Guomindang's branch of the Huangpu 
Military Academy created the Chinese Young Military Representative Society 
(Zhongguo gingnian junren daibiao hui) to recruit promising members from other units 
around Guangzhou. After a slow start, the Communists began to dominate the 
society.485 On 1 February 1925 the Chinese Young Military Representative Society was 
reorganised and named the League of Chinese Military Youth. It began publishing 
Zhongguo junren (The Chinese Soldier) and Qingnian junren (Military Youth). Bao 
Huizeng remembered that the League developed very quickly under Communist 
leadership which penetrated many military units in Guangdong by February 1925, it 
claimed to have a membership of 2,O00.á86 
Because of its growing influence, the League of Chinese Military Youth soon 
got into trouble with the Guomindang right- wing's the Society for the Study of Sun 
Wenism. Through the influence of Dai Jitao and the propaganda activity of the 
Western Hills Conference (a Right -wing Guomindang group), the competition between 
the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism and the communist -controlled League of 
Chinese Military Youth grew more intense. Each faction attempted to mobilise support 
484 Ibid., p. 779. 
485 Huangpu junxiao shiliao, Part 6: 329 -336. 
486 Huangpu junxiao shiliao, Part 6: 332; Bao Huizeng, Bao Huizeng huryilu (Memoirs of Bao 
Huizeng), p. 154. 
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in and outside the academy and the I Corps. Their rivalries reached Chiang Kaishek's 
headquarters. On 8 December, the Commandant called a meeting of political workers 
in the I Corps and Party representatives of various levels to discuss harmonisation. 
Chiang proposed the following solution: (I) Agitation by Communists in the academy 
should be conducted openly; and (2) Guomindang members in the academy wishing to 
join the Communist Party should announce their intention and seek permission from the 
Special Guomindang Branch in the Academy.487 
There are conflicting accounts of the problems between the two organisations. 
According to Hsu Kai -yu, who interviewed many former Huangpu cadets and 
instructors, trouble started when Wang Jingwei gave Rightist agitators authorisation 
and financial support to inaugurate the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism in 
December 1925. The head of the Academy's Political Department, Zhou Enlai on the 
other hand, enlisted Borodin's support. The Russian threatened Wang with the 
withdrawal of all Russian aid if the organisers of the Society could not be stopped. 
Wang then led a delegation, which included Chen Cheng, He Zhonghan, Huang 
Zhenwu, and Pan Youchang to plead with Borodin. Borodin yielded but warned Wang 
of the consequences according to this account.488 Cherepanov has a different version of 
events. In his account the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism planned a mass rally for 
29 December. At the rally, it would urge the forthcoming Second National Congress, of 
the Guomindang to pass a resolution supporting the Western Hills Conference's 
resolution against the Russian military advisers. "However, the Russian advisers in 
Guangzhou decisively declared that if such a resolution were passed, all of them would 
quit. The Society backed down and sent their representatives to the Left -Wing 
Guomindang and Russian advisers with assurances that they would not use counter- 
revolutionary slogans at the rally." Apparently Wang Jingwei was so worried, that on 
28 December, he sent a telegram to Chiang Kaishek, informing him of the Society for 
the Study of Sun Wenism's plans for a great demonstration the following day. He 
warned that they would pass out handbills with Western Hills propaganda. Chiang sent 
Wang a stern telegram, telling him to stop it.489 
487 See Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao (A draft chronicle of Chiang Kaishek's life). 8 December 
1925, pp. 470 -471. 
4fle See Hsu Kai -yu. Chou En -lai: China's Gray Eminence. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 
1968, 55, 243, n.8; see in particular, 52 -55, which discusses the conflict between the League of Yo'ing 
Soldiers and the Society of Sun Wenism. 
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The Society for the Study of Sun Wenism held its rally and was formally 
inaugurated at a congress on 29 December where it issued its first manifesto. 
According to Cherepanov, the demonstration backtracked on its original plan. It came 
out in support for the planned Second National Congress of the Guomindang. He 
writes that the Society was unable to rally many people or win the participation of 
many important organisations in Guangzhou.490 Li Yunhan on the hand, who based his 
account on reports from the Guangzhou Minguo ribao of 30 December, says that at the 
Society's inaugural ceremony Wang Jingwei addressed a great gathering on Zhongshan 
University's parade ground. Later the Guangzhou Students League paraded and issued 
a public letter upholding the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism. According to Chen 
Gongbo, who was acting president of the university, the student body was torn by the 
conflict between Leftists and Rightists.491 
The League of Chinese Military Youth and the Society for the Study of Sun 
Wenism both aspired to become national organisations. By June 1925 the League 
claimed to have set up bureaus in North China, Manchuria, the Yangzi valley, and the 
Southwest 492 The Society for the Study of Sun Wenism had organised local units in 
Shanghai in November and in Beijing in December 1925, societies in Nanjing, Wuhan, 
Wuhu, and Zhangde sprang up in early 1926. Apparently Sun Fo and Dai Jitao acted 
behind the scenes as did members of the Western Hills Faction. Its members were 
mainly middle school and college students. Just as in Guangzhou, the Society opposed 
the Communist Party and its Youth Corps everywhere. They accused them of 
preaching conflicting ideologies.493 
a Military Adviser, 1926 -1927. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1968, 73 -74; Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 
28 December 1925, p. 490. 
49° Cherepanov, Severnyi Pokhod Natsional'no- Revoliutsionno Armii Kitaya, p. 74; Li, Yunhan. 
"Sun wen zhuyi xuehui yi zao qi fan gong yun dong (Sun Wenism society and the early years of 
anti- communist activities)." Huangpu jianxiao liushi zhounian lunwenji (Papers on the 60th anniversary 
on the founding of the Huangpu military academy), p. 86. 
491 See Li, Yunhan. "Sun wen zhuyi xuehui yi zao qi fan gong yun dong ", p.86; Chen Gongbo, 
Ku xiao lu (Memoirs with a bitter smile), 1: 52 -53. 
492 Their work in the North was not well known. If they tried to recruit promising younger 
officers and cadets in northern military academies, it must have been secret and dangerous work. Li 
Yunhan. "Sun wen zhuyi xuehui yi zao qi fan gong yun dong ", p. 88, citing a statement in Zhongguo 
junren, no. 6, written by Wang Yifei. 
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In Guangzhou the conflict between the two organisations raged on. The 
Russian gives an interesting contemporary interpretation of the struggle between the 
two societies.494 It comments that Chinese Communist Party member working in the 
army made an error in opposing the Society of Sun Wenism and declaring its work 
counter -revolutionary. Rather they should have taken an active part to gain influence in 
the organisation. By opposing them, the Rightist elements in the Guomindang gained 
strong influence in the Society and converted it into a tool for their struggle against the 
Left. The conflict reached fever pitch that "some comrades even raised the question of 
the total elimination of Communists from the army." Apparently, Borodin was one of 
these comrades they wanted to remove. They put forward the slogan. "The 
Communists must be excluded from the Guomindang". To put an end to this state of 
affairs, "measures of a decisive character" were undertaken by Chiang Kaishek. "The 
leaders of this Society after individual undergoing proper 'schooling,' publicly denied 
their program. In a public declaration, they also acknowledged the need to struggle 
against imperialism to the end and work jointly with the Communists, to organise 
peasants, workers, and students, and to tighten discipline in the Guomindang. This 
"schooling" probaby took place on 1 January 1926 when Chiang Kaishek "harshly 
warned" Hui Dongsheng and others about the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism's 
activities.495 It could also have taken place at a joint meeting of the two rival societies 
held at the academy on 2 February 1926.496 After this event, says the Russian adviser, 
"the Military Section of the Communist Party's Provincial Committee instructed its 
members to take an active part in the affairs of the Society." The Political Training 
Department (P.U.R.) directly controlled and guided the Society's work in the army. A 
tendency was discernible to make this Society "proceed to its own liquidation." The 
Russian anticipated that "in the near future this problem will totally dwindle away from 
the army "49' 
On 2 February 1926, Chiang Kaishek and Wang Jingwei called a joint meeting 
of officers from the two bodies, to hammer out a truce at the Central Military Political 
Academy. The Leagues representatives were Li Jishen, Zhu Yijun, and Zhang 
494 "Political Work of the National Revolutionary Army ", Document 37, !vlissionaries of 
Revolution, 662 -663. 
495 Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 1 January, 1926, p. 502. This was just after the formal 
inauguration of the Society and the issuance of its Manifesto. 
a9s Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 2 February 1926, p. 535. 
497 "Political Work in the National Revolutionary Army ", p. 663. 
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Zhixiang. And the Society had Pan Yujiang, Ke Wuchi, Yang Yaotang, and Miao Bin 
for representatives. Lí Zhilong was soon to be appointed head of the Political 
Department of the Southern Navy and become a principal character in the Zhongshan 
Gunboat Incident of 20 March. Miao Bin had recently been elected a reserve member 
of the Guomindang Central Executive Committee. The chairman of the Society among 
Huangpu graduates, Ho Zhonghan, had left for Moscow to enter the Frunze Military 
Academy. The solutions for resolving the intra -party conflict that emerged were: (1) 
the officers (Ganhu) of each society should be allowed to join the other; (2) within the 
academy and the First Corps, the two organisations should accept the direction of the 
commandant and Party representative -i.e. Chiang and Wang; (3) military officers of the 
rank of regimental commander and above, except for Party representatives, were 
prohibited from joining the two societies; (4) if members of the societies had occasion 
to mistrust each other, they could appeal to the commandant and academy party 
representative for a solution.498 
Chiang subsequently organised the Huangpu Alumni Association for the 
graduates. Chiang attended the inaugural meeting and gave three speeches on 27 June. 
Two days later he visited the association and commended it for its organisational 
plans 499 
The Zhongshan Gunboat Incident 
The ideological conflict among the students of the Central Military Political 
Academy and in the units of I Corps was not National Government's only problem. 
The rapid pace of military reform in Guangzhou had also created friction between 
commanders and the party leaders on the one hand, and between commanders and 
Russian advisers on the other. The Guangzhou government's leadership crisis was 
clearly demonstrated on 20 March 1926 in the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident. 
498 See Jiang Jieshi nianpu, 2 February 1926, p. 535; Li Yunhan. "Sun wen zhuyi xuehui yi zao 
qi fan gong yun dong ", p. 90. 
499 Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 27, 29 June 1926, 592 -594. The association was to have a 
president, a secretary, twelve standing committee members, and three branches dealing with general 
affairs, organisation, and propaganda. 
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According to Chiang Kaishekt00 the acting chief of the Naval Bureau, Li 
Zhilong, ordered the gunboats S.S. Zhongshan and Baobi to Huangpu on the evening of 
18 March.501 Li Zhilong was a Naval Academy graduate at Yentai (Chefoo). Shandong 
and also a graduate of the First Class Huangpu Military Academy. He was also a 
member of the Communist Party. The vessels stood off the Central Military Political 
Academy all night with steam up at ready and fully armed. Chiang Kaishek who was in 
Guangzhou, was very surprised when he heard of this, since he had not ordered the 
vessels to Huangpu. Between 9 and 10 the following morning, a person whom Chiang 
declined to name phoned to ask when Chiang was leaving for Huangpu. When the 
person rang a third time, Chiang became suspicious and replied that he had not decided 
whether to return to Huangpu. Within an hour, Li Zhilong phoned to ask whether he 
might return the Zhongshan to Guangzhou to be ready for an inspection by the visiting 
team (the Bubnov Commission). Chiang refused to order the return of the vessel since 
he did not order its move to Huangpu in the first place.. He then demanded to know 
who had ordered the move, and Li was reported to have replied that it was a telephone 
order from Deng Yenda, which he understood to have come from Chiang Kaishek. The 
Zhongshan returned to Guangzhou on 19 March evening, after dark, but again with 
steam up and arms at the ready. Under these circumstances, according to Chiang, he 
became even more suspicious. And at dawn he sent the Naval Academy's deputy 
commandant, Ouyang Ge, with troops to board the vessel, put it under guard and arrest 
Li Zhilong. In addition, Chiang put Guangzhou under martial law.502 Liu Zhi, a 
recently appointed commander of the 2nd Division of the I Corps and the main garrison 
force for Guangzhou, had all Communist Party representatives and political workers in 
the division arrested.503 Chinese guards at the Russian advisers' residence and at the 
00 Much of the information available on the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident comes from three 
public accounts by Chiang Kaishek on 22 and 23 March and on 20 April. Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 
548 -550, 570 -577. 
'° Hsu Kai -yu, Chou En -lai: China's Gray Eminence. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 
1968, p. 242, n. 25. According to the author, Li was the head of the Naval Bureau's Political Department 
, but in the absence of Smimov, who held the position of chief of the bureau, Wang Jingwei had 
appointed Li as acting chief. 
Soz Ibid. According to Hsu Kai -yu, Ouyang Ge was a brother of Ouyang Lin, the navy's chief of 
staff, woo had been involved in illegal dealings and had fled to Hong Kong. Ouyang Ge is said to have 
"framed" Li Zhilong in the incident. The Nationalist Government's public announcement blamed Ouyang 
Lin, the deputy chief of the Naval Bureau, for leaving his duty so that the naval squadron was without 
leadership and Zhongshan acted illegally. The government had arrested and published those responsible. 
See Zhi Zhong (pseud.). "An Investigation of the Guangzhou Incident [20 March 1926] ". In Xiangdao 
zhoubao, p. 1379, 3 April 1926, 148: 1379 -1381. 
5°' Liu Zhi. Wo di huiyi (My recollections). Taibei: Guanglong, 1966, 36 -37. Liu Zhi makes a 
point of his cooperation with Ouyang Ge, who was from his native county, Ji'an (Chian xian), Jiangxi. 
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Hong Kong -Guangzhou Strike Committee's headquarters were disarmed, and many 
Communists were arrested. 
There are many interpretations of the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident.' In 
general, two divergent lines of interpretation can be discerned. The first is that it was a 
Russian and Chinese Communist plot to kidnap Chiang Kaishek abroad the Zhongshan 
and force him to go to Vladivostok. They would then overthrow the government 
replaced it with workers' government. Wang Jingwei may have been privy to the plot. 
Chiang Kaishek is pictured in this line of explanation to have discovered a plot against 
him and taken action on 20 March to smash it. Chiang himself consistently advanced 
this interpretation. For example, about six months after the event, he reportedly told 
Chen Gongbo that Wang Jingwei had plotted to have Chiang inspect a visiting Russian 
vessel where he would be kidnapped and taken to Vladivostok and Moscow.505 Chen 
Jieru, a legal consort of Chiang Kaishek and his constant companion from 1920 to 
1927, also confirms that it was Wang Jingwei who planned to plot against Chiang.'06 
Proponents of the opposite line say that the Guomindang rightists, particularly 
leaders of the Society for the Study of Sun Wenism, planned a coup against the 
504 For the Guomindang's interpretation, see Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, vol. 1; Li Yunhan, Cong 
ronggong dao gingdang, 483 -491; and the most recent study is by Jiang Yongjing. "San yue er shi ri shi 
jian zhi yanjiu (Research on the 20th March incident)." Huangpu jianxiao liushi zhounian lunwenji 
(Papers on the 60th anniversary on the founding of the Huangpu military academy), 115-154; Wu Tien - 
wei explores various interpretations and concludes that here probably was a conspiracy involving some 
Chinese Communists and Russian advisers inspired by "Kisan'ka" and Wang Jingwei, see "Chiang 
Kai -shek's March Twentieth Coup d'Etat of 1926." China in the 1920s: Nationalism and Revolution, 
Editors Gilbert F. and Etzold, Thomas H. Chan. New Viewpoints, 1976, p. 612; see also Hsu Kai -yu. 
Chou En-lai: China's Gray Eminence, 56 -57, 243 -245, for a sophisticated interpretation. 
sos Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, 1: 72. 
soe Chen Chih ju {Jieru }. Chiang Kai -shek's Secret Past. Edited and introduced by Llyold 
Eastman, Boulder: Westview Press, 1993, chapter 18, 176 -185. This autobiography is written by 
Chiang's legal consort and companion from 1920 -1927 Chen Jieru. Chen bore Chiang a daughter. After 
their separation, Chen lived in retirement in US, Shanghai and Hong Kong where she wrote her account 
of the life with Chiang. She died in 1971. This work was suppressed by the Guomindang, but apparently 
a copy came into the hands of her grandson Chen Zhongren. He quoted parts of it in an article that has a 
section on Zhongshan Gunboat Incident. Chen essential point was that Wang Jingwei planned to have Li 
Zhilong kill Chiang. And learning that Chiang was going to Huangpu, faked an order in Deng Yanda's 
name for Zhongshan to proceed there_ Wang then asked his wife Chen Bijun to telephone Chen Jieru to 
learn when Chiang planned to depart on the gunboat, on the pretext that Wang was to accompany him. 
She telephoned five times arousing Chen's suspicious. She reported these strange calls to Chiang, who 
realised seriousness of the situation, investigated, and then took the action he did on 20 March to seize 
the gunboat and Lui Zhilong. He also put Wang under house arrest, but declined to reveal that suspicious 
caller was Wang Jingwei's wife. Thus, Jieru's account elaborates on Chiang's contention that Wang 
plotted against him. 
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Communists and the Russians. Chiang Kaishek, was either part of the plot or tricked 
into believing that the Communists intended to oust him, and hence would play into the 
hands of the Society. This is the line, with variations, taken by three Russian advisers- - 
Cherepanov, Konchits, and Vishnyakova 
-Akimova- -and by Yuriev, who studied many 
contemporary newspaper accounts.507 The interpretation that the Society for the Study 
of Sun Wenism plotted a coup was hinted at by Zhi Zhong in the official Communist 
publication, Xiangdao zhoubao, as early as 3 April 1926.505 A year later, Zhou Enlai 
commented on a statement by Peng Shuzhi, which named four members of the Society 
who allegedly forged an order by Chiang that tricked Li Zhilong, and who also 
allegedly told Chiang of a plot to deport him to Russia. Zhou stated that the correct list 
of names of the principal plotters was Wang Boling (commander of the 1st Division, I 
Corps), Ouyang Ge, Chen Zhaoying, and Hui Dongshen, but it should not include Miao 
Bin. Communist historians have consistently blamed Chiang, and usually point to 
Rightist plotting.509 
What actually happened is still unknown for now as impartial archival evidence 
is unavailable. It is possibe that each side had planned action against the other. The 
chief of the Russian adviser Kuibyshev was certainly hostile to Chiang Kaishek. He 
saw Chiang as an obstacle to his plan for "rigid centralisation" of the National 
Revolutionary Army and its subordination to the central military organ. Wang Jingwei 
who apparently was close to Kuibyshev and may have indicated to Chiang that he 
should take a trip to Russia. Apparently, there were signs of an anti -Chiang movement 
in Guangzhou before 20 March according to Chiang's own account.'1° 
It is not the intention of this chapter to untangle and analyse the various factors 
that underlie the incident. What is interesting about this incident is that it shows the 
tremendous tension excited by the National Revolutionary Army's process military 
reform. This is evidenced in the post- incident settlement of the main parties involved. 
007 Cherepanov, Severnyi Pokhod Natsional'no- Revoliutsionno Arm ii Kitaya (Zapiski Voennogo 
Sovetnika) 1926 -1927, 201 -202; Konchits, N.I. "In the Rank of the Revolutionary Army of China," 
contains of diary entry for 5 April recording what Cheng Qian told him; Vishniakova -Akimova, Dva 
Goda v Vosstaysheme kitae, 1925 -1927, 310 -314. 
'° Huangpu junxiao shiliao, 361 -367. This is a reprint of the Xiangdao zhoubao, 3 April 1926, 
148: 1381. 
569 Huangpu junxiao shiliao, 353 -354, the reprint of Xiangdao zhoukan, nos. 192 (March 1927), 
193 (6 April 1927); Bao Huizeng, Bao fluízeng huiyilu, 194 -217. 
s' Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 548-550. 
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Immediately after the incident there seems to have been a continuous round of 
discussions between Chiang Kaishek and other leading figures in Guangzhou. Wang 
Jingwei, who was ill then, was said to be furious at Chiang's unilateral action. Political 
Council held a meeting on 22 March but no public statement was announced. Wang 
reportedly went into a hospital the next day, and then "disappeared ".51 
According to Zhang Guotao (Chang Kuo- t`ao), who arrived in Guangzhou about 
ten days after the incident to make a personal investigation, members of the Wang 
Jingwei clique demanded Chiang Kaishek be suppressed. All the National 
Revolutionary Army officers except the I Corps were dissatisfied with Chiang because 
he favoured the I Corps at the expense of the others. However, Wang's withdrawal left 
them leaderless.51' 
Chen Gongbo remembers the Political Council meeting on 22 March which was 
held at Wang Jingwei's bedside. He mentions three key points of discussion. One 
concerned methods to restrict Communist Party activities; another was the decision to 
ask the Russians to recall "Kisan'ka." Chen had heard that, Chiang Kaishek had 
constant disagreements with the Russian; and the third was concerned with settling the 
Hong Kong- Guangzhou Strike.51 
During Wang Jingwei's seclusion, Tan Yankai acted as chairman of the National 
Government and became an intermediary between various factions to stabilise the 
situation, according to Zhang Guotao, Zhang describes Tan as very close to Chiang 
then.514 Zhang Renjie (Jingjiang) arrived in Guangzhou on 23 March and became 
Chiang's adviser in settling matters. Chiang formally petitioned the Military Council to 
punish himself for his necessary action on 20 March. He wrote on 26 March to Wang 
Jingwei, chairman of the Military Council, asking for leave. But Wang had already 
indicated his own intention to resign. Chiang also wrote individually to Tan Yankai, 
511 JiangJieshi nianpu, 22 March 1926, 548 -550. 
512 Chang Kuo t'ao. The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921 -1927, 1: 498 -499, 
SIS Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu. 1: 63. According to the author, Eugene Chen, T.V. Soong, and he 
were appointed as a committee to negotiate with the Hong Kong Government. But as Eugene Chen had 
not yet returned to Guangzhou C.C. Wu then became the third member appointed. Chen Gongbo also 
recalls that the next day Wang Jingwei refused to receive visitors, and a few days later he learned that 
Wang was no longer at his residence. Wang disappeared. 
514 Ibid. 
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Zhu Peide, Li Jishen, and other generals, as well as to T.V. Soong, minister of finance, 
to tell them that he was retiring. He also urge the return of Wang. Chiang then went 
off to Humen, to fortifications thirty miles south of Guangzhou. According to Chiang, 
T.V. Soong followed him there and pleaded with him, on behalf of all the comrades, 
not to depart. Chiang consented.515 However, he absented himself until 1 April. using 
his time to inspect the 20th Division, located in the Dongwan region. He also prepare 
policy documents to present to the leadership. 
Chiang's attitude toward the Chinese Communists appeared to be equivocal. 
While he implied that they had instigated the Zhongshan Incident to overthrow him, he 
did not publicly accuse them of conspiracy. Most Communists were released after the 
incident. In his speech to the Central Military Political Academy's cadets on 22 March, 
Chiang declared that it was not yet clear who was guilty of the suspicious behaviour of 
the Zhongshan. He added that even if Li Zhilong were guilty, it was an individual 
matter and not one that involved the entire organisation (the Communist Party)516 
On 3 April, Chiang introduced a proposal to the Guomimdang's Central 
Executive Committee to readjust the army, stabilise the Party, and set a date for the 
Northern Expedition. On the matter of Guomindang- Communist relations, he proposed 
that: (I) A plenum of the Guomindang Central Executive Committee be convened to 
regulate discipline and investigate certain elements in the Party and army. (2) 
Communists must not criticise Sun Yatsen's character and should be devoted to the 
Three Principles of the People in their work. They should also abolish all secret 
organisations and activities within the Guomindang, notify Guomindang authorities 
about all policies and instructions of the Communist Party, and register all Communist 
members of the Guomindang with the proper Guomindang authorities. Furthermore, 
they must not occupy more than a third of the membership of the Central Executive 
Committee. (3) A joint Guomindang- Communist Party conference be called to settle 
all difficulties. 
In the proposal, Chiang suggested that the Russians serves strictly as advisers 
and should not hold any administrative posts. They should not exceed the limits of 
their position without obtaining permission from their respective superior officers- -that 
sis Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 23 -26 March I926, 550 -551. 
516 Ibid., 22 March 1926, 548 -550. 
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is, Chinese officers. However, he reaffirmed the policy of cooperation with the 
Russians as well as the Chinese Communists.'" 
At the same time Chiang issued a public telegram accusing the Western Hills 
faction for ignoring his warnings about holding their own Second National Congress of 
the Guomindang in Shanghai.'" Chiang claimed that he was distressed at the thought 
of the Right Wing's alliance with imperialists aiming to destroy the Guomindang and 
the government. He continued to denounce the Right Wing in no uncertain terms in 
subsequent speeches. 
On the specific issue of Communists who were also Guomindang 
representatives in the army, Chiang's attitude was hazy. He proposed the temporary 
withdrawal of all Party representatives for further training on the grounds that conflict 
between Communists and non -Communists in the First Corps had assumed dangerous 
proportions. He also said that Communist and anarchist elements should be withdrawn 
because the National Revolutionary Army was founded on the Three Principles of the 
People. Yet, he declared that the system of Party representatives should not be 
abolished. 
While, Chiang appeared to be conciliatory toward the Russians as a group but 
insisted he Kuibyshev ( "Kisan'ka "), the head of the military adviser, Rogachev, and 
Razgon ( "Olgin ") be sent away. Chiang recalls that he met a Russian adviser and 
Bubnov ( "Ivanovsky "), the head of a Russian Commission visiting Guangzhou, on the 
evening of 20 March Bubnov complained about Chinese troops surrounding Russian 
quarters and the disarming of their guards. Chiang apologised and assured the 
Russians that the troops would be withdrawn shortly and the guards restored.519 On the 
morning of 22 March, a representative of the Soviet Embassy, Solovyev, confirmed 
with Chiang that the problem concerned particular individuals and not the Soviet Union 
itself. The representative then told Chiang that Kuibyshev and Rogachev would be sent 
back to the Soviet Union.52° Solovyev, then attended Guomindang Political Council 
meeting concerned to settle the incident. The first of their three resolutions affirmed 
517 Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 3 April 1926, 3 Aprii 1926, 553 -558. 
SIR Ibid., p. 554. 
519 Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 20 March 1926, p. 547. 
520 ¡bid.. 22 March 1926, p. 548. 
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cooperation with the Russians but was also firm about Guomindang autonomy "...our 
Party should continue cooperation with the Soviet Russian comrades and increase our 
intimate relations. Russian comrades with differing opinions concerning work should 
leave Guangzhou immediately, but the rest should be invited to stay as advisers." The 
other resolutions granted Wang Jingwei a leave because of his illness and were 
concerned with the investigation and the trial of chief suspect. Li Zhilong.'=' 
Chiang was highly conciliatory in public about the friendship with the Russians. 
In an interview with the Guangzhou minguo ribao, a Guomindang organ, he expressed 
profound regret that the Russians had been inconvenienced on 20 March due to 
subordinates misunderstanding of his orders. Chiang denounced reports of his hostility 
toward the Russians and Communists as fabrications of the "running dogs of 
imperialists," who wished to overthrow the government. He emphasised that there was 
definitely no change in the policy of alliance with Soviet Russia.522 
The Russians moved rapidly to carry out their side of Solovyev's agreement 
with Chiang. On the evening of 24 March, Kuibyshev, Rogachev, and Razgon sailed 
from Guangzhou on the Soviet vessel Lenin's Memory, together with members of the 
Bubnov Commission."Z' Bubnov had a farewell discussion with Chiang, during which 
they exchanged their conflicting opinions concerning the strategy of the Chinese 
revolution."' 
Before departing, Bubnov held a meeting of the Russian advisers in Guangzhou 
on 24 March at which he analysed the social roots of the incident, gave a critique of the 
performance of the Russian mission and the work of the Chinese Communists, and 
recommended new procedures Su He assessed the 20 March event as a "small semi - 
uprising, directed against the Russian advisers and Chinese commissars." In his 
52! Li Yunhan. Cong ronggong dao qingdang, p. 492, is based on the minutes of an extended 
Political Council meeting. 
522 Guangzhou minguo ribao, 27 March 1926, reprint in Huangpu_iunxiao shiliao, p. 368. 
525 Vishniakova-Akimova. Dva Goda v Vosstavsheme kitoe, 1925-1927, 212-213. 
524 Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 24 March 1926, 550 -551. Chiang argues, among others, that the 
foremost task of the party is to prepare for the launching of the Northern Expedition. To achieve this task 
the unity of the party and the army are the prerequisites. 
szs Cherepanov, Severnyi Pokhod Natsional'no-Revoliutsionno Armii Kitaya, 82-86; As Military 
Advisers, 211-213. 
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opinion, it reflected the conflict between centralised state power and militarism; 
between the petty urban bourgeoisie and the proletariat; and finally between the Left 
and Right wings of the Guomindang. He equated the Right Wing members with the 
Society for the Study of Sun Wenism. Bubnov pointed out the major mistakes in 
military work and in general political leadership which had directly provoked the 
incident. There was an overestimation of the strength and unity of the Guangzhou 
leadership and failure to foresee the conflict within the national government and 
army.526 
Bubnov then cautioned the approximately 58 Russian workers to be more 
sensitive to the Chinese military's nationalism and not provoke their displeasure by 
pressuring them. Nor should they step out of their roles as advisers and take direct 
command of Chinese troops doing so, he predicted, would lead to a series of disastrous 
consequences. It would frighten away the rich bourgeoisie, cause the middle -class 
bourgeoisie to vacillate, revitalise the Chinese militarism practices, strengthen and 
inflame the contradictions between the Guomindang's Right and Left Wings. This 
would raise a wave of anti -Communist sentiment, and create a crisis in the National 
Government. Bubnov tied all their subsequent work to the northern campaign, but he 
cautioned against its being regarded as a purely military venture. "To launch the 
Northern Expedition without precise and definite slogans and to contemplate...liti 
without touching the peasant masses -this means to commit a complete mistake," 
Bubnov said. 
In the political field, Bubnov urged the advisers to work with the Left Wing of 
the Guomindang, which he regarded as still weak, disunited, and out of touch with the 
masses. Such work should be aimed at directly strengthening the Guomindang itself. "I 
admit that this work...will demand flexibility, very calm, and very restrained tactics 
from the Chinese Communist Party," he said. Though praising some aspects of the 
Communist Party's recent development, he criticised the Chinese comrades for 
insufficient connection with the proletariat, for sectarian tendencies, and for excessive 
attention to military work. 
sec Ibid p. 86. Cherepanov has an addition statement which says that another shortcoming is in 
not "exposing and liquidating those tremendous extremes in military work which were clearly revealed 
during the course of March events ". This sentence is not translated in the official English version of 
Cherepanov's memoirs. 
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Before leaving, Bubnov also gave an interview to the Communist journal, 
Xiangdao zhoubao. In it, he emphasised that, although Li Zhilong and some fifty 
others had been arrested, none had been killed; that Chiang said he was neither anti - 
Russian nor anti -Communist; and that he seemed to understand that the Communists 
did not plot to overthrow the government or him. The storm, therefore, already had 
been calmed and only the disruptive incitement of the Society for the Study of Sun 
Wenism had not been stopped. He warned against this danger to the Chinese 
revolution.527 
Bubnov put his finger on several specific points which also appeared in a report 
on the 20 March Incident528. General V.A. Stepanov, who succeeded Kuibyshev, 
reported Russian adviser's meeting on the incident about two weeks later, reiterating 
the points made by Bubnov. He commented the Russian's major "errors" was that they 
had pushed for the centralisation of the army too quickly without taking adequate 
account of the psychology and habits of the Chinese generals. The party representative 
(commissars) and the Russian advisers had the controlled the generals too tightly. As 
Bubnov put it, "five dog -collars were put upon the Chinese generals ". The "five 
collars" he referred to were the General Staff, Supply Department, the Political 
Department (P.U.R.), Party representative, and advisers. 
In short, it appears that within a few days of the incident the Russians on the 
scene had set to work to appease with Chiang Kaishek. They criticised their own errors 
and cautioned themselves to be sensitive to the Chinese nationalism. Most 
significantly, the Russians started to realise their inferior positions in the Guomindang 
government. Their influence in the party had been seriously weakened as the result of 
the departure of Liao Zhongkai and Wang Jingwei. The Chinese Communist Party was 
too weak a force to contend for power. The most powerful force in Guangzhou was the 
military led by Chiang Kaishek and the Huangpu's I Corps which they had been trying 
to strengthen in the past two years. The Russians had to work with them if they wanted 
to continue their presence in Guangzhou. 
sn Zhi Zhong, "An investigation of the Guangzhou incident ", which includes : "An interview 
with Ivanovsky and others ", Xiangdao zhoukan, 148: 3 April 1926. 
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"Stepanov's Report on the March Twentieth Incident ", Document 50, Missionaries of 
Revolution, 703 -707. General Stepanov had served in Guangzhou since October 1924. He was an adviser 
to Chiang Kaishek in the two eastern expeditions and the campaign against Yang Xiwen and Liu 
Zhenhuan in 1925. He succeeded Kuibyshev as head of the Soviet Military Group in Guangzhou on 24 
March and held the post until Bliukher arrived in May 1926. 
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In conclusion, the experience of the late 1925 and early 1926 reform and the 
reorganisation of the National Revolutionary Army had both positive and negative 
effects. The most positive development was the centralisation of the army under one, 
albeit loose, command. This was achieved through financial control and centralised 
training for the cadres of all the National Revolutionary Army. However, the result of 
the structural reform in these units was mixed. The I and the IV corps accepted the 
change more readily but others were not. These reformed units, however, had invited 
political rivalries from within the army units and among political parties. They needed 
time to work out many teething problems, but time was not on the Guomindang's side. 
The active involvement of the party leadership, the Russian advisers, and the Chinese 
Communist Party activists in the reorganised National Revolutionary Army soon ran 
into conflict between the party and the military on the one hand, and within the various 
army units on the other. The appeal for greater restraint by all parties was the only 
solution that could help to save the revolutionary government from breaking up. What 
had emerged after this internal crisis was the recognition of the position of the Chinese 
officer corps. They held the balance between the various competing groups in the 
United Front. They were also the arbiters of conflict among the power groups. 
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Chapter 6: The National Revolutionary Army Prior to the Northern Expedition 
In June 1926, less than six months after Guangdong's unification, the 
Guomindang decided to launch the Northern Expedition. However, the National 
Revolutionary Army was still in the midst of change and suffered from the regional 
army's many weaknesses. The National Revolutionary Army had now expanded to 
eight corps. This included: the original five corps which were formally established on 
26 August 1925; the newly formed VI Corps commanded by Cheng Qian in January 
1926; the combined Guangxi forces into VII Corps in late March; and just prior to the 
expedition in July 1926, the Hunan troops led by Tang Shengzhi which became the VIII 
Corps. When the Northern Expedition began, only the first six corps were actually 
preserved in Guangdong. The VII Corps was still in its native Guangxi, and the VIII 
Corps was in Hunan. 
This chapter aims to look at the nature of the National Revolutionary Army by 
examining the formation, the leadership, readiness and fighting experiences of the 
troops in each of the units of the National Revolutionary Army. Traditionally, scholars 
have debated on two key but closely related questions regarding the National 
Revolutionary Army. The first was whether the National Revolutionary Army was a 
unified army before the Northern Expedition; the second was the impact of massive 
defections of troops to the National Revolutionary Army. F. F. Liu claims that 
Guangzhou was "forging a unified force out of the disparate elements of the various 
provincial units then existing in South China ". He also claims these forces were 
"standardised and indoctrinated" 532 Donald Jordan also stresses the unity of the base 
on the eve of the expedition and credits that unity to the success of the campaign.i33 To 
these scholars, a unified National Revolutionary Army would seem to answer the 
question of why such a small force could take on and defeat the much larger forces of 
Wu Peifu and Sun Chuanfang forces. But they felt that the massive defections of the 
warlord armies had created disunity in the National Revolutionary Army. Donald 
Jordan argues that the National Revolutionary Army's decision to accept warlord 
defections and the National Revolutionary Army's inability to control their behaviour 
created significant problems both for itself and the Nationalist Government at 
532 Liu, F. F. A Military History of Modern China, 1924 -1949. New York: Kennikat Press, 1956, p. 
16. 
" Donald A. Jordan, The Northern Expedition: China's National Revolution of 1926 -1928. 
Honolulu, USA: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976, 288 -9. 
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Nanjing534 later on. James E. Sheridan was also struck by the defectors' importance, 
noting that the original National Revolutionary Army was diluted by large number of 
militarists enrolled directly into the National Revolutionary Army. Sheridan argues 
that mass organisations made civilian control of the military possible during the early 
stages of the Northern Expedition. But their destruction meant that power passed to the 
military "just when the military, as a result of the absorption of the warlords, was 
becoming less committed to the goals and principles of the Guomindang ". --s Sheridan 
echoes the theme in a later work: "The number of warlord units in the National 
Revolutionary Army ultimately far outnumbered the original components of the army. 
These militarists had various political ideals, goals, and attitudes...The absorption of so 
many diverse interests into the Kuomintang...inevitably weakened Kuomintang. unity 
and perhaps adulterated Kuomintang nationalism. "536 
This chapter will argue that the National Revolutionary Army was already a 
very complicated and diverse forces prior to the outset of the expedition. With 
exception of the I, VI and VII Corps, the National Revolutionary Army before the 
Northern Expedition was not well -unified but a very diverse force that closely 
resembled the other warlord forces of the same period. Thus, the lack of unity before 
the start of the expedition suggests that one does not have to look for reasons why the 
armies split during the campaign. During the Northern Expedition, only three of the 
original eight units would do any serious fighting. Only the I Corps was really 
responsive to Chiang Kaishek's orders although the other two would cooperate with the 
I Corps during certain battles. In addition, this chapter will raise another question 
which has been ignored by scholars. That is, in view of the inherent divisions within 
the Guomindang and Chinese Communist Party, and among units of the National 
Revolutionary Army, how did this delicate alliance hold together till at least mid -19277 
The National Revolutionary Army 
When Chiang Kaishek issued mobilisation orders on 1 July 1926, the National 
Revolutionary Army's strength may have been between 100,000 and 150,000 men, 
530. Ibid., 276-295. 
535 James E. Sheridan, Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu- hsiang. USA: Stanford University 
Press, 1966, p. 240. 
536 James E. Sheridan, China in Disintegration, New York: The Free Press, 1975, p. 179. 
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organised in eight corps and six regiments.537 Cadets of the Central Military Political 
Academy at Huangpu formed several regiments. However, since almost all the units 
had to guard their base areas, the actual force available for the Northern Expedition was 
probably less than 65,000 in the beginning. 
The size of each of the National Revolutionary Army corps varied widely. 
While the V Corps under Li Fulin had only two divisions organised into eight 
regiments and one battalion, the I Corps commanded by He Yingqin comprised five 
divisions, with a total strength of nineteen regiments (see table 16).538 Its opponents, 
the three militarist groupings in central and northern China outnumbered the National 
Revolutionary Army by at least two times in troop strength. Official Guomindang 
sources estimate Wu Peifu's and Sun Chuanfang's strength at more than 300,000 each; 
Zhang Zuolin's at more than 350,000.x39 Cherepanov, Russian adviser to the I Corps of 
the National Revolutionary Army, gives a similar estimate for Wu's forces and far 
lower estimates for those of Sun and Zhang.5ao 
In preparation for the Northern Expedition, Chiang Kaishek organised a General 
Commander -in -Chief Headquarters which would be the supreme command organ 
during wartime. However, the commander -in- chief's authority was limited as the 
National Revolutionary Army was essentially a decentralised force with individual 
commanders exercising command through personal relationships with the subordinates. 
Directly responsive to Chiang's order were the I and the IV Corps. 
The I Corps 
537 The estimates on the strength of the National Revolutionary Amy varies, Hollington K. Tong 
and Cherepanov gives the figure of around 100,000; see Hollington K. Tong, Chiang Kai -shek: Soldier 
and Statesmen. Shanghai: 1937, p. 63; Cherepanov in Severnyi, pp. 110, 107, 115, gives a similar 
number. But Beifa zhanshi (The war history of the northern expedition), 2: 321, states the National 
Revolutionary Army strength had less than I50,000. 
e Geming wenxian (Documents on the revolution), 12: 1802 -1805. It states that the Second 
Corps under the command of Tan Yankai had three divisions in twelve regiments; the Third Corps under 
Zhu Peide had three divisions in eight regiments and two battalions; the Fourth Corps under Li Jishen 
had four divisions in thirteen regiments; the Sixth Corps under Cheng Qian had three divisions in nine 
regiments and two battalions; the Seventh Corps under Li Zongren had nine brigades totalling eighteen 
regiments and two battalions; the Eighth Corps under Tang Shengzhi had four divisions and two 
regiments totalling seventeen regiments; in addition, there were two divisions of undetermined strength 
that had recently been incorporated. 
539 See Geming wenxian (Documents on the revolution), 12: 1780 -1787. 
sao Wu Peifu's troop strength was about 210,000; Sun Chuanfang's 157,000; and Zhang Zuolin's 
190,000. See Cherepanov, Severnyi Pokhod Natsional'no- Revoliutsionno Armii Kitaya, p. 115. 
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The I Corps was considered by all --the Guomindang, Chinese Communists and 
the Russians --as one of the only truly "revolutionary" units.' The significance of the I 
Corps lies in the fact that it was created for the purpose of the Northern Expedition. 
Unlike the other units that participated in the Northern Expedition, the I Corps was not 
a redesignated or reorganisation of some other existing unit. I corp was the result of the 
expansion of the various Training Regiments set up by the instructors and students of 
the Huangpu Military Academy. Although some of the officers had served in the 
Guangdong Army, most had come to Guangzhou as individuals, and, not as the 
commanders of other warlord units. This force was young, highly nationalistic, but 
without very much practical experience. In addition to being a regionally diverse unit, 
the I Corps was also well educated of its officers had gone to higher military education 
institutions such as Baoding Military Academy, the War College, or to military schools 
in Japan (see table 15). This made the composition of the I corp divserse and freed it of 
its dependency on officers bound by provincial or school ties. While it lasted, the I 
Corps had three commanders: Chiang Kaishek, 1925 -6, He Yingqin, 1926 -7, Liu Zhi, 
1927 -8. All were military staff of the Huangpu Military Academy since its inception. 
However, despite its officer corp fervour, I Corps was the least experienced of all the 
units gathered in Guangdong had only been in existence less than two years. Few of its 
senior officers had ever held positions as combat commanders before to 1925. Instead 
they had served as instructors or staff officers. Its junior officers had graduated from 
Huangpu in November 1924 or September 1925, only nine months prior to the 
expedition. Their only combat experience consisted of the two Eastern Expeditions. It 
was probably for this reason that the I Corps played a minor role in the early stages of 
the expedition, with many remaining in Guangdong as a rearguard unit. Some 
divisions would participate in the attack on Wuchang and Nanchang in the later part of 
1926, but the entire corps did not engage with any major opponents until mid -1927, 
after the split with the Chinese Communist Party. 
Although it lacked experience, the I Corps was distinguished by its fighting 
style. As discussed in the previous chapter, the highly motivated officers, guided by 
541 For sources about the National Revolutionary Army, see Geming wenxian (Documents on 
revolution), 12: 1798 -1805; Huangpu junxiao shigao (Draft history of the Huangpu military academy), 
6: 213 -215; Guomin gemingjun fazhan xulie (a brief development of the National Revolutionary Army), 
Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1987, 9 -14; for Russian sources see, "The National Revolutionary Army; 
Short History of its Origin, Development, and Organisation (to March 1926), Document 3; "Report on 
the National Revolutionary Army and the Kuomintang (Guomindang), Early 1926 (March 1926), 
Document 26, in Missionaries of Revolution. 
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the "win or die ", lianzuofa, philosophy, combined with strong political work within its 
units and among the general public brought a new style of warfare in China Although 
their tactics might sometimes be faulty, their zeal and willingness to fight, and their 
ability to sustain casualties without breaking made them all but invincible against 
warlord armies. 
The I Corps was also the darling of the Russians for these same reasons. The 
Russian advisers describe it as the largest, the best trained and equipped, and the most 
thoroughly indoctrinated.542 They said that this corps was "a loyal bulwark of the 
Revolutionary Government" and would be the "shock troops" of an anti -North 
expedition. The Russians also identified features a peculiar to the I Corps -- its 
extensive political work among the population while campaigning and its steadfast 
refusal to loot. The Russian predicted that as word of this unusual behaviour spread 
among the populace, the Huangpu troops would be welcomed, as they had been during 
the expeditions against Chen Jiongming. Chiang Kaishek had been commander of the 
corps until January 1926. According to a Russian's report, Chiang was regarded as one 
of the most loyal followers of Sun Yatsen and one of the best revolutionaries. It 
describes that from his speeches, Chiang might be regarded as a Communist, "but 
looking more deeply at his convictions, one sees that he belongs to typical 
"intelligentsia" of the radical kind, after the pattern of the French Jacobins." By 
character, the writer asserts, Chiang was irresolute but stubborn, and because of his 
character he could not have obtained much success as a leader of troops in battle 
without the aid of the Russian instructors. Chiang's rapid advancement "with our aid" 
began after the opening of the Huangpu Academy. "He is so connected with us that the 
possibility of a rupture on his part can hardly be admitted ".543 This prediction, which 
reveals some anxiety, was written about two weeks before the 20 March Zhongshan 
Gunboat Incident. 
The II Corps 
Unlike the I Corps which was newly created, the II Corps had already had a 
long and eventful history prior to the Northern Expedition.544 Its commander Tan 
542 
"Report on the National Revolutionary Army and the Kuomintang (Guomindang), Early 1926 
(March 1926), Document 26, op. cit., 599 -601. 
sa Ibid., p. 609. 
s4a For a history of the 11 Corps, see "Guomin gemingjun di er jun lueshi" (A brief history of the II 
corps of the national revolutionary army), Junshi zhengzhi yuekan, no. 3 (1926): 47. 
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Yankai was a Hunan native who had been a Qing dynasty jinshí and Hanlin compiler. 
Active in Hunan politics since 1911 Revolution, Tan had been forced out of the 
province in 1920. He then journeyed to Shanghai and later to Guangzhou in 1923. In 
Guangzhou, Sun Yatsen named him the commander of the Bandits Suppression Army 
(Taozeijun) and then went to Hunan to rally his subordinate Zhao Hengti who had 
succeeded Tan as ruler of Hunan.545 
In 1924, Tan led this force, now designated as the Hunan Reconstruction Army 
(Hunan jianguojun) into Jiangxi in another of Sun Yatsen's ill -fated Northern 
Expeditions but was quickly forced back. By the time of this defeat, Tan had 
withdrawn from active command although he continued to hold the title of corps 
commander until 1928. Due to Tan increased involvement in national politics, actual 
command devolved to his subordinate Lu Diping. Lu was also a Hunan native and a 
graduate of the junior officer's training academy (bingmu xuetang) under the Qing 
military education system. He began his career in the New Army and was a follower of 
Tan since the 1911 Revolution. Lu rose to division commander in the Hunan Army 
when he withdrew from the province and followed Tan to Guangzhou in 1924. Lu 
served as acting commander throughout the entire campaign of the Northern 
Expedition.54c 
The II Corps was originally one of the "guest armies" in Guangzhou. It was a 
Hunan force that wanted to return home. During his sojourn in Guangdong, Tan 
maintained a Hunan government -in -exile preparing for the day when he would return to 
rule his native province.547 This unit was probably bound together primarily by 
provincial ties and was not particularly well -educated (see table 14). 
It might be supposed that the II Corps would be the logical vanguard for the 
attack into Hunan. Using political workers, Guangzhou might have been able to build 
on the irredentist feeling to create a highly motivated force. Instead, very little political 
work seems to have done within this unit which jealously guarded its autonomy. It 
as Tan Zu'an xiansheng nianpu ( A chronological biography of Mr Tan Yankai), Taibei: 
Zhongguo Guomindang dangshi weiyuanhui, 1979, p. 57. 
sua Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, editors Howard L. Boorman and Richard C. 
Howard, II: 451; Zhuanji wenxue, XXXI: 3 (September 1979), p. 179; Hu Naian, "Xinxiang junzhi" 
(Record of the Hunan new army), Zhuanji wenxue, XII: 2 (February, 1928), 7 -8, 
41 Hu Naían, op.cit., 10, 20. 
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went so as far as to refuse to accept junior officers who had graduated from Huangpu.54s 
In fact, the II Corps did not participate in the Hunan invasion at all but was sent instead 
into Jiangxi only after the expedition well under way.549 This unit was neutral during 
the Nanjing -Wuhan split, but Lu later led the unit to join Nanjing. The II Corps 
expanded to add the XIV Corps in 1927. These two units were reduced to divisions, 
the 18th and 50th in late 1928. Both units were eventually re -made into Central Army 
divisions. 
The III Corps 
The III Corps, like the II Corps was also a provincial army, in this case the 
Yunnan units that fled to Guangdong after being ousted from its native province. Zhu 
Peide commanded the unit from 1925 -1927, and by Wang Jun from 1927 -1928. Both 
commanders were Yunnan natives who had graduated from Cai E's Yunnan Military 
Academy. This unit may well have been the least revolutionary and most extractive 
force in the province. It collected its own taxes and levied tariffs as it chose. The III 
Corps had not participated in earlier campaign nor later did it exhibit any particular 
military ability.550 By 1927, the unit had moved to Jiangxi and its commander tended to 
rule as his personal territory while trying to avoid becoming entangled in Nanjing - 
Wuhan split. Under Wang Jun, marginally better general then Zhu, the unit 
participated in the 1928 Shandong campaign but only as part of the reserve. The units 
were reorganised as 7th and 12th Divisions at the end of the expedition and later re- 
made into Central Army divisions. 
The IV Corps 
548 No Huangpu graduate commanded troops in the II Corps. The Russian's report states that due 
to a shortage of political workers political work had not yet accomplished much in this corps. The 
Russians, however, regarded Tan Yankai as a revolutionary, "though not of the very radical type." The 
Revolutionary Govemment and "our leaders' regarded him as trustworthy and as a loyal partisan. Ibid., 
p. 609. 
49 Reason that the II Corps were despatched to Jiangxi rather than Hunan might have to do with 
the objection of Tang Shengzhi who did not want any Hunanese military leaders involved in the Hunan 
campaign. 
550 On Zhu Peide, see Biographical Dictionary of Republican China, editors Howard L. Boorman 
and Richard C. Howard, II: 453 -7; Zhuanji wenxue, XXIX: 6 (June, 1976), p. 122; Zhu Gong Yizhi 
shilue (A brief history of Zhu Peide), n.p., n.d., 1 -9; on Wang Jun, see Dangdai Zhongguo mingren zhi, 
(Biographies of famous contemporary Chinese), Shanghai: Shijian pinglun chubanshe, 1938, 129 -130. 
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Apart from the I Corps, the IV Corps was the other revolutionary unit in 
Guangdong on the eve of the Northern Expedition. The IV Corps was basically made 
up of the 1st Division of the Guangdong Army. Its commander Li Jishen had 
commanded the 1st Division. During its formation in 1925, the senior officers were 
almost all natives of Guangdong and graduates of Baoding Military Academy. many 
came from the Sixth Class. During the Northern Expedition the IV Corps became 
seriously divided. Much of what Harold Isaacs argues about the Northern Expedition 
appears to apply to the IV Corps.55' Although its nationalism was reinforced by 
provincial, school and class ties, the IV Corps functioned as a unit only up till the time 
of Nanjing -Wuhan split, when its splinted into five different groups. 
Torn between provincialism and nationalism, as well as between social and 
national revolution, the unit split into groups that warred with Chiang Kaishek for the 
possession of Nanjing; with the Communists for the possession of Wuhan; and with 
each other for the control of Guangdong itself. Ye Ting went with the Communists; 
Zhang Fakui followed Wang Jingwei; Chen Mingshu and Chen Jitang concentrated on 
fighting one another. Represented here are all the conflicting values held by those who 
participated in the Northern Expedition. 
For what was essentially a reconstituted warlord force, the IV Corps was 
remarkably well educated. And like the I Corps, it was led by some remarkably 
talented officers who were willing and able to fight. At the outset, at least, it was 
probably the best unit of the National Revolutionary Army.sn 
During the course of the Northern Expedition, the IV Corps had a number of 
commanders. After the Nanjing -Wuhan split, there were two units had claimed to be 
the IV Corps. The principal figure was, however, the corps commander Li Jishen. Li 
was a native of Guangxi, an exceptional non -native commander, who had risen to top in 
the Guangdong Army. When Huangpu was established in 1924, Li was the deputy 
commandant and became the head of the Military Training Department although he 
was not active in these posts. Nonetheless, he did accept large number of Huangpu 
55' Harold Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1961. The IV Corps had the only Communist unit commander Ye Ting who commanded an Independent 
Regiment. In fact, it is likely that the IV Corps had the highest concentration of regular Communist 
officers, other than political party representatives, of any unit, although the I Corps had also a sizeable 
contingent. 
ssz Ibid., p. 609. 
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graduates into his units, the only unit apart from the 1 Corps to do so. When the 
expedition began, Li stayed behind with two of the unit's four divisions. Other 
commanders of the IV Corps include Zhang Fakui, Huang Qixiang, and Miao Peinan. 
Of the four divisions made up of the IV Corps in 1926, each expanded to a larger size 
or became a corps. 
The V Corps 
Of all the military groupings in Guangdong, the V Corps was the most 
colourful. Made up primarily of Guangdong smugglers and pirates, the unit was 
commanded by Li Fulin who was an ex- pirate. This force did not participate in the 
Northern Expedition but remained behind in Guangdong. It appears that it was most 
probably enrolled in the National Revolutionary Army only to present it from allying 
with any of the Guomindang's enemies outside the province. During the Guangdong 
civil wars of 1927, this force was taken over by Xu Qingtang, a senior officer of the IV 
Corps. Li Fulin was a Guangdong native who had no formal military education. He 
had a long history of association with Sun Yatsen, however, and had participated in one 
of Sun's earlier attempts at overthrowing the Qing government at Annam A member 
of. the Tongmenghui since 1907, Li had also participated in most of the early Northern 
Expeditions. Li was ousted in 1927 and fled to Hong Kong but returned to rally his 
subordinates after the Japanese invasíon.553 
The VI Corps 
The VI Corps was the first unit to join the National Revolutionary Army since 
August 1925. According to He Chengjun, the basis of this force was a unit he had 
commanded in Fujian during an earlier Northern Expedition in 1923 -1924, comprising 
officers from Hubei and troops from Fujian. This unit was renamed the Attack Hubei 
Army (Gong- E-fun) in 1925, when it was commanded by Cheng Qian.554 In January 
1926, this unit was designated the VI Corps with Cheng still in command. The unit 
was quite complicated, as it shared neither school nor provincial ties. But it was 
5" For Li Fulin, see Chuanji wenxue, XXX: 6 (June, 1977), p. 129; "Guomin gemingjun di wu jun 
shilue" (A brief history of the V corps of the national revolutionary army), Guangdong wenxian 
(Documents on Guangdong), IX: 1 ( March 1979), 52 -55. 
sin He Chengjun, Bashi huyi (Recollections at 8C), Taibei: privately printed, 1961, p. 39. Donald 
Jordan claims that the VI Corps was a Hunanese force that had been defeated and taken over during the 
Second Eastern Expedition. Jordan, The Northern Expedition, p. 24. It is possible that the Hunanese 
force Jordan is talking about was added to the Gong -E jun. 
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distinguished by having the highest percentage of officers, who were from the Japanese 
military schools graduates, within its officer corps. Cheng Qian was a Hunan native 
and Qing dynasty xiu cai who had also studied in Japan. Like Tan Yankai, Cheng 
began his early career in Hunan, hut was ousted from the province in one of its 
internecine wars in 1920. He eventually made his way to Guangzhou where he joined 
Sun Yatsen. Cheng served in a variety of high -level positions in the Nationalist 
Government at Guangzhou, including Minister of War.sss 
This unit had a somewhat mixed background and may well have been an 
amalgam of several different units. It did not do well during the Northern Expedition. 
Prone to operate without orders, it suffered heavily in the first, abortive attack on 
Nanchang and was later blamed for instigating the Nanjing Incident.'S6 With the 
Nanjing -Wuhan split, and VI Corps also split. Cheng led part of the unit, presumably 
the Hunanese half, back to Wuhan, while the remainder stayed with Nanjing. 
The VII Corps 
The first six corps of the National Revolutionary Army were units in 
Guangdong which had been with the Guomindang in early campaigns. The VII and 
VIII Corps, on the other hand, joined the National Revolutionary Army only just prior 
to the Northern Expedition. In fact there were never present in Guangdong throughout 
the Northern Expedition. The inclusion of these two units was based on political as well 
as military considerations. 
While military preparation was underway in Guangdong, political preparation 
for a northern expedition was also moving ahead. One task was to bring neighbouring 
Guangxi province into the fold, and another was to find supporters in Hunan province 
to the north. The elections of Li Zongren and Huang Shaohong as reserve members of 
the Guomindang Central Supervisory Committee and the National Government Council 
signified an intra- provincial alliance in the making, since Generals Li and Huang, 
together with Bai Chongxi, had only recently established their authority over Guangxi. 
555 Chuanji wenxue, XXIX: 5 (May 1976), p. 123; Wu Xiang -xiang, "Cheng Qian wanjie bujie" 
(Cheng Qian lost his integrity in his later years), Chuanji wenxue, XVI: 4 (April 1970), 17 -22. 
sse In the Nanjing Incident, the 19th Division of the VI Corps refused to obey Chiang's order to 
move north from Nanjing. As a result, Chiang ordered the removal of its commander and the unit's 
disarmament. Jiang zongtung milu (The secret diary of president Chiang), Taibei: Zhongyang ribao, 
1975, I: 112, 121 -122, 152. 
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On 26 January, after the close of the second Guomindang National Congress. a high - 
level delegation from the National Government, escorted by General Bai_ arrived in 
Wuzhou on the border between the two provinces to confer with the Guangxi 
leadership about bringing the province into the National Government system. General 
Bai returned with the delegates to Guangzhou, and on 17 February the Political Council 
appointed him, together with Wang Jingwei, Deng Yankai, Chiang Kaishek.. T.V. Song, 
and Li Jishen as members of a commission to work out details of political, financial, 
and military unification of Guangdong and Guangxi ss7 
The lack of unity and standardisation among the original six corps of the 
National Revolutionary Army was exacerbated in March 1926 when the Central 
Political Council of the Guomindang passed three resolutions providing for the 
unification of the Guangdong and Guangxi under the Nationalist Government at 
Guangzhou.558 On 24 March, Guangxi accepted the designation of its two armies as the 
VII Corps, thus becoming the first and the largest unit to join the National 
Revolutionary Army outside Guangdong. 
Guangxi military leaders comprising Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi and Huang 
Shaohong, who had expelled units professing loyalty to Wu Peifu in Guangxi recently, 
led the VII Corps. So the new leaders of Guangxi had a common enemy as 
Guangzhou. The Guomindang, weak as it was, could at least recognise the new 
leadership and confer on it a sort of legitimacy.559 Most importantly, in the short run, 
Guangxi offered them an ally against Hunan, a province still loyal to Wu, and the 
province where most of their enemies had fled. 
The alliance of Guangdong and Guangxi, however, was more apparent than real, 
the Guangxi leaders jealously guarded their autonomy throughout the Northern 
Expedition.560 The VII Corps was, despite of the poverty of the province, a remarkable 
force, well commanded and well trained. The officer corps, bolstered by provincial and 
557 Li Zongren, Li Zongren huiyilu (The memoirs of Li Zongren), Hong Kong: Nanyue 
chubanshe, 1986, chapters 14 and 19; Guo Tingyi, Zhonghua minguo shishi rizhi (Historical chronicles 
of the Republican China), vol. 2, entries for 26 January and 17 February 1926. 
658 
"Resolutions on the Unification of Government, Military and Finance between the Guangdong 
and Guangxi, 13 March 1926 ", Zhonghua minguo dangan ziliao huibian, 2: 910 -912. 
"9 Diane Lary, Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925 -1937. London 
and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974, p. 58. 
560 'bid, 60 -62. 
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school ties, was young and highly nationalistic. Notably, the VII Corps had only a 
small percentage of officers educated outside the province, and none outside the 
country. 
The VII Corps played a key role in all the crucial battles and campaigns of the 
Northern Expedition, the only unit to do so. With the IV Corps, it led the way through 
Ilunan in 1926 and fought the battles along the Hunan-Hubei border. With the I Corps, 
it defended Nanjing against the Sun Chuanfang's counterattack at Longtan in 1927. 
Later that year, it was responsible for the leading the "Western Expedition" against 
Tang Shengzhi and Wuhan. By early I928, the VII Corps controlled not only its native 
Guangxi, but also Hunan and Hubei. During the process, the VII Corps expanded and 
added more four corps. Thus, by the end of the expedition, the Guangxi leaders still 
controlled the largest military force within the National Revolutionary Army, larger 
even than that controlled by Chiang Kaishek. Due largely to this, Guangxi strongly 
resisted the 1928 disbandment and was the first group to revolt against Nanjing in 
1929. 
During the period of its existence, the VII Corps was commanded first by Li 
Zongren and later by his long -time subordinate Xia Wei. Li was a Guangxi native who 
had graduated from Guangxi Military Primary School before going to Guangxi Rapid 
Course Academy. Thus, Li had ties to Baoding schoolmates, via the military primary 
school, and other Rapid Course graduates. Li rose within Lu Rongting's Guangxi Army 
until its defeat in 1921. Then, he spun off to become an independent local militarist. 
During 1923 -1924, Li established ties with the leaders of the Guangxi Model Battalion. 
All were Baoding graduates -- Bai Chongxi and Huang Shaohong. The Li -Bai -Huang 
group, as it came to be called, was a triumvirate of three talented men who worked well 
together until the early -1930s when Huang opted to go with Nanjing. During the 
Northern Expedition, Li commanded the VII Corps, Bai acted as Chiang Kaishek's 
chief of staff and chief strategist, while Huang remained behind to control the base. 
During the Nanjing -Wuhan split, Li placed himself firmly on the side of Chiang 
Kaishek and helped He Yínggín purge his I Corps. Still, Li guarded the autonomy of 
both his army and his province closely. He refused to accept Huangpu graduates and 
.l 
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was the most successful of the corps commanders in limiting the influence of the 
political Party representatives sent from Guangzhou.' 
The VIII Corps 
While Guangzhou was busy recognising and re- designating its military units, 
civil war had broke out in neighbouring Hunan. On 1 June 1926, Tang Shengzhi, a 
local warlord who commanded the 4th Hunan Division, enrolled in the National 
Revolutionary Army as commander of the VIII Corps, after being defeated in the 
Hunan civil war. He was the first warlord to join the National Revolutionary Army. Of 
all the units that joined the National Revolutionary Army during the Northern 
Expedition, this unit was usually treated by as the most important, supposedly because 
it made the National Revolutionary Army's invasion of Hunan possible. And it is 
usually supposed that Tang's decision was forced upon him by the mass movements 
that were shaking the province at the time. 
In fact, Tang's manoeuvre had little to do with mass movements but a great deal 
to do with the inner working of the Hunan political scene. Donald Jordan who had 
conducted a thorough review of mass movements, concluded that Tang's decision was a 
typical warlord -like manoeuvre in a warlord war.562 Following his defeat, Tang went 
hat in hand, to Guangzhou looking for help that many there were loathe to provide. 
Thus, the notion of the National Revolutionary Army poised on the Hunan border and 
prepared to fight its way into the province, but fortunately assisted by Tang's timely 
defection, is probably not correct. It is more likely that the National Revolutionary 
Army eased into the Northern Expedition, by taking advantage of Tang's problems to 
go North via Hunan rather than using the traditional invasion routes through Jiangxi or 
Fujian. 
It was clear in 1925 that Tang, then the commander of the 4th Division, was 
ready to seize all of Hunan. His division was the largest of the four indigenous units 
that had been organised in the province since the ouster of Tan Yankai, now the 
commander of the II Corps, in 1923. The governor of the province was Zhao Hengti, a 
b' This is according to Li, who also notes that the 150 graduates of the Four CIass who were sent 
to his units as probationary officers were haughty undisciplined and would not obey orders. Li Zongren 
huiyilu (The memoirs of Li Zongren), p. 193. 
562 Donald A. Jordan, The Northern Expedition: China's National Revolution of 1926 -1928. 
Honolulu, USA: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976, 70 -74. 
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provincial warlord, who had organised the effort to expel Tan, but Zhao only ruled the 
province through the concurrence of the four division commanders, only one of whom 
was actually Zhao's subordinate. The other three were local warlords. Zhao in turn, 
was nominally subordinated to the overlord Wu Peifu, who had little real power in the 
province. 
If Tang's plan had succeeded, the Northern Expedition would in fact have had to 
fight its way into Hunan, or at least take the more traditional route north. Thus, 
Guangxi leaders, whose province also bordered Hunan, but not Jiangxi or Fujian, 
bombarded Guangzhou with a stream of messages urging the Guomindang to take 
advantage of the situation.563 It was fortunate that they had been in touch with Tang 
since 1925. This Guangxi pressure increased after Tang visisted Wuzhou secretly in 
January 1926, to discuss the upcoming campaign with the Guangxi leaders and with 
Tan Yankai, the commander of the II Corps.564 On 18 February, Tang sent delegates 
directly to Guangzhou but little is known of the visit.565 By this time, Guangxi leaders 
had emerged along with Chiang Kaishek and Tan Yankai, as the most vocal supporters 
of the Northern Expedition, which was still opposed by the Russian advisers.366 
Apparently assured of at least southern neutrality, Tang began to move in mid- February 
and advanced from Hengyang to Yuezhou within two weeks without the help of mass 
movements or political workers. Zhao Hengti fled the province on 26 February 1926.56' 
In possession of the provincial capital, Tang appealed to Wu Peifu, and not 
Guangzhou, to legitimatise his victory by naming him the governor. But Wu, who had 
earlier encouraged Tang's revolt, now betrayed him and refused to recognise him. 
5e3 Li Zongren. Li Zongren huiyilu (The memoirs of Li Zongren). Recorded by Tang Degang, 
Hong Kong: Nanyue chubanshe, 1986, 143 -145. 
sba Zeng Shengzhai, "Wo yu Tang Shengzhi ti junshi guwen" (I and Tang Shengzhi military 
adviser), Yiwenzhi, 30 (March 1968), p. 28. 
565 Hu Nai'an, "Jiushi xinyi" (Old things and new ideas), Chuanji wenxue, IX: 6 (December 1966), 
39 -40. 
sóó Jordan claims that Guangzhou had signed an alliance with Tang in February but provides no 
evidence for it. Jordan, op. cit., p. 72. This claim seems unlikely given the split in Guangzhou. What 
Tang probably wanted from Guangzhou was not an alliance but a pledge of neutrality, or a promise that 
Tan Yankai would not move into southern Hunan while Tang was attacking the north. If so, Guangzhou 
could cheerfully assent. It had no intention of using Tan's marginal force. Diane Lary states that Guangxi 
was making false claims about such an alliance. Diana Lary, Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in 
Chinese Politics, 1925 -1937. London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976, p. 65. 
567 Zhang Chunyi, op. cit ( ?); Li Pinxian, "Rongma shengya" (A life in the military), Zhongwai 
zazhí, XV: I (November 1973), p. 49. Li was one of Tang's top subordinates at the time. 
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Moreover, Wu ordered Tang to withdraw to his original base, and named Ye Kaixin 
commander of the "Protect Hunan Army ". It was ordered to re- invade Hunan and oust 
Tang. Wu went so far as to place some of his Hubei units under Ye.568 Tang refused to 
vacate Changsha and declared himself governor of Hunan on 25 March. On the same 
day, Tang met with two more delegates from the Guomindang: Bai Chongxi, deputy 
commander of the Guangxi VII Corps, and Chen Mingshu, a division commander in 
the IV Corps. But this meeting did not produce any help for Tang as the Russian 
advisers continued to oppose a northern expedition. Lacking anyone to legitimatise his 
conquest of Hunan, and outnumbered by a reinforced Ye Kaixin, Tang withdrew from 
Yuezhou and in early April from Changsha. By late April, Tang had retreated to his 
original base area.569 
The Hunan civil war provides a good example of warlord warfare and politics at 
work. Despite the large number of soldiers who had advanced and retreated over large 
areas, there had been almost no fighting. In fact, there may have been as many public 
telegrams sent as bullets fired. The war was one of manoeuvre and perception, and the 
results were determined even before any fighting took place. Because Tang's force was 
larger than Ye's, Tang had advanced and Ye had retreated. After Ye's troops had been 
reinforced, Ye had advanced and Tang had withdrawn. Finally, there had been little 
evidence of loyalty involved on the part of the various local warlords all of whom acted 
in self -interest. [The only exception may be Ye Kaixin who had withdrawn from 
Hunan with his superior Zhao Hengti. The characteristics of Chinese warlord warfare 
will be discussed in the next chapter.] 
With Tang now retreating back towards the Hunan- Guangxi border, Li Zongren 
responded, apparently without the permission from Guangzhou, and began to move 
troops into Hunan, some two months prior to the official "launching" of the Northern 
Expedition. The first unit as part of Li Jishen's IV Corps from Guangzhou was 
dispatched to Hunan in early June.57° 
56a Li Pinxian, op. cit., 49-50; Zhang Chunyi, op. cit. 
s69 Li Zongren, op. cit., p. 145; Zhang Chunyi, op. cit., 591-592. 
svo Li Zongren, op. cit., 145 -6; Li Pinxian, op. cit., p, 51. The ease of these units' move into Hunan 
clearly suggests that Guangxi and Guangdong had already seized the control of the passes between their 
provinces and Hunan either during Tang's advance or earlier. Thus, there is no reason to believe that 
Tang's defection helped the National Revolutionary Army "cross, unopposed, the difficult Nanling 
mountains ", as claimed by Donald Jordan, op. cit., p. 277. 
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After Li Zongren's units arrived in Hunan, Tang who was still opposed by Ye 
Kaixin, agreed to enrol in the National Revolutionary Army. He accepted the 
designation units under his control as the VIII Corps with himself as commander. 
Despite the claims of some, Tang was of little value to the National Revolutionary 
Army. He would stay in Hunan and Hubei, and even there would do little fighting. 
This was typical of almost all of the local warlords who joined the National 
Revolutionary Army, just as it had been the case during the entire warlord era. A year 
later, however, Nanjing would change the rules, move on the local warlords like Tang 
and break them up. 
The VIII Corps was a purely provincial force with the bulk of its officers from 
only a few xian. In addition, the unit was also bound together by school ties with many 
Baoding schoolmates and classmates within its ranks (see tables 14 and 15). 
During the Northern Expedition, Tang Shengzhi and later By Li Pinxian 
commanded the VIII Corps. Tang, like most of his subordinates, was a native of Hunan 
and a Baoding graduate. He had risen within the Hunan Army and had participated in 
the various wars to drive the non -Hunanese (waishengren) from the province and 
establish its effective independence. During the period of his tenure, Tang expanded 
his control from Hunan into Hubei and part of Anhui. Li Zongren drove Tang from 
power during the 1927 Western Expedition. After his abortive 1929 rebellion, Tang 
went into retirement until the war with Japan. Li Pinxian, also a Hunan native and 
Baoding graduate, took over the unit in 1927. When this unit was reorganised as the 
51st Division in 1928, Li remained in command and joined Tang's 1929 revolt. After 
this was defeated, Li went to Guangxi and joined the Guangxi clique.`57' 
Commanders' Political Orientation 
It is interesting to note the Russian advisers evaluated commanders and their 
units in terms of political orientation at the start of the Northern Expedition. 
Cherepanov recalls that they still considered Chiang Kaishek's I Corps and Huangpu, as 
the Guomindang's centrist mainstay, although Chiang had greatly weakened the 
Communist and Leftist influence at the academy after the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident. 
The Russians were concerned about the embryo of a pro- Japanese clique led by I Corps 
commander He Yingqin and his deputy, Wang Boling, a principal leader of the Rightist 
57' Li Pinxian, op. cit., passim. 
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Society for the Study of Sun Wenism.s' Blagodatov ( "Rollan" ), who was transferred to 
Guangzhou after the Second Guominjuns defeat in Henan in early 1926, estimated that 
the I Corps and Huangpu together comprised 20,000 men. Although Huangpu had 
begun evolving toward the Right, Blagodatov cites the Political Department's estimates 
showing that 60 -70 percent of Huangpu students belonged to the Left. The I Corps' 
political apparatus, however, was in the hands of members of the Society for the Study 
of Sun Wenism.S73 S.N. Naumov ( "Kalachev "), appointed adviser to Huangpu in 
November 1925, asserts that Communists and Leftists were still in dominant positions 
at Huangpu, where he says there were 400 Communists.574 
Russian advisers regarded Tan Yankai's II Corps, Zhu Peide's III Corps, and 
Cheng Qian's VI Corps, as a Leftist grouping. Cherepanov recalled that these three 
corps held the most favourable attitude toward the advisers. II Corps was led according 
to relatively "democratic principles" of leadership. The Russians considered III Corps 
commander Zhu Peide a Leftist; he had drastically changed his attitude toward Chiang 
after 20th March and spoken against him Political work was expanded in these three 
corps. According to Cherepanov, Tan Yankai requested for Communist political 
workers in his units. Political workers in each of his regiments were increased from 
three to ten. Forty to forty -five workers staffed the III Corps' Political Department. 
Communists who had left the I Corps were assigned to Cheng Qian's VI Corps at his 
request.575 A Chinese Communist source confirms that many political workers in the II 
Corps's Political Department headed by Li Fuchun and the VI Corps's Political 
Department headed by Lin Zihan were Communists.i76 Both Li and Lin were leaders of 
the Chinese Communist Party. 
572 Cherepanov, Severnyi Pokhod Natsional'no-Revoliutsionno Armü Kitaya, 110-112. 
Blagodatov, A. V. Zapiski o kitaiskoi revolutsii, 1925 -1927 gg (Notes on the Chinese 
revolution of 1925- 1927). Moscow: "Nauka ", Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Institute of Oriental 
Studies, 1970, p. 139. 
574 Naumov, S. N. "The school at Huangpu." Sovetskiie Dobrovoltsy v Pervoi Grazhdanskoi 
Revolutsionnoi Voine v Kitae; Vospominaniia (Soviet volunteers in the first revolutionary civil war in 
China; reminiscences) , 126 -139. Akademia Nauk SSSR. Institut Norodov Azii. Moscow. Izdatel'stvo 
Vostochnoi Literatury, 1961, p. 136. 
575 Cherepanov, Severnyi Pokhod Natsional'no-Revoliutsionno Armii Kitaya, 110-114. 
ne Hu Hua. Zhongguo xin minzhu zhuyi geming shi (A history of the Chinese new democratic 
revolution). 2nd ed. Guangzhou: Xinhua Bookstore, 1951, p. 71. 
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Blagodatov estimates that this "so- called Leftist group" comprising the three 
corps, and led by Tan Yankaí, totalled thirty thousand men, most of whom were not 
natives of Guangdong. The group had connections with the Guomindang Left -wing. 
Those who refused to accept Chiang's dictatorship leaned on it. The commanders of the 
three corps were connected through the Baoding Military Academy,' the prestigious 
military school in North China. Baoding's graduates held many of the senior posts in 
both the National Revolutionary Army and (Beiyang) militarist armies during the 
Northern Expedition. 
According to Cherepanov, Russian advisers considered the IV and V Corps, 
together with the two corps that had recently declared allegiance to Guangzhou- -the VII 
Corps of Guangxi leader Li Zongren and the VIII Corps of Hunanese Tang Shengzhi -- 
"more to the Right." However, they classified Bai Chongxi, another Guangxi leader 
who served as acting chief of staff of the National Revolutionary Army, as a Leftist. In 
their view, the fighting efficiency of the IV Corps under Li Jishen's command was 
second only to the I Corps'.578 The IV Corps resented the I Corps' privileges, 
Blagodatov said. Its commanders were hostile to the peasant and labour movement, he 
alleged. The IV and VII Corps were connected through Baoding ties and were joined 
by the VIII Corps as well as the VIIII and X corps, which had just been incorporated 
into the National Revolutionary Army, In Blagodatov's view, this grouping lacked 
political leadership because Li Jishen was too "colourless ". The V Corps joined none 
of these groupings. Its commander, Li Fulin, who did not hold a high Party post, joined 
the Right and had ties with local landlords and merchants.579 
In a separate report dated 9 August 1926, the Russian adviser revealed anxiety 
about the commander of the VIII Corps, Tang Shengzhi's loyalty to the National 
Government.580 On 30 July, less than three weeks after the occupation of Changsha, 
577 Blagodatov, op cit., p. 139. 
578 Cherepanov, op. cit., p. 112. 
s'9 Blagodatov, op. cit., p. 140. 
580 
"Nefedov's Report on the Eighth Army, (9 August 1926) ", Document 66, Missionaries of 
Revolution, 765 -766. Nefedov (Pavlov) was the military adviser to the Tang Shengzhi's VIII Corps 
shortly before the Northern Expedition began. This report was compiled barely two months after the 
appointment of Tang as the commander of the VIII Corps. 
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Tang organised the Hunan provincial government and assumed the post of chairman. 
I -le was concurrently the commissioner of military affairs.581 
The VIII Corps also expanded rapidly through the incorporation of defecting 
units. The Russian adviser reported that Tang had carried out his policy of organising 
and training twenty -eight regiments. Should the National Government fail to appoint 
him to the highest position, he would sever connections with the National Government. 
This possibility depended on the reaction of parties opposed to him and on his ability to 
form alliances. Tang was already talking about the idea of separation, but barring 
unforeseen circumstances, the Russian adviser thought it unlikely that he would break 
away at Wuhan. But after the occupation of Wuhan by the National Revolutionary 
Army, the relative strength of all parties concerned prevented such an eventuality.552 
The same report was also severely critical of Liu Wendao, the Guomindang 
Party Representative to the VIII Corps and head of its Political Department. Tang's 
former schoolmate at Baoding, Liu had played a significant role in gaining Tang's 
initial adherence to the National Government. In late 1925, he had gone to Hunan to 
persuade Tang to join forces with the National Revolution and in the following January 
had gone to Guangzhou to serve as a bridge between Tang's army and the National 
Revolution Army.583 Shortly after, Chen Mingshu, commander of the 10th Division of 
the IV Corps, and the Guangxi leader General Bai Chongxi, both also Tang's 
schoolmates at Baoding, had visited Hunan. The Russian adviser reported that the VIII 
Corps actually did no Guomindang work. Liu Wendao engaged in other activities. He 
was not closely connected with the Guomindang and was extremely hostile to the 
Chinese Communist Party. He had no confidence in the Political Department and did 
not trust its personnel, suspecting many to be Communists. The Russian adviser 
identified him with a group of officials who had connections with compradors, as 
í8' Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 30 July 1926, p. 631. Early in June, while Tang was being 
rescued by the National Revolutionary Amy units, he organised a provisional provincial government at 
Hengyang and assumed the chairmanship. Ibid., 4 June 1926, p. 595. In his report, Nefedov, the Russian 
adviser whom Bliukher had sent to Hunan, described Tang as lively, resolute, and radical in speech. He 
acted with great determination and promoted Buddhism in his army. Nefedov apparently conducted a 
thorough investigation, for he observed that while Tang forbade smoking on the grounds that he himself 
did not smoke, he must have been hypocritical because two fingers on his right hand were "stained as 
dark as smoked sausages ". Document 66, op. cil., p_ 766. 
582 Ibid. 
583 Ibid., 765 -66; for Liu Wendao, see Wu Xiangxiang, Minguo bairen zhuan (One hundred 
biographies of the republican period), 3: 154, 141, 137. 
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hostile to the Chinese Communist Party. He believed they exercised influence over 
Tang. The various cliques within the VIII Corps, on the other hand, were unimportant 
because they were all loyal to Tang and held moderate opinions.584 
Organisation of the Corps 
The Russian advisers had also reported in detail the organisation and conditions 
of units in the National Revolution Army prior to the Northern Expedition. It 
comments that there was no uniform organisation of the army corps in the National 
Revolutionary Army. The corps was the largest unit and was designed to carry out an 
independent military mission or warfare on a large sector of the front.' The corps 
should have three divisions, each made up of three regiments, each regiment of three 
battalions, and so on through company to platoon (see table 16). However, some of the 
corps had only two divisions, others three, still others four, and their numerical strength 
varied from twelve thousand to twenty -three thousand. Subordinate to the corps 
commander were the divisions, the Corps Staff, a Political Section, and a Gendarmerie 
Battalion. Subordinate to the chief of staff were the Administration of Supplies, 
Engineering section, Communications section, and a sanitary section. In some army 
corps there was an regiment, others only an Artillery Battalion. The strength of the 
artillery battalion varied greatly among the corps, and it seemed impossible to transfer 
guns from one corps to another.586 However, the overall combat service support for the 
corps was extremely weak. There were no cavalry or engineer arms in the National 
Revolutionary Army. The communications arms could only provide radio, lines and 
field telegraph among corps and between corps and the higher headquarters services. 
The division was more definitely and uniformly organised than the corps. As a 
unit, the division comprised exclusively of infantry. It had supporting arms for 
machine guns and small engineering and communications sections with no technical 
584 /bid., p. 766. The Russian adviser observed that, however, like other groups, the Baoding 
Clique was not a strong organisation. Formed as a result of jealousy of Chiang, it might be divided into 
leaders and followers. The important elements were Tang and his army and Chen Mingshu. Nefedov 
warned that Soviet policy toward Tang was not clear. The Russians should not miss any opportunity to 
defend their objectives. 
585 The following are based on the Russians' appraisals of the Nationalist military forces in March 
1926. "Organisation of an Army Corps and Its Component Units ", Document 32, Missionaries of 
Revolution, 632 -33, provides a description of the organisation of the army corps of the National 
Revolutionary Army prior to the Northern Expedition. 
586 "Organisation of an Army Corps and Its Component Units ", Document 32, op. cit., p. 632. 
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equipment. The regiment was also well -defined with three battalions or sixteen 
companies. Each regiment had a machine gun company but the number of machine 
guns varied. This was dependent on the total number of machine guns available to the 
army corps. Machine guns were at the disposal of the regimental commander, and in 
wartime they were distributed to the platoons of battalion. The regiment was organised 
as a fundamental fighting unit which could fulfil an independent mission.' As for the 
VII and VIII Corps which joined the National Revolutionary Army only in March and 
June 1926, they still retained their original organisational structure and unit designation 
(see table 14). 
Staff Officers 
Staff officers trained in modern warfare were in short supply except in the I 
Corps which had a staff officer system since the summer of 1925.588 In most of the 
corps headquarters army staff offices merely had clerical functions. There were few 
properly trained chiefs of staff or staff officers in the National Revolutionary Army. 
Staff organisation at corps, division, and regiment IeveI was still being created and they 
could perform only minimal duties. These were: to keep elementary personnel records; 
to introduce some system inio military preparations; to systematise intelligence data; to 
utilise auxiliary troops effectively; and, most importantly, to direct lower units as fully 
as possible and maintain close liaison with the higher -unit staff. Even these "most 
simple duties" could not yet be done properly since the work was so new and they were 
short of trained personnel, who could keep to the habit of executing orders exactly.589 
A separate report describes the characteristics of the officers of the National 
Revolutionary Army. About three hundred Baoding alumni served in the South, 
making up the majority of the regimental commanders and general officers. They had 
their separate association and club. There were also graduates of the provincial military 
academies, such as Jiangsu and Yunnan. The latter was considered the best of the 
provincial schools. A few higher officers had been trained in Japan. About eight 
hundred junior officers were graduates of the Huangpu Military Academy. They were 
mostly platoon, company, and battalion commanders, and they were the majority in the 
I Corps and in the Independent 2nd and 20th Divisions. The Russians describe them as 
"' Ibid., p. 633. 
58B "Organisation and Functions of Army Staffs ", Document 33, op. cit., p. 634. 
589 Ibid.. Document 33, p. 635. 
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"having revolutionary spirit, energy, and impetus, they greatly differ from the rest of 
the officers ". Among them, according to the Russians estimate, that 6 percent of the 
Huangpu graduates were Communists. Junior officers in other corps apparently were 
graduates of the six -month courses given in separate schools of each unit.590 
The material conditions of the officers were unsatisfactory. Salaries were 
seldom paid in full or on time. The average officer received no more than $30 to $40 
per month, which "inevitably drives officers to embezzlement of public funds." There 
were no prescribed rules for promotion, support of families, pensions, etc., though plans 
were being drafted. The monthly pay scale of officers in the I Corps ranged from $40 
to $50 for a second lieutenant, upward to $216 to $240 for a colonel. The implication 
appears to be that officers in the I Corps actually received markedly higher salaries than 
those in other corps.59' 
Troops of the National Revolutionary Army 
The National Revolutionary Army troops were the product of past militarist 
practices and of the current recruitment system, according to Russian reports which 
gave some interesting details.S92 Generals of extra -provincial armies in Guangdong 
always preferred to recruit soldiers from their native provinces rather from Guangdong. 
They believed such troops could not desert with rifles, as they were unfamiliar with the 
Guangdong dialect. They could scarcely exist outside their military units. Officers 
were also recruited from the general's home province and were closely linked to the 
men. Such officers usually "followed their 'boss,' the fellow countryman- general." The 
influence of this system persisted to some extent in the II, III, IV and V Corps, and 
some generals still incorporated officers and men who had surrendered or been taken 
prisoner593 into their units. 
Recruitment was decentralised. Each corps commander, and even some division 
commander, arranged for the recruits he needed by sending recruiting agents with funds 
to specific regions in the central and northern provinces. In Hunan, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, 
$90 Ibid., p. 627. 
591 "Characteristics of the Officer Personnel of the Army ", Document 30, op. cit., p. 628. 
592 "Characteristics of Enlisted Personnel ", Document 31, op. cit., 629 -631. 
s93 Ibid., p. 629. 
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and Anhui recruitment had to be done secretly. The agent would bring or send his 
recruits to Guangzhou in groups of one or two hundred, at a cost of fifteen or twenty 
dollars per man. The majority of higher and middle ranking officers also believed that 
Guangdong men made poor soldiers and were so provincial in outlook that they would 
fight only to defend their province. Hence, most generals thought it best to use 
northern troops for the prospective northern campaign.'" This turned out to be a gross 
miscalculation of Guangdong men's fighting ability as seen in major battles of the 
Northern Expedition involving the IV Guangdong Corps (this will discuss in the next 
chapter). 
The recruitment system in the central and northern provinces had not been able 
to provide better quality soldiers. Agents hired men without careful selection so that 
"there are many men in the army who are sick, physically weak, and unfit for military 
service" according to a Russian's report. It states that previously, professional soldiers 
had been recruited but now "workmen, peasants, unemployed coolies and also brigades 
are being enlisted." Criminal and depraved elements were getting into the armies.'95 
The Russian's report also gave considerable information on the health of the 
NRA's troops596 which was far below expectation. About 5% suffered from beriberi as 
a result of their poor diet, while about 2% had malaria and 1% suffered from dysentery. 
There were many other diseases that had been discovered. The only groups that had 
been carefully examined were the students of the Huangpu Military Academy. Out of 
5,790 men examined, 15 percent were found fit only for inactive duty, and 153 had to 
be dismissed altogether.597 Considering that the students were in better condition than 
the troops, a greater percentage of the troops would be found unfit for military service. 
The I Corps was made up largely of men from Zhejiang (General Chiang 
Kaishek's home province) and from Jiangsu, Anhui, and Shandong.SB Yet, there were 
differences among the divisions. The 1st Division, the one formed from the original 
594 Ibid. 
595 Ibid., 630. 
596 "Report on Sanitary Conditions in the National Revolutionary Army of the Canton 
Government as of March 15, 1926 ", Document 34, op. cit., 636 -639. The author of Document 34 
apparently was a Russian physician in the National Revolutionary Army. 
59] Ibìd., p. 638. 
598 "Characteristics of Enlisted Personnel ", Document 31, op. cit., p. 629. 
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Training Regiment at Huangpu, comprised mainly of Zhejiang and Jiangsu men.56 The 
3rd Division was a mixture of natives of Hunan, Guangdong, and Anhui, while the 14th 
Division was from Guangdong. The II Corps was made up entirely of Hunan men, 
General Deng Yankai's province, and recruitment continued there. The III Corps was 
largely Yunnanese, reflecting General Zhu Peide's nativity. The IV Corps consisted of 
Guangdong natives, though its commander, Li Jishen, was a native of Wuzhou, 
Guangxi. General Li Fulin's V Corps was a native of Guangdong, while the VI Corps 
under the Hunan general, Cheng Qian, had a mixture of Hunan. Guangdong. and Hubei 
troops, a result of a recent reorganisation."' 
The pay scale I Corps soldiers ranged from $10 a month for a second class 
private to $20 for a sergeant. In several other corps the pay scale was lower. A solider 
receiving $8 a month would have $5 or $6 deducted for his maintenance. Nevertheless, 
"for many of them, two or three bowls of rice a day and clothing is, in comparison with 
their former condition of living, a very alluring prospect." Yet, "although the food and 
equipment of the soldiers are comparatively sufficient, the lodging conditions and 
especially regularity in pay are far from satisfactory"."' 
The training of the troops was completely unsatisfactory, according to another 
Russian's report. This was due to "the absence of proper instruction, the inertness of 
the old officer personnel and especially the ignorance and inexperience of the junior 
officers," who had graduated from the various southern academies. Drill regulations 
and textbooks on tactics had been compiled from German and Japanese materials 
dating from the beginning of the century. Each corps trained its troops according to its 
own program, but left the work to the junior officers, resulting in an "irrational waste of 
time ".ó02 Too much time was spent on drill for the parade ground or on lectures to 
illiterate Chinese soldiers rather than on shooting and battle drill, the Russian 
s9v For the recruitment of the Training Regiments, see Chen Guofu. "Jianjun shi zhi yi ye (One 
page in the history of creating the army)." Deming wenxian (Documents on the revolution), 1458 -1461. 
in it, Chen gives a graphic account of recruiting in Zhejiang, Anhui and Jiangsu, and the need for 
secrecy, and of the difficulties in shipping recruits from Shanghai to Guangzhou during early 1925 and 
April 1926. After which Chen turned over his responsibility to others. His organisation had recruited 
more than 4,000 new troops at an average cost (including losses of men spired away by other 
commanders) of a little more than S21. 
600 Ibid., p. 629. 
fi01 Ibid., p. 630. 
G02 "The Training of the National Revolutionary Army for War ', Document 29, op. cit., 623 -26. 
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commented. For example, a two -hour battles in which 10,000 -11,000 cart-idges were 
fired might result in only ten to twenty casualties or even less. The author of the report 
also cited statistics of the low standard of marksmanship from the results of target 
practice: at one hundred metres only 10 percent hit the target; at seventy metres, SO 
percent missed. This was due to improper instruction but also to the bad condition of 
the rifles G03 In the Russians opinion, worst of all, was the neglect of training for actual 
combat. Troops were not taught to report battle situations properly and as a result the 
commander was never exactly informed about the enemy. Communications between 
units was very inefficient and mutual support between units inadequate. Soldiers were 
not taught to adapt themselves to terrain. Tactical exercises were carried out in a 
routine and careless manner.600. The Russian adviser predicted that it would be most 
difficult to improve war training. It was not merely a matter of issuing new programs 
and instructions, but of retraining the officers. The report concluded with a note of 
despair that as a result of two years' work by the group of Russian instructors, "very 
little has been accomplished ". The report explained this by the fact that much of the 
time had been spent in campaigning, and only since the end of the last Eastern 
Expedition in Guangdong had it been possible "to take this matter systematically in 
hand ". Since then, regulations regarding training were being prepared and a plan of 
military exercises with necessary instructions was almost completed. It recommended 
that unless there was "at least one adviser to a division no substantial results can be 
expected from this work ".605 
The Guangzhou Arsenals 
The Guangzhou Arsenals located about sixteen kilometres outside the city, was 
considered to be the third largest in China. The small arsenal in the northern part of the 
city had been taken over after the defeat of the Yunnan Army. According to the 
Russians, the production sections the arsenals reported their combined monthly 
capacity as: 1,100,000 cartridges, 800 rifles, 4 machine guns, and 400 artillery shells. 
They could repair 300 rifles, 6 machine guns, and 2 cannons a month. The capacity 
would be increased by installing machinery that had been purchased previously and by 
603 Ibid., p. 625. 
b04 Ibid., 625-6. 
ws Ibid., p. 626. 
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other machinery taken over from Chen Jiongming`s arsenal at Shantou.506 It is evident 
the according to this estimates that the arsenals at Guangzhou simply could not meet 
the need of the National Revolutionary Army in several years, even with a somewhat 
enlarged capacity. 
The Air Force 
Apart from the eight army corps, the National Revolutionary Army had also a 
small aviation service in Guangdong. The aviation service was started by Sun Yatsen 
in 1916 but the progress was slow. By the time the Russian advisers had arrived in 
1924, they found a confused situation 60' After a fire had destroyed all the equipment, 
four German instructors had been engaged and steps had been taken to purchase some 
machines. A tiny squadron of two Curtis trainers and one hydroplane was created. 
Outfitted with bombs, which were "mostly of no use," the planes took part in all the 
previous two years campaigns during the previous two years, demonstrating to the 
Chinese generals "the boundless possibilities afforded by this branch of the service.o609 
In June 1925, when the Guomindang Political Council confirmed the 
reorganisation plan for the armed forces, it decided to allocate half a million dollars 
from the military budget for the organisation of the air service, and to send a 
commission to the Soviet Union to seek support for the purchase of machines and for 
training.609 The council also decided to create a commercial aviation service between 
Guangzhou and Shantou and Guangzhou and Wuzhou. The "Friends of Aviation" 
Society was organised to raise money; it succeeded in gathering about $25,000, to 
construct an aerodrome.610 A Junker 13 passenger plane was purchased from the Soviet 
bob See Document 26, p. 612. This report states that supplementary equipment for the arsenal was 
ordered in 1923 and arrived in Guangzhou by end of 1924. But the government lacked Ch$1,500,000 to 
pay for the equipment, it remained in warehouses until the end of 1925. The government intented to pay 
for the equipment and install it at the beginning of 1926. 
bo' "Aviation." Missionaries of Revolution, Document 35: 640 -643. 
b" Another document written a few weeks earlier said that only two of the four available plans 
could fly, and their range was no more than 10 to 15 kilometres. See "Report on the National 
Revolutionary Army and the Kuomintang, Early 1926. ", op. cit., Document 26: 607. 
609 "Aviation ", Document 35: 641 -3, op. cit.. 
515 In a report to the Second National Guomindang Congress on 9 January, it states that overseas 
Chinese had contributed to the Aviation Society, the amount is as follows: HK$12,914, Guangzhou 
$20,146, and Francs 32,895. See Zhongguo Guomindang di yi, er ci quanguo daibiao dahui huiyi shiliao 
(Minutes of the First and Second National Congress of the Guomindang), 1: 231, the Chinese Second 
Historical Archives, Jiangsu: Guji chubanshe, 1986. 
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Union and was "quite suitable for flying in Guangdong province for propaganda 
purposes." The Russian adviser on aviation L. Grey expected with the province's 
improved financial situation, it would be possible to establish civil air lines in the near 
future.° 
The work of military aviation was proceeding in two directions: training of 
personnel and purchase of machines. Six men were sent to Russia for training in 
September 1925. A preparatory training school was set up in Guangzhou with the 
"modest task" of training pilots for the Curtis machines. Two German officers gave the 
instruction, and a mixed Russo -Chinese squadron was established. It would be 
commanded by a Russian aviator and consist of Russian fliers and instructors, with the 
Chinese performing auxiliary service.' 
The Russian adviser L. Grey stressed the great potential importance of aviation 
for the coming northern military campaign: to provide liaison between corps and 
divisions, to photograph enemy locations and provide photographic substitutes for 
maps, to demoralise the enemy and heighten the morale of the Nationalist troops, to 
bomb and strafe the enemy, protect lines of communication, suppress counter- 
revolutionary movements in the rear, etc. He then recommended the purchase of forty - 
six planes of three types to be formed into three squadrons, and sending thirty to forty 
students to Russia for training, especially in the auxiliary services613 immediately. 
The war diary of the National Revolutionary Army records that the commander - 
in -chief Chiang Kaishek inspected the Russian aircraft on 21 July 1926. It was a large 
aircraft (presumably a bomber) and the Russian pilot was very skilful according to the 
diary.614 During the Northern Expedition, Guomindang sources also report the Aviation 
Bureau move to the front (or outskirts as the source calls it) of Wuchang on 6 
September. It credits the planes positive contributions in bombing, reconnaissance, and 
distribution of leaflets although it does not mention the pilots were Russians.615 Two 
186. 
61 "Aviation ", Document 35: 641, op. cit.. 
612 Ibid., 640, 642; also Vishnyakova -Akimova. Dva Goda v Vosstaysheme kitae, 1925 -1927, p. 
613 
"Aviation ", Document 35: 641 -2, op. cit.. 
614 Beifa zhengzhong riji, 21 July 1926, p. 19. 
615 Geming wenxian: 12: 1991-1992. 
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Russian aviators Sergeev and Kravtsov took part in the battle of Wuchang. Sergeev 
states that they left Shaoguan on Bliukher's order to Wuchang front in mid -September 
1926. Their main task was throwing bombs, distributing leaflets, and firing machine 
guns from an altitude of fifty metres to disperse enemy concentrations at city gates. In 
general, the air attack had helped the National Revolutionary Army in breaking 
through the walled -city, boosted the morale of own troops and caused panic among 
enemy troops.616 However, another report, mentions that although eight aviators were 
at the front line, they did not fly because of the lack of plane and that they were not 
"instructed well enough ".617 
The Navy 
The Guangdong government's navy was also in a dilapidated state, according 
to L. Grey.618 In 1926, there were forty -four vessels in the active fleet, eleven of them 
sea - going. Most had not been repaired on dry dock for a decade, but now this work 
was being carried out as finances and political conditions permitted. The army also had 
a great variety of cannons and machine guns, but some of the cannons were completely 
obsolete. Only half the shells and three- fourths of the machine -gun cartridges were 
good for firing. Machinery and ship bodies had not been repaired since the ships were 
built and were falling into decay. It would take a year and cost $20,000 to put them 
into shape. This fleet, nevertheless, carried out several missions. Some gunboats were 
assigned to corps commanders in distant parts of the province. Some, under the direct 
command of the Military Council, were suppressing pirates in the delta and on the high 
seas. Other gunboats were blockading Hong Kong in conjunction with the Strike 
e7e 
"Aviation ", Document 35: 642 -3, op. cit.; Sergeev,, V. "Reports of the senior aviation advisers 
of the National Revolutionary Army Sergeev on the action of the aviation in the northern expedition, I 
March 1927 ". Istoricheskii Arkhiv, 4 (1959): 126. 
617 "Kostuchenko's Report on the Bureau of Aviation and General Plan for the Organization of 
the Air Services in the National Revolutionary Army ", Document 71, 3, 7; op. cit.; also Bella 
zhengzhong riji, 22 August 1926, p. 67. 
61g "The High Sea and River Patrol Fleet of the Kuomintang Government." Missionaries of 
Revolution, Document 36: 644 -653. Document 36 gives details about the southern fleet as it was early in 
1926. This information which probably cannot be found in any other source. After forty- eight days of 
work within the southern navy, L. Grey wrote a devastating report on the condition of the ships, their 
guns, and the officers and crews. In his own words, "As it is at present, with its worthless ships, its rotten 
machinery, and its incompetent personnel, the whole Chinese fleet is an obsolete thing, capable only of 
political blackmailing, of opium traffic, and of extorting money by all means from the population and 
the merchants. It is unable to give battle...because of the condition of its armament and the moral 
character of its personnel ", ibid. Doc 36: 652. 
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Committee, and guarding the sea approaches to Guangzhou. The remainder were under 
repair or waiting their turn. 
Grey hoped that a strong nucleus of a navy could be created in the South which, 
the rest of the Chinese fleet could be formed in the future. He seems to have modelled 
this on how the Huangpu Military Academy and its training regiments had been the 
nucleus from which the I Corps of the National Revolutionary Army had grown. He 
insisted that school for officers and training courses for sailors must be arranged at 
Guangzhou and E- Iuangpu. The alternative, he felt, was to wait until bases of the fleet in 
North China had been taken by land, and it is clear he was not recommending this, 
because training classes had already begun. 
A class for 100 signalmen would open on 25 March, and classes for 
artillerymen and engineers would begin Iate June. These were for sailors from the 
ranks or recruits from the Seamen's Union. But their educational work department 
faced familiar difficulties: lack of textbooks on naval subjects in Chinese, and 
prospective teachers who had studied in a variety of naval academies abroad had no 
practice in teaching. Still, Grey was hopeful that some results would be achieved to 
form the basis of educational work in the future navy.619 
As for the accomplishments, according Grey, the southern fleet, which only 
recently had consisted of seven groups under seven commanders, was united. Party 
representatives (commissars) had been appointed in principal ships. Arrangements had 
been prepared for strikers and Communists to replace part of the crews, though so far, 
the only Communist in the fleet was the chief of the Naval Political Council 
(Bureau).620 However, there were seventeen Communist political workers in the 
navy.621 The staff had been organised according to European standards, and higher 
officers were being trained for staff work. Budgets and plans had been prepared for 
schools and training courses, and a schedule for repairs of seagoing vessels had been 
made. A special commission was examining enlisted personnel, and a vigorous 
campaign had been mounted against graft and theft. It was now possible to keep the 
work of some sections of the staff secret. A Political Section had been organised, most 
619 Ibid., Doc 36: 651. 
620 This probably refers to the appointment of Li Zhilong. 
621 "Number of Members of the Chinese Communist Party in the National Revolutionary Army." 
Missionaries of Revolution, Document 43: 685. 
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of its work being done on the gunboats, and a club for officers had been organised by 
the Political Section.622 
Grey predicted many future difficulties in the future attempt to revive the fleet 
and its efficiency. In fact he had developed the greatest contempt for the Chinese naval 
officers. He alleged 'the difficulties are not only of a financial character but they result 
also from the incompetence of the staff and of the government as a whole in naval 
matters.... In general, it may be said none of the officers knows his business 
theoretically or practically and, as a matter of fact, none of them deserves to be called a 
naval officer, not only in regard to ability, but also with respect to his moral character ". 
They were opium smokers and grafters, he charged, and were counter -revolutionaries 
not for political but for material reasons. He thought they knew absolutely nothing of 
tactics, astronomy, navigation, artillery, mines, shipbuilding, mechanics, and other 
naval sciences. Senior noncommissioned officers of long experience performed these 
special functions. The officers received good salaries and knew they could not find 
employment in the commercial fleet because of their ignorance, so they "stick to the 
navy like a louse to the skin." It was not easy to dismiss an officer. But Grey believed 
they must be replaced as soon as a new contingent could be trained in a naval academy 
that would open soon.623 
Overall, the navy did not play an active part in the Northern Expedition except 
two naval concentrations conducted on the east coast, one at Fuzhou and other at 
Shanghai. The deployment of ships at Shanghai was particularly crucial as they could 
have prevented the possibility of enemy disrupting military crossing or transport of 
troops on the lower Yangzí.624 
The Military Budget for the Northern Expenditure 
The Guangdong government had been in the red for many years and the 
financial situation was especialIy critical during 1925 -1926, the period of launching the 
Northern Expedition (see table 17). The Guangdong government's military budget had 
also reached a critical point in 1926 consuming fourth -fifth of the entire provincial 
622 The High Sea and River Patrol Fleet of the Kuomintang Government." Missionaries of 
Revolution, Document 36: 652 -3. 
623 ibid., Doc 36: 653; 649 -50I. 
624 Geming wenxian, 12: 1780 -9; Belfa zhanshi, 1: 62 -8. 
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revenue (see table 18). From 1915 to 192I, the military budget was between 
$11,377,000 and $23,593,000, with an average of $17,481,636 per annum. 1923 -1924 
was the lowest with only $8,815,000 and $6,208,000 respectively. This was the period 
of division in Guangdong where most of the province was dominated not only by Chen 
Jiongming and his supporters but also the regional armies friendly to the Guomindang. 
This situation was corrected in 1925 after the launching of the First Eastern Expedition 
and the suppression of Yunnan- Guangxi generals. The military budget increased from 
$35,943,000 in 1925 to $83,266,000 in 1926. The main expenditures went to the 
expansion of the National Revolutionary Army and the financial aid to the armies 
supporting the Guomindang. According to the Finance Minister Song Ziwen's report to 
the Central Committee on 9 November 1926, 78.28% of the Guangdong government 
expenditure inl925 -26 went to the military. Other than the National Revolutionary 
the Guomindang contributed monthly to the VII and VIII Corps $200,000 and 
$400,000 respectively. It also assisted Feng Yuxiang's army with $500,000 monthly 
and to those armies defected to the Guomindang in Henan and Fujian.625 
Finances were a perpetual problem throughout the Northern Expedition and it 
later became a source of conflict between the Wuhan Left Wing and Chiang Kaishek at 
Nanchang. On 21 December 1926, Chiang wired Finance T. V. Song and Deng Yanda 
to pay the VIIII and X Corps in western Hubei immediately. On 24 December he wired 
Song informing him that VII Corps troops in Hubei had mutinied for lack of pay and 
asked Song to devise measures to maintain regular payment to the army. The next day 
Chiang wired Song complaining that the Central Bank in Guangzhou had declined to 
pay the army on the grounds that it must await Song's return to Guangzhou. Chiang 
stated that the delay appeared intentional. In a second wire to Song the same day, 
Chiang asked whether it was true, as reported by He Yingqin in Fuzhou, that the I 
Corps' expenses henceforth must be raised in Fujian and that the Finance Ministry 
would stop payment as of 1 December. On 31 December Chiang wired Song, 
requesting him to supply funds immediately for the previous and current months. He 
emphasised the gravity of the situation and urged Song not to base his attitude toward 
the National Revolutionary Army's corps on his attitude toward Chiang himself.626 
625 Geming wenxian, 20: 167 -168, for Song Ziwen's report to the Central Committee; Guangdong 
sheng difeng caizheng (The Guangdong financial policy), II: 394 -417, for detail of the expenditure. 
626 Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, entries for December 21, 24, 25, and 31, 1926, in 856 -860; 862- 
866; 874 -5. 
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Chi Hsi -Sheng argues that financial constraints could have also affected the 
strategy of the National Revolutionary Army during the Northern Expedition.627 Purely 
logistic calculations probably would have led the Guomindang to mount the expedition 
along the Guangzhou -Hankou railway. But the financial centres in lower Yangzi delta 
were probably valued more than the industrial assets in Wuhan. Significantly, the most 
loyal units were assigned the task to take Shanghai through the provinces of Fujian and 
Zhejiang even though the transportation system along the route was quite backward. In 
addition, he further argues that financial calculations also might dissuade the 
Guomindang leaders from seeking a destruction of all their opponents along the 
expedition's path. Instead, they aimed at annihilating only a few intransigent foes. In 
the short run, it definitely appeared to be cheaper to buy the alliance of opposing 
militarists than to destroy them 628 
The seizure of the lower Yangzi delta, however, failed to produce a fundamental 
change in the Guomindang's financial position. The National Revolutionary Army 
continued to experience frustration in its effort to fill up its war chest. Consequently, 
the government was able to plan a very limited campaign against the warlords still 
entrenched in North China, and declared itself victorious as soon as Beijing was taken, 
even though the entire Manchuria and many other provinces remained beyond the 
effective power of either the Guomindang army or civil administration. 
Russians' Attitudes towards the Northern Expedition 
The Russian military advisers had mixed reactions to the 1926 Northern 
Expedition. Although those who were present in Guangzhou generally accepted the 
necessity of a northern Expedition they differed in their views about the timing and 
contents of the campaign. The Russians' views were fully expressed during the 
Bubnov Commission's visit in Beijing in early 1926.629 
627 Chi Hsi -sheng. "Financial Constraints on the Northern Expedition." Conference on the Eariy 
History of the Republican of China, 1912 -1927, 249 -69. Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 
Taibei, 20 August 1983.. 
626 Ibid. 
629 Andrey Sergeyevich Bubnov, who used the pseudonym "Ivanovsky" in China, had been an 
important political commissar in the Red Army during the civil war in Russia, and had been appointed 
head of the Central Political Administration of the army in 1924. The secret mission that he headed was 
to study the work of the Russian aid missions in China and to recommend policy for the future. Other 
members of the commission were also members of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist 
Party. They were I. I. Lepse, representative of the All -Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the 
Profintern, N. A. Kubyak, secretary of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Bolshevik (All -Union Communist 
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In February, Borodin and three of the most experienced military advisers in 
Guangzhou, Tereshatov, Cherepanov, and Sakhnovsky ( "Nilov ") went to Beijing to 
report to the Bubnov Commission. Sakhnovsky, who had been in Guangzhou since 
June 1924, stated his belief that within two or three months the National Revolutionary 
Army could launch a successful campaign into Central China, and then it could liberate 
Beijing. Nikolai Tereshatov, one of the first military advisers to reach Guangzhou, 
believed a year of political preparation in Guangdong and neighbouring provinces, as 
well as an accumulation of weapons and supplies, would be needed first. A. I. 
Cherepanov, the source for this report on the Bubnov inquiry. stated that a northward 
campaign must be accompanied by an uprising of the peasantry, but that the "national 
revolutionary united front ", as he called it, lacked a precise agrarian program to bring 
on such an uprising.63o 
According to Cherepanov,631 Borodin believed it was necessary first to promote 
an agrarian revolution, for, in his opinion, "the chief bulwark of imperialism in China 
and particularly in Guangdong, was the medieval land -owning system, and not the 
warlords." He fully realised the tremendous difficulties he would face in persuading 
the Guomindang to support such a revolution; to do so it might be necessary to split the 
party and drive out its conservatives. Yet, he argued in favour of a northward campaign 
on two grounds. First, if Wu Peifu were victorious in his wars in the North, the British 
would be sure to try to set him on Guangzhou; and second, the economic situation in 
Guangdong had so improved as a result of recent military campaigns, strengthening of 
the government, and stabilisation of finances, that many Guomindang members had 
Party), and R. V. Longva, an officer with a distinguished military career, who later became the military 
attache in Beijing. See Cherepanov, A. L .Severnyi Pokhod NatsionaPno- Revoliutsionno Armii Kitaya 
(Zapiski Voennogo Sovetnika) 1926 -1927, p. 16; As Military Adviser, p. 175; 
Vishniakova -Akimova, Two Years in Revolutionary China, 1925 -1927, p. 239; Jacobs, Dan N. 
Borodin: Stalin's Man in China, p. 193. 
630 See Cherepanov, op cit., 16 -21; As Military Adviser, 181 -182. Cherepanov apparently was on 
Borodin's side who believed the Northern Expedition should be both political and military at the same 
time; whereas Bliukher seemed to be more interested in concentrating on military matters first before 
politics. 
ós' Cherepanov describes Borodin's views because Borodin allowed him to see the report he 
intended to give to the commission. The report is still retained in an archive in Moscow, and both 
Cherepanov and the modem Russian scholar, R. A. Mirovitskaia, studied it. Cherepanov, Ibid., 24 -30; R. 
A. Mirovitskaia, "The First Decade." Leninskaia Politika SSSR v Otnoshenii Kitaya (The Leninist policy 
of the USSR with regard to China), 20 -67. Moscow: "Nauka ", 1968, p.38; and "Mikhail Borodin 
(1884 -1951)." Vidnye Sovetskie Kammunisty- Uchastiniki Kitaiskoi Revolutsii (Outstanding Soviet 
Communists 
-the participants in the Chinese revolution) , 20 -40. Moscow: Akad. Nauka SSSR, Institut 
Dal'nego Vostoka, "Nauka ", 1970, 33 -37. 
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concluded that now was "a time for resting." They were ready to forget the "National 
Revolution" for the sake of enriching themselves; hence, it was necessary to get the 
Guomindang out of Guangdong. In his report to 1'lubnov on the necessity of an 
agrarian revolution to accompany the Northern Expedition, he explains "It is necessary 
to pursue a policy to ensure that along its entire route of advance the army would carry 
out measures that would bring the peasantry to its feet and attract it to our side." He 
argued it would be up to the expedition either to solve the agrarian question, or at least 
begin to tackle it. "It is one thing to smash the generals, but to start changing land 
relations and the system of taxes is incomparably more difficult.... Here one may 
encounter the resistance of whole classes." After his return to Guangzhou, he would 
work out a program for agrarian revolution that would differentiate the coming 
Northern Expedition from Sun Yatsen's previous campaigns. His projected program 
also included strengthening the Left Wing in the Guomindang and in the army; work 
among the peasants; strengthening the trade unions and infiltrating them with 
Communists; the growth and improvement of the Communist Party; and concentrating 
that party's efforts on its main tasks, one of which would be participation in the 
organisation and carrying through the Northern Expedition.632 Clearly, this agenda 
would take much time to execute; it was not an argument for haste in launching a great 
political -military campaign. 
The Bubnov Commission's final conclusion was that the conditions for a 
northern expedition had ripened and that it was necessary to prepare for a move to the 
North in six months. According to Mirovitskaia, Bubnov's report recommended to 
Moscow that it satisfy all of Guangzhou's requests.633 The Russian arms supplies were 
sent to Guangzhou from Vladivostok in May and June 1926. These included 13,694 
rifles, 11 million cartridges, 65 machine guns, 12 mountain guns, 9 guns and 9 
airlanes.634 The cost amounted to 564,148 roubles, payable on delivery, The supplies 
did not include spare parts for artillery and munitions.635 Six Russian ships regularly 
632 Mirovitskaia, R. A. Soviet Volunteers in China, 1925 -1945, p.45. 
63 Mirovitskaia, R. A, "The First Decade." p. 50. 
634 See Mirovitskaia, R. A. "The First Decade ", 49 -50, which based on Soviet archives. Chiang 
Kaishek, however, mentions that Russian supplies arrived on 6 July, in Jiang Jieshi nianpu, p. 607. 
Another source by A. Yurkevich which quotes from A. Kalyagin's On Foreign Road, p.13, that between 
October 1924 and October 1926, the USSR shipped 24 aircraft, 157 field cannons, 48 mountain cannons, 
128 mortars, 295 machine guns, 73,993 rifles and other armaments and materials to Guangzhou. See 
"The Huangpu Military School and the Chinese Revolution." Far Eastern Affairs, 1985, 4: 101. 
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plied between Vladivostok and Guangzhou loaded with oil, arms, and disassembled 
planes."6 
Other than the situational factor, the Russians' support for a northern Expedition 
was also motivated by self interest. One result of the decision to launch the Northern 
Expedition was the opportunity it provided for Russian advisers to expand their work. 
Their activity had been sharply curtailed after the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident. as one 
of the Russian advisers put it, "they almost did not let us work" at the Huangpu 
Academy."" Once the preparation for the Northern Expedition was underway, the 
Russian advisers were actively taking part in the work of drawing up plans and making 
other arrangements for the northern campaign. 
The CCP's Participation in the Northern Expedition 
The Chinese Communist Party's leadership initially also opposed to the 
National Government's decision to launch the Northern Expedition, but it soon changed 
course and directed Party members to arouse farmers to support the campaign. In its 
Second Enlarged Plenum convened in Shanghai from 12 to 18 July 1926, the Central 
Committee of the CCP deliberated a multitude of problems confronted by the party 638 
Among them, most immediate problem was the CCP's policies toward the Northern 
Expedition. The leadership of the party was divided on this issue639 
The Central Committee's Political Report adopted at the July Plenum 
questioned the Guomindang government's decision to launch a full -scale Northern 
635 Soviet Plot in China, p. 61. The draft of a telegram to Borodin dated 27 August 1926, lists the 
supplies already concentrated or to be assembled in a week's time at Vladivostok. The telegram 
apparently sent by the Russian military attache in Beijing, Egorov. The currency is not indicated. 
636 Vishníakova- Akimova, Dva Goda v Vosstaysheme kitae, 1925 -1927: Vospominania, p. 177. 
637 See "Reports of Senior Artillery adviser Borodin on the Northern Expedition of the National 
Revolutionary Army of China." Istoricheskii Arkhiv, no. 4 (1959): 105; Cherepanov, A. I. Severnyi 
Pokhod Natsional'no- Revoliutsionno Armii Kitaya, p. 120. 
638 The original Chinese documents of the Second Enlarged Plenum of July 1926 have been found 
among the Beijing Raid papers. These include the Central Committee's political re[ort and twelve 
resolutions. The following discussion of the CCP's policies toward the Northern Expedition is based on 
the documents 1, 53, 58 of the Missionaries of Revolution. 
fi19 The Russian reports that there was no unanimous opinion among the CCP members. Certain 
organs and comrades opposed it and other members supported it. See "A Brief History of the Chinese 
Communist Party", Document 1, op. cit., p. 470. 
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Expedition. "In the South, the dispatch of the forces of the National Government 
signifies nothing more than a defensive war against the anti -Red army's penetration into 
Hunan and Guangdong. It does not signify a real revolutionary northern expedition "64° 
The Central Committee stand reflects Chen Duxiu's article entitled "The National 
Government's Northern Expedition" (Lun guomin zhengfu yu belfa) published a few 
days earlier in the CCP organ Xiangdao zhoubao. In it, Chen argues that judging from 
the National Government's political position, its army's strength, fighting capabilities, 
and revolutionary understanding, the time had not arrived for a revolutionary northern 
expedition. He then concluded that the present problem was not how to carry on the 
Northern Expedition but how to defend against Wu Peifu's southern expedition, the 
anti -Red armies invasion of Guangdong, and the anti -Red activities of compradors, 
local bullies, bureaucrats, and the Right Wing within the Guomindang.641 The Central 
Committee's attitude is reflects in the Enlarged Plenum's documents, which contains 
only one explicit reference to the Northern Expedition.TM2 
The CCP Central Committee's position evoked opposition from some of its 
leaders. According to Chang Guotao, a majority of the Central Committee at the 
Plenum, including Chen Duxiu and Peng Shuzhi, Chen's protege who headed the 
Propaganda Department, did not think highly of the expedition and doubted that the 
National Revolutionary Army could reach Wuhan. But Chang, Tan Pingshan, and Qu 
Qiupai demanded positive participation in the campaign."' Qu, in fact, believed that 
the CCP should strive for hegemony during military operations.644 Tan Pingshan 
advocated using the expedition for the primary purpose of spreading agrarian revolution 
throughout China.645 The Communists in Guangdong also generally supported the 
64° "Political Report of the Central Committee ", Document 53, op. cit., p. 723. Li Yunhan refers to 
the document as Chen Duxiu's political report in Cong ronggong dao qingdang, 2: 599. 
64' Chen Duxiu, Lun guomin zhengfu yu beifa (The National Government's Northern Expedition), 
Xiangdao zhoubao, no. 161 (July 1926), 1584 -85. 
642 In one document it states that Communist must use various events such as May Thirtieth and 
the Northern Expedition for propaganda tours in the countryside to organise farmers's associations and 
similar groups. See 'Resolutions on the Peasant Movement ", Document 58, op. cif., p. 749. 
643 Chang Kuo -t'ao (Guotao), The Rise of the Chinese Communist Party, 1921 -1927, 2: 526. 
64 Bernadette Yu -ning Li, A Biography of Ch'u Ch'iu -pai (Qu Qiupai): From Youth to Party 
Leadership (11899-1928), p. 178, citing Qu's Zhongguo geming zhong zhi zhenglun wenti, 1st ed., April 
1927, 112, 170. 
bas North and Eudin, ed., M.N. Roy's Mission in China, p. 35, which based on Roy's interview 
with Robert North in 1951. 
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campaign.' Mao Zedong called for organisation of farmers during the expedition. At 
a meeting of the Guomindang's Farmers' Movement Committee on 30 March 1926, he 
proposed a motion to devote careful attention to the farmers' movement in the 
provinces to be crossed by the National Revolutionary Army.54 
The Central Committee had more than those reasons advanced by Chen Duxiu 
for opposing the Northern Expedition. A major factor was its weakness relative to the 
Guomindang led by Commander -in -Chief Chiang Kaishek. The resolutions of the 
Guomindang CEC Second PIenum in May 1926 restricting Communist activity in the 
Guomindang had brought about sweeping changes at the Guomindang's Central Party 
Headquarters. The organisational outline of the Commander -in- Chiefs Headquarters 
published the next day placed all units of the army, navy, and the air force under the 
Commander -in- Chiefs command Article g invested in him the power of direction over 
military, civil, and financial organs of the National Government.648 Zhang Guotao 
memoirs indicate that the CCP began to cultivate its own armed forces after the 
Zhongshan Gunboat Incident. The CCP transferred more than forty Communists to the 
Independent Regiment of the IV Corps as junior and middle -ranking cadres. Ye Ting, 
the commander, was a Communist who kept his party affiliation secret. Before the 
regiment set out for Hunan in May, Zhang instructed Communist members of the unit 
to establish contact with underground CCP organs in various localities and raised 
money for the purchase of weapons and ammunition for the regiment. Russian advisers 
also did whatever they could to strengthen the regiment 649 
Confronted with the danger of party division over the issue of the Northern 
Expedition, the Central Committee of the CCP changed its attitude toward the Northern 
Expedition shortly after the July plenum. In a directive to correct divisions within the 
646 Chang Kuo-t'ao, op. cit., 1: 526; Cherepanov, Severnyi Pokhod Natsional'no-Revoliutsionno 
,4rmii Kitaya, p. 143. 
607 Stuart R. Schram, Political Leaders of the Twentieth Century: Mao Tze -tung, England: 
Penguin Books, 1966, p. 88. 
648 Geming wenxian, 12: 1801-02. 
649 Chang Kuo -t'ao, op. cit., 1: 526 -27; Zhou Shidi, a Communist officer of the Independent 
Regiment, states that after the establishment in the winter of 1925, all new soldiers and many cadres 
above the company level were Communists. See "Zhou Shidi huiyìlu ", reprint in Huangpu junxíao 
shiliao, 327 -28. For the Russians' aid to the Independent Regiment, see Cherepanov, op. cit., p. 181. 
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Party regarding the campaign, it declares that unity was essential and that the peasantry 
should be aroused to support the expedition.65° 
Although the Chinese Communist Party was eager to convert military men and 
had organised the League of Military Youth in 1925 for that purpose, the Party 
apparently was slow in creating an organisation among its military comrades to 
compete with the Guomindang nuclei in almost all units of the National Revolutionary 
Army 651 The Communist Party had a secret Military Section in the Guangdong 
Provincial Committee and the Shanghai Central Committee (one of its functions was to 
guide the nuclei of the Communist Party which existed as illegal organisations in 
southern armies) but much of its work was directed toward enemy armies and local 
paramilitary forces 652 
On the eve of the Northern Expedition in July 1926, the Central Committee 
criticised the ineffectiveness of the Party's military work "our organisation appears to 
be a study group," it complained.653 "Although our comrades' attention has most 
recently been directed to the military movement, they tend to emphasise manoeuvring 
high- ranking military officers" instead of "systematically preparing for armed 
uprisings." The Party urged its members should try to organise soldier's cells in 
"reactionary militarist" (warlord) armies, arsenals, and ordinance bureaus.65a 
In the plenum of the Central Committee held in December 1926, however, the 
Party made the decision to build nuclei in the army but only among commanding 
officers and not the rank and file. The Russian could have influenced the decision. 
Voitinsky, the Comintern's chief representatives to the Chinese Communist Party, 
opposed such policy by saying that Moscow had decided against organising 
Communist nuclei in the National Revolutionary Army. The main reason was "the fear 
us 
"A Brief History of the Chinese Communist Party ", Document I, op. cit., p. 470. 
6' Document 3, "The National Revolutionary Army: Short . History of its Origin, Development, 
and Organisation (to March 1926), op. cit., p. 488. 
652 Its efforts were mostly directed towards enemy forces or assisting in the creation of workers' 
and peasants' armed groups. Document 44, "The Military Section Attached to the Provisional 
(Provincial) Commission of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party", op. cit., 686 -88. 
6s) Document 65, "Resolutions on the Military Movement ", op. cit, 762 -63. 
bs4 Ibid., p. 763. 
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of revolutionising the army which pervades some party leaders.ió'J Behind that fear, no 
doubt, was the cardinal policy of the Comintern's Executive Committee, accepted by 
the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, to work within the structure of 
the Guomindang and avoid "premature differentiation " --that is, the inevitable inter- 
party conflict. Discovery of Communist activity, particularly organisational activity, 
within the National Revolutionary Army would intensify the hostility of the 
Guomindang's Centre and Right wings, and even of Leftist allies, a prospect the 
Communist Party's Central Committee greatly feared. 
In conclusion, with the exception of the I Corps, the National Revolutionary 
Army prior to the Northern Expedition was a very diverse regional force resembled 
warlord armies in the South China at the time. In terms of the command structure, the 
commander-in-chief had a direct command of the I Corps and general control of the rest 
of the army corps. The Party representatives appointed by the Guomindang assisted the 
corps command, and Russian advisers were assigned to the each corps. However, the 
personal and provincial nature of corps composition would allow the commanders of 
the corps to continue exercise personal control of their units. In this sense, each of the 
unit was very much an independent entity. 
The overall National Revolutionary Army's strength and weaponry was weak as 
compared to its opponents. Among the units of the National Revolutionary Army, only 
three of the original eight corps, the I Corps, IV Corps and VII Corps, had the fighting 
capability. During the Northern Expedition, these three units would do most of the 
fighting (will be discussed in detail in next chapter). The leadership of these three 
corps would be decisive in determining the direction of the Guomindang revolution. In 
addition, as the fighting capability depended much more on the human elements- -the 
fighting spirit, unit cohesion and leadership --than on technology, the requirements of 
the Russian expertise for modern warfare would be less important than its arms 
supplies. 
Although the hard- pressed provincial financial budget and Russian aid were 
sufficient to maintain the original units of the National Revolutionary Army, it could 
not sustain the war for long or maintain the ever -expanding army of the Guomindang. 
655 Nassanov, N., N. Fokine, and A. Albrecht. "The Letter from Shanghai, March 1927." 
Problems of the Chinese Revolution, 397 -432. Leon Trotsky. New York: Paragon Book Gallery, 1966, 
421 -423. 
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The Russians and the Chinese Communists were forced by circumstances to 
launch the northern expedition in the hope of increasing their presence and influence in 
some units of the National Revolutionary Army. Their influence was particularly 
strong in the IV Corps. Apart from this unit, their influence was very limited. 
The National Revolutionary Army's officer corps had been an important and 
decisive factor. Through the school ties and teacher -student relationship, these officers 
had their own internal network to forge temporary unity. They shared a common 
nationalistic ideology such as the belief in a unified China and an active role of the 
military in national affairs. The alliance of the Guangdong -Guangxi was a 
manifestation of the officer corps trained in the same military academies that shared a 
similar outlook and concern for the political situation in China. However, most of them 
were also realistic to recognise that their immediate interests lay in the control of their 
own province and a friendly relationship with its neighbours. To a great extent, the 
launching of the Guomindang's Northern Expedition was a direct result of the VII 
Corps, the Guangxi units, involvement in the affairs of its neighbouring Hunan border. 
The commander of the VII Corps sent its troops there even before the Guomindang in 
Guangzhou made the decision. During the Northern Expedition, the IV, VII, and the I 
Corps did most of the fighting. The success of the Northern Expedition would depend 
very much on these units' performance and above all the commitment and co- operation 
of the officer corps in these units. 
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Chapter 7: The National Revolutionary Army and the Northern Expedition 
On 9 July 1926, the Guomindang officially launched the Northern Expedition. 
Once under way, the Northern Expedition split into three fronts. The first important 
action occurred on the Hunan front. The IV, VII and VIII Corps of the National 
Revolutionary Army accompanied by the Russian advisers and many left -wing 
Guomindang and Communists first moved into Changsha and then struck toward the 
inland city of Wuhan, the main power base of Wu Peifu. With Wuhan under seizure, 
the main central column, under Chiang Kaishek's command, marched into Jiangxi 
Province and made for Nanchang and then Nanjing. Finally, a coastal column under He 
Yingqin, comprising the I Corps, followed through Fujian and Zhejiang. By April 
1927, the National Revolutionary Army took Hunan, Hubei, Fujian, Jiangxi, Anhui, 
Zhejiang, and parts of Jiangsu within the first nine months 656 The expedition was 
disrupted following the Nanjing -Wuhan confrontation but was resumed in early 1928. 
By the end of 1928 and after Zhang Xueliang pledged his allegiance to the National 
government in Nanjing, China was nominally under the banner of Guomindang. 
The success of the Northern Expedition in 1926 -28 has attracted many scholars' 
interests on the subject. Harold Isaacs advanced that the success of the Northern 
Expedition was political. He states that "...the masses of ordinary people rose in a 
veritable tidal wave that swept the expeditionary armies to the banks of the Yangtze 
[ Yangzi]. The spontaneous rising of the people gave the Kuomintang [Guomindang] 
armies little more to do other than occupy the territories that had already been seized 
for them.i657 This view has since been strongly disputed. Most notably by Donald 
Jordan who concludes in his study of mass movements during the Northern Expedition 
that its military aspects were more important than admitted even by the participants 
themselves.65s 
It is not the intention of this chapter to examine the Northern Expedition of 
1926 -1928 in its entirety. Instead, its primary aim is to look at the role of the National 
'56 Beífa jianshi (A brief battle history of the northern expedition), Taibei: Guofangbu shizheng ju, 
41 -99; Beifa tongyi (The northern expedition and the unification of China), edited by Chiang Wego, 1: 
7 -8; 3: 119 -120, 122 -138. 
657 Harold R. Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1961,p.111. 
658 Donald A. Jordan, The Northern Expedition: China's National Revolution of 1926 -1928. Honolulu, 
USA: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976, p. xi. 
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Revolutionary Army in the expedition. As the last chapter is devoted to examining the 
conditions and battle readiness of the National Revolutionary Army, this chapter will 
focus on the performance of the National Revolutionary Army in the Northern 
Expedition. It aims to examine two key questions. Despite being a smaller political - 
military group in the South, why did the Guomindang launch the Northern Expedition 
in 1926? Why was the Nationalist Revolutionary Army able to defeat the two powerful 
militarists Wu Peifu and Sun Chuanfang, which had a total strengths of three times the 
National Revolutionary, in central and southern China? Through the discussion of 
these questions it hopes to shed light on the contribution, strengths and weaknesses of 
the National Revolutionary Army. 
Launching the Northern Expedition in 1926 
Since 1917, Sun Yatsen had wanted to organise a military campaign to reunite 
China. He envisioned such a military expedition would start from his base in 
Guangzhou, unite progressive elements along the way, and together they would strike 
northward against entrenched militarism and foreign imperialism. Sun in this lifetime 
had organised two northern expeditions but with little success. Various reasons 
attributed to it, chief among them was his dependence on mercenary warlord armies and 
the Guomindang was too weak to challenge the northern militarists (see previous 
chapters for details). 
Sun Yatsen's ambition to reunite China by force provided the general 
motivation but not specific reasons why another northern expedition was conducted in 
July 1926. The specific factors for launching the Northern Expedition in 1926 could be 
found in the military situation of mid- 1920s. Arthur Waldron, in his recent work, 
provides a new interpretation of the Chinese nationalism in the 1920s. By looking at 
the nature of warfare and focusing tightly on the civil war in 1924, he argues "the 
disruption and destruction caused by the wars of 1924" as indispensable preconditions 
which paved the way for the subsequent May Thirtieth Movement and the Nationalist 
Revolution. His basic thesis is that, contrary to common belief that Chinese 
nationalism in the 1920s was created by various political movements under the Chinese 
Communist Party and the Guomindang, political events such as the May Thirtieth 
Movement of 1925 and the Nationalist Revolution of 1926 -28 were developed as a 
direct consequence of the wars of 1924. The wars of 1924, as defined in the book, are 
the Jiangsu- Zhejiang War (28 August -2 October) and the Second Zhili -Fengtian War 
(17 September --23 October). The author believes these wars are significant because 
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"militarily, these wars marked the arrival in China of something new and deeply 
destabilising, which was fighting in the style of the First World War in Europe_ Jiazi 
year (1924) saw the first example in Chinese history of a new kind of war fighting: 
litizhan -- "three dimensional" or "combined arms warfare ", in which operations by 
infantry, cavalry, ships, and aircraft were co- ordinated in the service of a single 
strategic plan.i659 
It is a fresh perspective to argue that the First World War technology and tactics 
transformed warfare in China, raising stakes, costs and impacts. The civil war had 
destroyed political confidence, and cleared the way for radical revolution and 
nationalism. Although one may take up Issues in this work such as the impact of 
warfare on Chinese politics it is generally acceptable that the civil wars in mid -1920s 
had weakened the power of the northern militarists.66w 
The power balance in 1926 China was an important consideration for the 
Guomindang but the impact was not the void of power but the threat of the 
Guomindang's allies' security in the northern and central China. The defeat of the First 
Guominjun, the potential revolutionary ally of the Guomindang, in Tianjin and the re- 
emergence of Wu Peifu in Central China had a direct impact on the launching of the 
Northern Expedition. By the end of December 1925, Feng Yuxiang's First Guominjun 
659 Arthur Waldron, From War to Nationalism: China's Turning Point, 1924 -1925, Cambridge, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995. Waldron seems to treat "three dimensional" and " combined arms 
warfare" as the same. In fact, they are quite different. The "combined arms warfare" refers to the 
deployment of various arms of the land forces such as the infantry, tank, artiIIery and engineering in 
military operations. In a "three dimensional" warfare where land, sea and air forces are deployed in battles, 
it is called a "joint- service" operations. For the strategic plan, see p. 9. 
660 For example, in Chapter Three: Armament and Tactics, the book describes in some length a list of 
weaponry and arsenals available in 1924 but it makes no attempt to assess the operational capabilities 
and performance. The author seems to assume that the presence of a large quantity of weaponry and 
numerous arsenals would naturally lead to higher levels of destruction, the kind of situation as seen in 
the European War of 1914 -1918. The equation is never so simple. China had been defeated practically 
in all extemal wars since the Opium Wars of 1839. In each of these wars, she had overwhelming 
superiority of arms, albeit obsolete, and troops over its opponents. In battles, the effective use of arms is 
always much more important than the hardware and its number alone. This is the domain of tactics. By 
definition, tactics entails the deployment of arms and manpower in battle. Training and education of 
military officers and soldiers; the organisation of the battle formation; the operational doctrine, i.e. 
offensive and defensive doctrines; operational staff and planning in the high command, such as the 
generai staff system which played such an important role in the European Great War of 1914 -1918; the 
relationship between geographical and topographical conditions and the tactical deployment of troops 
and weapons; the logistics supply system; the command and communications system, e.g. the use of 
telegraph and field telephone in the battle; etc. These are the common tactical and operational issues of 
the major armies of the European Great War which the author claims to have taken as criteria for 
comparison to the wars of 1924 in China. Unfortunately, none of these issues are discussed except the 
use of the railways. Yet, major battles in the 1924 wars were fought outside the railway lines. 
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had succeeded in capturing Tianjin. But his ally, Guo Songlin. who had staaed a revolt 
against Zhang Zuolin, had been crushed. Feng then announced his retirement on 1 
January 1926, probably in the face of the alliance between Zhang Zuolin and Wu Peifu 
against him. During February, the Second and Third Guominjun, nominally under 
Feng's command, simply collapsed under attack by the Wu and Zhang forces. In 
March, the First Guominjun found itself in an impossible military situation in Tianjin 
and had to be evacuated to Feng's headquarters at Kalgan.661 In Central China, Wu 
Peifu's comeback in October 1924 had been a slow process since his defeat in the 
Second Zhili -Fengtian War. However, with the death of General Xiao Yaonan, Wu's 
former subordinate and his supporters in Hubei, Wu acquired Xiao's resources in 
February 1926. He allied himself with Zhang Zuolin for a combined drive against their 
mutual enemy, Feng Yuxiang's Guominjun. Based in Hubei, Wu Peifu also had a hand 
in the politics of neighbouring Hunan and Jiangxi. On 13 March, Wu offered 
assistance to the governor of Hunan, Zhao Hengti, who had been driven out by Tang 
Shengzhi.662 In Jiangxi, Wu Peifu and Sun Chuanfang agreed to upset Fang Benren, the 
military governor, who might have had a quasi -alliance with Guangzhou. On 1 April, 
Fang left Nanchang for Shanghai, and Deng Ruzhuo, the protege of Wu and Sun, 
announced that he was commander in chief of the Jiangxi army.663 Therefore before the 
end of April, the Nationalists' quasi -allies had suffered serious setbacks. With Wu's 
support, Ye Gaixin had driven Tang Shengzhi back to his base in Hengyang, in 
southern Hunan, and Tang was calling for help from the Guomindang members in 
Guangzhou. In fact, prior to the official launch of the Northern Expedition in early July 
561 For more on the revolt of Guo Songlin, see "Gua Songlin fan Fengzhanzheng" (The rebellion of 
Guo Songlin against Fengtian), V: 262 -307, Beiyang junfa, 1912 -1928 (The beiyang warlords, 1912- 
1928). Editors Zhang Bofeng and Li Zongyi. Wuhan: Wuhan chubanshe, 1990; for wars between Feng 
Yuxiang and Zhíli- Fengtían armies, see "Guominjun yu beifang ge pai junfa de hunzhan (The mixed war 
between Feng Yuxiang's army and the rest of the northern warlords) ", V: 308 -342, ibid; for the Russian 
accounts of the Guominjun, see Julie How's study, "Russian Advisers with the Kuominchun, I925 -1926: 
A Documentary Study." Chinese Studies in History XIX, no. 1 -2 (September 1985): 50 -70, 
662 Before the end of April, Tang Shengzhi was one of the Nationalists' quasi -allies. When Tang was 
driven back to his base in Hengyang (in southern Hunan) by Ye Gaixin with Wu's support, he called the 
Guomindang in Guangzhou for help. By 25 March, the Nationalist delegates, Chen Mingshu 
(commander of the NRA's 12th Division of the IV Corps) and Bai Chongxi (the NRA's Chief of staff of 
the VII Corps), had arrived in Changsha to negotiate with Tang. By the end of the month Tang had 
driven Ye Gaixin, across the border into Hubei, but this immediately brought on Wu's counteraction. 
Guo Jianlin, Wu Peifu da zhuan, II: 640 -42. 
66' For details of Sun Chuanfang in Jiangxi, see "Wusheng lianjub yu Fengxi zhan zheng" (The war 
between the federation of five provinces and Fengtian), V: 222 -25, Beiyang junfa. 
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1926, units of the VII Corps of the National Revolutionary Army were already engaged 
in operations against Wu Peifu's supporters in Guangxi -Hunan borders.' 
As early as 3 April, Chiang Kaishek proposed to the Central Executive 
Committee of the Guomindang six basic policies to prepare for the Northern 
Expedition. They included, firstly, to affiliate with Feng Yuxiang's Guominjun and get 
its army to retreat to the Northwest to consolidate its strength. Secondly, to "unite" 
with Soviet Russia to increase the power of the revolution. Thirdly, to send delegates 
to Sichuan and Guizhou to persuade them to entangle with the armies of Hubei and 
Yunnan. Fourthly, to unite with Hunan and Guangxi for an offensive -defensive 
alliance and prepare for a joint military effort troops to hamper a southern move by Wu 
Peifu's army. Fifthly, to affiliate with Sun Chuanfang so he would take a neutral rather 
than a hostile stand. Lastly, to decide within three months whether Guangdong and 
Guangxi will actually launch a Northern Expedition if preparations have been 
completed.666 In brief, the basic strategy was to prepare a northern expedition against 
Wu Peifu in Hunan and Hubei; to ally with Feng Yuxiang who would hold the Fengtian 
forces in the North; and to negotiate with Sun Chuanfang in the southeast so as to delay 
his involvement in the conflict. 
The Russians, however, give a different account of the strategic plan. 
Cherepanov recalls that by the time Bliukher returned to Guangzhou in May 1926 to 
replace Kuibyshev as the chief military adviser, he found a strategic plan had been 
worked out. The plan called for occupation of Hunan and Jiangxi and an advance into 
Hubei. Three National Revolutionary Army corps were to invade Jiangxi and the other 
four to take Hunan. This meant fighting Wu Peifu and Sun Chuanfang simultaneously. 
Therefore, from the first day of his return, Bliukher sought to change the strategic plan 
to confine operations to Hunan. After numerous conferences he dictated a new plan to 
Li Jishen, the chief of staff, calling for them to take Hunan and Wuhan and then uniting 
with Feng Yuxiang's Guominjun. The National Revolutionary Army units were to 
concentrate on 13 July at various designated points. The new plan was approved at a 
meeting of the Military Council on 23 June.666 
66" Li Zongren huiyilu (The memoirs of Li Zongren), interviewed by Tang Dekang, Hong Kong: 
Nanyue chubanshe, 2nd., 1988, 192 -95. The commander of the VII Corps Li Zongren sent his forces to 
aid Tang Shengzhi without prior approval of the Guomindang. Li only informed Guangzhou about his 
decision and urged the Guomindang quickly launch the Northern Expedition. 
665 Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 3 April 1926, p. 555; Beifa riji, 1 July 1926, 6 -7. 
666 A.I. Cherepanov, Severnyi PokhodNatsional'no- Revoliutsionno Arm ii Kitaya, 123 -127. 
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What the Russians failed to mention was the fact that the crisis in Hunan had a 
strong influence on the plan of the Northern Expedition. Hunan shares a common 
border with Guangxi and it was in the interest of the VII Corps (The Guangxi forces) to 
aid Tang Shengzhi in order to halt Wu Peifu from threatening his position. There was 
another reason why the National Revolutionary Army would not be able to commit all 
its forces in Hunan. Among the eight corps, three were originated from Hunan. The II 
and VI Corps, commanded by Tan Yuankai and Cheng Qian, were Hunanese and had 
previously crossed fire with Tang Shengzhi (see the previous chapter). These two corps 
were definitely unwelcome in Hunan. Therefore, they and other less battle -worthy 
corps were deployed along Guangdong- Jiangxi borders. The Hunan front was given to 
the IV, VII and VIII of the National Revolutionary Army. The Russian advisers 
accompanied them and many left -wing Guomindang and Communists who had close 
association with local labour and peasant organisations. 
In summary, the prime mover for the 1926 Northern Expedition was the 
National Revolutionary Army spearheaded by its Commander -in- Chief, Chiang 
Kaishek. The National Revolutionary Army was keen to pursue a northern expedition 
in 1926 as they saw the opportunity to strike when major militarists were relatively 
weak. With the Russians' aids, both in armaments and military advice, Chiang and the 
National Revolutionary Army planned a strategy of taking its main opponents one at a 
time. The deployment plan of the National Revolutionary Army was carefully worked 
out along the lines of regional sensitivity and conditions in each province. Regional 
identity and power conflicts were important considerations. The expedition was 
certainly a brilliant decision made at the right time and the right place. The decision 
also reflected a strong presence of the National Revolutionary Army's leadership in 
driving the Northern Expedition. 
Regionalism and Nationalism 
Other than the right decision, the National Revolutionary Army was also skilful 
in manipulating the sentiments of both regionalism and nationalism in the Northern 
Expedition. Chiang Kaishek and his commanders understood these two currents 
flowing through China simultaneously and often manipulated their strengths 
effectively. In his inaugural speech as Commander -in -Chief of the National 
Revolutionary Army Chiang offered other militarists who were willing to follow the 
Guomindang's Three People's Principles to join in the expedition. He promised that he 
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would treat them "absolutely without bias of regional distinction of the North and 
South, neither with feeling of gratitude or resentment or with differentiation of the old 
and new (units). "66' 
The regional identity of the North and the South had developed over a long 
period of time but became more politically pronounced after the 1911 Revolution (see 
Chapter 1). This distinction was rooted in very real and different subcultures 668 In his 
study of warlord politics, Ch'i His -sheng observes the northern warlords explicitly 
warned their followers "the forthright and honest northern soldiers could never expect 
to receive a fair deal from those cunning and treacherous southerners." As the result, 
few high- ranking northern generals defected or surrender to the Guomindang without a 
serious battle. Ch'i further argues that the wide gap in political style, ideological 
outlook, educational background, and personal loyalties between the northern and 
southern military groups let them to conclude that compromise was impossible.669 
During the Northern Expedition the National Revolutionary Army was successful in 
using regional identity to convince many local militarists from provinces south of the 
Yangzi River to come over the Guomindang's side. The Guomindang also succeeded 
in mobilising mass and civilian support mainly in the South. This has led Donald 
Jordan to conclude that although the Guomindang proclaimed nationalism as its goal, it 
took every chance to address regional identity when it tried to make southern militarists 
defect. However, Jordan attributes the uncompromising attitudes between North and 
South was mainly due to educational differences.67° 
Closely related to the North -South divide is the question of ideology. The 
ideological ferment and conflict between the North and South was even more diverse 
and complicated. Hu Shi and a number of his contemporaries argue that there did exist 
a "new China" and a "old China ". Hu commented in 1926 that he saw the fifteen -year 
Republican China as a failure but a failure of the "old China." "New China had never 
667 Belfa rgí, 9 July 1926, 13 -16. 
66a See Chen Xulin, Zhongguo nanbei wenhua guan (A critical survey between northern and southern 
culture in China). Taibei: Mutong chubanshe, 1976; and Zhongguo wenhua de chulu (The opening for 
Chinese culture). Shanghai: Shangwu, 1934, 124 -145. 
669 Ch'i His -sheng, Warlord Politics, 115. 
610 Jordan, Northern Expedition, 74, 85 -9, 285 -86. 
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been in power" yet. Therefore, the fundamental problem in China, Hu argued, had been 
a "conflict between the new and the old. "G7 
Hu Shi saw the Russian sponsored reorganisation of the Guomindang in 1924 a 
step to enlist students who were inspired not by left -wing communist ideology but by 
the ideas of the New Cultural Movement. Hence he regarded the Russian- Guomindang 
co- operation a part and consequence of the larger movement he named the "Chinese 
Renaissance ". He defined the Guomindang's movement in 1927 a conscious attempt 
to work out solutions for our own problems in the light of our own needs and in the 
light of our historical heritage." In brief, he saw it as a "new revolution from within ". 
Hu proclaimed that the Guomindang was "probably the only movement- that could 
defend China against the foreign powers, and more importantly, end military rule. It 
marked "the first time since the founding of the Republic that a new force, a 
revolutionary army, has appeared on the scene." He believed it might "bring to China, 
if not a fundamental, at least, a transitional salvation" and he predicted that "it was 
tending towards a basic salvation.i672 Thus, in 1926 he publicly admitted the 
Guomindang's movement as part of the New China or Young China. 
Ideology and Indoctrination 
Diana Lary suggests that in order to end warlordism in the 1920s' China she 
needed a military force to unite all regional forces and that this military force must 
commit itself with a higher ideological goal to crush regional militarism.673 The 
importance of ideology in the 1920s was manifested in the proliferation of "isms" in 
China. Among them, nationalism was certainly the most potent. Like in many other 
nations, the power of nationalism lay in how it touches people's feelings rather its 
theoretical discourse. For the majority of the Guomindang's participants, slogans 
directed towards emotions were much more important than elaborated theoretical 
constructs. Among the Guomindang's leadership, Chiang Kaishek was probably the 
one who fully realised and intended to use nationalism in the Northern Expedition. 
Chiang grasped its utility through his appreciation of the power of regional identity. He 
argues that if the northern warlords could not win a war in the hostile South, then 
671 "China at the Parting of the Ways ", in Hu Shi de riji, 26 November 1926. 
672 Ibid.; Hu Shi et al., Forward or Backward in China. Beijing: Peking Leader Press, 1927, 5 -9. See 
also Patrick Cavendish, "The New China of the Kuomintang" in Jack Gray, ed., Modern China's Search 
for a Political Form, London, 1969, 139. 
673 Lary, Diana. Region and Nation: The Kwangsi Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925 -1937. UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1976, p.13. 
217 
certainly the imperialist powers could not conquer an aroused populace in a war in the 
Chinese interior. He, therefore, discounted the threat of foreign retaliation, whether or 
not he adopted an extreme nationalist position. Just as important, if the National 
Revolutionary Army was to fight any imperialist power, it would immediately win 
popular support throughout the country. In such a context, even defeat would 
eventually benefit the Guomindang more than any other Chinese contender.5 -4 
The Guomindang's was not the only army adopting ideology for its soldiers. In 
fact, it was the northern militarists who started introducing ideology in the army. Yan 
Xishan and Feng Yuxiang adopted indoctrination or spiritual education in their armies 
before they allied with the Guomindang and modelled the Russian military methods. In 
Hunan, Tang Shengzhi applied Buddhism as his ideology. When he joined the 
Guomindang in 1926, Tang managed to combine Buddhism and revolutionary 
principles to cultivate a "Buddhist Revolution ". The National Revolutionary Army 
generally displayed a high degree of group solidarity and this could have driven other 
northern militarists to become more ideological. Zhang Zuolin and Wu Peifu at first 
referred to Feng's Guominjun as "reds" but that label soon went primarily to the 
National Revolutionary Army.675 
The ideological distinction between the North and South, however, had also a 
political dimension. Some northern militarists used the term "reds" to gain support 
from foreign powers. Other might single out the difference in order to promote unity of 
the northern militarists. Before Hunan and Hubei became "red ", the ideological 
distinction was not so strong and clear. Wu Peifu was willing to adopt the "anti -red" 
banner to co- operate with Zhang Zuolin in fighting against Feng Yuxiang. But he 
would resist Zhang's military support in fighting against the Guomindang in his 
controlled territory. These two examples indicate the limited role of ideology in the 
minds of major militarists. For the same reason, Sun Chuanfang did not support Wu 
'74 Chiang Kaishek, "Military Plan to the Military Council ", 7 July 1925, Jiang Jieshi nianpu chugao, 
384 -92; "Address at the Military Council ", 26 July 1925, Jiang Zhongzheng xiansheng yanshou ji 
(Chiang Kaishek's speeches), comp. By Jia Betao, (Shanghai, 1925), 101 -112. For Chiang's belief that a 
war between Britain and the Guomindang "might unite the rest of China" see William R. Louis, British 
Strategy in the Far East, Oxford: Clarendon, 1971, p.129, where the author cited J.W. Jamieson, the 
British concul at Guangzhou shared Chiang's perception. 
Ch'I, Warlord Politics, 54 -56, 95 -100, 115; Donald G. Gitlin, Warlord Yen His -shan in Shansi 
Province, 1911 -1945, 59 -65; James E. Sheridan, Chinese Warlord: The Career of Feng Yu- hsiang, 78- 
83. For Tang Shengzhi's Buddhist Revolution, see Li Pingxian, Li Pingxian huíyílu (Memoirs of Li 
Pingxian), Taibei, 1975, 59 -62. 
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nor urged other northern militarists to support Wu during the Hunan and Hubei 
campaign until Sun was attacked by the National Revolutionary Army.b'6 
In brief, the Guomindang had been a national political party with a nationalist 
ideology. Since 1921, however, it had been associated with the South as it built its 
revolutionary base in Guangzhou. The Party had created a new agenda but it had to 
respond to the needs and objectives of the South. AIthough its followers were mainly 
southerners, the Guomindang had, in the words of one author, "evangelised throughout 
China and could boast a membership that was at least nominally representatives of all 
the region. "677 Ideology was an important and effective propaganda tool to the 
National Revolutionary Army. The simplified Three Peoples' Principles was able to 
provide the soldiers with a clear purpose --to save the nation from the oppression of 
imperialism and warlordism, for which they fought. 
One issue that scholars have been debating is that did political propaganda 
directly promote military success? Donald Jordan has corrected the pervious belief that 
there was a mass wave of propaganda teams at work ahead of the National 
Revolutionary Army. Most propaganda teams in fact followed the Guomindang's 
army. Even if they were ahead of the troops, the propaganda teams were there to 
distribute leaflets or write some Guomindang' slogans on the walls. In the urban areas 
such slogans and leaflets might have excited the young and educated Chinese but such 
areas were usually far from the battlefield. In the countryside, where battles were 
decided, it is doubtful that propaganda had much impact on the residents 678 Guo 
Moruo, who was in charge of propaganda in the Party Army during the early period of 
the expedition, recalled that the propaganda teams were facing difficulty just to follow 
the advance of the troops, not to mention doing anything else 679 
The political workers of the National Revolutionary Army also reported 
difficulties in Guomindang occupied area of Henan. The literacy rate was general low 
and the effect of written slogans was greatly reduced. The Henan people spoke 
676 See Beiyang junta, V: 380 -391, the exchange of telegrams among Wu Peifu, Zhang Zuolin, Sun 
Chuanfang and other northern militarists. 
677 Jordan, Northern Expedition, 289. 
67a The US military intelligence observed the relationship between the military success and 
propaganda, US Military Intelligence Reports, XXV, 11411. 
ó79 Guo Momo, Geming chungiu (Events during the revolution), Shanghai: Haiyan Bookstaore, 1947, 
287 -331. 
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different dialects and it as difficult for the southern political workers to communicate 
with local residents.680 If political works under the occupied area was difficult, it would 
even worse in areas under the control of hostile forces. Thus. the political propaganda 
failed to achieve the same results as in the Eastern Expedition. 
The Party-Army Relations 
The close relationship between the civilian and the military within in the 
Guomindang was another contributing factor to the Northern Expedition success. The 
re- organised Guomindang after 1924 provided the structure and channels that would 
bridge and integrate the civilian and military components of the Party. As Wang 
Jingwei explained, "the previous failure of our Party was because of the separation 
between the Party and the army." "We have now established this [Huangpu) academy 
for the purpose of unity between the belief and force. For the sake of belief, we have 
established the Party; for the sake of force, we would build up an army.... the Party and 
the army, therefore, were interdependent for survival. The Party created the army, 
without the Party, there would be no army. The Party depended on the army, without 
the army, the Party would not exist" 681 One of the instructors of the Huangpu Military 
Academy, Ye Jianyin, who later became a leading general in the Communist Army, 
summarised this relationship as that "the army was converted form the Party; the Party's 
accomplishments and achievements depended on the army (jun yi dang hua, dang yi jun 
cheng). "682 
Hu SM also applauded the integration of the Party and the army. He observed 
that not only were there Party representatives in every military units, but "the whole 
Party was more or less under a military type of discipline." He concluded, "The army 
thus organised had certainly won victories over the older armies which were not 
organised.683 Wellington Koo called it "unprecedented element in China, the political 
organisation supporting the military actions contributed to the success of the National 
Revolutionary Army.684 Overall, although, the new relationship between the Party and 
680 Beija zhanzheng in Henan (The northern expedition in Henan), comp. by Henan sheng difangzhi 
bianzuan weiyuanhui. Kaifeng: Henan chubanshe, 1985. See reports on 319, 327, 322, 358 -59. 
681 Hunagpu junxiao shiliao, 1924-1927, p. 43. 
682 Pan Qiaoshi, "Geming hongliu thong de Ye Jianyin" (Ye Jianyin in the stormy water of 
revolution), Xinghuo liao yuan, bimonthly, Beijing, special issue, 1983, p. 8. 
687 Hu Shi, "Addressing at the Royal Institute of the International Affairs ", 9 November 1926, Journal 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, V: Nov -Dec December 1926, 278 -9. 
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the army was complex and often troublesome, it brought about a rare integration of 
civil -military resources that put the National Revolutionary Army above other major 
militarists. 
Defections and Decisive Battles 
Scholars who have studied Chinese warlordism generally agree that by mid - 
1926, warlordism had evolved into a political and military system with a set of rules 
and perceptions that governed the resolution of its conflicts. In his study of warlord 
politics during the Republican China, Lucian Pye focuses on the limits of the warlords' 
political structure. Pye argues that warlord politics is essentially factional. formed by 
groups whose main purpose is the search for power. When the group around the 
warlord is small, loyalty is gained through the use of particularistic ties such as teacher - 
student and sworn brother relationship.685 However, as the size of the warlord's forces 
expanded and the number of subordinates increased, the central power would be unable 
to hold the structure together. This was particularly true when a warlord emerged as a 
multi -provincial figure, a "super- warlord" ( "super -dujun" or overlord)686, who had to 
deal with subordinates who were now warlords themselves. As these subordinates ran 
their own provinces, they placed conflicting demands on the "super- warlord" for arms 
or resources. So, when the "super- warlord was unable to meet all the demands placed 
on him, he had to sacrifice efficiency for loyalty. At the same time, the "super- warlord" 
would have to find a new way to bind his top subordinates by tempting them with the 
prospect of future rewards."S7 If the "super -warlord" continued to prosper, or expand, 
the subordinates would remain loyal. If not, they would begin to look elsewhere. This 
would, in turn, produce a rapid downward spiral, as one defection produced others.688 
Thus, concludes Pye, no warlord could expand beyond his ability to manage his 
personal ties with his subordinates. 
684 Gu Weijun [V.K_ Wellington]. Gu Weijun huiyilu (Reminiscences of Gu Weijun), Vol. 1: 303. 
685 Lucian W. Pye, Warlord Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Modernisation of Republican China. 
New York: Praeger, 1971, p.49. 
686 Ibid., p. 42. 
687 Ibid., 50, 52. 
688 Ibid., 52-55. 
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Ch'i Hsi -sheng in his study of warlord politics also analyses the internal 
dynamics of the relationships within a warlord faction and agrees that a warlord could 
not expand beyond his ability to maintain the loyalty of his subordinates. He agrees 
that at a certain point the subordinates would be motivated by pure self-interest.''' But 
Ch'i also believes that the warlord system has its own build -in constraints that he terms 
"a balance of power ". Ch'i argues that when one or another warlord expands to a 
certain point, the other warlords will ally against him, thus balancing his power.69f' 
In addition, there was another constraint to the warlord power that is not 
discussed by either Pye or Ch'i. Below the "super- warlord" and the provincial warlords 
was another layer of militarists who were closely attached to the ground. These were 
small, sub -provincial, usually rural figures who were not part of any warlord or "super - 
warlord" units but who were counted as his subordinates because they controlled the 
territory within that claimed by them. These local warlords represent a third constraint 
on the warlord's power. These warlords were able to exercise real authority at the local 
level. 
The behaviour of these local "subordinates" was not controlled by particular ties 
or by the promise of rewards because they already had held their territory and had not 
gained it through the action of the major militarists. Thus, local militarists' behaviour 
was quite different from the major militarists discussed by Pye and Ch'i. Specifically, 
these local militarists were tied to their Iocalities and to the revenues that they derived 
from it, and they would try to maintain their hold on them regardless of whom the 
major militarists might be. They were the true exemplars of the "pure self -interest" 
discussed by Ch'i Hsi -sheng. As we shall see in the Northern Expedition, some 
militarists did retreat with their overlords despite the fact that this meant the loss of 
their base. Local militarists almost never withdrew; they merely came to terms with the 
new overlord. 
By the mid- 1920s, the general situation in the warlord -controlled regions was 
that, overlords ruled their territory through the provincial warlords; the provincial 
warlords, in turn, ruled through the acquiescence of the local warlords. Thus, overlords 
such as Wu Peifu might claim the provinces of Hunan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Sichuan, 
689 Hsi -sheng Chi, Warlord Politics in China, 1916 -1928. Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 1976, see "Calculations of Self- Interest" in Chapter 3, 47 -54, 
690 Ibid., 51-54. 
Henan and Hubei in 1926, but in fact, he had IittIe power in the first, and none 
whatsoever in the other provinces where he "ruled" through the local warlords 69' 
Another important factor that governed a warlord's behaviour in conflict was the 
power perception of the parties involved. In an era when wars were frequently declared 
but seldom fought, conflicts were resolved by perception. Lucian Pye calls it the "logic 
of power ", by which major warlords (overlord and provincial warlords) decided to align 
with one another to determine the results of conflict politically, by achieving the 
perception that one warlord's force was more powerful than another.692 Ch'i Hsi -sheng 
also discusses the use of mutinies, defections and other political means to solve 
disputes by creating coalitions that look too powerful to oppose, as well as the 
problems faced by smaller warlords with having to choose between two camps.593 All 
of this manoeuvring was aimed at the perception of victory. In practice, these 
perceptions had hardened into what might be called "rules" that governed not only the 
warlords' behaviour, but also determined the outcome of the conflict. There was, of 
course, bloody fighting among warlords, some even fairly stiff battles, but these usually 
occurred only after the "rules" could not determine the victor, or in some rare 
occasions, when the loser refused to accept the result. 
During the Northern Expedition, some of the characteristics of warlord warfare 
were exhibited, but there were some fundamental changes in the conduct of warfare by 
the National Revolutionary Army. The traditional patterns of warfare such as defection 
and the new tactics of the National Revolutionary Army - -to fight a decisive battle- - 
could be discerned in the Northern Expedition. The following military campaigns of 
the National Revolutionary Army in central and southern China are just a few 
examples. 
The Hunan -Hubei Campaign 
In the mid- 1920s, Hunan became part of Wu Peifu's territorial base because the 
provincial warlord Zhao Hengti professed allegiance to Wu. Zhao's power, in turn, was 
69i On the relationship between the overlord and the local warlord, James Sheridan notes Feng 
Yuxiang's problems with the local warlords in Shanxi. See James E. Sheridan, Chinese Warlord: The 
Career of Feng Yu- slang, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966, 103 -107. 
s9z Lucian W. Pye, Warlord Politics, p. 167. 
693 Hsi -sheng Chi, Warlord Politics in China, 33 -40, 59 -60. 
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limited by the existence of three local warlords who controlled most of the rest of the 
province. Wu had no troops directly under him in the province in 1926. Thus, as the 
National Revolutionary Army began to entered the province in spring and summer that 
year, all the warlord units in the province had to face the same decisions forced upon 
them by Tang Shengzhi's advance northward through the province earlier that year. 
In fact, the two campaigns (see previous chapter on the VIII Corps) looked 
remarkably similar, and also appeared to closely resemble other warlord campaigns of 
the period. First, none of the local warlords, apart from Tang, would fight either for or 
against the National Revolutionary Army. This had been the case during Tang's 
original advance, as the locals awaited the outcome of the battles between Tang and Wu 
Peifu. The provincial warlord responded to the logic of force by withdrawing into 
Hubei to join the regular force of Wu Peifu, just as he had during Tang's first advance. 
The result is that the National Revolutionary Army found no one to fight in 
Hunan, and the army was able to move northward quickly, although the National 
Revolutionary Army moved no more quickly than Tang had earlier.694 The closest 
thing resembling a battle was a skirmish at the Guluo River where the National 
Revolutionary Army casualties were more than ten officers and 200 men.695 
There were several groups of warlord units in Hunan on the eve of the Northern 
Expedition. First, there were the indigenous Hunanese units nominally or actually loyal 
to the provincial warlord Zhao Hengtí. The four divisions were all Hunanese and all 
contained a fairly high percentage of Baoding graduates. Yet, the four unit 
commanders reacted differently to the invasion of the National Revolutionary Army, 
just as they had done during the earlier advance. Tang Shengzhi had already joined the 
National Revolutionary Army. He Yaozu led his unit into Jiangxi, a province under 
Sun Chuanfang, to wait the outcome of the battles between the National Revolutionary 
Army and Wu Peifu. Liu Xing' s division had already been split following Tang's arrest 
of Liu in March. Ye Qi took over most of the force for Tang, and accompanied him the 
694 Tang's first advance had taken a little over two weeks. Guangzhou declared the Northern Expedition 
on 9 July and arrived in Yuezhou on 22 August. For detail, see Beifa zhenzhong riff (The war diary of 
the northern expedition), July 1926 to May 1928, Guomin gemingjun zongsiling bu canmou chu (The 
general staff department of the general headquarters of the national revolutionary army). Reprint by 
Jindai pihai, vol. 14. Sichuan: Sichuan renmin chubanshe, 1988, 13 -76. 
69s Beifa zhenzhong riji, p. 76. 
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spring campaign. When Tang was forced to retreat, Ye joined Zhao Hengti. With Tang 
again on the advance, Ye joined him once again. His unit had yet to move.696 Once 
Chiang Kaishek had defeated Wu Peifu in Hubei, both Ye and He joined the National 
Revolutionary Army.597 
The second militant group in Hunan comprised the fixed forces from Jiangxi 
and Guangdong that had fled to Hunan following their ouster from their native 
provinces that they controlled in the name of Wu Peifu. These units were either 
unwilling or unable to make their peace with the National Revolutionary Army and 
continued to withdraw northward even after Wu had been defeated. 
The third group of units in Hunan were the Hubei troops that occupied the 
Hunan-Hubei border. Regular troops of Wu Peifu for the most part, withdrew into 
Hubei to fight the National Revolutionary Army on more favourable terrain. The one 
exception was Xia Douyin's 2nd Hubei Mixed Bridge, which joined Tang's VIII Corps. 
The fourth group was made up of the "Help Hunan Army" which like the Hubei troops 
withdrew into Hubei to fight the National Revolutionary Army. 
The fifth group comprised Guizhou Army units commanded by Yuan Zuming. 
Yuan, the governor of Guizhou and a provincial warlord only nominally subordinated 
to Wu Peifu, had taken the advantage of Wu's problems in eastern Hunan to push out 
southwest of Hunan. With Wu now in retreat, and with neighbouring Guangxi already 
with the National Revolutionary Army, Yuan did the same, and his units were enrolled 
as the VITTI, X, XII Corps in July and August, thus "Iegitimatising" his new territory in 
Hunan.69s 
696 Beifazhansht, II: 337. 
69T Ye Kaixin and his troops joined as the XXXXIV Corps. Beifa zhanshi, II: 648. He Yaozu joined 
the National Revolutionary Army in Jiangxi as the XXXX Corps, but he was arrested in 1928. The unit 
was later reorganised as the 8th Division of the Central Army. "He Yaozu", Chuanji wenxue, XXXV :1 
(July 1969), p. 147. 
698 See Beifa zhanshi, I: 361, 405. The three units did very little fighting and had no apparent impact 
on the outcome of the Northern Expedition. Two of the three corps commanders and several subordinate 
commanders were executed by the Central Army in July 1927, and the units were either taken over or 
returned to Guizhou. Donald Jordan, on the other hand, claims that these units "were readied to rush 
eastward through Hunan toward the Jiangxi border ", and that "their presence in western Hunan allowed 
the National Revolutionary Army to concentrate its forces elsewhere." However, Jordan offers no 
evidence to prove this. The Guomindang official history points out that the units refused to obey orders. 
See his The Northern Expedition, 265 -6, 278 -9. On the poor quality and rapacious nature of these units, 
see Wan Yaohuang, op. cit., XVII: 2 (February 1975), p. 78; Chen Xisheng, op. cit., 185 -6; Beifa 
zhanshi, 1: 70 -1. In fact, the NRA had no flank to defend from the west, as it had no enemies to the west. 
i 
In all, there were twenty -three warlord units in Hunan on the eve of the 
Northern Expedition. Among them, eleven withdrew from the province, five joined the 
National Revolutionary Army, three disappeared altogether, one was disarmed and 
three were neutral,'" Thus, the eleven that withdrew and the three neutral units indicate 
that well over half the units in Hunan were still uncertain of the outcome because the 
National Revolutionary Army had still not been tested against Wu Peifu's regular force. 
In terms of the rules of the warlord warfare, these unit commanders would wait until the 
situation became clear. Their movements had nothing to do either with mass 
movements or the unity of the National Revolutionary Army that had yet to fight a 
battle. 
Although Wu Peifu had not contested Hunan, he would stand against the 
invasion of Hubei. Wu's control of Hunan had not been very strong. He had few troops 
there and the province shared a long border with Jiangxi which was under Sun 
Chuanfang. Wu could afford to cede Hunan to the National Revolutionary Army 
temporarily. If he could win the battle in Hubei, it would be easy enough to return to 
Hunan. 
For the National Revolutionary Army, now in northern Hunan, the decision was 
divided. Some wanted to continue to move north, against the forces of Wu Peifu, while 
others wanted to move east into Jiangxi against Sun Chuanfang. After what was 
reported to have been a particularly heated military conference, the National 
Revolutionary Army divided into two main forces, one to keep an eye on the Hunan- 
Jiangxi border, and the other to march north against Wu Peifu.'m 
The battle in Hubei could be divided into two stages. First, there were the 
battles at the border, at Dingsigiao, Xianning and Heshengjiao. Second, there were the 
If there was a need to defend such a flank, it would have been handled by the units under Li Zongren 
that had been left behind in Guangxi. 
There were no reasons given for units disappearance during this period. It could be that these 
units were quite small and they were either absorbed directly into a larger unit without the commanding 
officers or simply disbanded. The "neutral units" refers to local warlords who were not near the main 
area of military activity or who withdrew to such an area until the battle was over before deciding which 
side to join. 
700 For Li Zongren'a account of the conference, see Li Zongren huiyilu, 171 -174. Although Li 
frequently distorts the facts to promote his own sagacity, it seems to be true when he claims that he and 
Tang Shengzhi wanted to go north against Wu Peifu, while Chiang was presumably motivated by a 
desire to achieve a link with the reminder of his I Corps which was still in Guangdong along the border 
with Jiangxi and Fujian. 
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battles for the walled cities: Wuchang, Hankou and Hanyang (see map 7 -3). During 
these battles, the National Revolutionary Army's goal was to ignore the local warlords, 
find Wu's regular units, forced them to fight and to destroy them -- something quite 
different from warlord warfare. The new tactics of the three core units of the National 
Revolutionary Army would be put to the test. 
Using the IV and VII Corps as the vanguard, Chiang sent the IV Corps directly 
against the railroad bridges of Dingsí and Hesheng, while the VII Corps circled around 
to try to encircle Wu from the rear. The battle for the bridges was bloody; the IV Corps 
forced its way across them under the artillery that Wu had installed on the heights 
commanding the bridges, in addition to the guns of the armoured railroad cars Wu had 
transferred south. The attack began on 26 August, and lasted six days, ending with the 
IV Corps' capture of Heshengqiao on the 31 August.701 
The IV and VII Corps fought a bloody battle and accomplished a significant 
victory in this campaign. Although Wu Peifu had enjoyed superiority in manpower, 
weaponry and terrain, they had attacked nonetheless. Most significantly, the junior 
officers of the IV Corps had proved singularly courageous by leading the charges 
across the bridges, and also by leading small units up into the mountains to silent Wu's 
artillery. Wu's warlord conscripts were no matches for the IV Corps motivated troops. 
Faced by the willingness of the IV Corps to sustain casualties by assaulting the bridges 
directly, most of Wu's troops simply surrendered.702 
In this battle, IV Corps troops exhibited most of the military advantages it 
enjoyed over its opponents: the willingness and ability to sustain casualties, as 
demonstrated by the assaults on the bridges; the importance of a qualified and 
motivated junior officer corps, who commanded both of these efforts; a disregard for 
the "rules" of warlord warfare, which dictated that attack only with superiority forces. 
07 There are dozens of accounts of the battles for the bridges. Some of the first hand versions are 
from Li Zongren, op. cit., 181 -182; Li Pinxian, op. cit., XV: 2 (February 1974), 74 -75; Bela tungyi 
wushi zhounian tekan (A special publication in honour of the 50th anniversary of the northern 
expedition), Taibei: Guofangbu shizhengju, 1978, 104 -106; and the official version, Belfa zhanshi, 401- 
432. 
702 In all, the IV and VII Corps had 32 officers and 235 soldiers killed, 41 officers and 769 men 
wounded. Belfa zhanshi, p. 418, chart 26; p. 428, chart 29. By comparison, the NRA captured almost 
6,000 officers and men. Ibid., p. 417, chart 25, p. 427, chart 28. 
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Wu Peifu was forced to withdraw while his forces remained inside the walled 
cities. The impregnability of the walled cities was overrated in warlord warfare, 
especially with the advent of modern artillery. More importantly, as the I Corps 
(formerly the Huangpu Army) and the IV Corps had demonstrated against Chen 
Jiongming's forces in 1925, walled cities were vulnerable to direct assault, provided 
that the attacking force was willing to sustain the casualties usually in an effort to scale 
the city's walls. Thus, despite the objections of some of the other commanders, Chiang 
ordered direct assaults on Hanyang and Hankou. 
The man defending Hanyang, Liu Zuolong, had no heart for this type of warfare 
and as soon as his outlying positions had been overrun, he surrendered to the National 
Revolutionary Army rather than face a direct assault.'03 On 7 September, Wu Peifu 
abandoned Hankou and the National Revolutionary Army occupied the city the next 
day. Wu's made his last stand in Wuchang, Hubei. Wuchang's thick walls stood 
against the National Revolutionary Army's artillery and successfully repelled several 
bloody attempts to scale the walls. After these defeats, which were criticised by Li 
Zongren and others as suicidal,704 Chiang called a halt to the attack, and ordered the city 
Iaid siege. Thus, despite his emphasis on direct assault as the primary means to defeat 
the warlords, Chiang also believed --as he had told the cadets at Huangpu --that other 
means should be used if "blood and guts" failed. 
Wuchang was thus bypassed, and Chiang ordered the IV Corps to move up the 
Pinghan Railroad to seize the pass between Henan and Hubei. In the warlord warfare, 
provinces were only under control if they were perceived as being under control, and 
that capture of the passes between provinces was the primary means to effect that 
perception. This was particularly true if Chiang intended to leave four divisions of 
Wu's troops inside Wuchang. The IV Corps seized the pass by occupying 
Wushengguan and Xíntian on 16 September. The fate of Wuchang was sealed, because 
Ó3 Liu Zuolong was originally commander of the Hubei 2nd Division. He later enrolled as the 
commander of the XV Corps of the NRA. Liu was executed and his forces broken up by Nanjing in 
1927. Wan Yaohuang, op. cit., XVII: 2 (February 1975), 80 -81; Li Pinxian, op. cit., p. 75; Hu Yipo, 
"Bashi huiyi" (Memories at 80), Hubei wenxian, 39 (July 1976, p. 67; Hu Yibo, "Cheng Zhongsu 
xiansheng shilu" (A biography of Mr. Cheng Ruhuai), Hubei wenxian, 12 (July 1969, 42 -43. Hu Yibo 
served under Liu at the time. According to the above accounts, none of them mentions mass movement 
forced Liu's decision on him. Liu defected because he was surrounded and did not want to fight. 
J04 Li Zongren, op. cit., p. 183. 
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Wu could not use his troops in Henan to break the siege, and the four divisions of Wu's 
troops surrendered on 10 October 705 
Wu's defeat was complete and overwhelming. Not only had he lost Hubei 
Province, he also lost over half the troops under his command. Of Wu's four 
indigenous Hubei divisions, all local warlords, Liu Zuolong's --as noted above -- joined 
the National Revolutionary Army, while the others were either destroyed or captured. 
Of the three Henan divisions, two of his regular troops that brought to Hubei were 
destroyed. One, commanded by Yan Riren, was destroyed outside Wuhan 706 Another, 
commanded by Wu Junjing, surrendered at Wuchang. Because this unit was not a local 
warlord force, it was not enrolled in the National Revolutionary Army. Rather, all the 
top officers were removed and returned to their native Henan. The force was then 
placed under He Duiding.707 The last Henan division, a local warlord unit that had 
served under Sun Yatsen in an earlier Northern Expedition, was enrolled in the National 
Revolutionary Army.7 ' 
In addition to the indigenous troops, Wu also lost four of his five other regular 
divisions. One was destroyed at the battles for the railroad bridges, one withdrew into 
Sichuan where the local warlords there broke it up, and two were captured with the fall 
of Wuhan. Only one, commanded by Jin Younuo, was able to escape to Henan'D9 The 
loss of these units, the pillar of Wu's power, marked the end of his status as a multi - 
provincial warlord, although he would try to hold out in Henan for a while longer. 
Wu's Hubei defeat also triggered the local warlords in Sichuan, the only other province 
still nominally loyal to Wu, to defect to the National Revolutionary Army. 
The Battle of Jiangxi 
705 In addition to the IV Corps, the 2nd Division of Chiang's I Corps also participated in the assaults. 
See Liu Zhi, Wodi Huìyi (My reminiscences), Taibei: privately printed, 1966, p. 38. Liu was the 
commander of the division. The VI and VII Corps lost 47 officers and 463 men killed, and 44 officers 
and 603 men wounded. See Beifa zhanshi, p. 471, chart 34, a full account of the battle is in 433 -475. 
706 Ibid., p. 434. 
707 Wu Junjing was executed in 1928 and the force broken up. Liu Jianru, op. cit., 61 -63. 
7" Jiang zongtung tnilu, VII: 156. 
7°9 Jin's unit was later taken by Feng Yuxiang, Chen Senfu, Xishou xinbeijun (The northwest army in 
detail), Taibei: Dehua chubanshe, 1974, p. 446. 
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Sun Chuanfang, the ruler of the five provinces of the lower Yangzi basin, now 
faced the National Revolutionary Army on two fronts. At the time, Sun was in control 
of Jiangxi, Fujian, Anhui, Zhejiang and Jiangxi. Like Wu. Peifu, Sun's power was 
based on the troops directly loyal to him, but also on the concurrence of indigenous 
local and provincial warlords in all five of the provinces that he claimed_ In addition, 
Sun was a new ruler, he had conquered Fujian and Zhejiang in 1924 and had added the 
other three provinces only the year before. So, his base was in no sense a "natural" one, 
defined as a unit by either terrain or precedent. Most of his subordinate provinces had 
been part of other major warlord groupings during the period, and all had served under 
a progression of warlords while maintaining their hold on local power. Like the local 
warlords in Hunan, most of the local warlords in Sun's five provinces would await the 
outcome of the battles between the regular troops of the major warlord and the 
vanguard of the National Revolutionary Army before deciding which way to go. For 
his part, Sun responded to the imminent attack on Jiangxi by ordering his subordinate 
commander in Fujian to invade the Guangdong base of the National Revolutionary 
Army, and by moving a number of his units into Jiangxi, where he prepared a trap for 
the main force of the National Revolutionary Army. Sun's hold on his area was 
apparently so weak that once he had been defeated in Jiangxi and Fujian, he ceded his 
entire base to the National Revolutionary Army, as we shall see, and would not 
counterattack until mid -1927. 
For Chiang Kaishek, the battles in Jiangxi would underscore the difficulty of 
leading the loosely organised National Revolutionary Army forces that were so 
incompletely unified at the outset of the expedition. Although his original strategy for 
invading Jiangxi was sound the actual campaign was poorly executed. Several units 
were out of control. Part of the reason for this was that the campaign in Jiangxi saw the 
participation --for the first time --of some of the more warlord -like members of the 
National Revolutionary Army, and particularly of the XI Corps. Their irregular 
behaviour allowed Sun Chuanfang, who commanded troops of much higher calibre 
than those under Wu Peifu, to defeat units of the National Revolutionary Army. During 
this campaign the National Revolutionary Army behaved very much like all of Sun 
Yatsen's earlier efforts. 
Before the invasion was launched, another local militarists joined the National 
Revolutionary Army, Lai Shihuang, commander of the indigenous Jiangxi 4th Division. 
Lai's unit was stationed in southern Jiangxi, far from the arena of combat. It did not 
defect but rejoined Guangzhou. A long -time member of the Guomindang, Lai had 
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served under Sun Yatsen during the early 1920s, and had participated in the 1922 
Northern Expedition. Following the failure of that effort, Lai had stayed on in southern 
Jiangxi near the border with Guangdong. In 1925, Lai had received his designation as a 
member of Sun Chuanfang's Jiangxi Army, but in fact remained autonomous. In 1926, 
Lai renewed his contacts with Guangzhou, which prohibited Xiong Shihui, a fellow 
provincial and like Lai, a graduate of the Second Class of Boading to contact Lai in 
July. In August, this force was enrolled in the National Revolutionary Army as the 
XIV Corps, and Xiong stayed on as political representatives and commander of one of 
Lai's subordinate divisions. 
The National Revolutionary Army entered Jiangxi in September by three routes 
(see map 7 -4). The II and III Corps advanced along the railroad from Changsha to 
Pingxiang and then overland to Nanchang. The VI Corps along with two divisions of 
Chiang Kaishek's I Corps, under Wang Boling, were to move overland toward Dean. 
There, they would cut the rail line linking Nanchang and Jiujiang. Finally, the VII 
Corps, and the IV Corps70 which had led the way through Hunan and Hubei, was 
ordered to advance southward along the Yangzi River from Wuhan to Jiujiang, cutting 
off any reinforcements. The VII Corps would then move down the railroad to link up 
with the I and VI Corps for an attack on Sun's forces in Jiangxi. 
For his part, Sun did not contest the National Revolutionary Army's invasion of 
the province. His plan apparently was to allow the I and VI Corps to capture the 
provincial capital of Nanchang uncontested, in preparation of a surprise counterattack. 
According the rules of warlord warfare, which dictated that walled cities were 
impregnable, Sun's decision to withdraw voluntarily was a bold gamble. Like Feng 
Yuxiang, who used a similar ploy, the intent was to induce overconfidence in the 
invading force, which was supposed to believe that the enemy would only abandon a 
walled city if his troops were in total retreat.''t 
70 The IV Corps at that time was advancing northward to the Hubei -Honan border, as discussed 
above. 
7" Donald Jordan, on the other hand, attributes the uncontested advance into Jiangxi to a defection, 
that of Fang Benren, who Jordan calls "Sun's Jiangxi man." Jordan claims, albeit without evidence, that 
Fang timed his defection when he had "his troops aligned at the strategic Pingxiang Pass" dividing 
Hunan and Jiangxi. Jordan, op. cit., 265, 279. There are several problems with Jordan's view. First, Fang 
was not Sun's subordinate. Re was a local warlord who, like Lai Shihuang, discussed above, had close 
ties to the Guomindang and had participated in earlier Northern Expeditions. Second, although Fang's 
defection might explain why Sun allowed the VII Corps to enter the province, it does not explain why 
Sun abandoned Nanchang. Finally, Fang had no troops with which to defect, neither at Pingxiang nor 
anywhere else. See Hollington Tong, Chiang Kaishek, Taibei: China Publishing Company, 1953, p. 13; 
Zhonghua minguo zhanyi dashi jiyao (A record of the major battles and events of the republic of China), 
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Sun's plan was an initial success. The VI Corps abandoned its original goal, 
Dean, and made for Nanchang instead, once it learnt that the city was undefended. 
Still accompanied by two divisions of the I Corps, this force entered the city on IS 
September. Sun moved quickly to close the trap, and the units at Nanchang, lacking 
reinforcements, were forced to abandon the city in great disorder. The defeat 
apparently turned into a rout, and Chiang ordered the arrest and court martial of Wang 
Boling, his long -time associate. Wang was charged with not having reinforced 
Nanchang quickly enough. As in the past, such failures were always punished, 
regardless of the stature of the individual.712 
Li Zongren, still moving south, arrived at the rendezvous point, and found no 
one there. But,unlike the troops that had occupied Nanchang, Li apparently knew that 
the Jiangxi campaign was designed to search and destroy Sun's troops, not capture his 
cities. Thus, rather than wait, Li abandoned his orders and marched on Ruoxi, west of 
Dean, where another of Sun's units was waiting in ambush. Li attacked on. 30 
September, and destroyed the Jiangsu 4th Division in an all -day battle. Both the 
division and brigade commanders were killed, and at least 2,000 men captured.' Li, 
still out of contact with the rest of the invasion force, then returned to De`an that he 
occupied, but it was one week too late for the National Revolutionary Army troops at 
Nanchang. Isolated and faced with a counterattack from the south, Li withdrew to the 
west. 
Taibei: Guofangbu Shizhengju, 1962, 15 -16. Despite his designation as Military Governor of Jiangxi 
Fang had no troops of his own. The units in Jiangxi were controlled either by Sun himself or the various 
local warlords. The NRA designation that Fang accepted, command of the XI Corps (A), existed only on 
paper. See Zhonghua minguo dashiji, op. cit., p. 233; Wen Gongdao, op. cit., I: 449. 
72 Beifa zhanshi, 496 -497. Wang was Chiang's schoolmate from Baoding, and had been his classmate 
at Shikan Gakko. Wang was not executed, despite the dictates of the Lianzuofa, but he never held 
another combat command. "Wang Boling, "Zhuanji wenxue XXIV: 2 (February, 1979), p. 143; Zhou 
Yingnong, "Belfa chuqi di huiyi: Jiangxi shiqi", (Recollection of the early northern expedition: the 
Jiangxi period), Jiangxi Wenxian, no. 69 (July 2, 1972), p.4; Liu Zhi, op. cit., p. 42. Liu Zhi succeeded 
Wang to command. Sun Yuanliang, a very fast -rising graduate of the Huangpu First Class, was also 
blamed for the defeat and cashiered. Sun was able to return to command during the 1930s. Zhou 
Yingnong, op. cit., p. 5. 
713 Li Zongren, op. cit., 187 -188. The official history Beifa zhanshi claims 2,000. Li admits that his 
victory was only possible because the enemy unit had been forced to fight without reinforcements; the 
remainder of Sun's troops were than attacking Nanchang. Although Li's claims that he faced an enemy 
force of 30,000 seem exaggerated, it was a tough battle, and the VII Corps probably did suffer 2,000 
casualties. Li Zongren, op. cit., 188 -189; Beifa zhanshi, op. cit., 518 -520. 
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Chiang Kaishek now moved to restore order, and the original campaign was 
resumed a month later. The VII Corps was again ordered to attack Dean, in 
conjunction with an assault on Nanchang. Sun now dug in to defend the two cities, and 
the fighting was fierce, with heavy casualties on both sides. Dean fell on 2 November 
and Jiujiang was occupied on 5 November. Completely cut off, Sun's troops at 
Nanchang surrendered on 8 November. "" In a pattern that was now becoming familiar, 
the warlord forces cracked under sustained assault. Sun's losses were enormous and far 
out of proportion to the scale of the battle, suggesting both poor tactics and mass panic. 
Sun's losses in Jiangxi were, like those of Wu Peifu in Rubel, remarkable. Only 
three of his I I divisions were able to withdraw back to Anhui or Zhejiang. Of the 12 
brigades that Sun had brought to Jiangxi, only five were able to return to Anhui or 
Zhejiang. While Sun was being defeated in Jiangxi, the other half of his military plan, 
the invasion of Fujian, was also going awry. Following the collapse of Hunan. Hubei 
and Jiangxi, similar defections occurred in Fujian, Zhejiang and Anhui. 
The Nanjing -Wuhan Split 
After the National Revolutionary Army successfully captured the lower Yangzi 
valley it began to split. The most basic division was a split between Wuhan and 
Nanchang. After the capital had been moved north from Guangzhou to Wuhan, the 
Chinese Communist Party backed the Guomindang government there and the Leftist 
Guomindang headed by Wang Jingwei, and the IV and VIII Corps supported Wang. 
The period of the Wuhan government from late 1926 into May 1927 saw the Russian 
Advisory Group and their Chinese Communist lieutenants reach a peak of authority. 
Tensions escalated when the Guomindang Left proposed the implementation of peasant 
land confiscation, execution of landlords and strike disorders in the cities.75 During 
this time, a Huangpu branch school was established in Wuhan responsible for the 
training of the political workers for the National Revolutionary Army. With the split of 
"" Li Zongren, op. cit., p. 191. Li claims to have captured 30,000 men, probably an inflated figure. 
For the battle of Nanchang, see Liu Zhi, op. cit., 40 -53. Liu commanded a division of the I Corps. Other 
accounts include Gan Guoxun, "Wu di jungma shenghuo," (My life in the military) 
Zhongwai zazhi XIX: 3 (March, 1976), p. 41; Hu Naian, "Jiushi huiyi ", (Recollections at 90) Zhuanji 
wenxue, IX: 6 (December, 1966), 40 -41. The official version is Beifa zhanshi, op. cit., 477 -564. Casualty 
lists can be found in /bid., vol. IV, Appendix, 2 -7. 
75 For a discussion of the Wuhan -Nanjing split, see C. Martín Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in 
China, 77 -94, 113 -124. 
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Wuhan and Nanjing, the Wuhan's branch came under the control of the Left 
Guomindang.76 
Opposing them was the Guomindang government at Nanjing, established by 
Chiang Kaishek and his generals and backed by the I Corps and Li Zongren s VII 
Corps. Thus, the split was ideological (right versus Ieft), personal (Chiang Kaishek 
versus Wang Jingwei), and military (between those who wanted the Northern 
Expedition to move north to join Feng Yuxiang versus those who wanted to go north 
through Jiangsu)."' One important consideration for Chiang and his officers rias that 
with the Communist Party and Leftist Guomindang triumphant in Wuhan. he lost 
access to the arsenal there. The only other arsenal of comparable importance was at 
Jiangsu (see previous chapter on the Guangzhou Arsenal). In addition, it is important 
to note that the split was also geographic, as the local warlords once again pledged 
allegiance to the government in their area. Thus, units from Guangdong. Hunan and 
Hubei supported Wuhan, while units from Guangxi and the lower Yangzi valley 
supported Nanjing. 
Ideologically, the split pit those who might be characterised as socialists and 
nationalists (Wuhan) against those more purely nationalistic (Nanjing). One of the 
many ironies inherent in the split was that Wuhan depended so heavily on the support 
of Tang Shengzhi's VIII Corps. Tang was neither a socialist nor a nationalist and 
opposed any activity that might undercut the profits he and his subordinates were 
deriving from their new base in Hunan and Hubei. Once the IV Corps decided to pull 
out and return to its native Guangdong, the Wuhan Government was totally dependent 
upon Tang. But the very mass movement that had been built after Hunan was captured, 
and from which the civilians derived their power threatened Tang. He would thus turn 
and crush the nascent trade union and peasant movements.78 
76 For detail of the Wuhan's branch of the Huangpu school, see Zhang Guangyu, Wuhan zhangyang 
junshi zhengzhi xuexiao (The central military- political academy of Wuhan), Hubei: Renmin chubanshe, 
1987. 
Chiang Kaishek presumably was loathe to link up with Feng Yuxiang because it would have 
meant an alliance with a warlord force, and also because Feng's army was so much larger than his own. 
Borodin supposedly wanted to go north to link up with Feng because the Communists had sympathisers 
inside his units. See James Sheridan, China in Disintegration, New York: The Free Press, 1975, p. 171. 
Others claim that Chiang wanted to go to Shanghai because he could link up with the bankers there. See 
O. Edmund Clubb, 20th Century China, New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1964, p. 
136. 
78 See Conrad Brandt, Stalin's Failure in China, 1924 -1927 (New York: Wm Norton and Co., 
1958), 102 -153, for a fuller discussion of Wuhan's dilemma. For a Russian's assessment of Tang 
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Chiang Kaishek struck first when he purged the Communist and Leftist officers 
from his I Corps in late April and early May. Chiang requested and received assistance 
from Li Zongren's VII Corps, which admitted no Communists or political officers into 
its ranks, to conduct the purge. Among those ousted were two talented division 
commanders, Xue Yue and Yan Zhong, both Guangdong natives. They had close ties 
with the officers of the IV Corps, which was supporting Wuhan. The purge of Yan and 
Xue, therefore, may have had as much to do with provincialism as ideology. In 
addition, another dozen junior officers were purged.79 Chiang then used the I Corps 
and Zhou Fengqi's XXVI Corps, a local Zhejiang warlord unit, to purge Shanghai. 
Chiang's units and most of his base were now secured, and most importantly, he had 
access to his own source of revenue, the Shanghai bankers.70 as well as his own 
arsenal. 
In Hunan, the first to move was Xu Kexiang, then garrison commander of 
Changsha. Xu, a Iocal warlord nominally subordinate to Tang Shengzhi, struck on 21 
May, precipitating what is now known as the Ma ri (Horse Day) Incident, breaking up 
the trade unions and other organisations of Communist Party power in the city.721 
Other local warlords were also unhappy with the spread of Communist mass 
organisations. Xia Douyin, another of those only nominally subordinate to Tang, 
conducted his own purge in western Hunan and then began to advance on Wuhan itself, 
while most of the regular troops were in the north fighting in Henan. But Xia's marginal 
unit was defeated outside the city by local peasants troops led by cadets from the 
Wuhan branch of the Huangpu Military Academy. By mid -May, Xia had withdrawn to 
Shengzhi who ambitiously wanted to take over Chiang Kaishek's place and attempted to seek the 
support of the CCP and Comintern, see "Tairov's Report to Borodin on the Situation at Wuhan." 
Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920 -1927, Document 69: 771 -776. 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 1989, 775 -6. 
"9 Li Tsung -jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen, Boulder: Westview Press, 1979, 207 -210. Li says he 
sided with Chiang during the split because he feared Chiang's military dictatorship less than he feared the 
CCP. 
720 Parks M. Coble, "The Guomindang Regime and the Shanghai Capitalists, 1927- 1929," China 
Quarterly, no.77 (January- March, 1979) has an excellent account of Chiang's relationship with the 
bankers. 
Harold Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961, 
234 -237. Xu's own account is Xu Kexiang, Ma'ri Changong huiyilu (Reminiscences about the 
Communists and the Horse Day Incident), Taibei: privately printed, n.d.. 
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the west." Later, the Chinese Communists would recall Xia's actions as the most cruel 
during the period, and him as the most "bitterly revengeful" of the anti- Communists.723 
The split, with its concurrent weakening of what had been central authority, was 
a boon to the local warlords, who became bolder. In Jiangxi, for example. Zhu Peide, 
whose II Corps had been one of the original National Revolutionary Army units, and 
who was being wooed by both Nanjing and Wuhan, took advantage of the situation to 
launch a coup in the province and seize it for him.724 With no one able to enforce 
obedience, Zhu would stay on in Jiangxi until 1930, when Chiang Kaishek ousted him. 
In Guangdong, long -time Chiang Kaishek supporter Qian Dajun, who had been 
left behind with a division to guard the original base, began his purge in early April and 
declared martial law on the 16 April. He moved against a local warlord unit 
sympathetic to the Communists, commanded by Chen Jiayou.725 Qian then marched 
into southern Jiangxi against Zhang Youren, a supporter of Zhu Peide, and captured his 
unit. 726 
The purge of the Chinese Communists even by minor militarists was important. 
The Communist Party could organise mass movements such as peasant associations 
and trade unions. But it could only maintain them if it could defend them. Otherwise, 
even the poorly -led local warlords could defeat them if they wished. Later, after the 
formation of the Red Army, the Communist Party could carry out its activities under 
the protection of the army. 
'22 Meng Da, "Wo canjia Guomin geming qianqi di huìyì," (Recollections of my participation in the 
early period of national revolution) Shandong Wenxian, III: 2 (20 September 1977), 112-113. Meng had 
been a cadet at the Wuhan branch of the Central Military- Political Academy and fought in 
the battle. 
723 Nym Wales, Red Dust, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952, p.360. 
124 Zhou Yingnong, "Belfa chuqi di huiyilu" (Reminiscences of the early stage of the northern 
expedition), Jiangxi wenxian, no. 69, (2 July 1972), 7 -8. Zhou was serving in the provincial government 
at the time. 
ns Qian Dajun, "Qian Muying shangjiang qishi zizhuan (The autobiography of General Qian Dajun 
at seventy), Taibei, privately printed, n.d., 14 -15. 
'6 Ibid. 
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In all, there were three different military actions against the Communists. First, 
Chiang Kaishek. Li Zongren and Qian Dajun removed suspected Communists from 
their own military units. Second, these same men then moved against local Communist 
Party organisations that had sprung up in the areas they controlled. Third. local 
Warlords crushed peasant organisations in their base areas." The latter was not 
necessarily allied with Chiang but they definitely make use of the opportunity open to 
them. 
The split also meant a sharp reduction in Chiang's territory, because Hubei, 
Hunan and Guangdong followed Wuhan, and later had to be "re- captured" by the 
Central Army. Only Zhejiang, Jiangsu and possibly Anhui remained, and Chiang's 
control of these was far from secure. 
The Battle of Longtan 
The Battle of Longtan was another major test for the National Revolutionary 
Army. It was the final major offensive launched by Sun Chuanfang's forces on the 
National Revolutionary Army for the occupation of Nanjing. Sun's defeat resulted in 
the total lost of his power base. To the Guomindang, the successful conclusion of the 
Battle of Longtan marked the control of Nanjing firmly in the hands of the National 
Revolutionary Army. It also marked the end of the Northern Expedition in southern 
and central China. 
The Battle of Longtan took place after Chiang Kaishek resigned from his 
command on 12 August 1927. Chiang's resignation was a direct result of the failure in 
defending Xuzhou against the Anguojun of Zhang Zongehang's attack. But it was also 
reported that Chiang left to facilitate the possible cooperation between Wuhan and 
Nanjing.728 With Chiang left the National Revolutionary Army, Li Zongren and Bai 
'27 Li Pinxian, "Rongma shengya" (A life in the army), Zhongwai zazhi, XV: 2 (December 1973), p. 
78, which provides some interesting discussions about the local warlords' reaction to the new peasant 
organisations. 
728 The reasons for the resignation are not altogether clear but is it believed that military defeat and 
disagreements within his command were the most important factors. Wan Yaohuang, who attended the 
meeting in which Chiang resigned, reports that Chiang said he would resign if it would facilitate 
cooperation between Wuhan and Nanjing. While such resignation might have been pushed by Li 
Zongren, who claims that he did not want war with Wuhan, what must have alarmed Chiang the most 
was the attitude of his long -time supporter and associate He Yingqin. Faced with He's silence, Chiang 
left the podium and returned to Shanghai. See Wan Yaohuang, "Wan Yaohuang huiyilu" (The memoirs 
of Wan Yaohuang), Zhongwai zazhi, XX: 1 (July 1976), p. 121. Li Zongren denies that he forced Chiang 
to resign, see Li Zongren huiyilu, p. 222. 
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Chongxi joined with I Corps commander He Yingqin to stem Sun's advance. A 
defence line was drawn up along the Yangzi, just as it was in April, during the first Sun 
Chuanfang counterattack. Emboldened by Nanjing's apparent inability to regroup. Sun 
prepared to cross the river 79 
Sun began with an artillery attack on Nanjing, apparently trying to convince the 
I and VII Corps commanders that his attack would come from this direction. Then, 
during the night of 25 -26 August, Sun began ferrying his troops across the river at five 
points east of Nanjing. He aimed his main force at Longtan Station along the railroad 
connecting Nanjing and Shanghai. Sun was initially successful, and was able to land 
most of his troops without incident. They cut the railroad, thus splitting the I and VII 
Corps. 
Sun threw his entire remaining force into the attack. It probably consisted of 11 
divisions and six brigades, about 70,000 men. In all, Sun had no options left. He had 
no reserves, no reinforcements, and his line of retreat and supply was unguarded. In 
addition, he destroyed the boats he had used to cross the river.730 But Sun's move was 
not as risky as it appeared. With the National Revolutionary Army in disarray, and 
Chiang Kaishek in retirement, the I and VII Corps should have withdrawn since Sun 
was determined to fight to the last man. 
Sun had another advantage in this attack that was the participation of Tang 
Shengzhi. The I and VII Corps withdrew originally from Shandong to face Tang's 
attack in Nanjing. Tang was coordinating his advance with that of Sun, hoping to 
squeeze Chiang Kaishek's troops out of the lower Yangzi basin altogether.731 Tang's 
advance was delayed, however, first by the 1 August Nanchang Uprising, second by the 
loss of the IV Corps, which had gone to Fujian, and then by the opening of negotiations 
729 Wang Yaohuang, op. cit., p. 122. Wan gives a good account of the gallows humour of the NRA's top 
commanders at the time. 
730 Li Zongren, op. cit., p. 229; Belfa zhanshi,p. 852, chart 61. 
731 One of Tang subordinates claims that Tang had spoken to his officers in late June about taking 
advantage of Sun's advance to attack Nanjing, and reports many details of the plan. See Li Pinxian, op. 
cit., XV: 3 (January 1974), p. 43. But Li also states that by the time of the Longtan attack in August, 
Tang had changed his mind primarily because of Chiang Kaishek's resignation and the opening of the 
negotiation between Nanjing and Wuhan. Li then claims that any report of an advance in August was a 
rumour spread by Jiang Boli. Li Zongren claims to have been told by Tang's other subordinates that 
Jiang Boli had been, in fact, the intermediary between Tang and Sun. See Li Zongren, op. cit., p. 226. 
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between Wuhan and Nanjing. Finally, one cannot discount the possibility that Tang 
betrayed Sun, preferring to allow him to fight Nanjing alone. after which he hoped to 
pick up the pieces. 
In any case, with Tang's advance was halted, the I and VII Corps were able to 
concentrate on Sun's troops. They did not panic following Sun's crossing of the 
Yangzi. In fact, the commanders treated it as an opportunity to fight and, destroy his 
units just as they had in the decisive victory in Jiangxi the year before. Thus, although 
outnumbered by more than two to one, the I and VII Corps went on the offensive, and 
attacked Sun's recently seized positions. The key to the battle. as was true of so many 
warlord battles, was the small -scale action for the control of the heights (and therefore 
artillery) that commanded the battlefield. Once again, the junior officers of the 
emerging Central Army distinguished themselves. The I and VII Corps defeated and 
captured all of Sun's outlying positions by 30 August. At that point, they closed on 
Sun's main force at Longtan. On the next day, at 2.00 p.m., Sun surrendered his entire 
force, and fled north in disguise.72 
The six -day battle at Longtan was the largest and most ferocious of the Northern 
Expedition. It marked the real end of Sun Chuanfang's power in China, although he 
would hang -on to some remnants of it under Zhang Zuolin. Of the 60,000 to 70,000 
troops that Sun had transferred across the river, almost 10,000 had been killed or 
wounded, and 20,000 to 30,000 captured. In turn, the I and VII Corps had possibly 
suffered as many as 8,000 casualties.733 
By any standards, it was a major battle, but by warlord standards it was 
incredible. Both sides had risked the destruction of their armies in the battle, an 
unprecedented move. Once again, Nanjing had demonstrated that it had brought a new 
'32 Longtan remains, after Tai'er zhuang (where Bai Chongxi was again combined with Huangpu 
troops), the single most chronicled campaign in the Guomindang history. Belfa zhanshi, op. cit., 851- 
916, which weighed in favour of the i Corps' contributions. This is however more than balanced by Li 
Zongren's account who claims that He Yingqin lost his nerve following Sun's crossing of the river, and 
that only Li's reassurance persuaded He to commit the I Corps to battle. Li Zongren, op. cit., 229 -233. 
Other accounts of the battle include, Liu Zhi, Wo di huiyi (My reminiscences), Taibei: privately printed, 
1966; 58 -61; Jiang Chunzhang, "Dongzheng beifa si da zhanyi" (Four major battles of the eastern and 
the northern expedition), Zhongwai zazhi, XVI: 2 (August 1979), 80 -82; He Yingqin, " Beifa di huiyi" 
(Memories of the northern expedition), Zhuanji wenxue, XXXIII: I (July 1978), 21 -22; Huang Kunshan, 
"Longtan zhiyi" (The battle of Longtan), Guangxi wenxian, no. 2 (September 1978), 44 -45. These are all 
first hand accounts. 
73 Belfa zhanshi, 897 -899. 
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type of warfare to China. Specifically, the l and VII Corps had demonstrated the value 
of a highly motivated and well -trained junior officer corps. In addition to their ability 
to win any and all small -scale actions, their ability to respond quickly to the attack, to 
mobilise troops and get them into position, all depended upon the junior officers. In 
short, the army was more flexible and more mobile, because decisions could be 
delegated, and once delegated, were implemented.734 
Following the Longtan victory, Nanjing began its third advance northward 
through Jiangsu and Anhui led by the I and VIIII Corps. Once again it aimed at the 
seizure of strong points in southern Shandong to secure the lower Yangzi basin. Faced 
with an advance from the troops under Feng Yuxiang, Sun Chuanfang and Chang 
Zongchang once again withdrew with only token resistance. Nanjing captured Xuzhou 
on 16 December. Once again, and for the final time, Nanjing was in control of the 
lower Yangzi.733 
The Final Phase 
Following the Battle of Longtan and Li Zongren led westward expedition 
against Tang Shengzhi in Wuhan, Chiang Kaishek returned to China and resumed 
command of the expedition in early 1928. He immediately ordered the National 
Revolutionary Army to advance into southern Shandong. During his absence no one 
emerged to succeed him. This seemed to demonstrate his indispensable role in the 
National Revolutionary Army. 
By this time, the National Revolutionary Army was no longer fighting alone. 
Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan soon joined in; the National Revolutionary Army was 
renamed the First Army Group, together with Feng Yuxiang's forces as the Second and 
Yan Xishan's Third Army Groups. The Third Army Group moved eastward against 
Zhang Zuolin and bore the brunt of the fighting.736 Following Zhang's decision to 
734 Be fa zhanshi, 915 -6, cites spirit, mobility and flexibility as the key reasons for the victory. 
Liu Zhi, op. cir., 60 -62; Beifa zhanshi, 1020 -40, 1052 -64. 
The only battle of significance for the southern troops occurred as Nanjing moved into Shandong 
to capture northern defence positions for the new base. These were at Yutai, near Linyi . See Wan 
Yaohuang, op. cit., XX: 2, (August 1976), p. 128; Beffa zhanshi, IV: 1213 -1219; Wang Gongyou, "Rang 
ri chuqi guojun shou budong di huiyi" (Reminiscences of the nationalist army's defence of the eastern 
Jiangsu during the early stage of the war against Japan), Zhuanji wenxue, XXII: 2 (February 1973), p. 
51. 
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withdraw into Manchuria. the Japanese assassinated him. His son, Zhang XueIiang, 
succeeded him and he promptly declared his support for the Guomindang, thus marking 
the "unification" of China. 
In conclusion, the Guomindang's decision to launch the Northern Expedition in 
1926 was mainly due to military factors. The main impetus was the attack by the two 
most powerful militarists cliques of Zhili and Fengtian on Feng Yuxiang's Guominjun. 
If the Guominjun was destroyed, it would not only mean the loss of a major northern 
ally but also mean that the Guomindang would have to confront its most formidable 
opponents directly. This grave consequence forced even the most unwilling United 
Front partners, the Chinese Communist Party, and its sponsor, the Comintern, to agree 
that the Northern Expedition had to start. The alliance with Feng Yuxiang became even 
more urgent when the pro -Wu Peifu faction of the Hunan army was preparing to attack 
units of Tang Shengzhi. The crisis in Hunan soon involved the VII Corps of the 
National Revolutionary Army. It also led to Tang's request for reinforcements and 
joining the Guomindang. 
The National Revolutionary Army's winning formula in the Northern 
Expedition was both political and military. The use of regional and national appeals, 
the effectiveness of political indoctrination and propaganda campaigns played 
important roles in preparing the ground and soldiers for combat. The decisive 
leadership of Chiang Kaishek and his ability to lead the National Revolutionary Army 
had contributed greatly to the speedy advance of the National Revolutionary Army in 
central China. Lastly, bloody battles and the traditional defection had won National 
Revolutionary Army territories and numeral forces to its side. However, not all the 
National Revolutionary Army units contributed equally during the campaign. Among 
the original eight corps that took part in the Northern Expedition, only the VII, IV, VIII 
and I Corps were actively involved in the battles. The early occupation of Hunan and 
Hubei laid the foundation of the Guomindang's further expansion in the Central and 
Northern China. As these units were the main fighting forces of the National 
Revolutionary Army, the behaviour of its commanders played a crucial role in deciding 
the direction of the campaign. When the Guomindang was divided into Wuhan and 
Nanjing factions, the military support of the regimes became decisive in the survival of 
the regime. When the commanders of the IV and VIII Corps withdrew his support of 
Wuhan, the regime simply collapsed. 
The split between the Guomindang and the Communist Party also seriously 
weakened some units of the National Revolutionary Army. The split, coupled with the 
high casualty rate during the campaign, seriously affected the IV Corps as it could 
hardly recover again. On the other hand, the split had little impact on the VII Corps. 
Being the least affected by the pre -expedition reorganisation, it managed to maintain its 
original structure and key personnel intact throughout the Northern Expedition. Its 
support for the Nanjing regime was crucial to the latter's survival. 
The defection of local warlords to the National Revolutionary Army was a two - 
edged sword. Although defection assisted the National Revolutionary Army in 
concentrating on seeking out and destroying the regular troops of the multi -provincial 
warlords, the rapid expansion of the National Revolutionary Army created both 
command and control, as well as logistic and maintenance problems. By the end of 
1928, over 100 units had joined the National Revolutionary Army.'37 Nanjing would 
have to decide whether to use and reorganise them as regular, loyal and competent 
members of the Central Army, or break them up. This was one of the reasons why the 
commander of the National Revolutionary Army needed to end the Northern 
Expedition as soon as possible. It needed to regroup and supply these ever expanding 
forces before they went out of control. 
"' The troops of the Second and Third Army Groups of Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan are not 
considered here. Among them, 24 of the 100 units were the original eight corps plus the 16 additional 
units they had created. Of the 80 warlord units that had joined the National Revolutionary Army, 32 had 
already been broken up by the end of the Northern Expedition. Two had opted to go with the Chinese 
Communists. Of the 47 remaining units, ten were in faraway Yunnan and Sichuan. Only 24 of the units 
that had joined the National Revolutionary Army were located, in 1928, in Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Anhui or 
Fujian. Details of the units of the National Revolutionary Army, see Zhang Guanyi, Guomin gemingjun, 
chapters 3 and 4, 130 -252. 
Chapter S: The Legacy of the National Revolutionary Army 
The National Revolutionary Army was split into three major groups after the 
Northern Expedition. After they were purged in 1927, the Chinese Communist Party 
conducted two abortive uprisings in the same year and retreated into the countryside 
and built its own Red Army. Some commanders within the National Revolutionary 
Army challenged Commander -in -chief Chiang Kaishek's legitimacy in the post - 
Northern Expedition China. The issue was partially settled in the battlefield in 1928- 
30. Although Chiang's Nanjing army won these battles, regional armies were allowed 
to operate in a semi -autonomous manner throughout most of the 1930s. In Nanjing, 
Chiang Kaishek, who had the support of both the military and the conservative 
members of the Guomindang, began to rebuild the National Revolutionary Army into a 
Central Army with a mantle of the Party Army. 
This chapter looks at the Nanjing government's efforts to transform the Party 
Army into a national army after the Northern Expedition. It will first discuss the post - 
Northern Expedition problems faced by the Nanjing government and the failure of the 
unit disbandment conference in 1928. This will be followed by a discussion of two key 
legacies of the Party Army: the formation of the Central Army and the establishment of 
the Central Military Academy in Nanjing. The last part of the chapter will discuss the 
military ethos of the Huangpu spirit and the "Third Party Movement" in the post - 
Northern Expedition era. 
Post -Northern Expedition Problems 
In the post- Northern Expedition years, two major problems confronting the 
Guomindang required immediate actions: the first was its mounting financial 
difficulties, and the second was the creation of a new political and military order in 
China. At the end of the northern expedition, nothing threatened the Nanjing 
government more than the crushing financial burden imposed by the military 
expenditure. According to He Yingqing's March 1929 report, the actual annual military 
expenditure at the end of the Northern Expedition stood at $350 million.738 This means 
that even of the entire budget was paid for the military, there still be a shortfall of 30 
million.' The Nanjing government clearly could not function as a central authority 
ns The China Yearbook, 1929 -30, 629. 
79 Chiang Kaishek, Jianguo caibing zhi yi yi (The meaning of troops reduction for reconstruction), 
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while maintaining such a bloated military establishment. In practical terms, the first 
military policy of the government in the post- expedition era was to devise a scheme to 
reduce military spending by 60% through drastic curtailment and reorganisation of the 
nation's multifarious armies. 
The second problem of creating a new political and social order was equally 
daunting. By the end of the Northern Expedition, only Jiangsu and Zhejiang came 
under direct jurisdiction of the Nanjing regime.740 The Guomindang, as scholars have 
noted repeatedly, was not strong enough to force the unity of the many diverse elements 
that made up China at that time.741 Chiang Kaishek apparently did not believe that a 
political party could control the local, provincial and multi -provincial militarists who 
claimed their political authority based on the armies they commanded. Despite the 
nominal allegiance of these figures to the Guomindang, these militarists would still 
have to be met and defeated in battle before they would actually subordinate themselves 
to the Nanjing Government. 
What the Northern Expedition had achieved, however, was to capture 
legitimacy for the Guomindang which was then the nominal national political authority. 
It also moved the capital from Beijing (now Beiping) to Nanjing. For the next 10 
years, still nominally under the Guomindang mantle, the Nanjing's Central Army 
would attack the various militarists, forcing them to acknowledge Nanjing's supremacy. 
But most militarists would refuse to do this until the Central Army had defeated them 
in battle, or invaded their province. 
During the 1930s, the Nanjing government would act on various levels. On the 
international scene, Nanjing was increasingly recognised as the seat of the central 
government. Domestically, Chiang would have to interact with the regional overlords 
(those militarists who controlled more than one province) in a different way. Chiang 
162 -64. 
74ó These two provinces were the only two to fulfil their tax contributions. For an account of tax 
contributions by the provinces, see "Finances of the Nationalist Army," The China Weekly Review, 17 
September 1927; Paul K.T. Sih, ed., The Strenous Decade: China 's Nation- Building Efforts, 1927 -1937, 
New York, 1970, 86. 
41 For examples, ,see Lloyd Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 
1927 -1937. Cambridge, Mass: 1974, p. 9; F. Gilbert Chan, China at the Crossroads: Nationalists and 
Communists, 1927 -1949, Boulder: Westview Press, 1980, p. 1; Hung -mao Tien, Government and 
Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927 -1937, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972, p. 4; James 
Sheridan, China in Disintegration, New York: The Free Press, 1975. 
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used a divide and rule strategy. Chiang's first priority was to play them off against one 
another. But Chiang did not just pursue this policy in order to survive; he did it to buy 
time to defeat them individually. 
At the local level, on the other hand, Chiang acted behind the facade of 
Guomindang unity and used the mantle of Guomindang legitimacy to create a new 
political and military order. Chiang and his supporters believed that this military and 
political unity needed to be accomplished before a unified political party could be 
established. Otherwise, as Chiang believed, various regional and local militarists 
would act within the party as geographic factions --based on their military power - -to 
prevent the party unity. Thus, once Nanjing had defeated a multi- provincial overlord 
and taken over his province(s), the Central Army, in the name of the Guomindang, 
would move in and take over the troops. These units would either obey Nanjing's orders 
or they would be broken up or chased out from their bases. In this respect, the loyalty 
of the Central Army was crucial in defeating other militarists. 
Rebuilding the Party and Army 
Chiang Kaishek had other choices to rebuild the country. The most obvious 
would have been to rebuild the party and to use the Guomindang as a mechanism for 
political control. It is unlikely that Chiang Kaishek and his associates ever seriously 
entertained the option of unifying China by purely or even predominantly political 
means. Even those within Chiang's coterie who might have tended toward such views- - 
such as the Blue Shirts, paid no more than lip service to the use of political means to 
accomplish it. For example, Deng Wenyi, one of the most important leaders frequently 
identified with the Blue Shirts, put much more emphasis on building an army than on 
building a party. During the late 1920s, Deng served as director of the Political 
Department of the Huangpu Military Academy. A Huangpu First Class graduate who 
had studied in the Soviet Union, Deng compiled a collection of lectures delivered at the 
academy in 1929. In retrospect, this compilation appeared to represent Nanjing's 
blueprint for the 1930s.742 
Deng argued that with the nominal end of the Northern Expedition, Nanjing 
42 Deng, who later raised high in the Central Army, was heavily involved in political work. In 1929 
he was serving as the director of the Political Office (Zhengxun chu) of the 10th Division. Deng Wenyi, 
Gemingjun wenti zhongzhong (The problems of the revolutionary army are serious), n.p.: Bati shutian, 
1929. 
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should focus on two goals: completion of the revolution, and victory in what he was 
already calling World War II with Japan. Deng noted that despite the Northern 
Expedition's completion, the revolution (i.e. Chiang Kaishek's revolution) was not 
complete. Nanjing still had to subdue the local militarists (which Deng called bandits), 
destroy the remaining provincial militarists and overlords, and thus unify China. If this 
were done, argued Deng, the course of World War II would not matter, the nationalist 
revolution could be protected. Conversely, if China were not unified by the start of the 
war, the revolution would be endangered; the militarists could unify with the 
imperialists to protect their autonomous status.743 
Deng raised two problems that Nanjing faced in the late 1920s. First, the army 
had expanded too rapidly, and the behaviour of many of the new units was not 
revolutionary. Second, there were still a number of militarists not even nominally 
allegiant to the Guomindang. To solve the first problem, Deng asserted that Nanjing 
must streamline and consolidate the marginal units. Defector units that were 
reasonably good could be changed, while the others would be destroyed.' Deng was 
concerned not only to reform provincial armies but also to prevent them from re- 
emerging. Thus, if China could not destroy provincial militarists, Deng predicted 
unification would he in question and foreign powers could enter China via these same 
militarists. 
Deng's proposals appeared to range beyond suggestion for the army. He also 
argued for the rebuilding of the party as well. Deng coined the slogan that China must 
"politicise the military and militarise the party" (Danghua jun; junhua dang).745 A 
strong party organisation would then have a loyal revolutionary army to do its bidding 
and enforce its will. This, Deng claimed, would unify China. Still, despite his 
arguments, Deng did not lay down any concrete proposals for party -building. Rather, it 
seems that he was proposing the idea of a strong party as a long -term goal. Deng 
recognised that the party in 1928 was a facade for unity, but concluded that they could 
only change the situation after military unification.74" Thus, the bulk of Deng's 
argument focused on what was required to politicise the military, on political education, 
T43 Ibid., 71-73. 
744 Ibid., p. 30. 
14s Ibid., p. 44. 
'46 Indeed, Deng was sharply critical of the Guomindang in 1929 and lists some 17 different factions 
and groupings within it, both political and military. /bid., p. 82. 
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and on the role of the political officers within regular military units.'4' Party work- - 
junhua dang- -could wait. 
It appears that the military may have been guilty of belief in a self -fulfilling 
prophecy. Because of their distaste for the party, they ignored the party in the pursuit 
of the unification. This decision may also affect party work in areas cleared of 
militarists. Chi Hsi -sheng argues that civil bureaucrats became "excessively 
dependent" on using the military to clear areas before they could move in. Over time, 
the party mentality became one of "complete dependence" on Nanjing's military 
superiority.748 \h'hile it is not possible to determine any sort of direct cause and effect 
relationship between Deng's report and Nanjing's subsequent actions, Deng's report, in 
retrospect, had announced the agenda for the 1930s. They included: streamlining the 
military and politicising it; breaking up the remaining major regional militarists; 
subdued the local militarists by either absorbing or destroying them; using the army 
that was thus constructed against foreign imperialists. This was what Nanjing did 
during the 1930s. Deng was also accurately predicted what would happen if Nanjing 
tried to fight the Japanese before the complete unification of China: the regional 
militarists would take advantage of the situation to expand again. 
Disbandment and Rebellion 
In late 1928, as Nanjing concentrated on streamlining its army, the country 
focused its attention on disbandment. Despite the emphasis given by contemporary 
observers to disbandment, it is difficult to take seriously the notion that any of the 
militarists or Nanjing would actually disband its army. A disbandment conference of 
one type or another had followed almost all of the major wars in warlord China, and 
Nanjing was careful not to make an exception. All of the major regional militarists, 
including Li Zongren and Fung Yuxíang, had publicly called for disbandment in 
hollowed tones. Predictably, however, the Disbandment Conference itself soon became 
enmeshed in the question of who was going to disband and how many troops. It would 
appear that all the parties, including Nanjing, were jockeying for the moral high 
ground. No one disbanded in the end. 
74' Ibid., 126 -198, which provides a very detailed discussion of how such work should be done. 
748 Chi Hsi- sheng, Nationalist China at War: Military Defects and Political Collapse, 1937 -1945, 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1982, p. 204. 
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This political jockeying continued during the I 930s, especially by those who 
tried to resist Nanjing by frequently couching their propaganda in terms of Sun Yatsen 
or Guomindang ideology. As we noted before, one of the most important 
characteristics of warlord warfare was the effort to portray oneself as cloaked in 
legitimacy. Nanjing, having broken with much of what Sun had originally espoused 
was still intent on legitimising its political power by claiming to pursue Sun's 
revolution, despite being vulnerable to charges that it had abandoned Suns "Three 
Principles of the People ". In addition, some regional militarists such as those from 
Guangdong and Guangxi claimed that they were the only true keepers of Sun Yatsen's 
original revolutionary flame. Although this study will not review such propaganda 
exchanges, the rhetoric exchanged at the time of the Disbandment Conference is a good 
example of the ideological aspect of a struggle between armies and their 
personalities." 
The ritual of the proceedings is highlighted by the outrageous goals set by the 
participants. In July 1928, He Yingqin delivered a report stating that China had about 
2.2 million soldiers in 300 divisions. He set a target of 80 divisions to be manned by 
1.2 million soldiers.75° This would have meant the loss of not just one million soldiers 
but also 220 division commands, along with concurrent numbers of corps and army 
commands. A week later, on 11 July, military figures at the Tangshan Conference, 
where they agreed on even more reductions, and the next days signed a document 
calling for only 60 divisions.751 The formal conference opened on 1 January 1929 and 
issued a stream of statements and resolutions. It closed two years later in flurry of 
paper without achieving any major change.752 
The only result of the conference was the temporary agreement to redesignate 
49 Over the last fifty years some scholars have been analysing Chiang Kaishek's work in terms of 
what Sun Yatsen had originally proposed. For example, Chi Hsi -sheng, argues that Chiang's problems 
during the war with Japan stemmed from his abandonment of the "Three Principles of the People ", 
which in fact had occurred earlier than the World War I. See his Nationalist China at War: Military 
Defects and Political Collapse, 1937 -1945, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1982, p. 204. 
, so Zhonghua minguo zhanyi dashí Jíyao (A record of major battles and events of the Republican 
China), Taibei: Guofangbu shizhengju, 1962, III: 16. 
751 Ibid., 16 -17; Wan Yaohuang, "Wan Yaohuang huiyilu" (The memories of Wan Yaohuang), 
Zhongwai zazhi, XX: 5, p. 102. 
' 52 The claims and counter -claims are aired in The Memories of Li Tsung-jen, Westview Press, 1979. 
256 -261; James E, Sheridan, Chinese Warlords: the Career of Feng Yu- hsiang, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 242 -243. 
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various military units. The corps. which had been the basic unit of the Northern 
Expedition, was abolished. The division became the basic organisation unit. [This may 
represent disbandment on paper) Each of major regional militarist was given a set of 
new division designations. Some accepted these but other did not. Still the new system 
would he used until 1938. In fact, one of the tests of Nanjing used to determine the 
attitudes of the a regional militarist would be whether or not the commander accepted 
the new designations. 
Creation of the Central Army 
The Disbandment Conference's failure had no discernible effect on Chiang 
Kaishek. Beginning in August 1928, even before the Northern Expedition was over, he 
had started to reorganise units under his command. The result was the formal 
beginning of the Central Army. This reorganisation involved both the Huangpu units 
and the local militarists that Nanjing had absorbed during the Northern Expedition. 
First, the Huangpu units subordinate to Chiang, the I, VIII, XXXII, and XXXXVI 
Corps and Guard units were abolished. He reorganised them into four divisions- -the 
1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 9th Divisions. This, in fact, was a typical disbandment on paper, 
twelve divisions had been reduced to four. In the process, Nanjing also reshuffled 
command so that most officers now had new superiors and subordinates. Chiang's 
former I Corps, for example, was split in half with officers sent to both the 1st and 9th 
Divisions. Thus, Nanjing reorganisation was more than just a simple re- designation of 
corps and divisions which would have been the case in most major armies such as that 
of Li Zongren, Feng Yuxiang and Yan Xishan. This intra- posting would become the 
norm within the Huangpu units whereby no officers could rise to power by advancing 
only within one unit, or under one commander. This inter -positing and exchanges of 
various Huangpu division officers is an important attribute of a modern army. 
Chiang set up two more Huangpu divisions shortly afterwards, the 10th and the 
11th.' These units were originally mixed divisions. The officers' corps comprised of 
both Huangpu graduates and officers from the regional militarist units. By the end of 
'S3 The 10th division was formed from the Guizhou units that joined the NRA as the Xth Corps and 
the XXXXVI Corps. The division commanded by Huangpu officers and cadets was used to mop up local 
militarists and bandits in Hunan. The 11th Divisions was formed from the XVII Corps, a Sun Chuanfang 
unit that had joined the NRA in Fujian, and the Huangpu's Guard unit (iingwei jun), an elite unit 
command by Chen Cheng. Guomin gemingjun donglujun zhanshi lilue (An outline record of the east - 
route army of the national revolutionary army), ed. by Chief Training Department Office, n.p., 1930, 
138 -144. No. 787/16722, Second Historical Archives, Nanjing. 
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1929, however, all but three of the officers who had served as a regiment commander or 
higher in the militarist units had been purged, and the units were then commanded by 
officers who served under Chiang in Guangzhou prior to the Northern Expedition, or 
Huangpu graduates.'" 
The other X Corps survivor was Pan Shanzhaì, who broke from the X Corps to 
join the XXXIII Corps. Pan was apparently not included in the 1928 reorganisation. 
His units operated in Anhui and Hubei. This unit underwent a series of reorganisations 
until Pan was removed. It was designated the 94th division in 1936.' The six 
Huangpu divisions shared three major characteristics. First, their officers tended to be 
interchangeable. Second, the officers, as seen in Chiang's I Corps during the Northern 
Expedition, would include men from most of the provinces in China. The provincial 
based divisions would be abolished. Finally, over Huangpu graduates occupied half of 
the top command posts of these three divisions_ 
While Nanjing was setting up the original six divisions, it was also preparing for 
further expansion, a process that would continue through the 1930s. It began to 
establish "skeleton units" which consisted of a headquarters and a few officers but 
without actual troops. Most commonly, these were designated as training divisions. 
For example, graduates of the Seven Class of the Central Military Academy were sent 
to set up several of these units in late 1929. They took over and trained various local 
militarists and then began to use them in combat. These units would later be designated 
as regular divisions.7' 
The Central Military Academy 
Apart from the build -up of the Central Army, The Nanjing government also 
established a Central Military Academy (Zhongyang lujun junguan xuexiao). Since its 
inception in 1928 till its removable to Chengdu in 1937, the Central Military Academy 
in Nanjing produced 6,000 junior officers and retrained many more the National 
7" For a list of names, from regimental comanaders and above, see Ibid., 144 -50. 
755 Guomin zhengfu gongbao, 104, (February 1936), p. 1, Order, no. 1974. Similarly, in the XVII and 
XXXVIII Corps, the original militarists were subsequently removed from command and they were 
replaced by Huangpu officers and graduates. 
736 Qian Dajun, Qian Muyin shangjiang qishi zizhuan (General Qian Dajun's autobiography at 70), 
Taibei: privately printed, n_d., p. 7. Qian commanded one of these units. 
Revolutionary Army officers. The Central Military Academe trained an average of 
1,000 cadets a class in the full two -year course preceded by a year in the rank. The 
enrolment was overwhelming for each successive class. For example, the 12th Class of 
1935, the recruitment committee had to select 700 entrants out of 10,000 applicants."' 
Chiang Kaishek continued to be the Commandant, a post he held for life, The deputy 
commandant, who was also the head of the education, took charge of the day -to -day 
running of the academy (xiaoyu chang). Zhang Zhizhong, whom Joe Stilwell praised 
as a "scholarly soldier of the best type ", held the post for ten years.758 During this time 
the German advisers were engaged to serve in the Central Military Academy and in the 
Central Army.7'9 Observers were impressed with the general air of efficiency, the smart 
drill, its building and facilities as a modem military academy. 
The Central Military Academy was larger and better equipped than its precursor 
at Huangpu on Changzhou Island.760 The premise of the Central Military Academy was 
spacious. It consisted of a large parade ground, a library, an auditorium for 3,000 
people, ball courts and gymnasiums, an indoor swimming pool, several weapons 
museums, a bridge -building lake, bayonet grounds, automatic weapons range, and 
modem arms for a full student regiment. The Academy's importance was underscored 
when Chiang Kaishek who became titular President, made national addresses on its 
campus. He also built a house close by, and entertained in the officers' mess.7fi1 
'57 Lujun junguan xuexiaoshi (History of the military academy), Lujun junguan xuexiao, ed.. Taibei, 
Guofangbu shizhengju, 1964, 3373. 
73s J.W. Stilwell, "Military Schools and Colleges: The Central Military Academy ", USWD 2277 -l- 
19:18. Zhang was a Baoding graduate and joined Huangpu after quitting from Guijun junguan xuexiao 
(the Guangxi Officers School). Re was one of the founders and company commanders of recruitment 
training for the Third Class. After joining Huangpu, he served also as staff officer in the National 
Revolutionary Army. He was responsible for the setting up Wuhan Branch School. During the split, after 
some hesitation, he joined Chiang Kaishek in Nanjing. He became the head of the Central Military 
Academy's Training Department (xiaoyu chang) and deputy commandant from 1928 to 1938. Zhang 
Zhizhong. "Huangpu íingshen yu guomin geming" (Huangpu spirit and the national revolution). 
Changsha fenxiao jingli ban tongxuelu (The alumni directory of the administrative class of the Changsha 
branch's Huangpu military academy), Changsha: 1938. 
759 Although the Germans' participation in the Central Military Academy was apparent, they were 
scarcely mentioned in the institutional histories and the class yearbooks. Up till 1936, it was estimated 
between five and seven German advisers taught full time at the Central Military Academy; that about 
four or five taught at the War College; and one or two were attached to each of the specialist schools. For 
details see Donald S. Sutton, "German Advice & Residual Warlordism in the Nanking Decade: 
Influences on Nationalist Military Training and Strategy." China Quarterly 91 (September 1982): 
386 -410; especially footnotes 24, 25. 
60 Lujun junguanxuexiaoshi (Ilistory of the military academy), 3244, 3283, 3302, 3333, 3344, 3370, 
161 Interviews with Qiu Xingxiang (5th Class) in Nanjing; and Zeng Huiqi, "Huiyi zai Nanjing 
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In 1932, the War College in Beijing was also moved to Nanjing. The War 
College was much less generously equipped and its effects were more limited. The 
three -year course of about 100 officers taught map planning, war games and high 
command skills. Chiang Kaishek was again the Commandant and the head of the 
Education (xiaoyu chang) was Yang Jie, a Japanese- trained graduate of the Yunnan 
Army.762 Americans officers were struck by the trainees' enthusiasm and praised the 
training plan which sent them back twice a year into the regular army for 
manoeuvres.7G3 But few of the generals whom Chiang would rely on went for 
retraining. 
Besides the military academy and war college, military' schooling was gradually 
extended. New artillery and infantry schools were added in 1933; cavalry and tank 
schools by 1934; and intelligence and engineering schools by 1935; and branch 
academies for a total of 8,500 officers had been set up by June 1936 in Wuchang, 
Luoyang, Yunnanfu, and Chengdu.764 
The German Advisers 
Another familiar phenomenon was the presence of foreign military advisers, but 
this time they were German. Up to 1936, between five and seven advisers taught full 
time at the Central Military Academy; and about four or five at the War College.'65 The 
zhongyang junxiao xuexi shenghuo pianduan" (Memories of the life in the central military academy in 
Nanjing), Zhengrong suiyue (Years of the extraordinary times), 161 -170, Guangdong Huangpu Alumni, 
ed., Guangdong: Shifan xueyuan, 1991. 
'62 For the war college, see Minguo shiyi de lujun daxue (The war college of the Republican China), 
ed. by Jiangsu sheng zhengxie wenshi ziliao weiyuanhui and Zhongguo di er lishi danganguan. Nanjing: 
Jiangsu wenshi chubanshe, 1994; especially memoir of Guo Rugui, "Wu zai lujun daxue, 1932 -1937 
(My war college's years, 1932 -1938) ", 52 -76. 
761 See a report by Major Constant's visit on 16 December 1932, USWD 2277 -1 -24. However, Joe 
Stilwell called the War College "the most inadequately housed military school in or about Nanjing ", on 
the basis of observations by Captains Crist and Tormey, in USWD 2277 -1- 19:17, 6 May 1936. 
764 See reports by Lt -Col Drysdale, 2 May 1935, USWD 2277- 1- 19 -26; Stilwell's report, 17 June 
1936, based on inspections by Captain F.N. Roberts et al., USWD 2277- 1- 19 -18; and Major Constant, 27 
February 1933, USWD 2657 -I- 357:23. 
765 In 1934, the German advisers were Generals Spemann (artillery), Streccius (air), Gudowius and 
Starke and Colonel Lucht and Lt -Col Guse, also present were Colonel Bade and Lt -Col Nolte, and 
Captain von Hunolstein. For the German advisers, see Fu Baozhen, "Zai hua Deguo junshi guwen 
shizhuan ", Zhuanji wenxian, 25 (August 1974), 81 -82, also his other articles published in Zhuanji 
wenxue, vols, 24, 25, 26 , 28 and 30, (1974 -77); Donald S Sutton, "German Advice & Residual 
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Germans were responsible for the teaching of tactics with the help of interpreters. 
Former generals mostly taught at the War College and colonels at the Academy usually 
in their speciality. Some helped to translate German manuals, which b' 1933 
completely supplanted the old Japanese -based ones.766 
By the time German advisers were repatriated, there were 68 serving in the 
Central Army. This figure excluded seven who had died in China, four who were 
dismissed before contract expired, and 13 who left at their own request before 
completing their contracts, 14 who left because of illness, and six after one year 
contracts expired. Thirty -one of the 68 stayed for two to seven years.76' 
Although there were many German advisers in Nanjing, their influence in the 
Central Army, as in the case of Russian advisers in Guangzhou, had its limitations. A 
substantial number of Japanese- trained officers wanted to see a balance be maintained. 
A typical case to illustrate this is the establishing of artillery school in Nanjing. Seeing 
that the army lacked fire power, a German adviser WetzelI recommended setting up an 
artillery school, and Captain Gilbert was assigned to organise it. The Nanjing 
government accepted the idea but rejected Wetzell's recommendation to have Gilbert 
train the teaching staff. Instead, they appointed the Japan -trained Chinese instructors. 
When the school opened in 1932 offering a eight -week course to a class of 80 officers, 
only two of its 27 instructors were German. This case demonstrates the kind of vested 
interest opposed to German methods.768 
Short Course and Training Regiment 
The Central Military Academy's greatest weakness was its limited capacity to 
produce out the number of officers required to fill one to two million men under arms 
Warlordism in the Nanking Decade: Influences on Nationalist Military Training and Strategy." China 
Quarterly 91 (September 1982): 386 -410. For a detailed study of the German advisers with the Nanjing 
government, see William C. Kirby, Germany and Republican China. California: Stanford University 
Press, 1984. 
82. 
766 Fu Baozhen, "Zai hua Deguo junshi guwen shizhuan", Zhuanji wenxian, 25 (August 1974), 81- 
767 Sutton, op. cit., n. 3, p. 25. 
766 For a description of the artillery school, see Wang Qianan, "Deguo guwen zai Nanjing shiqi 
gongzuo de huiyi" (German advisers during the Nanjing period), Zhuanji wenxue, 27, 4, ( no 161, 
October 1975), 53 -54. 
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n China in the 1930s. As noted earlier in the chapter, the total output of fully trained 
cadet officers at Nanjing was only 1,000 a year. Since the German system was only 
adopted from the 6th Class in 1931, it means that fewer than 6,000 graduated by the 
end of the 12th Class in January 1938. In order to make up the shortage of number, 
branch schools and short courses were reintroduced. Although these measures 
produced more graduates the officers were of a much lower calibre.'G9 In 1933 and 
1934, some 10,000 officers went up for two -week courses at the summer resort of 
Lushan. At Lushan, they were taught the latest principles of the anti -Communist 
campaigning, and exposed to ideological Chiang Kaishek's "baptism of fire". Chiang 
strongly believed that given the time constraints similar to the early years of Huangpu, 
political indoctrination was the best alternative to conventional military training.--`' The 
second method was the more elaborate retaining class of up to one year. for middle 
ranking and a few senior officers at both the War College and the Central Military 
Academy. One difficulty here was that established officers were reluctant to leave their 
troops, a reflection of the persisting underlying reality of private militarism. 
The third and most serious retraining effort was the Training Brigade, the 
Lehrbrigade, proposed by Seeckt to Chiang Kaishek during his first visit to China in 
1933. The Dresden -educated Gui Yungqing set it up. One purpose of this non- 
combatant unit was to prepare middle and higher ranking officers to work with the fully 
German- educated officers. Once again, practice took priority over theory. In the 
brigade's infantry regiments, artillery battalion, engineers, communications and tank 
companies, and the cavalry squadron, Chinese officers could practice the articulation of 
the different arms. That six advisers were still attached to the Training Brigade in May 
1937 indicates its significance.' 
Of all the German contributions to the army reform, the most famous was the 
Training Divisions. Unlike the later Training Brigade, the Training Division was an 
actual fighting force. Bauer proposed it as the nucleus of a truly modern army. The 
69 Lujun junguan xuexiaoshi, 3244, 3283, 3302, 3333, 3344, 3370; Harry H. Collier and Thomas M. 
Williamsen, The First and Second Infantry Battalions, 21st Class, Chinese Military Academy Student 
Directory, Taibei, 1970, 1: 4 -12. 
TO Though nine Germans were present it was of more political than military significance. This brief 
programme continued in E'mei in 1925. For greater details, see Peng Guodong ed., Jiang Jieshi, 
xiansheng jiayan leichao, Shanghai, 1937, 479 -80, 456 -62; Chiang Kaishek, ed., Lushan junguan 
xunlianji, n.p., n.d.,; E'mei junguan xunlianji, n.p., 1935; William W. Whitson, "Jiangxi jiaofei zhi 
jiantao ", Zhanshi huikan, I (April 1969), 35. 
771 Donald S Sutton, "German Advice & Residual Warlordism in the Nanking Decade ", p. 393. 
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original Training Corps (xíaodao dui) incorporated units of infantry, heavy infantry, 
cavalry, engineers, and communications. Each had its German adviser. under the 
overall supervision of the energetic Colonel Wangenheim. The pro -German General 
Feng Yipei commanded them. The force was soon expanded to regimental size. and in 
1930 was named the first Training Division. A second Training Division was formed 
from the training corps at the Central Military Academy.'" 
These two divisions, designated as the 87th and 88th Division, were the best - 
armed and most carefully trained in China. In accordance with Bauer's insistence on 
the close tactical co- operation of rifles with other arms on the battlefield, each division 
had light anti -tank and anti -aircraft guns, and at least 12 of the newest Krupp- designed 
75 mm Bofors guns. In 1933, the 87th Division consisted of two infantry brigades each 
4,500 strong, and a special Unit brigade numbering about 6,000. Each infantry brigade 
was divided into two regiments of three battalions, each battalion into three rifle and 
one machine -gun companies. Besides a large German -style staff corps, there were six 
or seven attached political workers from the Officers' and Soldier Moral Welfare 
Society attached to each regiment.73 The personnel were young, well -paid and well - 
trained officers in their mid -thirties. Ninety per cent of them from the Huangpu 
Military Academy, and were imbued with "what they proudly called the revolutionary 
spirit ". " These were the units intensively trained by the advisers.75 As the 88th 
Division commander later wrote, "apart form the central military schools, these two 
divisions were the only units with German advisers engaged in training ". ?6 Germans 
advised a number of other divisions and training units, but rarely for more than a year 
or so, or in a ratio much larger than one adviser to a division, that is, one to 700 
officers. By contrast, with one adviser per regiment in the first yew years, the Germans 
"Z Ibid. 
73 Wang Qianan, op. cit.. 
79 Lt -Col W.S. Drysdale, "The S7th Division, the Chinese national army ", 24 January 1933, in 
USWD 2009/230: 1. Both divisions took in more recent graduates of the Central Military Academy, e.g. 
40 each from the 8th Class of 712 graduating in May 1933. 
75 In spite of Seeckt's wish to create a nucleus of 10 new divisions, about eight German -trained 
divisions were formed in 1937. Liang Hsi -Huey, The Sino- German Connection: Alexander von 
Falkenhausen between China and Germany, 1900 -1941, Ph D dissertation, Assen /Amsterdam, 1978, 
p.90, citing the Starke papers for divisions "reorganise and trained by the Germans ". By 1937, there were 
probably eight German -armed divisions (80,000 each), and about 220,000 more following German -style 
training. See Lloyd E. Eastman, "The war years, 1937 -1945 ", China Under Nationalist Rule: Two Essays 
(Urbana, n.d.), p. 96. 
"6 Sun Yuanliang, Yiwan guangnian de yishun. (Taibei, 1972), p. 136. 
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in the 87th and 88th could have daily contact with most officers and closely supervise 
combined -arm tactics. 
Different approaches adopted by the Chinese and German advisers toward 
military training were apparent. The Germans, based on their experience in World War 
I; sought mobility, concentration and close combination of all arms. Although the 
Chinese realised the importance of the combined arms tactics, they emphasised the 
integration approach of social, political and military efforts, a lesson they had learned 
from the Guangdong's unification and the Northern Expedition. The Chinese officers 
believed that any vigorous joint operations would presuppose a well co- ordinated unit. 
But this was not easily available in the 1930s. The various provincial commanders 
simply did not trust each other. For example, should the Guangdong troops of Chen 
Jitang lag behind, no co- ordinated plan would materialise. As late as 1933. poor 
relations among commanders had a devastating effect on troops already discouraged by 
arrears of pay and Communist leniency toward captives and defectors. Local militarists 
continued to cling to their control over territorial taxes levied to argument funds doled 
out from Nanjing. Energetic pursuit of the "red bandits" would have meant giving up 
control of such taxes and becoming dependent on Chiang Kaishek. 
The Huangpu Spirit 
Apart from the Central Army's reorganisation, the post -Northern Expedition 
also witnessed the institutionalisation of the Huangpu Spirit as the Central Army's 
military ethos. Most established armies have a set of military ethos for servicemen and 
women. The German sense of honour was rooted in the Christian faith and heroic tales 
from its tradition expressed in the concept of Prussian Kriegsschulen and kasina. A 
Japanese soldier's honour was rooted in the samurai code and the history of their heroic 
exploits in the spirit of Yamatodamashii (the spirit of the Yamoto race) and bushido. 
When Jiang Boli was the commandant of the Baoding Military Academy he introduced 
the bushido spirit to the cadets but it failed to create much impact on the officer 
corps.' The English officer corps was specially concerned with the development of 
the officer' character, particularly, a sense of honour. A soldier's foremost duty was to 
"' For more on the Chinese bushido see Liang Qichao, Zhongguo zhi wushi dao (China's bushido). 
Taibei: Taiwan Zhonghua, 1957. This book embodies the outlook of Baoding's third and most influential 
commandant, Jiang Boli, who eulogised the role to be played by China's soldiers. He envisioned them as 
the saviours of the nation. It suggests that Chinese trained professional soldiers of the future would have 
ideas of modern nationalism that were minglings of notions borrowed from the West with traditional 
concepts about the heroic qualities of the soldier. 
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fight. His training in the classroom, on parade grounds, or in the barracks centred on 
the elimination of his cowardice. his fear of death. To achieve this, he needed moral 
discipline and such institutional arrangements as duelling, brutalization and 
punishment. 
In the Chinese army, the sense of honour for being a soldier was not explicit. It 
is subsumed under traditional personal cultivation and principles of being a man and 
there was no formal institutional arrangement to strengthen it. Chiang Kaishek was 
probably the first modern army trainer who paid some attention to this problem. A 
complete expression of Chiang Kaishek's military ethos was the Huangpu spirit. 
According to the Commandant, the Huangpu spirit consisted of the spirit of self - 
sacrifice, unity and responsibility. These three elements were interrelated and the sum 
total of them was the spirit of revolution. This meant possession of ideology, thought, 
organisation, leadership, and the determination to succeed.' For Chiang, the spirit of 
Huangpu was exemplified by staff and students of the Huangpu Military Academy 
during the unification of Guangdong and the Northern Expedition. And this was the 
Guomindang's official version of the Huangpu spirit. In essence, it is a set of military 
ethics for the Central Army and subsequent Taiwanese military_ It is still being taught 
in the Fengshan Military Academy and other military schools in Taiwan today.79 
For most of the people from the Huangpu Military Academy, the Huangpu spirit 
was best remembered in the early years of academy on Changzhou Island. One form of 
Huangpu spirit is the teachings of basic values. The earlier training at Huangpu 
focused on the "internal training" which would remake them as individuals by nurturing 
in each cadet a revolutionary conscience. This conscience would serve as constant 
point of reference in his future military career. For most Huangpu Military Academy's 
students in Guangzhou, the teachings were clearly manifested in the forms of many 
parallel couplets (lianyu) which hung on the Academy's doors and gates during 1924- 
1927. The cadets were encouraged to memorise these couplets and to meditate on their 
meaning. On either side of the Academy's front gate were lianyu derived from Sun 
Yatsen's speech at the school's opening ceremonies that read: "The blood of martyrs is 
"a "Huangpu jingshen" (The Huangpu Spirit), Lujun junguan xuexiao sanshiwu zhounian xiaoqing 
jinian xunci (The Commandant's speech for the 35th anniversary of the founding of the academy), 
Zongtong dui junshi jiaoyu xunci xuanji (Select speeches of the president on military education), vol. 4: 
1954, Taibei: Ministry of National Defence, 1964. 
"9 This was confirmed by the Curator of the Fangshan Military Academy during my visit on 22 
August 1993. 
the flower of the ideology ".750 Sun Yatsen's speech to the First Class of the Huangpu 
cadets on 16 June 1924 was adapted into the Republican China's national anthem. It 
reads: "Sanmin zhuyi (the three peoples' principles) is respected by our party for 
building the nation and to promote the great commonwealth. You are the knights (s hi) 
who will rise with us. Be the advance guard, be not careless in carrying out the 
ideology (zhuyi). Be diligent, be brave, be true, be loyal and with one heart and one 
mind carry through the end." Another lianyu presented to Chiang Kaishek b. Chen 
Qimei read: We must rely on each other to the end in peace and in danger in the days 
ahead; we must taste together the sweetness and bitterness of the days ahead. "'s' There 
were also couplets with neo- Confucian messages like: "Exhaustively study the 
principles at the point where a thing begins, meticulously study the moment when the 
heart's intention is moved. "782 There was also couplet from the Song loyalist Wen 
Tianxiang who read: "Nourish the orthodox forces (qi), follow the complete individuals 
of the past and the present's' 
The essence of Chiang Kaishek's six training principles was also captured in the 
following catchy verse. "Teach them to be men, teach them to be modern men. teach 
them to be modern Chinese men; teach them to be soldiers, teach them to be modern 
soldiers, teach them to be modern Chinese soldiers."'" They were also imbued with 
Chiang Kaishek's belief that "to use soldiers is not as good as using the people; to teach 
the people we must teach them as we would teach troops." A similar idea was 
contained in the slogan: "Make of yourself a pattern for others.i 785 The Huangpu and 
Central Military Academy cadets were models of ideological and moral pursuit whose 
exemplary behaviour would transform society. Like a good knight -errant or a 
Confucian junzi, he was to renounce rank and money and work instead wholly for the 
ao Deng Wenyi, "Huangpu xuesheng wushi pian" (Fifty years as a student of Huangu ", in Huangpu 
jianxiao liushi zhounfan lunwenfi, 99; Zongjun baoguoji (Joining the army to repay the country), 28 -30. 
It is striking how strongly Huangpu training methods influenced the future course of the Republican 
history. The lianyu memorised by the cadets of 1924 continue to be learned today by military trainees in 
Taiwan. 
781 Ibid., p. 28. This couplet aptly captured the tone of Huangpu friendships was prominently erected 
by the sides of Huangpu's gates,. 
782 Ibid., p. 35. 
783 Wen Tianxiang (1236 -1282) was a Song patriot who was executed by the Mongols. Before his 
death he wrote the Zhengqi ge. 
84 Ibid., p. 35. 
795 Ibid., 33, 29-30. 
good of the nation. His training armed to help him act resolutely in situation where the 
faint- hearted or ambivalent party elements might hesitate. 
Huangpu cadets were also urged by their Commandant to respect the people and 
to be willing to perform menial tasks without hesitating over about the propriety of 
manual labour.'86 At the end of the lecture, for example, cadets themselves should 
move the chairs back into place. They should also take the initiative in mending 
clothes, carrying water, and emptying "night- soil ", and not wait for the orderlies to 
perform these unpleasant tasks. They should be frugal and not use their positions to 
acquire wealth or possession.787 
At the Central Military Academy, as in Huangpu, one could almost imagine that 
one was to be a national hero in the future years. The cadet corps would unify China 
and revenge all the humiliation wreaked on her by foreign powers. The commandant 
held up to his mesmerised pupils a mirror which showed each of them in the most 
flattering possible way. In return, he demanded of them obedience and loyalty which 
verged on servility. Many were too happy to make the exchange. 
Huangpu Officers and the Third Party Movement 
Not all officers of the Huangpu's units gave their allegiance to the Guomindang 
or embraced Communism. A small group of them could not subscribe to the political 
programme of either party. Instead they attempted to fashion a "non- communist but 
left-wing alternative to the Kuomintang (Guomindang) ".785 
The popular and influential former Huangpu faculty member Deng Yanda was 
one of the leaders of this group which became known as the "Third Party" (ti'san clang). 
Soon after the Guomindang- Chinese Communist Party split, he proposed that 
adherents of both parties be incorporated into a party dedicated to achieving a radical 
revolution through a national party. Although the Guomindang soon disowned Deng, 
7" Deng Wenyi, Huangpu xunlianji (Huangpu training collection), p. 29. 
787 Huangpu's rhetorical war on privilege was echoed in many of the propaganda works of the New 
Life in the 1930's. The condemnation of selfish gain and obviously obnoxious vestiges of the "feudal" 
social order was the Right's equivalent of the doctrine of the class struggle. Eastman, Abortive 
Revolution, p. 48. 
7" Donald Gillin, "Problems of Centralisation in Republican China: The Case of Ch'en Ch'eng and 
the KMT." Journal of Asian Studies 29 , no. 4 (August 1970): 837. 
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he and former Communist Tan Pingshan formed the so- called Provincial Action 
Committee of the Guomindang in Hong Kong in 1929. This event laid the foundations 
for the Third Party.789 
Leaders of various political persuasions rallied to support Deng, a number were 
from the Huangpu alumni. The most prominent of the Huangpu men were Yan Zhong. 
and Ji Fang, both formerly from the academy faculty. Yan 's association with Dena may 
have been primarily personal. Yan was a Baoding graduate and a subordinate of 
Deng's in the 1st Guangdong Division prior to 1924. He seems to have taken his 
political cues from his mentor both at the academy and later after 1927. Ji Fang. who 
served as head of the Organisation Section of the General Political Department under 
Deng during the Northern Expedition, also disengaged himself from the Guomindang 
soon after the split. After a two year sojourn in Shanghai where he founded and edited 
liberal journals (the Blitz and Light- house), Ji joined the Third Party in the 1930. The 
actions of these officers spurred other military leaders to follow suit. 
Some pro -Communist Huangpu officers were among the radical elements who 
flocked to Deng's Third Party in the earlyl930s. The period 1928 -1931 were lean 
years for the Communists in the isolation of their rural base areas. Xu Jishen and Zhou 
Shidi (both from First Class) were among the young Red Army leaders who felt that a 
continuation of the armed struggle against Nanjing was useless and looked to support a 
radical group within the Guomindang. Xu, commander of the Red Fourth Corps' 12th 
Division in the E -Yuwan base, grew so disenchanted with the prospects for 
Communism that he deserted the Red Army with most of his forces to join Deng in 
Hong Kong in 1931.'90 
Zhou Shidi also became disillusioned with Communism during the Nanchang 
retreat, deserted the Red Army and fled to Japan. He became acquainted with Third 
Party elements there, and returned to join the party in China to participate in the short- 
lived Fujian Rebellion mounted by Chiang Kaishek's leftist opposition in December 
'E9 For details see, Zhang Gangyu. Deng Yanda zhuan (The biography of Deng Yanda). Wuchang: 
Wuhan University Publication, 1993, chapter 9, 190 -207. 
90 Zhonggong junren zhi (Biographies of the Chinese Communist military leaders), Editor Huang 
Chenxia. Hong Kong: Research Institute of Contemporary History, 1968, 276 -77; Wales, Nym (Helen 
Foster Snow }. Red Dust: Autobiographies of Chinese Communists, as told to Nym Wales. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1952, p. 156. 
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1933. Zhou's reasons for participating in the revolt were unclear. Zhang was a leader in 
the Fujian Revolt, and the 19th Route Army. The 19th Route Army, staffed with 
Guangdong Huangpu graduates, undoubtedly included close associates of Zhou. who 
was himself a Hainan native. This affiliation may help to explain how Zhou reportedly 
moved up so quickly to assume command of a regiment during the campaign.'97 
Since the Third Party remained for a time within the Guomindang fold, the 
Provisional Action Committee attracted a substantial number of young officers who 
still were considered loyal to Chiang. Chen Cheng, a Huangpu officer then serving as 
commander of the 18th Route Army, furnished the best example of the leader who 
belonged to both camps. Despite his devotion to Chiang, his radical social and 
economic philosophy impelled him to closely associate with Deng. 
The history of the Third Party is scanty. It continued to exist after Deng's 
death, with Zhang Bojun and the Guangdong General Huang Jixiang assumed Deng's 
mantle as leader. The Fujian Rebellion dealt another severe blow to the party's 
aspirations as Caí Tíngkai's sympathetic 19th Route Army was decimated during the 
operation. Its remnants were ultimately absorbed into either the Guomindang forces or 
the Red Army. Huangpu officers Chen Cheng and Zhou Shidi seem to have influenced 
the decisions taken by the 19th Route Army cadre at this time. Zhou was the highest 
ranking Communist officer who joined the Red Army. He undoubtedly swayed a 
number of other officers to join him at that time; and some three years later he is 
reported to have induced another large group of former 19th Route Army soldiers in 
Shenxi to change sides.'92 Chen Cheng is also reported to have coopted most of the 
Third Party membership after Deng's death. Chen succeeded in securing the loyalty of 
most 18th Route Army cadre to Chiang. He continued to command the allegiance of 
Huang Qixiang, one of Deng's successors, and ensured that most of the defeated 19th 
Route Army returned to the Guomindang fold.793 The Third Party, shorn of its own 
J91 Zhonggong juraren zhi, p. 197; Donald W. Klein and Anne B. Clark. Biographic Dictionary of 
Chinese Communism, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1971, p. 232; Smedley, Agnes. The 
Great Road: The Life and Times of Chu Teh (Zhu De). Monthly Review Press, 1956, p. 210; Who's Who 
in Communist China, 2 vols., Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 2nd rev. edn 1969 -70, 1969, p. 152. 
792 Zhonggong juraren zhi, p. 187; Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism, p. 232. For details 
concerning Zhuo Shidi's enticement over to the Red Army after the Battle of Baozuo (Shenxi), see 
Huang Yuren. "Y1 huangpu." Gujin, over four issues, from number 1 to 4 (20 August 1905 to 5 
September 1964). 
'93 Gillin, "Problems of Centralisation in Republican China: The Case of Ch'en Ch'eng and the 
KMT ", 837 -38. 
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military power, never regained its former potency.794 
In sum, leaders with Huangpu's affiliations led the Third Party movement. The 
military units that supported it, the 18th and 19th Route Armies, had a substantial 
number of Huangpu officials and alumni. They were influential in redirecting the 
loyalties of the Third Party military leaders to either the Guomindang or the 
Communist. 
In conclusion, the post- Northern Expedition realities imposed great constraints 
on the Nanjing regime. The military solution appeared to be most desirable to the 
ruling elite since many were military men. They realised that "power came from the 
barrels of the guns" more than anything else. The Nanjing regime needed to 
continuously fight the Chinese Communist guerrillas in the countryside. It had to 
suppress regional militarists who revolted against Nanjing government. Finally, it had 
also to win over officers of the Third Party movement. In the meanwhile, the legacy of 
the Huangpu Military Academy and the Party Army was institutionalised in Nanjing by 
the creation of the Central Military Academy and the Central Army. In this process, the 
German advisers played important roles in this transformation. Chiang Kaishek might 
have preferred the German model of professional officer corps and the combined -arms 
tactics doctrine. But he had to balance the influence of German advisers and the 
Japanese -trained Chinese officers on the one hand, and military and political training on 
the other hand. Above all, the demand for officers in the Central Army and anti - 
Communist campaigns in the countryside soon forced Chiang to resort to shorter 
courses and political training more than the conventional military training as envisaged 
by the German advisers in the Central Military Academy. The greatest legacy of 
Huangpu and the Nationalist Revolutionary Army was the Huangpu spirit. Essentially 
it was an ideology of military nationalism, which contained certain individual basic 
values, and Chinese nationalism. The Huangpu spirit spread not only among 
commanders in the Central Army but also in Communist Red Army and the Third Party 
movement who had associated with Huangpu in Guangzhou It was this spirit of 
putting the unity of the country in first priority that allowed commanders of three 
camps to change side occasionally and to forge a second -United Front during the 
Japanese invasion of China in 1937 -45. 
94 Ji Fang retained his commitment to the Third Party programmes up until 1949, despite the fact he 
served as a military commander in Chen Yi's New Fourth Army in Sino- Japanese War. When the Third 
Party was resuscitated in 1947, Ji Fang became one of its most important members. Biographic 
Dictionary of Chinese Communism, 164 -5. 
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Conclusion 
The military dimension of the modern Chinese history has received a greater 
attention by scholars lately. The focus of study has shifted from the warlord study to 
wider issues of military modernisation process and structural change that occurred in 
the military and their impact on the Chinese society_795 
This dissertation challenges the traditional approach that subsumes the history 
of the Huangpu Military Academy and the National Revolutionary Army under the 
Guomindang's movement. Instead, it treats modem military academy as it main 
subject of inquiry and look at broader issues of the military modernisation and its 
impact on Chinese society. It also attempts to explain, from a military perspective, 
why the Huangpu Military Academy and the National Revolutionary were successful 
during 1924 -1928 and how did these successes transform modern Chinese military 
and politics. 
The military as a social institution has always been shaped by the society and 
politics of the period. But the military has also its dynamic and is able to assert its 
influence on the society as well. The modern military academy is no exception. The 
creation of modern military academies in China during the turn of the 19th and 20th 
century had a great impact on the Chinese military in early 20th century. The rise of 
Chinese officer corps was a direct consequence of modern military academies. In 
term of leadership, graduates of modern military academies stood at the forefront of 
the national political scene in early Republican years. Graduates of the Tianjin 
Military Academy filled in the first generation of military leadership and they hold 
key positions in the military bureaucracy in the 1910s. Likewise, the Baoding 
Military Academy graduates assumed the leadership roles in the 1920s; the Huangpu 
Military Academy and Central Military Academy provided leadership of the 1930s 
and 40s. Organisationally, the military stresses discipline; esprit de corps; collective 
action and the power of using violence and force. if one were to compare with other 
795 See Hans Van de Ven, "Recent Studies of Modem Chinese History." Modern Asían Studies 30, no. 
2 (May 1996): 225 -269. They are eleven articles in this a special issue on the subject of War in Modern 
China; for earlier work see Edmund Fung. The Military Dimension of the Chinese Revolution: The New 
Army and its Role in the Revolution of 1911. Australia: Australian National University Press, 1980. 
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modern institutions such as political party, labour, farmer and student unions, military 
academies had much longer years of development, numerically stronger and wider 
spread in the country. It was the best organised and the most powerful of all the 
political organisations, at least before the Japanese invasion in 1937. The process of 
the officer corps emerging to take over the government began in late 1910s and 
completed in the late 1920s, a period coincided with the founding and development of 
the Huangpu and Central Military Academy in Guangzhou and Nanjing respectively. 
Although modern military academies set up in China at different period and 
under varied circumstances, there were common features in these training institutions. 
The presence of foreign military advisers was a common feature in many Chinese 
military training schools. Li Hongzhang and Chiang Kaishek preferred the German 
military models and hired the German advisers. Zhang Zhidong, Liu Kunvi and Yuan 
Shikai sought the service of the Japanese military officers. Sun Yatsen and Zhu 
Zhixin went after the Russian Red Army system. Secondly, the primary purpose of 
modern military academies was to upgrade military skills so as to prepare for the 
formation of a new military unit. The formation of the New Army at the turn of the 
20th century and the Party Army of the Guomindang in the 1920s shared a common 
characteristic that the new unit had a national identity and destined to play the role of 
the central army. 
The experience of the Huangpu Military Academy shared some of these 
elements but also created some additional ones. The most important new element is 
the Party Military Academy and Army. The married between the military and 
political party was a breakthrough to establish a new military- political structure in the 
warlord China where military separatism had weakened the national unity. Sun 
Yatsen's main contribution to the Huangpu Military Academy was the introduction of 
the Party army. Sun's ideas were novel but they lacked details. Sun and some of the 
Guomindang members found the Russian Red Army attractive. But Sun had other 
military agenda other than learning from the Red Army. He and his colleagues 
wanted military aid and assistance to fight regional militarists and foreign powers. 
The military assistance formed a substantial part of the Guomindang- Comintern 
coIIaboration in the 1920s. 
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Contrary to the common belief, the Huangpu Military Academy was not also 
an academy but also an army. Huangpu established its own army to protect its own 
existence in hostile Guangzhou. Although it was a Guomindang's militar. academy, 
the Party control of the academy was lax and the Chinese officer corps led by Chiang 
Kaishek played a crucial role in determining the development of the academy. 
Huangpu established its own army as early as 1924 and it started to take part in local 
conflicts such as the Merchant Corps crisis and the Eastern Expedition. 
The success of the Eastern Expedition in 1925 had led to the formation of the 
Party Army, and later, the National Revolutionary Army. The Huangpu Military 
Academy was then reorganised and expanded to become the Central Military and 
Political Academy. Its primary mission was to convert provincial armies and 
integrate these units into a central army of the Guomindang. The process was 
protracted and uneven as demonstrated by many conflicts among members of the 
Guomindang and the Communist Party on the one hand, and commanders of the Party 
army on the other. In addition, the Russian advisers were also involved in the rivalry 
for power. The conflict from within the Guomindang reached its pick in Zhongshan 
Gunboat Incident and the Commandant of the Central Academy reacted swiftly to 
quell the challengers. This was the turning point for Chiang Kaishek who emerged as 
a strong leader of both the military and the party. 
It was the development of Huangpu units --the Academy Army, the Party 
Army and I Corps of the National Revolutionary Army- -that explained the fast 
progress of Huangpu in Guangzhou. The formation of the National Revolutionary 
Army spearheaded by Huangpu's I Corps coincided the unification of Guangdong and 
the preparation for the Northern Expedition. Within a short period of two years, a 
seven -corps National Revolutionary Army was fonned. 
Russian military aid and advisers played an important role in setting up 
Huangpu and the National Revolutionary Army. Unlike other foreign military 
advisers the Russian military assistance included monies and arms to help the 
Guomindang. These material supports were crucial in the first two years when funds 
and military resources were in the hands of regional armies. Russian aid thus helped 
to create the Party academy and Huangpu army. 
' 0? 
The system of the political commissar, or the Party representative. was 
introduced originally to assist the Party to control the army. However, the system of 
control did not produce the same effect in the Guomindang army as in the Russian 
Red Army. For the Guomindang the Party representative was used against regional 
armies who joined in the Party army, or as liaisons between the army the civilian 
population in areas of operations. In short, the Party representative was primarily 
useful in establishing the Party Army and in military operations. This was a vast 
distinction from the Russian Red Army where political commissars were deployed by 
the party to check on the "military specialists " --the professional officer corps. In the 
case of the Guomindang army, the officer corps used it to check on former regional 
armies. Therefore, the main beneficiaries of the Russian Red Army model and 
military assistance went directly to the Guomindang military headed by Chiang 
Kaishek rather than the party. 
During the preparation for the Northern Expedition, the Russian advisers also 
played important roles in the reorganisation of the National Revolutionary Army. 
They were active in co- ordinating the General Staff headquarters and the army corps, 
the navy and the air force headquarters. In fact, they formed an internal system of 
communications between the General Staff and the rest of the corps and service 
commands. This command and control system would be useful in inter -corps 
operations and battles, which required more than two corps. But during the Northern 
Expedition it was the smaller units, which were below corps level, fought most of the 
battles. Hence, the usefulness of Russian military advisers during the Northern 
Expedition was limited. Instead, the traditional Chinese warfare of inducing opponent 
subordinates to defect gained importance during the expedition. 
Russian military advisers and assistance to the Guomindang were important 
but the Russians were definitely not in control of any military units. They realised 
this in the Zhongshan Gunboat Incident in early 1926. The Russian influence 
diminished as the Norther Expedition progressed 
The Chinese officer corps formed the backbone behind the establishment of 
the Huangpu Army, the Party Army, and the National Revolutionary Army. The 
officer corps protected the Party Army against the threats from regional armies. They 
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gained the support of the Russian advisers because of their common military outlook 
that placed national unification beyond sectarian interests, and the view that the 
military had a decisive role in this unification effort. This was particularly evident in 
the cordial working relationship between Chiang Kaishek and Bliukher before the 
Northern Expedition. 
Although Huangpu did not play the key role in the Northern Expedition. it was 
the main co- ordinating body of the Guomindang's effort in launching the attack in 
central China. It played co- ordinating roles through its Baoding network among 
commanders and staff officers of the National Revolutionary Army, and between the 
National Revolutionary Army and other regional armies. The Northern Expedition's 
success came through the elimination of major regional militarists in central China 
and through inducement of military defections to the National Revolutionary Army. 
The officer corps contributed decisively on both counts. 
Some scholars argue that Hunagpu cadets were of higher quality. Ch'i Hsí- 
Sheng believes that "from the beginning the quality of the Whampao [Huangpu] 
cadets was high... [and] Whampao's applicants were superior to those of all the 
military schools in the nation, and in some cases they were even superior to the 
graduates of other military schools. "796 Many cadets later recalled that the enrolment 
requirements and examinations for applications were not so strict as the 
Guomindang's documents might suggest. Certainly, Huangpu cadets were not 
superior to either cadets or graduates of Baoding Military Academy. Baoding cadets 
had nine -year preliminary formal military school training and were required to spend 
a full two -year officer' training at Baoding.797 
In terms of the battlefield performance, Huangpu's cadets fought courageously 
in the Eastern Expedition. They suffered 217 deaths from a total strength of 2327 
(from Classes 1 to 3). Huangpu's cadets, however, did not fight as well in the 
Northern Expedition and the death of the graduates in the battlefield declined sharply. 
Ch'1. Warlord Politics, p.12. 
797 Xu Xianggian, "Huiqu Huangpu junxiao (Remembrance of the Huangpu military academy), in 
Diyici guogong hezuo shiqi de Huangpu junxiao (The Huangpu Military Academy during the First 
United Front) Beijing, 1984, 21 -17; Wang Dawen, "Kaoru Huangpu dierqi de qianqian houhuo" 
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Up to April 1927, only 101 deaths from a total graduate of 4981 (Classes I to 4). 
Chiang Kaishek confessed that the Huangpu cadets under his command during the 
Northern Expedition did not win even one battle before the capture of Nanchang in 
November 1926.98 
The Northern Expedition was successful because of a combination of 
ideological, military and leadership factors. AIthough numericaIIy weaker as 
compared to main regional forces of Wu Peifu and Sun Chuanfang, the National 
Revolutionary Army was perceived by many as a military force with an ideological 
appeal to reunify China from military separatism and foreign encroachments. The 
timing for launching the Northern Expedition was crucial as it allowed the National 
Revolutionary Army to strike when the opponents were weak, divided and 
unprepared. Most important, however, was the decisive battles that turned the support 
of many local militarists to the side of the National Revolutionary Army and the 
Guomindang. 
The weaknesses of the National Revolutionary Army began to surface after 
the split of the United Front. The rivalries between Wuhan and Nanjing divided the 
National Revolutionary Army into two main factions. Within the two factions many 
smaller allies also started to act independently with little regards to the order of 
Commander -in- Chief. Chiang had to Iook for new alliances to safeguard the foothold 
in Nanjing. It took nearly another one and a half year and established new alliances 
with northern militarists to end the Northern Expedition in 1928. This was the main 
reason why the Northern Expedition could only achieve partial unification of China. 
The most influential and critical person in the establishment of both the 
Huangpu Military Academy and the National Revolutionary Army was the 
Commandant and the Commander -in- Chief, Chiang Kaishek dubbed by the French as 
the "Napoleon of China ". Chiang was instrumental in pushing for the Party academy 
and Party army. He could work with both the Guomindang officials and obtain the 
support of the Russian advisers to implement many development plans, some went 
(Before and after I was admitted into the second class of Huangpu), ibid., p.287. 
798 Mao Shicheng, Shiwu pian yiqian zhi Jiang Jieshi xiansheng, p. 855; Ch'I His -sheng also noted the 
against Sun Yatsen's instructions, to create an effective and creditable army. Chiang 
rose above many of the Guomindang's commanders because of his nationalistic 
outlook and pragmatic approach to the problems of the Guomindang in Guangzhou 
and central China. His political orientation and policy gained the support of many 
well- trained officers from the southern provinces. These academy -trained officers 
formed the bulk of Chiang's loyal supporters. Their support was crucial to Chiang in 
setting the Huangpu Military Academy, and in difficult times during the Northern 
Expedition. Even when Chiang resigned from his post of the Commander -in -Chief of 
the National Revolutionary Army, no one would want to take over his position. 
The post -Northern Expedition period saw the forces under Chiang Kaishek 
consolidating itself by defeating the rebellious armies, as well as building up its 
central army into a national army. The Central Military Academy in Nanjing was to 
bring about this new army. It appeared that Nanjing regime was keen in a 
professional army when it adopted the German model of military build -up. Under the 
German model, a professional army with modem technology and combined arms 
operations would be the standard army. Yet, situation would not allow this slow and 
costly build -up of the military. The demand of large number of officers to staff the 
ever -expanding units meant that short- course training would have to supplement 
officers trained in the Central Military Academy. 
Looking at the development of military academies in early Republican China, 
the Huangpu Military Academy in Guangzhou was a transitional phase of the Chinese 
officer corps attempting to establish a new national army. The Guomindang's Party 
Army first absorbed these officers. However, unlike the Russian Red Army where the 
party could maintained its close control of the military, the Chinese officer corps was 
not only free from political party control but successfully provided leadership to the 
party. The Party Army was thus became the platform in which to launch a central 
army. 
limited roles played by the Huangpu forces in the Northern Expedition, Warlord Polities, 200 -201. 
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Table 1 : Military & Political Cadres in 1923* 
Institution/Year 
1923 
Baoding Graduates 
6574 
Shikan Gakko Graduates 
548 
GMD Members 
1503 
CCP Members 
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Military & Political Cadres in 1923 
Baoding Grads tes Shikan Gakko Graduates GMD Members 
Institution 
Sources: Baodingjunguanxuexiao: C.M. Wilbur, Sun Yet -sen (1976) 
CCP Members 
111Series1 
"This table compares graduates of military academies who had at least 3 -5 years of military schooling to registered members of the GMD and CCP in 1923. 
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Table 2 Provincial Origins of the Baoding Military Academy Alumni 
Province)Course 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th Total 
Zhili 228 240 47 232 234 10 301 405 1697 25.81 
Hubei 53 37 26 189 10 272 2 7 13 609 9.26 
Henan 72 45 8 22 109 64 47 58 425 6.46 
Fujian 59 70 106 4 52 92 10 _ 396 6.02 
Hunan 63 58 147 6 3 26 3 17 42 365 5.55 
Shangdong 97 53 6 47 70 1 45 25 344 5.23 
Zhejiang 9 34 162 2 6 85 - -- 32 7 337 5.13 
Anhui 36 41 54 4 58 46 8 27 56 330 5.02 
Jiangsu 46 54 111 - -- 15 73 14 15 328 4.99 
Guangdong 54 33 15 - -- 1 121 10 8 242 3.68 
Fengtian 47 10 13 94 8 1 31 34 238 3.62 
Shanxi 58 37 2 - -- 68 8 2 38 2 215 3.27 
Sichuan 68 62 7 2 1 47 2 11 3 203 3.09 
Jiangxi 29 30 35 - -- 57 1 11 10 173 2.63 
Guangxi 39 29 34 1 30 1 2 3 139 2.11 
Shannxi 45 31 7 3 21 5 112 1.70 
Jilin 19 21 3 47 5 5 5 105 1.60 
Gansu 31 14 - -- 1 42 2 1 2 93 1.42 
Guizhou 38 26 6 1 7 3 81 1.23 
Yunnan 7 21 7 - -- 36 1 1 1 74 1.13 
Heilongjiang 13 8 2 21 - -- - -- 1 48 0.73 
Suiyuan - -- - -- - -- - -- 4 1 1 6 0.09 
Jehol - -- - -- - -- - -- 1 1 1 3 0.05 
Xinjiang 2 - -- --- - -- - -- - -- --- - -- 2 0.03 
Chahar -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- 1 1 0.02 
Mongolia 2 - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- - -- 2 0.03 
Inner Mongolia 1 I 0.02 
Unknown 5 --- 5 0.08 
Total 1114 956 801 209 630 1333 191 638 702 6574 100 
Sources: Lujun xingzhengjiyao (An account of the army administration). Beijing, 1916 and 1920, reprint, Taibei: Wenhai, 1971; 
Lujun junguan xuexiao tongxuelu (Alumni of the Baoding military academy). 2nd edn, Beiping (Beijing): Wuxue shuguan, 1929. 
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Table 3: Banding Graduates by Arms 
Arms /Course 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th Total 
Infantry 565 555 506 209 328 875 146 411 436 4071 
Cavalry 189 137 90 -- 79 141 45 65 76 822 
Artillery 185 118 127 -- 91 148 -- 97 121 887 
Engineering 94 80 41 -- 38 88 -- 37 40 418 
Logistics 81 66 38 -- 40 81 -- 28 42 376 
ources: Lujun xingzheng jiyao; Lujun junguan xuexiao tongxuelu 
Table 4: Founding Budget of Huangpu, Jan -June 1924' 
Month Item Credit Debit Balance 
Jan -May Founding Funds 160,370.500 
Jan -May Founding Expense 131,209.157 
Jan -May Administrative Expense 10,871.053 
Jan -May Uniforms (Shanghai) 18,832237 
June Monthly Income 30,000.000 
June Monthly Expense 30,115.971 
Jan -June Total 190,370.500 191,028.418 -657.918 
Table 5: Monthly Budget of Huangpu, May -June 1924 
Month Item Credit Debit Balance 
May Monthly 
Income 
27,500.000 
May Expense 20,878.000 
June Monthly 
Income 
25,000.000 
June Expense 29,133.000 
May -June Total Expense 2,500.000 50,011288 
Jan -June Total 
Founding and 
Monthly 
Expense 
242,870.500 241,039.706 +1,830.794 
Sources: Zhongyang shang zongli ji zhi jian weiyuan hui qing zhun he Huangpu baaxìao chenghan (The 
budget of Huangpu for the zongli {Sun Yatsen} and inspection committee approval), file no: 454/47.5, 24 
July 1924, the Guomindang Archives. 
I Currency is in Guangdong dollars. In the original text some figures are given in silver dollar (Shanghai). The 
conversion is based on $1 silver dollar being equal to $1.25 Guangdong dollar. 
273 
Table 6: Salary Scale of the Huangpu Officers and Soldiers 
Rank First Class Second Class Third Class 
MAI-GENERAL $550 - -- 
BRIG- GENERAL $400 
- -- 
COLONEL $300 $240 
LT- COLONEL $220 $200 - -- 
MAJOR $180 $160 - -- 
CAPTAIN $100 $90 $80 
LIEUTENANT $72 $64 $56 
2ND -LIEUTENANT $50 $45 $40 
2ND- LIEUTENANT 
(unconfirmed) 
$35 $30 
SERGEANT $20 - -- - -- 
CORPORAL $14 - -- 
L- CORPORAL $12 - -- 
PRIVATE (TOP 
CLASS) 
$11 - -- 
PRIVATE (1ST 
CLASS) 
$10.5 - -- - -- 
PRIVATE (2ND 
CLASS) 
$10 
STUDENT -CADET $10 
LABOURER $10 - -- - -- 
Source: Huangpu junxiao ji dangjun xinxiang shumu biao (Table of salary of the Huangpu military 
academy and army), file no. 454/33. dated July 1924, the Guomindang Archives. 
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Table 7: Provincial Background of the First Class Cadets 
Province 1st Coy 2nd Coy 3rd Coy 
21 
4th Coy 
3 
Sub -total 
59 
6th Coy 
116 
Total 
185 29''.3 Hunan 23 22 
Guangdon 26 33 30 17 106 3 109 17.17 
Shaanxi 15 8 19 15 57 0 57 8.98 
Jiangxi 6 6 7 6 25 19 44 6.93 
Zhejiang 12 10 7 8 37 1 38 5.93 
Guangxi 11 7 10 3 31 5 36 5.07 
Anhui 6 6 6 7 25 0 25 3.24 
Jiangsu 5 4 3 10 22 0 22 3_46 
Sichuan 4 5 6 4 19 1 20 3.15 
Hubei 4 5 4 4 17 0 17 2.68 
Guizhou 1 4 4 6 15 0 15 2.36 
Yunnan 0 0 0 13 13 1 14 2.20 
Henan 1 2 3 5 11 0 11 1.73 
Shangdon 3 2 1 5 11 0 11 1.73 
Shanxi 4 2 1 3 10 0 10 1.57 
Fujian 3 3 2 2 10 0 10 1.57 
Hebei 1 2 0 1 4 0 4 0.63 
Gangsu 1 0 0 2 3 0 3 0.47 
Inner Mon 0 1 0 1 2 0 2 0.31 
Jilin 0 0 0 1 i 0 1 0.16 
Helongjian 0 o 0 1 1 0 1 0.16 
Total 489 146 635 100.00 
Source. Huangpu junxiao shiliao, "Students directory", 522 -530, 
Table 8: Provincial Background of First to Third Class Cadets 
Province First Class Second Class Third Class Total 
Hunan 197 75 220 492. 21,14 
uangdon 108 107 226 441 18.95 
Zhejiang 37 66 173 276 11.86 
Jiangxi 42 52 100 194 8.34 
Sichuan 21 49 100 170 7.31 
Jiangsu 24 10 100 134 5.76 
Hubei 16 23 78 117 5.03 
Anhui 25 15 76 116 4.98 
Guangxi 37 15 37 89 3.82 
Shaanxi 57 4 7 68 2.92 
Guizhou 15 13 26 54 2.32 
hangdon 11 6 26 43 1.85 
Yunnan 13 3 18 34 1.46 
Fujian 11 6 16 33 1.42 
Shanxi 10 2 12 24 1.03 
Henan 10 0 10 20 0.86 
Hebei 4 2 3 9 0.39 
Korea 0 0 4 4 0.17 
Gangsu 3 0 0 3 0.13 
Mongolia 2 1 0 3 0.13 
Jilin 1 0 1 2 0.09 
elongjian 1 0 0 1 0.04 
Total 645 449 1233 2327 100.00 
Sources: Huangpu junnaa sklgon ,vol.2_ 411) Pian, pp. 4,17,31; Huangpu jnrixiaa slriliao, p_ 93. 
Table 9: Heads of the Political Department of Huangpu 
May 1924 -Jan 1926 
Name Province Education /Institution Appointment Date 
Dai Jitac Sichuan Japanese University )Law) Head 10.5 -28.6. 1924 
Zhang Songnian Hebei French University Acting Head 28.6.1924- 5.1925 
Shao Yunchong Zhejiang US Wisconsin and Columbia Universities Head 9.- 11.1924 
Zhou Enlai Zhejiang (studied in France institution unknown) Acting Head 11.1924 -2.1925 
Bao Huiseng Hubei Hubei Teachers' Training College Acting Head 11.1924- 2.1925 
Shao Lizi Zhejiang Traditional Chinese education 7.1924 
Wang Jingwei Guangdong Japanese Law Short Course 14.9.1924 -1926 
Lu Yi Hunan unknown 10. "924- 2.1926 
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Table 10: Education Background of the Huangpu Military Academy Military Staff 
of the First, Second, and Third Courses (1924 -1925)* 
Names of the Academy /School /University No. 
Baoding Military Academy 69 78.41 
Shikan gakko (Japanese Military Academy) 1 i 12.50 
Beijing Army Surveying School 3 3.41 
Second Army Preparatory School 1 1.14 
Jiangxi Military School 1 1.14 
Zhejiang Military School 1 1.14 
Baoding Senior Officers' Short Course 1 1.14 
Nanyang University, Department of Electrical Engineering 1 1.14 
TOTAL 88 100 
Table 11 Provincial Origins of the Huangpu Military Academy Military Staff(1924 -5) * 
Provinces No. % 
Jiangsu 19 21.59 
Jiangxi 16 18.18 
Zhejiang 11 12.50 
Hubei 9 10.23 
Guangdong 8 9.09 
Fujian 7 7.95 
Hunan 5 5.68 
Anhui 4 4.55 
Yunnan 4 4.55 
Henan 2 2.27 
Guizhou 1 1.14 
Sichuan 1 1.14 
Guangxi 1 1.14 
Total 88 100 
Sources: Qian Dajun, "Huangpu chuangli shìji renwuz i; Liu Fenghan," Nrrongpu =n ji zuzhi ji ji renuv ferai ": Huangpu juraian 
rongxuehi, Hunan Archives comp; 2iben lupin shiguan xuexiao liierrrcehengminghr; '.ujun junguan longxuelu 
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Table 12 : Monthly Revenue of the Guangzhou Government 
Year 
1924 
1925 
1926 
Revenue (S) Remarks 
667,000 Yearly average 
1,584,375 Yearly average 
14,731,207 Month of July 
Source: George Sokolsky, "A Visit to Hong Kong and Canton ", China Express and Telegraph, London, 1926. Cited 
in C. Martin Wilbur. "Military Separatism and Reunification, 1922 -1937 ", p. 227. 
Table 13 : Revenue of the Guangzhou Government, January 1925 (before the first 
Eastern Expedition) l 
Revenue (S) Remarks 
Guangzhou 
Government 
1,584,375 Yearly average based on George Sokolsky's account 
Guangdong Army 910,000 Month of January, based on the records of the 
Guangdong Army 
Yunnan Army 3,190,000 Based on Cherepanov's estimates 
Sources: Zhonghua minguoshi dangan zilias huibian, 4 b: 1076; Chereponov, Zapiski, p. 36; C. Martin Wilbur, 
"Military Separatism and Reunification, 1922 -1937 ", p. 227. 
1 According to Chiang Kaishek, the total revenue for Guangdong province could rich about 35 
million to 40 million per month. These figures are exaggerated. More realistic amount is half about of 
it as in George Sokolsky's account. 
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Table 14 : The National Revolutionary Army, July 1925 -June 1926 
Unit Commander Remarks 
I Corps 
Ist Division 
2nd Division 
3rd Division 
14th Division 
20th Division 
Reserve Regiment 
Artillery Regiment 
Guard Regiment 
1 
He Yinggín 
Wang Boling 
Liu Zhi 
Tan Shuqing 
Feng Yipei 
Qian Dajun 
Zhang Zhen 
Cai Zhonghu 
Zhu Yizhi 
The I st and 2nd Divisions 
were reorganised from units of 
the Party Army. The 3rd 
Division was formed in the 
latter half of 1925 from a 
portion of the Guangdong 
Army at Guangzhou. Total 
strength: 5 divisions and 3 
regiments. or 19 regiments. 
II Corps 
4th Division 
5th Division 
6th Division 
Training Division 
Artillery Regiment 
Tan Yankai 
Zhang Huizan 
Tan Daoyuan 
Dai Yue 
Chen Jiayou 
Xie Muhan 
Reorganised from Jianguo 
xiangjun (Hunan Army units) 
at Guangzhou in the latter half 
of 1925. Total strength: 12 
regiments. 
III Corps 
7th Division 
8th Division 
9th Division 
Military Police 
Battalion 
Artillery Battalion 
Zhu Peide 
Wang Jun 
Zhu Shigui 
Zhu Peide 
Wu Xuanguo 
Zhang Yanchuan 
Re- organised from the 
Jianguo dianjun (Yunnan 
Army units) at Guangzhou in 
the latter half of 1925. 
Total strength: 8 regiments 
and 2 battalions. 
IV Corps 
10th Division 
11th Division 
12th Division 
13th Division 
Independent 
Regiment 
Artillery Battalion 
Artillery Battalion 
Li Jishen 
Chen Mingshu 
Chen Jitang 
Zhang Fakui 
Xu Jingtang 
Ye Ting 
Guo Siyan 
Xue Yangzhong 
Reorganised from Jianguo 
Yuejun (Guangdong Army 
units) at Guangzhou in the 
latter half of 1925. Total 
strength: 13 regiments and 2 
battalions. 
V Corps 
15th Division 
16th Division 
1st Independent 
Regiment 
2nd Independent 
Regiment 
Li Fulin 
Li Jun 
Lian Bingzhang 
Liang Lin 
Lin Zhu 
Reorganised from Fu Army 
units, a militia force at 
Guangzhou in the latter half of 
1925. Total strength: 8 
regiments and I battalion. 
VI Corps 
17th Division 
18th Division 
Cheng Qian 
Deng Yanshan 
Hu Qian 
Reorganised from units of the 
Hunan Army and a division of 
the Guangdong Army at 
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19th Division 
Artillery Battalion 
Artillery Battalion 
Yang Yuanjun 
Mo Xide 
Lo Xinyuan 
Guangzhou in the latter half of 
1925. Total strength: 9 
regiments and two battalions. 
The above six corps were formed These two corps retained their 
before January 1926. On the eve original organisation and did not 
of the Northern Expedition in June conform to the NRA. 
1926, the following two corps 
were added to the National 
Revolutionary Army. 
VII Corps 
1st Brigade 
2nd Brigade 
3rd Brigade 
4th Brigade 
5th Brigade 
6th Brigade 
7th Brigade 
8th Brigade 
9th Brigade 
Li Zongren 
Xia Wei 
Li Mingrui 
Wu Tingyang 
Huang Xuqu 
Liu Rifu 
Wei Yunsong 
Hu Zongduo 
Zhong Zipei 
Lu Huanyan 
Reorganised from the 
Guangxi Army units on 24 
March 1926. Even after 
joining the NRA, it retained 
its original organisation 
structure and units 
designation. Total strength: 
18 regiments and 2 
battalions. 
VIII Corps 
2nd Division 
3rd Division 
4th Division 
Training Division 
5th Division 
Hubei 1st Division 
Training Regiment 
Artillery Regiment 
Tang Shengzhi 
He Jian 
Li Pinxian 
Liu Xing 
Zhou Lan 
Yeh Qi 
Xia Douyín 
Zhou Rongchong 
Wang Xitao 
Reorganised from the 4th 
Division of the Hunan Army 
on 2 June 1926 when the 
NRA moved toward Hunan. 
Total strength: 17 regiments. 
(Each division had 4 
regiments whereas the early 
first six corps had 3 
regiments) 
Sources: Geming wenxían, 12: 1802 -5; Beifa zhanshi, chart 17. 
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Table 15: Education Background of the National Revolutionary Army 
Military Commanders prior to the Northern Expedition* 
1st 
Corps 
2nd 
Corps 
3rd 
Corps 
4th 
Corps 
5th 
Corps 
6th 
Corps 
7th 
Corps 
8th 
Corps 
Total 
Baoding Military 
Academy 
12 5 3 13 -- 2 1" 27 79 
Shikan gakko 4 2 -- I -- 5 - 12 24 
Army War College 2 _ -- 1 -- -- 3 
Huangpu Military 
Academy 
I -- -- 1 _ -- -- -- 2 
Wuchang Military 
Preparatory School 
2 -- -- 1 -- _ 
Provincial Short 
Military Course 
-- I -- 4 -- -- 1 -- 6 
Provincial Military 
Schools 
2 2 6 2 -- -- 
_ 2 17 
Units Training 
Courses 
-- -- I I -- -- I -- 3 
hi() Formal Military 
Training 
3 -- -- i 1 -- - -- 5 
Militia Training -- -- -- -- l -- -- -- 1 
Traditional Education -- i -- - -- - - -- 1 
Others -- -- 1 -- -- -- -- - 1 
Unknown 5 11 3 2 II 5 3 -- 45 
' The military commanders include all line officers from regiment commanders and above, and all chiefs of 
staff in the divisions and corps. 
Sources: Chen Xunzheng, Guomin gemingjun zhanshi chugao (A draft history of the national revolutionary 
army), Taibei, 2nd edn, 1952, vol.1, part 2, pp. 37 -9; Beffa zhanshi (War history of the northern expedition), 
Taibei, Historical and Political Department, Ministry of the Natioanal Defence, 1959, vol.2, table 17; Huang 
Xuchu, "Lia guang gemin di tongyi jingguo jixiang" (Details of the revolutionary unification of Guangdong and 
Guangxi), Chunqiu, 1491.12, no.5; Lujunjunguan tongxuelu (Army officers alumni), Beiping, Wuxue Bookshop 
1929; Lu hai lcong junguanzuo renguan mingbu (Army, Navy and Air Force Officers Appointments Book), 
complied by the Military Committee Office, 1936; Riben lujun .chiguan xuexiao liuxuesheng mingbu (Records 
of the Shikan gakko graduates), Taibei, Wenhai Publication, 1977; Yunnan lujun jiangleudang tongrenlu (Yunnan 
army school alumni), Yunnan fu, c1910. 
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Table 16: Organisation and Strength of a standard Corps in the National 
Revolutionary Army* 
Unit No of Officer No of Soldier 
Corps = 3 x Divisions 768 8748 
Division = 3 x Regiments 255 2916 
Regiment= 3 x Battalions 84 972 
Battalion = 3 x Companies 26 324 
Company = 3 x Platoons 8 108 
Platoon = 3 x Sections 2 36 
Section = 6 x Groups 2 12 
Group -- 2 
* In principle, this was the standard organisation of the all the National Revolutionary 
Army. But in practice, all the battalions had 4 companies, and some divisions had 4 
divisions, 3 combat and 1 training divisions. 
Source: Wen Gongzhi, Zuijin sanshinian zhongguo junshishi (The Chinese military 
history of the last thirty years), Taipingyang Bookshop, Shanghai, 1930, 77-78. 
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Table 17: Provincial Budget Balance of Guangdong, 1912 -1926 
Year Revenue (S) Expenditure (S) Balance (S) 
1912 38,139,000 31,834,000 6,305.000 
1913 19,679,000 27,764,000 -8,085.000 
1914 20,428,000 22,975,000 -2,547.000 
1915 19,938,000 24,261,000 -4,323.000 
1916 25,057,000 38,247,000 -13,190.000 
1917 28,016,000 40,173.000 -12,157.000 
1918 28,856,000 40,113,000 -11,248,000 
1919 32,178,000 47,056,000 -14,878.000 
1920 22,382,000 36,694,000 -14,312.000 
1921 30,466,000 41,076,000 -10,610,000 
1922 24,108,000 33,704,000 -9,596.000 
1923 13,818,000 16,724,000 -2,906.000 
1924 9,746,000 12,196,000 -2,450,000 
1925 50,374,000 70,284,000 -19,913.000 
1926 84,822,000 125,430,000 -40,608,000 
Source: Guangdong sheng difang caizheng (Provincial financial policy of Guangdong), edited by Xiong Neng, 
II: 414 -417. 
Table 18: Military Expenditures of Guangdong, 1912 -1926 
Year Administration Expenditure 
($) 
Military Expenditure ($) Other Expenditures ($) 
1912 12,085 19,749,000 
1913 6,831,000 19,461,000 1,472,000 
1914 6,812,000 12,504,000 3,659,000 
1915 5,373,000 11,377,000 7,511,000 
1916 5,240,000 14,327,000 18,680,000 
1917 4,982,000 15,187,000 20,004,000 
1918 4,509,000 15,703,000 19,901,000 
1919 6,418,000 21,319,000 19,319,000 
1920 5,643,000 16,3I9,000 14,732,000 
1921 5,073,000 23,593,000 12,410,000 
1922 3,575,000 22,759,000 7,370,000 
1923 2,002,000 8,815,000 5,907,000 
1924 1,439,000 6,208,000 4,549,000 
1925 7,372,000 35,943,000 26,969,000 
1926 18,984,000 83,266,000 23,180,000 
Source: Guangdong sheng difang caizheng (Provincial financial policy of Guangdong), edited by Xiong Neng, II: 413 -417. 
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Appendix 1: 
DR SUN YATSEN's INAUGURAL SPEECH AT THE HUANGPU MILITARY 
ACADEMY OPENING CEREMONY ON 16 JUNE 1924 
The opening ceremony of the Huangpu Military Academy was held on 16 Juan 1924. In 
the morning at around eight, invited guests, academy staff and students assembled on 
the parade ground waiting to welcome the guest -of- honour Dr Sun Yatsen. The guests 
included members of the Guomindong's Central Executive Committee Wu Hanmin, Wang 
Jingwei, Zhang Ji; Minister of Defence General Cheng Qian and his duty Wu Qian; 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Wu Chaoshu; Commanders of Guangdong Army General Xu 
Chongzhi, the Hunan Army General Tan Yankai, the Yunnan Army General Yang Xiwen, 
the West Route Army General Liu Zhenghuan; and the Head of the Guangdong Civil 
Administration Sun Ke etc.. Dr Sun accompanied by Madam Sun, went on to the stage 
at nine a.m. and spoke for about two hours. The following speech is translated from 
Zhangyang lujun junguan xuexiao shiqau (Draft history of the Central Military Academy), 
Nanjing, c1936, vol 1. 
Today, we celebrate the opening of our military academy. Why do we 
establish this academy? Why must we have this academy? You gentlemen all know 
that our revolution has a history of 13 years, but what we now have is a Republic in 
name only; so our revolution of 13 years is still a failure. Until today it remains a 
failure. But what about the world revolution? How about other revolutions which 
took place after ours? Six years ago, a neighbouring country which has a mutual 
border with China of more than 10,000 Ii, which is larger than China, and is a part of 
both Europe and Asia, and which was one of the powers before World War I, this 
country had a revolution during the War. They had their revolution six years later 
than we did. What is this neighbouring country? It is Russia. Its revolution came six 
years after us, but it was thoroughly successful. Let us compare the histories of these 
two countries. Domestically, our revolution was against the alien Manchurians; the 
Qing Emperor was weak when we revolted, and the administration was corrupt. At 
that time the Manchurian monarch was the weakest while the Russian was one of the 
strongest in the world. Thus, we might say that in China the revolt was against a very 
weak emperor, while the Russians revolted against a very powerful one. In this 
respect, the Chinese revolution was easy and the Russian difficult. Externally, the 
Russian Revolution encountered very strong resistance from other powers, but in 
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China no one bothered us after our revolution. Before the revolution, the foreign 
powers planned to divide China, and we feared they might intervene. However, they 
took no action. The Russian revolution not only met with the foreign intervention 
verbally, but also with armed forces. The troops of Britain. France, the United States 
of America, Italy, Japan, and other minor nations invaded the territory of Russia. It 
seemed as if the whole world was intervening. So we can see that our evolution was 
against a very weak government, while the Russians were dealing with a very 
powerful domestic government and all the foreign powers of the world. Therefore, 
externally, the Chinese revolution was easy and the Russian Revolution was difficult. 
But how did the Russian Revolution become so successful, overcoming so many 
difficulties within the short period of six years? And why is it that our revolution, 
facing fewer obstacles, and with twice the amount of time. has proven unsuccessful? 
We have discovered the reason producing these different results of the Chinese 
and Russian revolutions, and we have taken it as a lesson. And it is also the reason 
why we are here today. What lesson is it? It is that during the revolution, the 
Russians had political party members to serve as a vanguard in the struggle with the 
Czar, and once the latter was overthrown, they built a revolutionary army to continue 
fighting. Therefore, even though there were many obstacles, they were able to 
overcome them all in a very short period of time. During our Revolution, the most 
famous party- members in Guangdong were the seventy -two martyrs, and many others 
in various provinces. Because of their sacrifices the uprising in Wuchang was 
followed immediately in other provinces and finally the Qing Monarch was 
overthrown and the Republic of China was founded. However, the revolution was 
only partially successful. As we did not have a revolutionary army to carry out the 
will of the Revolutionary Party, so even today the foundation of the Republic is weak- 
-although the bureaucrats and warlords to not dare openly to change the name of the 
Republic. The reason, in simple words, is that our Revolution has been simply the 
struggle of the Party, not of a revolutionary army. This is why bureaucrats and 
warlords can control the Republic, and our revolution has not been successfully 
concluded. 
What hope do we hold for this Academy? It is that we are starting our 
revolutionary careers over again from today. We are going to make the cadets of this 
Academy into the central core of our revolutionary army. You cadets will be the 
backbone of the Revolution and with you as our revolutionary armed force, our 
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revolution will be successful. Without a strong revolutionary army, the Chinese 
revolution will remain forever a failure. So our one and only hope for this Academy 
is to establish that revolutionary army and save China from her peril. \Vhat is the 
revolutionary army? How can you cadets determine whether you want to become a 
part of the revolutionary army? What are the qualifications for membership in this 
revolutionary army? If we wish to know how to become one of the revolutionary 
soldiers, we must follow the examples of our martyrs, and struggle as the 
revolutionary party does, struggle for the goals of the revolutionary party. Then we 
can call ourselves the revolutionary army. 
In the 13 years of our Chinese Revolution, there has never been a single 
military organization struggling for the same cause as the revolutionary party has. I 
dare say that in the past 13 years China did not have troops which could be regarded 
as a revolutionary army. There are a certain number of troops in Guangdong fighting 
on the same side as the revolutionary party, but I dare not call them the revolutionary 
army. They are working with our revolutionary party, but why is it that I can not call 
them the revolutionary army? The reason is that they have not had revolutionary 
training, and that they do not take a revolutionary position. What is the revolutionary 
position? It is sharing the same experiences as the revolutionary martyrs. Today, the 
enlisted men of the military units in Guangdong know nothing about the activities of 
the martyrs. Besides, as China is suffering from poverty, there are many people who 
say they want to join the revolution--just because they are suffering from hard living 
conditions. But once they have attained some positions, they turned away and 
opposed the revolution. This was why the troops of Chen Jiongming, who called 
himself a revolutionist, sheIIed Guanyinshan and fought against the government of the 
South. The troops, which called themselves revolutionists and worked under the same 
revolutionary government, fought against each other because of their own greed, and 
they did things even the enemy would not do. Therefore, we can see clearly that the 
troops who lack comprehension of the causes of revolution will never free themselves 
from selfishness and will be most unreliable once their own interests are at stake. This 
is why our revolution has met successive failures. 
I am here today to urge you gentlemen to treat the past successes and failures 
as a dream and never to be returned. Beginning from today, we shall build the 
foundation of the Revolution and establish an ideal revolutionary army. Knowing that 
our purpose is to build up a revolutionary army, and coming as you do from far away, 
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you gentlemen must have enough determination to devote yourselves to the career of 
revolution. But where will we start? We must begin with our hearts. We must 
eliminate bad thoughts, habits, and characteristics; all evilness, all unrighteous and 
unkind characteristics must be eliminated. You gentlemen must start the political 
revolution from your hearts. If you do, our future in revolution is promising. If not, 
even you who are here studying military science in this modern military academy 
cannot become a part of the revolutionary army, nor accomplish the ends of 
revolution. You gentlemen must first have the determination of revolutionaries, with 
which you will make yourselves the officers of the revolution very soon. We must 
accomplish our revolutionary tasks with full commitments to save the Nation and the 
people by carrying out the Three Principles of the People and the Five -power 
Constitution. 
Even you gentlemen with a great deal of combat experience, who occupy large 
amounts of land and command tens of thousands of men, you are still not necessarily 
members of the revolutionary army. There are two kinds of bad military men in 
China. One is the military men within the revolutionary party; they absolutely oppose 
the revolution. What they have in mind are higher positions, riches, destruction of the 
republic, and restoration of the Monarchy. If you gentlemen want to maintain the 
Republic and to eliminate these types of military men, you must determine today that 
after attaining success you will not become one of the selfish commanders of divisions 
or brigades. nor a tyrannical warlord. 
After you make up your mind, how can you get across the second threshold 
of revolution? What is the second threshold of revolution? It is done by following the 
example of the revolutionary martyrs. It is nothing exceptional, only the willingness 
to sacrifice your lives for your country. How was our struggle accomplished in the 
past? Most of the struggling was done with our bare hands; we were luckily even to 
have a few pistols and grenades. We continually fought the Qing troops with such 
weapons. But how many troops were there all over the country? There were Green 
Banner units, the navy, patrol battalion, and then the new army, totalling more than 
1 million men. For example, on 29 March in the year of Xi hai(1911), there were 
more than 50,000 troops in Guangzhou, including the navy units under Li Zhun, army 
units under Zhang Míngzhi, the new army units at Yantang, and the Manchurian 
garrisons. There were only several hundred revolutionists. In that uprising, 72 men 
of the revolutionary party were killed, although many survived. At the time only 
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about 300 men in the assault force were armed, and they fought against more than 
30,000 enemy soldiers. This is what we called revolutionary determination, daring 
to fight one against one hundred. 
Now, here, we have gathered together this military instructors, officers, and 
cadets. Please tell me if this kind of behaviour is tactically reasonable in the study of 
military science? Is there any historical example of one fighting against one hundred? 
According to my understanding, no such tactics have been employed in the past. 
Ordinarily, it is rare to use one man against ten. Our ancient art of war says to attack 
if you have twice as many men as the enemy, and to besiege if you outnumber the 
enemy by ten times. In modern times, we usually take the defensive or withdrawal 
if we equal the enemy in number. This is what has been called tactical necessity in 
the past, and also at present. But in the Guangzhou Uprising 13 years ago, the 
revolutionists used only pistols and grenades against a superior enemy who was 
equipped with rifles and artillery. Finally, 72 revolutionists were killed and others 
believed that they failed. Actually, they were successful; for they had taken the office 
building of the Provincial Governor and driven the Guangdong -Guangxi military 
Governor away. The reason the revolutionaries finally failed was that reinforcements 
did not arrive on time. Besides the 300 men of our charging party were ill -equipped. 
If anyone of them had been well equipped, they might have succeeded. Comparing 
the enemy's situation and ours afterward, one must decide it was not that their 30,000 
had beaten our 300 men, but that we were defeated by our own poor planning. If our 
operation had been well planned, it would have been successful. 
After the Guangzhou Uprising in the year of Xinhai, there was the Wuchang 
Uprising, which ended successfully. But how about the situation at that time? There 
were not more than three hundred revolutionists in Wuchang and Hankou, and not 
more than a hundred of them were members of the Revolutionary Party. They looked 
almost everywhere before finding two boxes containing a total of one hundred rounds 
of ammunition for their small arms. They then started the action with the Engineering 
Battalion stationed within the city. They were immediately supported by the Artillery 
Battalion from outside the city, and the latter moved their artillery pieces downtown 
to seize the Military Governor's Office and to drive Ruizhi out of town. There were 
more than 20,000 Qing troops in Wuchang, including the 8th Zhen (Division) of the 
New Army Yangtze River naval units, and old army units known as the Patrol 
Battalion. Against the enemy of 20,000 men, each member of the Revolutionary 
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Army, altogether not more than one hundred men, had to take care of five hundred 
men. In the Guangzhou Uprising, we used one against one hundred, but it failed. In 
the Wuchang Uprising we used one against 500, and we won. Therefore, 
revolutionary struggles cannot be considered in the same terms as the art of war in the 
past or at present, neither in foreign countries nor in China. Nevertheless, this kind 
of struggle is not new to the history of revolution. If we keep the revolution moving 
step by step, no one can say we will not overcome the superior numbers of the enemy. 
Some of you instructors came from abroad, and some from Baoding Military 
Academy, but it is ordinary military science that is being taught in military schools all 
over the world. So what you gentlemen will teach is ordinary military science, that 
which you have studied. Our Cadets will probably learn ordinary military science 
according to the norm. With this kind of knowledge, can you become members of the 
revolutionary army? The path to membership in the revolutionary army cannot be 
sought in knowledge; it can only be gained through devotion and determination. In 
the Academy you Cadets must follow the directions of the instructors, and obey the 
orders of your senior officers, and learn by heart everything the instructors teach. 
Some of you with higher wisdom may turn out to be better than your instructors. 
However, you must remember everything taught by the instructors, for it may be 
helpful some day. In comparison, the members of the Revolutionary Party did not 
have the opportunity to secure a military education, but you, at least, will be given six 
months training in this Academy. In the past, members of the Revolutionary Party 
received only handguns, but you have good rifles. In the past, the Revolutionary Party 
could gather together for action at any one place two or three hundred men at the 
most, but you already have five hundred men in this Academy. With such favourable 
conditions, if you have the necessary devotion and determination prerequisite to 
participation in the Revolutionary Party, the five hundred men with five hundred rifles 
alone can achieve excellent revolutionary goals. 
Whether the troops are revolutionary or not depends on the revolutionary 
devotion of the officers and men, not on how good the weapons are. Without devotion 
and understanding of the reasons behind revolution, you cannot succeed. This was the 
case with the latter Qing dynasty New Army, which had good rifles and artillery 
pieces, and with the navy, which had powerful men -of -war and torpedo boats. But 
they still could not glorify the career of revolution. Thus, later, in the Wuchang 
Uprising, they became the tools of the Revolutionary Party. In general, revolution is 
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an extraordinary career which cannot be judged according to ordinary standards. In 
the past we have tried very hard to persuade Chinese overseas students at military and 
naval academies in Japan, American, and Europe they should join our revolutionary 
party, but many of them refused and opposed the revolution. But what was in the 
mind of those intellectual military men who were against the revolution? After careful 
study and investigation we discovered they thought, as military experts, that the 
Revolutionary Party had no change of success employing one man against one 
hundred, and one hundred against ten thousand. There is no need for us to argue about 
this , but I lust wish to remind them of who finally overthrew the Qing Monarchy. At 
the time, we had the assistance of some militarists, but the primary driving power was 
a mere handful of revolutionary party members. The intellectual military men at that 
time did not approve of revolution, for they thought it was tactically impossible for 
the few to defeat the many. Therefore, the Revolutionary Party did not include many 
military men who had real military expertise. The Xinhai Revolution was soon 
followed by the overthrow of the Qing Monarchy because there were uprisings 
everywhere, all over the country, which repeated the Wuchang revolt. Duan Jirui 
then led the military men by publishing a circular cable supporting the Republic. And 
the Revolutionary Party had to compromise to accept militarily. Therefore, the 
success of the Xinhai Revolution actually did not depend on those military men who 
had real military knowledge. You must keep in mind that revolution is not an 
ordinary career and cannot be judged by ordinary standards, When at school, you just 
have to pick up as much knowledge as you can, and with the revolutionary spirit, you 
can put to optimum use what you have picked up. Without revolutionary spirit, no 
matter how much you have studied, you are still useless. We begin this Academy 
today, but the warlords in the North already have had the Baoding Military Academy 
and the Beijing War College for a long time. Compared with our school, theirs have 
longer histories, more alumni, and are better furnished. Ours is far behind theirs in 
every way. If we use material comparisons, and judge by ordinary standards, then 
how can we reform China? However, the officers and men of the North are bound 
together only by their mutual desires for higher positions, riches and better living; they 
think nothing of saving the nation and the people, and they lack any devotion to 
revolution. This was true in the Qing Dynasty, and it is also true of the troops of Cao 
Kun and Wu Peifu. 
The revolutionists without military knowledge were able to overthrow the 
Qing Monarchy, so it will be easier for our revolutionary army with military 
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knowledge to eliminate Cao Kun and Wu Peifu. But in our present position, the 
revolutionary spirit is most essential to our success against them. Otherwise, no 
matter how strong we are, we will be eliminated by them. Six years ago, Russia 
organized the revolutionary army at the same time they began their revolution, in 
order to eliminate both the old party and alien enemies. Now we are following the 
example of Russia in starting this Academy. After 13 years of revolution, China 
needs this Academy and a revolutionary army, for a revolutionary army is most 
essential to the construction of a new nation. 
You gentlemen came to study in this Academy and have listened to my speech 
today; of course you have determined to be part of the revolutionary army. But what 
is the first and basic requirement for membership in the revolutionary army? First we 
must have knowledge, and then we must be very brave; these are the basic 
requirements for the revolutionary army. But how can we gain knowledge? The way 
to accumulate knowledge is not to pick up only what the instructors teach in the 
classroom. It requires your own inspiration. You must spend studying all the books, 
magazines and newspapers concerning military science and revolution. For once you 
learn how, it will be easy for you to glorify the spirit of revolution by following the 
steps of our martyrs and sacrificing yourselves to build a foundation for the Republic 
of China. Thus you will bring the Three Principles of the People into reality, and 
accomplish, as the Russians have done, your revolutionary mission. Not until China 
can stand as tall as the Russians do with other nations in the world, can the people of 
China exist among mankind. If we fail in our revolution, China will decline and 400 
million people will perish. The country and people are yours, and you gentlemen 
must save them. The revolutionary army is the only means of salvation, and that is 
why we have this Academy: to rear the revolutionary army for national salvation. 
You gentlemen will be the backbone of the revolutionary army, and you have on your 
shoulders the responsibility for saving the country and people; toward this end, you 
must study hard beginning today. After graduating and becoming part of the 
revolutionary army, you must fight bitterly those who jeopardize the Republic, one of 
you against one hundred of them. 
But how can you be capable of fighting single -handedly against one hundred? 
Who can supply the standard for qualification as a member of the revolutionary 
army? It is the martyrs. We have to do as they did, to sacrifice our lives, and to give 
up all personal rights in favour of national salvation. Thus, we can transform 
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ourselves into fearless military revolutionaries. The qualification of revolutionists is 
to not fear death. But how can we not fear death? Again, by following the examples 
of our martyrs. Today I speak to you as a revolutionist, ready to die. I frequently took 
part in past uprisings, and have never once valued my life; I was never wounded. So 
I am able to tell you today the 'how' of not fearing death. There is, I dare say, no 
secret spirit in the revolutionary party, except that of not fearing death. With this kind 
of courage, we can overcome death. For we know everyone must die; but our deaths 
have value. Once you understand the reason, we may say death is what we are waiting 
for, the quicker the better, and preferably in front of enemy weapons. With such 
courage and determination, we can fight single -handedly against one hundred 
enemies. For in their minds they think it is lucky to live. We feel that it is lucky to 
die for the cause. With such great differences in attitude toward life and death, 
naturally we are without equal. 
Viewing death as good luck and even looking forward to death is not an 
imaginary frame of mind, but it is actually held. For instance, there was an overseas 
Chinese student in Japan, named Chen Tienhua who had revolutionary spirit, but did 
not have the opportunity to show it. He drowned himself in the sea to show his 
willingness to sacrifice for China. In addition , there was another Chinese student, 
named Yang Dusheng, in England, who drowned himself in the sea, for he already 
understood the truth of revolution; he could not wait for the time to come, and he was 
hurt to see the corrupt condition of China. What were Chen Tienhua and Yang 
Dusheng? They were revolutionists with enthusiasm and boiling blood. They 
drowned themselves because they could not find a desirable place to die. It is a pity. 
But by their deaths we can tell that once someone is impressed by the spirit of 
revolution, and understands the true meaning of revolution. he will regard death for 
the revolution as a matter of nobility and happiness. And they will be glad to be killed 
by the bullets of the enemy on the battlefield fighting for their cause. With a 
willingness to die, the true revolutionists of the past could fight one hundred enemy 
apiece, and dared to revolt repeatedly. This was why the revolution succeeded. But 
you cannot find such examples in the books of military science, either abroad or in 
China. These can only be seen in the history of revolution, although such case 
histories are rather extraordinary. So we must have extraordinary devotion to follow 
such extraordinary examples, and it is then that we can look down upon death and die 
willingly. If everyone does the same, then we can use one hundred men against ten 
thousand, and ten thousand against one million. Now if we have a revolutionary force 
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of ten thousand men, we can easily unify China, for there are not more than one 
million troops opposing the revolution. It is because we do not have the force of ten 
thousand that the greedy and tyrannical warlords dare to act throughout the country, 
to accomplish evil and plot the overthrow of the Republic. For the maintenance of the 
Republic, and to eliminate the tyrannical warlords, I am now asking you to look down 
upon death and to follow the steps of the martyrs. And furthermore, I wish to build 
up, with your five hundred cadets as the foundation, my ideal revolutionary army, 
with which we can accomplish our revolution; China can be saved, and 400 million 
countrymen can be delivered. The career of revolution is to save your country and 
people- I have shouldered these revolutionary responsibilities my whole life. As 
cadets of this Academy, I ask you gentlemen, starting from today, to take these as our 
mutual responsibilities. 
Appendix 2: 
THE SOVIET RED ARMY AND COMMAND SCHOOLS 
After coming to power in 1917, the Bolshevik devoted their energies 
throughout 1918 to creating a Red Army in response to the threat posed by foreign and 
domestic enemies. Before the spring of 1918, the Red Army mainly consisted of the 
socialist militia. Revolutionary soldiers and sailors joined the Red Guard detachments 
to form the first volunteer units in Moscow, Petrograd, Ivanova -Voznesnsk, and the 
cities in the Urals.' However, the renewed German offensive in February 1918 
created a panic, and subsequently the Central Executive Committee of Soviet decreed 
universal military training for workers and peasants. The Universal Military 
Administration (Vsevobuch) was established to train all eligible citizens in an eight - 
week course with minimal disruption of their workdays. On 19 March 1918, after 
L.D. Trotsky took command of the army, the Council of People's Commissars 
sanctioned a Iarge -scale recruitment of former tsarist officers and non -commissioned 
officers, commonly called the military specialists. By the end of 1918, the Red Army 
counted 22,000 former generals and officers, and 13,000 former non -commissioned 
References pertaining to the Red Amy and Command Schools are from: John Erickson, The 
Soviet High Command: A Political -Military History, 1918 -1991. London: Macmillan, 1962; Dimitrii 
Fedotoff -White, The Growth of the Red Army. Princeton New Jersey: Princeton, 1944; T.F. Karíaeva, 
Direktivy komandovaniia frontov krasnoí arm ii ("1917 -1922 gg.): shornik dokumentov y 4 -kh to nakh. 
Moskva: Institut voennoi istorii, August 1971. 
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officers of the tsarist army. As late as 1921, after sustained efforts to train Red 
commanders from workers and peasants, 34 per cent of the 217,000 command 
personnel were military specialists. Because these men held critical posts in the 
military command, the academies and supply administration, they slowly regained 
their influence within the Red Army. 
Military- Political Commissars of the Red Army 
The rise of the military specialists in the Red Army met with determined 
resistance from within the revolutionary government as many Bolsheviks harboured 
deep suspicions about the loyalty of these professional military officers. In response 
to these criticisms, the Bolshevik leadership reformed and expanded the institution of 
the political commissars in the Red Army. It began to institute the three -man 
revolutionary military councils (revvoensovety), where two commissars watched over 
one military specialist, to direct the war effort at all levels of command. Based on this 
dual command structure, orders were to be obeyed only if they bore the signatures of 
both officer and commissar. During the Civil War, the commissars' responsibilities 
grew to include supervision of party members, maintenance of troop morale and 
organisation of political education. 
The Command Schools 
The system of command schools was founded in February 1918 by the order 
of Trotsky to train a large number of military -political commissars for the Red Army.' 
By January 1921, a total of 151 command courses, each of three or four months' 
duration, were operating concurrently in numerous schools. During these three years, 
1918 -21, about 39,914 commissars graduated from these courses. With no 
requirement for competitive entrance examinations, the schools accepted applicants 
who did not have any prior military experience, as well as those from existing military 
units. Successful applicants, however, had to provide school or military records 
testifying to their ability to read, write, calculate, and more importantly, had to possess 
documents that reflected their loyalty to the Bolsheviks and the Soviet government. 
The curriculum of the command schools included military drill, language, 
2 Erickson, The Soviet High Command, 32 -3; Fedotoff- White, The Growth of the Red Army, 51 -62. 
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history, mathematics (arithmetic and geometry), hygiene, and political indoctrination. 
Students with previous military experience were enrolled in three -month courses 
which stressed the study of tactics, fortifications, artillery, military topography, 
administration, drill, and political indoctrination. In most cases, the indoctrination 
was taught by political commissars and the military subjects by military specialists. 
During the second half of 1919, the school shortened the training period and curtailed 
political indoctrination in order to meet the heightened demand for graduates. 
Nevertheless, this change did not reduce the number of students who became 
communists before graduation. The courses of these schools were, therefore, "an 
important breeding -ground for new communist party membership" in the Red army.' 
The communist members among command school graduates ranged from a low of 
54 per cent in 1 918 to between 62 per cent and 70 per cent in 1919 to 1921. 
The school administration remained in the hands of both the military 
specialists and political commissars appointed by the Soviet government. When the 
question of ultimate responsibility between the military specialists and political 
commissars arose, Trotsky announced that either of them might eventually assume full 
responsibility for administration of a particular school. By 1925, the concept of 
unitary command had been adopted in the entire Red Army. 
Overall, there was a significant increase in the number of training 
establishments in the period immediately following the year 1918 as the need for 
junior commanders in the Red Army grew. In 1918 there were merely 13 military 
schools; by 1919 the number increased to 63, in January 1920 to 91, and in October 
1920 to 153. At a lower level there were numerous short courses for the "command 
staff' of front armies, which by the end of 1920 had produced 39,329 commanders 
trained directly in courses conducted in the field by front commanders.' The short 
Fedotoff- White. The Growth of the RedArrny, p. 59. 
° Shatagin, N. I. Organizatsiia I stroitePstvo Sovetskoi armii y period inostrannoi voennoi 
interventsii I grazhdanskoi voiny (1918-1920 gg). Moskva: Voennoe Ib.d-vo Ministerstva Oborony 
Soiuza SSR, 1954, 220-1. 
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course was indeed a characteristic of an educational system which had to train 
thousands of young officers in a critical national emergency, and which would be 
dispensed with in peacetime. 
Appendix 3: 
THE DAILY QUESTIONS- AND -ANSWERS FOR THE SOLDIERS (SHIBING 
RIKE WENDA)5 
On the relationship between the army and the people: 
I . Question (Q): Have we seen the suffering of the people? 
Answer (A): Yes, we have seen their suffering. 
2. Q: Who provides our clothing, food, and housing? 
A: The people provide our clothing, food, and housing. 
3. Q: Why do we labour for the revolution? 
A: We want to save the people and the country. 
4. Q: What is the purpose of our revolution? 
A: We want to carry out the three principles of the people. 
On national revolution: 
5. Q: Why must we have a national revolution? 
A: Because we are suffering from the oppression of foreign nations. 
6. Q: Why must we have a democratic revolution? 
A: Because we suffer from inequality. 
7. Q: Why must the revolution improve the people's livelihood? 
A: Because we are suffering from class inequality between the rich and the 
poor. 
On the Three Principles of the People: 
8. Q: Do we all understand the three principles of the people? 
A: Yes, we understand. 
9 Q: Are we able to act in accord with these principles of the people? 
A: We will strive for their realisation. 
10. Q: How can we accomplish the tasks given in the three principles of the 
people? 
5 Extracted from Huangpu junxiao shigao (Draft history of the Huangpu military academy). Zhongyang 1 
297 
A: We must destroy all tyrannical power and force, and give up our lives and 
privileges in order to recover equality and happiness for mankind. 
11. Q: Are we able to shoulder such heavy responsibility? 
A: We must shoulder this burden. 
12. Q: Is what we say consistent with what we do? 
A: Yes. 
13. Q: Why must we be revolutionaries? 
A: Because we want to save the people from their distress. 
14. Q: What causes the distress of the people? 
A: The oppression of capitalists and warlords, the aggression of imperialists. 
15. Q: Where do our supplies come from? 
A: From the people. 
16. Q: Why do the people supply us? 
A: The people want us to save them. 
17. Q: To save the people, what is our duty? 
A: There is no alternative other than using our whole strength and energy even 
until death. 
18. Q: What guidance do we have for use in saving the people? 
A: The three principles of the people. 
19. Q: What is the symbol of the three principles of the people? 
A: The Guomindang flag with a white sun on a blue sky background. 
20. Q: What is the price of the white sun on a blue sky flag? 
A: The heads of our martyrs. 
21. Q: Why did our martyrs sacrifice their lives? 
A: Because they wanted to carry out the three principles of the people and save 
the people. 
22. Q: How can we continue the lives of our martyrs? 
A: We must be obedient to discipline and carry out the three principles of the 
people. 
23. Q: How can we put the three principles of the people into effect? 
A: The only path is through sacrifice and struggle. 
24. Q: What is our life? 
A: The three principles of the people. 
25. Q: What is our duty? 
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A: To carry out the three principles of the people. 
26. Q: When will we accomplish our mission? 
A: There is no end until death. 
27. Q: Have you forgotten the cruelty of the rebels? 
A: The cruelty imposed on the Guomindang by the rebels is the disgrace of a 
lifetime for all Guomindang members. 
28. Q: Will you forget the perversity and tyranny of the national traitors? 
A: To tolerate the perversity and tyranny of the national traitors is the greatest 
disgrace for Chinese nationals. 
29. Q: Have you seen the oppression of tyranny? 
A: It is a great disgrace for Chinese nationals to tolerate the oppression of 
tyranny. 
30. Q: Do you understand the three principles in which you believe? 
A: I already understand that the three principles of the people are my life. 
31. Q: Have you identified your enemy? 
A: I know my enemies are national traitors, rebels and the tyrannical powers. 
32. Q: Do you comprehend your disgrace? 
A: I feel the shame for myself and for my country. 
33. Q: How can you remove your disgrace? 
A: By making every effort toward the revolution. 
Ten requirements for the success of the revolution: 
34. Q: How can the revolution be successful? 
A: There are ten requirements for the success of the revolution. 
35. Q: What is the first requirement? 
A: No fear of death. 
36. Q: What is the second requirement? 
A: No greed for money or wealth. 
37. Q: What is the third requirement? 
A: To be able to endure hardship and toil. 
38. Q: What is the fourth requirement? 
A: To honour a good reputation and to have a sense of shame. 
39. Q: What is the fifth requirement? 
A: Observe the three principles of the people and obey the discipline. 
40. Q: What is the sixth requirement? 
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A: Eliminate prejudice. 
41. Q: What is the seventh requirement? 
A: Love the people. 
42. Q: What is the eighth requirement? 
A: Be loyal to your job and duty. 
43. Q: What is the ninth requirement? 
A: Keep the spirit of unity. 
44. Q: What is the tenth requirement? 
A: Be consistent from beginning to end and fulfil our final duty. 
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Appendix 4: 
MAXIM/MOTTO OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (GEMING GE YAN)6 
"We have established this academy for nine months, 
Yet, the rebel leader Chen Jiongming is still at large at Huizhou." 
"Ask our comrades, where are your courage? Where is your determination? 
Why until today, we are still unable to wipe out the rebels?" 
"How could we ever implement the Three Principles of the People? 
Do you think it is a great shame ?" 
"Fellow comrades, we do not know when will be the next battle. 
We know we could only wash away all the shame once we received the order for 
battle." 
"We could then fulfil the wishes of the Prime Minister (Sun Yatsen) and other 
comrades, and calm the soul of the martyrs." 
6 Extracted from Huangpu junxiao shigao (Draft history of the Huangpu military academy), 
Zhongyang lujun junguan xuexiao (Central military officers' academy) comp. 10 parts, 12 vols., reprint 
of the 1936 ed. by Beijing: Dangan chubanshe (National archives publication), 1989, vol.7: 256 -7. 
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
1. Li Mo'an (Graduate of Huangpu's First Class) 
2. Su Wenqiu (First Class) 
3. Song Ruike (Third Class) 
4. He Chongxiao (Fourth Class) 
5. Wen Jiang (Fourth CIass) 
6. Qiu Xingxiang (Fifth Class) 
7. Chen Ruihe (Fifth Class) 
8. Yu Yan (Sixteenth Class) 
9. Mai Tangna (Seventeenth Class) 
10 Xia Shiduo (Seventeenth Class) 
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Notes on Sources of the Huangpu Military Academy & Nationalist Revolutionary 
Army 
Documentary sources on the history of Huangpu Military Academy and the 
Nationalist Revolutionary Army are vast. Most of the official records are kept in Taiwan 
and China. Other than Chinese records there are various contemporary diplomatic and 
military correspondence, reports, and participants reminiscences and memoirs in Russian, 
Chinese, English and Japanese languages. 
The greatest repository of Huangpu Military Academy records and documents is 
in Taiwan. The official publication of the ten -volume Zhongvang lujun junguan xuexiao 
shigao (Draft history of central military officers academy) compiled by the Central Military 
Academy in 1936, gives a comprehensive and basic chronological narrative of Huangpu 
Military Academy history from its inception to 1935. The original records of enrolment, 
students bio -data, admission procedures and examinations, alumni directories, 
correspondence of key personnel, reports by the Commandant to the Military Council of 
the Guomindang on various matters of the academy are kept in the Guomindang Archives. 
Many documents from these archives are available in Geming wenxian (Documents of the 
revolution). Volumes 10,11 and 12, in particular, contain a large amount of material on 
Huangpu Military Academy. In 1954, Guomindang Archives published Huangpu jianjun 
sanshi pian gaishu (A brief narration of Huangpu and building of the army in the last thirty 
years). 
On Sun Yatsen's career and involvement in the Huangpu Military Academy, the 
National Historical Commission has published important collections such as the two - 
volume chronological biography of Sun Yatsen, entitled Guofu nianpu, and a multi -volume 
collection of Dr Sun's writings, speeches and correspondence, Guofu quanji. 
Archives on Chiang kai -shek and Huangpu Military Academy include Huangpu 
congshu (Huangpu collections) which contain many of Chiang's addresses to the students; 
Huangpu jian jun shihua (Historical notes on Huangpu and the founding of the army); and 
Chiang kai -shek de geming gongzuo (The revolutionary activities and selected works of 
Chiang kai -shek) provide a good account of Chiang and other staff members' experiences 
of conducting the first few classes.' There are still some records concerning Chiang kai- 
t These sources have been used extensively by F. F. Liu in A Military History of Modern China, Port 
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shek and Huangpu Military Academy kept in the classified Dazi Archives which have yet 
to be released to the public. 
Some of the political lectures delivered during the course to the cadets such as Dai 
Jitao's Guomin geming yu zhongguo guomindang (The national revolution and the Chinese 
nationalist party) and Hu Hanmin's Geming lilun yi geming kungou (Theory and practice 
of revolution) are also available in the Guomindang Archives. 
The Historical and Political Bureau (Shizheng ju) of the Ministry of Defence in 
Taiwan has published several works on Huangpu Military Academy and war histories 
during the 1920s. It publishes a two-volume Huangpu junxiao liushi zhounían lunwen jí 
(Papers on the Huangpu military academy in commemoration of the sixty years since its 
Founding) and a single volume Huangpu junguan xuexiao xiaoshi jianbian (A brief history 
of the Huangpu Military Academy) in 1986. It has also compiled Zhongyang lujunjunguan 
xuexiao ge ke fern xiao pian zian (Organisation of the central military academy and its 
branches), and Lujun junguan xuexiao yan ke shi (History of the development of the army 
officer cadets school) in previous occasions and they are available only at the Bureau. 
These works are based primarily on the 1936 version of the Draft History. On campaign 
history, there is a four- volume Belfa zhanshi (Battle history of the northern expedition) and 
Belfa tongyi (Unification through the northern expedition) which provide detailed accounts 
of the National Revolutionary Army, especially the I Corps (the Huangpu Army 
commanded by Chiang kai -shek) in battles. 
Other than the official archival records, there are a number of personal records such 
as the Yan Xishan Archives, newspapers and journals of the 1920s, and oral history 
interviews of senior officers of the National Revolutionary Army are available in the 
Institute of Modem History, Academia Sinica. These are useful supplements to the official 
records. 
In mainland China, Archives of Republican China (Minguo dangan) in the Second 
Historical Archives of China, Nanjing is the most important repository of Huangpu and the 
National Revolutionary Army archives. It has published the reprint of the ten -volume Draft 
History of the Central Military Officers' Academy first published in 1936 with a new title 
Washington: Kennikat Press, 1956, and R. L. MacFarquhar in his article "The Whampoa Military 
Academy ", Papers on China, 1955. 
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Huangpu junxiao shigao (Draft history of the Huangpu military academy). The Second 
Historical Archives has also published the multi -volume Zhonghua minguo shi dangan 
ziliao huibian (Historical materials of the republican China), and Jiang Jieshi nianpu 
chugao (A draft chronological biographical of Chiang Kaishek). Contemporary journals 
such as Qingnian junren (Young soldiers), and the Gemingjun (Revolutionary army) series 
contain detailed accounts of the first and second Eastern Expedition campaigns are 
available in the Second Historical Archives. For Huangpu's roles in the first Eastern 
Expedition, Gemingjun di yi ci dongzheng shi zhan ji (War diary of the revolutionary army 
during the first eastern expedition) compiled by Liu Bingcui is a valuable source. Liu 
Bingcui was then chief of staff of Huangpu's 1st Training Regiment. This work, based on 
battlefield diary of the Staff Department of the regiment and official war bulletins, was first 
published in Shanghai by Zhonghua shuju in 1928. A reprint is produced in the United 
States by Xerox Systems Centre, Washington D.C, 1971. At the provincial level, archives 
in Guangdong have over the years restored many valuable sources concerning the history 
of the First United Front. Few works have been published in recent years. One is Huangpu 
junxiao shiliao, 1924 -1927 (Historical materials on the Huangpu military academy, 1924- 
1927) and its supplement xubian, edited by the Guangdong Revolutionary Museum and 
published in 1983 and 1994 respectively. The other is Diyi ci guonei geming zhanzheng 
shiqide Huangpu junxiao (The Huangpu military academy during the period of the first 
revolutionary civil war) edited and printed by the Cultural and Historical Material Press 
(wenshi ziliao) in commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the founding of the 
academy. The former depicts the founding and development of the academy, its training 
and political education, achievements and the struggle between the nationalists and 
communists in the academy. The latter contains the reminiscences of the leading members, 
instructors, students of the academy, including those of Sun Yatsen, Zhou Enlai, He 
Xiangning, Nie Rongzhen and Xu Xiangnian, as well as those of Song Xilian, Tan Yizhi, 
and Song Ruike. As for the Second Eastern Expedition, the Cultural Bureau of Huizhou 
Prefecture and the Huizhou City Museum edited, in 1981, Guomin geming jun di er ci 
dongzheng (Historical material on the second eastern expedition of the national 
revolutionary army). Furthermore, there are contemporary newspapers and periodicals 
including Guangdong minguo ribao (Canton republic daily), Lingdong minguo ribao 
(Lingdong republic daily), Zhongguo qingnian (China youth) and Zhongguo nongmin 
(Chinese peasants) available in Zhongshan University in Guangzhou. Zhou Enlai tongzhi 
zai chaoshane (Comrade Zhou Enlai in Chaozhou and Shantau) is a compilation of papers 
presented in the symposium of Comrade Zhou Enlai's revolutionary activities in Chaozhou 
and Shanton held in November 1984. These are useful sources in understanding, albeit the 
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communist version, of the Huangpu Military Academy in Guangdong. 
On the Northern Expedition, most important first hand material was I3eìfa 
zhenzhong riji (The war diary of the northern expedition. July 1926 to May 1928), 
compiled by Guomin geminjun zongsiling bu canmou chu (The general staff department 
of the commnader -in -chief headquarters of the national revolutionary army). Reprinted 
by Jindai baihai in 1988. In addition, there is the diary of Lin Bogu, Beifa zhanzheng 
ziliao xuanji (Selected material on the northern expeditionary war) published by the Party 
School Press of the CCP Central Committee in 1981. This is also a first hand material on 
the northern expedition of 1926 -28.2 In particular, it contains main battles fought by the 
II, IV and VI Corps.' It also includes material translated from the documents of the CCP 
delegation to the Comintern concerning seven battles in the Northern Expedition: the Rattle 
of Lutian and Longjiawan., the Battles of Liling, Pingjiang, Dingsi Bridge, Hesheng 
Bridge, Wucheng., and the Battle of Dean, Gushan, Wanjialong, Mahuiling and 
Jiuxianling.4 Some of the memoirs of participants in the Northern Expedition have also 
been published. Guo Mojo s Beifa tu ci (On the path of the northern expedition) and Zhou 
Shidi's Beifa gianwei (The vanguard of the northern expedition) are the better known. Guo 
Mojo was then Director of the General Political Department of the National Revolutionary 
Army. His memoirs discuss many historical figures and events written six to seven years 
after the Northern Expedition. Zhou Shidi was then commander of the Armoured Car 
Brigade under the leadership of the CCP. His brigade later joined Ye Ting Independent 
Regiment and he was once appointed as acting regimental commander.' 
2 See Research on Modern History (Jindai shi yanjiu), 1980: 3. During the Northern Expedition, Lin 
was the Party representative of the Sixth Army and concurrently head of the army's political department. 
His diary portrays the CCP's alliance with the Guomindang -Left to oppose Chiang Kai -shek. The diary also 
gives a brief account of the struggle concerning the National Government's move to Wuhan in December 
1926, the struggle over how to attack Nanjing, and the meeting at the Third Plenum of the Second Central 
Committee of the Guomindang. 
3 Originally published in the third and eleventh issues of the Political Correspondence of the Party 
Centre (Zhongyang zhengzhi tongxun). 
4 There is a problem of translation of these battles. The original drafts were translated from foreign 
languages, as most of the names of people and places were not translated into Chinese, they had to be 
transliterated when incorporated into this book. The problem could be solved by checking them against 
similar material and books. 
5 In his memoirs, Zhou explains that the Independent Regiment was also called "the iron army" because 
of the presence of the Armoured Car Brigade. As the regiment was subordinate to the Fourth Army, many 
generally referred to the Fourth Army as "the iron army ". This is also the reason why the Red Army was 
named the Fourth Army when it first set up its own armed forces. 
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In addition, Huangpu Alumni in Beijing, Guangzhou. Shanghai and Wuhan also 
keep updated alumni lists and photographs. The alumini associations are also the best place 
to get in touch with Huangpu graduates. 
In Hong Kong, the libraries of the Supreme Court and South China Post Daily 
preserve a number of major Chinese and English newspapers and periodicals published in 
Hong Kong and southern China provinces in the 1920s. The Fung Ping Shan Library of 
Hong Kong University has a good collection of sources on modem southern Chinese 
history. For example, Gemingfun di yi ci dongzheng shi zhan ji (War diary of the 
revolutionary army during the first eastern expedition) compiled by Liu Bingcui is available 
there. 
Although sources on the Huangpu Military Academy in China are more scattered 
and less well- organised, there are some documents which are not available in Taiwan. 
Even for those sources which are available on both sides of the Straits, comparisons can be 
very useful to check the authenticity and fill in the gaps due to censorship. 
The period 1924 to 1927 marks the involvement of the Communist International 
and Soviet Union in Chinese politics and the military on a large scale. The establishment 
of the Huangpu Military Academy depended a great deal on Soviet assistance. Specific 
sources pertinent to the study of Huangpu Military Academy are memoirs, diaries and 
reports by Russian advisers, numbered some 50, who served in the Huangpu Military 
Academy and the National Revolutionary Army during 1924 to 1927. A. I. Cherepanov 
has published his memoirs Zapiski voennogo sovetnika v Kitae (Notes of a military adviser 
in China) and Severnyi pokhod natsionalno revoliutsionnoy armii Kitaya6 (The northern 
expedition of the national revolutionary army of China) in 1964 and 1968 respectively. 
Other memoirs include V.M. Primakov, Zapiski volontera: grazhdanskaya voina v Kitae7 
(Notes of a volunteer: the civil war in China) ., N.I. Konchits, Kitayskie dnevniki 1925 -1926 
(Chinese diaries 1925- 1926)., M.I. Kazanin, Vshtabe Bliukher: vospominania o Kitayskoy 
revoliutsi (In Bliukher's headquarters: reminiscences of the Chinese revolution); 
6 English translation of abridged Russian text is Sergei Sosinsky, As Military Adviser in China, 
Moscow, 1982. 
7 This book was originally published in 1930 under the name of Henry Allen, an Anglicised form of 
Primakov's Chinese pseudonym Heng -li Lin, and purported to be the reminiscences of an English volunteer 
instructor in General Feng Yuxiang's army. 
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Vishnyakova -Akimova, Dva goda v vosstayshem kitae, 1925 -19278 (Two years in 
revolutionary China,1925 -1927) ; all have relevant references relating to the Huangpu 
Military Academy and the National Revolutionary Army. These materials would have been 
considerably enriched had Borodin or Bliukher compiled their own recollections. 
On 6 April 1927, Chinese police in Beijing raided the Soviet military attache's 
office and carted off a great volume of documents generated by Soviet Russian activities 
in assisting the Nationalist Revolution, and some documents of the Chinese Communist 
Party. Many of these documents have been translated and published by C.M. Wilbur and 
Julie How.' The Institute of the Far East, Academy of Sciences, in Moscow has also 
published in 198.6 Kommunisticheskii International i kitaiskaia Revolutsiia: Documenty i 
Materialy (The communist international and the Chinese revolution: documents and 
materials). 
For the American archives, government archives concerning China are preserved 
in the National Archives in Washington. Dispatches from the American legation in Beijing 
and from consular officials in Guangzhou, Changsha, Hankow, Nanjing and Shanghai are 
useful for the period. The National Archives also contain information provided by military 
and naval intelligence, and from commercial attaches in China. Particularly interesting 
reports include "Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of China, 
1910 -1929 ", "US Military Intelligence Report: China, 1911 - 1941 ", which has a detailed 
report on "Whampoa Military School: A Report compiled from Soviet Documents (A -44) ". 
These are now available on microfilms. 
The US Army Office of Military History in Taibei has compiled Organisational 
Changes in the Chinese Army, 1895 -1950 in 1969 by Harry H. Collier and Chin -chin Lai; 
A Chronology of Important Military Events in the Republic of China, 1924 -1950 by T. 
M.Williamsen in 1971; a field level monograph prepared under auspices of the Office of 
the Chief of Military History, Department of Army in 1966, Major Campaigns in Chinese 
Modern Military History, and two field projects entitled "Whampoa Graduates on Taiwan" 
and by William W. Whitson, "Lesson from China (Kiangsi, 1934)" in 1966. 
8 English translation is available. 
9 See the list of publications in C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien -ying How (ed), Missionaries of 
Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China, 1920 -1927, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989. 
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British archives in the Public Record Office in London has also compiled 
correspondence of the Foreign Office and Colonial Office from China and Hong Kong. 
The series FO 405 "confidential print" is particularly informative. It contains important 
documents from and about China, printed for high -level circulation in the government and 
missions abroad, then cumulated and bound semi -annually or quarterly. FO 228 contains 
China consular correspondence, 1854 -1930; FO 371: 12440 \9156, "The National 
Revolutionary Army. A Short History of its Origins, Development and Organisation "; FO 
371: 12502, "Political Work in the National Revolutionary Army "10 are the more important 
records. In the War Office Archives, WO 33, "Reports and Miscellaneous Papers, 1853- 
1948"., and WO 106 "Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence, 1837 -1948" 
contain relevant information regarding the Huangpu Military Academy and National 
Revolutionary Army in the 1920s. 
As regards Japanese sources, important official documents and manuscripts (diaries 
and other personal papers) are kept in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(Gaimusho)and the War History Department, Defence Agency. Many of these official 
documents have been microfilmed and published over the years. Cecil Uyehara's Checklist 
of Archives in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a number of listings: "On arms 
trade in China" (MT 5.1.5.44, 1922 -1924); "Employment of Japanese officers in China" 
(MT 5.1.1.14, 1898- 1909); "Russia and China" (MT 2.5.2. 1 -1, 1920 -1926); "Canton 
government" (MT 1.6.1.89, 1926 and MT 1.6.1.87, 1924 -1926); "Civil war" (MT 1.6.1.84, 
1920 -1926); "Northern Punitive Expedition of the Nationalist Army" (S 1.6.1. 5 -20, 1927- 
1929); "Supply of arms" (MT 5.1.5.50, 1919 -1926); "The Japanese Army in southern 
China" (MT 5.1.10. 10 -1, 1900 -1926).11 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also compiled 
and published Nihon gaiko nenpyo narabini shuyo bunsho,1840 -1945 (A chronology and 
major document on Japanese foreign policy, 1840 -1945) in 1955. 
As for the Army and Navy archives, John Young's checklist provides several 
listings: "Japanese weapons policy on China" (R 101 FO 9047, 1924); "Minutes of the 
Meeting of army intelligence officers in China" (R 102 FO 8222, 1925); "Future prospects 
10 See Lo Hui -min, Foreign Office Confidential Papers Relative to China and Her Neighbouring 
Countries, 1840 -1914 with an Additional List, 1915 -1937; and Andrew J. Nathan, Modern China, 1940- 
1972: An Introduction to Sources and Research Aids, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1971. 
I l See Cecil H Uyehara comp. Checklist of Archives in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 
Japan, 1868- 1945., Microfilmed for the Library of Congress, 1949- 1951., Washington DC, Library of 
Congress, 1954. 
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for Kuomintang" (R 102, FO 8281, 1925); "Progress of the remedial conference and 
attitude of Kuomintang" (R 102 FO 8286, 1925); "Conditions in Fukien and hopes for 
Japan" (R IO2 FO 8587, 1925); "Bolshevik movement in China" ; "Soviet activities in 
Shanghai" (R 102 FO 8694, FO 8714, 1925); "Progress of the military operations in war 
between Zhang Zuolin and Guo Songling" (R 102 F11230, 1926); "Opinions of American 
and British commanders regarding the state of affairs in China" (R 103 F11609, 1927); 
"Japanese policy toward current the military situation in China" (R 104 F12454, 1927); 
"Recent economic conditions in Canton" (R 104 F12458, 1927); "State of affairs in China" 
(R 104 F12502, 1927); "Study of the impetus which many lead to military operations 
against China" (R 104 F12551, 1927); "Organisation and functioning of Russian 
propaganda in the Far East" (R 104 FO 12698, 1928)." 
It should be emphasised that there is a large quantity of Foreign Ministry and Army 
Ministry documents which were never microfilmed. They can be read only at the 
Diplomatic Record Office and War History Department, National Institute for Defence 
Studies, Defence Agency (Noeicho Boei Kenkyujo, Senshibu) in Tokyo. In addition to 
official records, the Iibrary of War History Department holds several thousand items of 
personal papers and records of interviews with surviving former .Japanese officers. No list 
of these records has been published. 
To sum up, the sources listed above are by no means exhaustive. There will still 
be other sources lying in some places undiscovered by researchers. Countries of great 
potential, are mainland China and the Soviet Union. More time and effort, however, are 
required to search for them. 
12 John Young comp., Checklist of Microfilm Reproductions of Selected Archives of the Japanese Army, 
Navy and other Government Agencies, 1865 -1945, Georgetown University Press, Washington DC, 1959. 
These were the documents American military seized during the occupation. Selected documents were 
microfilmed before returning to the Japanese. But because of the limited time and funds available for the 
project, it was said that only a mere 5% were microfilmed. 
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Zhang Zhidong 
Zhang Zongchang 
Zhang Zuolin 
Zhao Shiqin 
Zhejiang 
Zhengxue hui 
zhengzhi bu 
Zhengzhi gongzuo 
zhengzhi xuanchuan dui 
Zhengzhi zhoubao 
zhidui 
Zhili 
Zhongguo cunwang wenti 
Zhongguo guonvndang zhoukan 
Zhongguo nongmin 
Zhongguo gíngnian 
Zhonghua gemingdang 
Zhonghua shuju 
Zhonghua xinbao 
Zhongyang jnnshi zhengzhi xuexiao 
Zhongyang íujun jiaodaotuan 
Zhou Enlai 
Thou Fuhai 
Zhu Peide 
Zhu Zhixin 
zixiu 
Ziyou dang 
zongdui 
Zou Lu 
zu 
zuzhi yuan 
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